

035  
77  
3  
**TERRAMARE PUBLICATIONS**

---

Edited by Richard Mönnig

**No. 3**

## **VERSAILLES IN LIQUIDATION**

**FRIEDRICH GRIMM, BERLIN**



---

**PUBLISHED BY TERRAMARE OFFICE BERLIN**

# VERSAILLES IN LIQUIDATION

PROF. FRIEDRICH GRIMM, L.L.D., BERLIN

1938

---

TERRAMARE OFFICE, BERLIN W 8



ON March 27, 1935, an American periodical, *The Nation*, published an article dealing with the restoration of military service in Germany through the Law enacted on March 16, 1935. The article was entitled: HITLER LIQUIDATES VERSAILLES. That phrase exactly defined one phase of the great task of German liberation to which Adolf Hitler has set himself. The Führer's goal is to free Germany from the shackles of Versailles. He is combatting the Peace Treaty of Versailles because it is unjust. And he combats it especially because this Treaty reduces Germany to the position of a State which does not enjoy equal rights with other states.

Hitler is convinced that there can be no lasting peace in Europe as long as there are states against which a definite discrimination is made in regard to sovereign rights and which therefore stand on a different footing from those States which possess full sovereignty. Therefore Hitler demands complete equality of status for Germany, being conscious of the fact that only a Germany in possession of full juridical equality can take up a rightful and honourable position in the European comity of nations, for the purpose of guaranteeing the peace of Europe.

Hitler's fight for Germany's equality and military sovereignty is therefore an essential part of his peace policy. But this peace policy means the abolition of the Versailles Treaty as it stands today.

Those who do not clearly understand the Versailles Peace Treaty cannot understand the great political task which the Führer has undertaken. They cannot understand because they do not realize the disastrous consequences which that Treaty has had, not only for Germany but for the whole world.

On March 16, 1935, the Führer promulgated the Law which restored Germany's military status and made military service once again obligatory on all German citizens. The new military forces are to consist of 12 Army Corps made up of 36 divisions.

Hitler's announcement of this enactment was accompanied by a statement which explained to the German public and the whole world the reasons for the steps he had taken.

March 16, 1935, proved a day of historic significance for Germany. It was then that Germany again took her place among the comity of European nations on an equal footing and with equal rights. She re-established that sovereignty which, although having been left to her *de jure* by the Treaty of Versailles, had nevertheless been mutilated by dishonourable limitations; so that in practice there was actually no equality of status and sovereignty.

For fifteen years Germany had borne this iniquitous status of a nation with inferior rights. That is why the restoration of military conscription in Germany was hailed as a measure that would cancel the Treaty of Versailles.

But concurrently with this step a wave of propaganda set in throughout the world and even today follows every advance which Germany makes in the direction of establishing her status of equality.

"Germany deals with treaties as with scraps of paper." That is what is said. "Chiffons de papier" is the slogan used by that section of the public press which is under the influence and in the service of those bitter anti-German forces that organized this propaganda campaign in March 1935.

That particular section of the press conveniently omitted to state that Russia had shortly before increased its grant for military armaments from 1,2 to 6 milliard roubles. They also omitted to state that France had introduced compulsory conscription for a period of two years and that England as well had decided, prior to March 16, 1935, considerably to increase its armaments.

"Germany is to blame." That is what they said. "Germany is wrecking peace. She has started the race for armaments. Germany has again sown discord and distrust in the world."

A new "guilt-clause" had been coined. There was total silence about the fact that Germany alone of all European nations had completely and effectively disarmed several years previously and that for her it was now only a question of attempting to catch up with the armaments of other European powers.

Irresponsible war-mongering became widespread. The Geneva verdict resulted. It seemed as if an attempt was to be made to return to the methods of Versailles. The interested parties were in session at Geneva to pass judgment on Germany. For Hitler, however, this struggle for Germany's status of equality was nothing but a struggle for German right, German honour, liberty and equality.

In none of the many problems left to us by the Peace Treaty of Versailles is justice so much on Germany's side as on the question of the right to her own military defence. In the speech which he delivered in the Reichstag on the occasion of the restoration of military conscription the *Führer* emphatically explained and justified to the European public the step he had taken. The case could not have been put more clearly. There was never so much talk about righteousness as in the negotiation and preambles concerned with Versailles. And never did facts so strongly contradict these professions of righteousness. This righteous phraseology paid homage to the Wilson ideal. Wilson had come to Europe to give peace to the world. Before leaving America he had declared to Congress that no people should be robbed and no nation punished and that the injustice which had been perpetrated in the war could not be remedied by a similar injustice to Germany.

"There is only one thing that can bind people together, and that is common devotion to right." Such was Wilson's declaration to the merchants of Manchester.

When the war-tired men laid down their arms they believed that a period of peace and justice would ensue. In a speech which he delivered at Mount Vernon on July 4, 1918, Wilson stated: "These great objects can be put in a single sentence. What we



seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind."

Even the preamble to the Treaty of Versailles illustrates this phraseology of righteousness. It runs as follows: "Bearing in mind that the Allied and Associated Powers being equally desirous that the war should be replaced by a firm, just and durable peace."

Furthermore the preamble to the League Covenant also makes an appeal to righteousness. It states: "*The High Contracting Parties* — In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security,—by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war,—by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations,—by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations."

Here in the Versailles Treaty we find the idea of security expressed for the first time, for which security disarmament is so important. And it is significant that, at this very first point in the Treaty of Versailles where we find the League of Nations mentioned, the concept of international security is placed in the foreground.

That was the system of collective security as Wilson understood it. It rests on the Wilsonian idea of security. According to Wilson's idea the security of the peoples could only be international. He opposed the French principle which starts with the idea of "national safety".

Therefore Wilson's international concept of security rests on the principle of equality. Universal peace was to be guaranteed to the peoples and the nations in full equality and with equal rights through the restriction of their armaments.

\*

Even before coming into the War, on January 22, 1917, Wilson outlined his programme for security and disarmament, in his speech before the American Senate, as follows: "There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The question of armament is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of mankind."

Here again we find the concepts of security and equality bound together as an indivisible unity.

The same applies to Point XIV of Wilson's 14 Points, in which he demands the creation of the League of Nations. Point XIV runs as follows: "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike. In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end."

Here also in Point XIV, which deals with the League of Nations, we find the principle of equality laid down for big and small nations alike. This principle of equality is essential for disarmament and for the League of Nations.

According to Wilson's programme, the idea of equality embraces also the idea that this equality should be simultaneously granted. Not only must disarmament follow on the same basis but also at the same time. According to Wilson's programme no distinction must be made regarding highly armed states and disarmed states.

Through the Preliminary Treaty of November 5, 1918—the so-called Lansing Note—all the Allies and Germany were bound by Wilson's programme. Thus the Versailles Treaty represented a violation of this Preliminary Treaty and Wilson's programme,



because in the Versailles Treaty it is demanded that Germany must lead the way in disarmament; whereas, according to Wilson's programme, all were to disarm simultaneously.

The disarmament question is based not only on the provisions laid down in Wilson's programme and in the Preliminary Treaty of November 5, 1918, but also in the Versailles Treaty itself.

In the disarmament controversy which arose after the Treaty of Versailles came into force Germany demanded incessantly that at least the Versailles Treaty should be fulfilled in this respect: inasmuch as it presupposed that when Germany herself had disarmed on the one hand the other states would also have disarmed and that the full equality of status should be restored, which had been previously abolished by the fact that Germany had already disarmed and the others not.

This legal obligation binding the former Allies follows logically from Article 8 of the Versailles Treaty and from the introduction to Section V of the same.

Article 8 envisaged universal disarmament on the part of all the signatory Powers. This was expressly formulated in Wilson's programme for universal disarmament and also in the 14 Points.

In the preamble to Section V it is stated: "In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow." Therewith German disarmament is stated to be an obligation the fulfilment of which had to be followed by the other states.

Therefore there is question here of an obligation that is mutually binding. Just as Germany was obliged to lead the way in disarmament so were the other signatories to the Versailles Treaty bound, on their side, to disarm subsequently.

That was clearly expressed in the first discussion which Wilson had with Clemenceau about this text. Wilson's secretary, Mr. Baker, who published Wilson's memoirs, gives the following account of the discussion which took place on that occasion on

April 26, 1919: "President Wilson suggested that it would make the naval, military and air terms more acceptable for the enemy, if they were presented as preparing the way for a general limitation of armaments for all nations."

General Bliss, who was Wilson's expert on questions of disarmament, laid special importance on this clause. Baker says: "General Bliss regards this as one of the most important provisions of the Treaty. 'In all good faith and honour' he said in his address at Philadelphia, 'these [twenty-seven nations and Germany] have pledged themselves to initiate as soon as practical a general limitation of armaments, after Germany has complied with her first obligation'."

The fact that this question of general disarmament was looked upon as a legal obligation binding all the signatory Powers is also clearly expressed in the exchange of notes between the Allies and Germany which preceded the signature of the Treaty. And it was solemnly acknowledged by the conclusion of the Locarno Pact.

The authoritative representatives of the opposing Powers have never seriously denied the justice of the German claim in this respect. Especially Paul Boncour, the leader of the French disarmament delegation, clearly admitted over and over again that the victor nations were legally bound to disarm. At the third session of the preliminary disarmament commission he declared as follows: "What lends special value to this stipulation is that it is not only a condition imposed upon one of the signatories to the Treaty; it is also a duty, a moral and legal obligation to arrive at general disarmament, devolving upon the other signatories to the Treaty as well."

During the debate which took place in the Disarmament Council on January 20, 1931, the Chairman, Mr. Arthur Henderson, declared as follows: "It is for us to bring it home to our parliaments and peoples that every member of the League is bound to this policy of collective disarmament by solemn obligations that are binding upon us in international law and



national honour. May I remind the Council that Article 8 of the Covenant, the preamble to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, the final Act of the Conference of Locarno, and resolutions adopted by the Assembly every year since 1920, mean that all members of the League share a common responsibility with regard to this question? We all have obligations, and if we fail to fulfil these obligations, doubt may be cast upon our pacific intentions and the influence and the authority of the League may be impaired."

The French Prime Minister, M. Briand, endorsed this attitude in the following declaration: "In my country's name I associate myself with the declaration made by our Chairman in opening the Session. I believe as you believe and I have often taken the opportunity of saying that the obligations which were undertaken by the nations who signed Article 8 of the Covenant should not remain a dead letter. They represent a common undertaking which is sacred and a country that should renounce this would be dishonoured."

How have the Allies fulfilled their legal obligation in regard to general and simultaneous disarmament?

In the year 1927, fulfilling the provisions laid down in the Treaty, Germany had completed her disarmament. The Control Commission was withdrawn. Marshall Foch himself acknowledged that Germany had disarmed in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. This was the latest date at which the other states should have begun to disarm and they should have carried through their process of disarmament within a reasonable period from then.

But no such thing happened.

During the first five years after the Treaty came into force they contented themselves from year to year with solemnly preaching the principle of disarmament at Geneva. Then a committee was formed for the purpose of preparing the way for a Disarmament Conference. After carrying on its labours for five years this committee produced a form of agreement in

which an attempt was made, under Article 53, to perpetuate the condition of juridical inferiority in which Germany was since the Versailles Treaty and which should have been only temporary. Therefore they did not hesitate to violate the Versailles Treaty, simply because they wanted to keep Germany in a perpetual condition of one-sided defencelessness.

In January 1932, the Disarmament Conference sat at Geneva. Questions of qualitative and quantitative disarmament were discussed, questions of aggressive and defensive weapons and the famous war potentialities. Especially the military experts in the debate brought forward all possible kinds of questions; but nobody brought forward the question of German equality of status. On that point we must be quite clear.

The first stage of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva came to a close on July 23, 1932. It ended with a resolution passed by the General Committee. In that resolution some disarmament measures were decided upon which were much more mild than those that the Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Germany. But in this resolution German equality of status was not mentioned. Thus the Conference entered into a decisive stage.

Twelve-and-a-half years after the Versailles Treaty came into force Germany was refused the right of juridical equality with the other nations and they in turn were allowed to ignore their obligations to disarm uniformly.

Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference. Then, on December 11, 1932, came the Geneva Declaration on the part of the Five Powers. According to this Declaration Germany's right to equality of status within the frame of a general security system was acknowledged. This Declaration enabled Germany to re-enter the Disarmament Conference. But the further developments that took place in the Conference were extremely disappointing. Theoretically Germany's equality of status had been recognized but they refused to put this recognition into any practical effect. Reservations were being constantly made, especially since Adolf Hitler took over power in Germany, and



a certain trial period was demanded before the equality of status could take effect.

No other course was left to the government that represented the national revival under Adolf Hitler except to draw the final conclusions from the situation. Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference for good and announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations.

On October 14, 1933, the *Führer* made an appeal to the German people in which he summarized the results of the Disarmament Conference so far, and submitted his decision to the ratification of the whole German nation. On November 12, 1933, a plebiscite was held, the result of which was that the whole country endorsed the policy of Hitler by an overwhelming majority.

But at the same time the *Führer* declared himself ready to negotiate with the other nations as an equal partner and consider any reasonable form of disarmament that might be suggested.

In January 1934 came the MacDonald Plan. Hitler declared himself ready to enter negotiations on the basis of this Plan.

On March 17, 1934, France broke off disarmament negotiations. That was a decisive step which had a disastrous significance.

A general race in armaments began. Barthou commenced his tours of negotiation. The French policy returned to the questionable methods of the pre-war alliance system which had finally brought about the World War.

And then a real pactomania set in.

On December 5, 1934, Laval signed the Franco-Soviet Protocol.

The consequences took a dramatic course. One heard of gigantic armaments in Russia.

On March 15, France restored the two years military service.

Finally, on March 16, 1935, Hitler took the only course that was possible in view of the international situation. He declared that Germany would no longer consider itself bound to maintain

a one-sided limitation of armaments such as was imposed upon her in the Treaty of Versailles. She now claimed full freedom of action once again.

For more than fifteen years Germany had waited and had put up with the most dishonourable treatment inasmuch as she alone was forced to disarm while all the other states around her had armed themselves to the teeth.

Realizing that Germany was only acting within her rights, the entire country gave its approval to the measures enacted by the *Führer*.

In other countries as well leading personalities had long since recognized that Germany had a right to its claim for military sovereignty.

M. Lavallaz, the French professor of International Law, declared already in 1926, in an article on Disarmament and League of Nations: "We are not afraid to declare that when Germany has fully disarmed and when the Inter-Allied Control Commission has ceased its work, that the question of German disarmament can then be upheld only so long as the Allies and Associated Powers on their part fulfil the obligations laid upon them by the Treaty of Versailles."

Hitler justified Germany's attitude in his speech before the Reichstag on May 21, 1935. On that occasion he supported his arguments with declarations of leading statesmen of former Entente countries all of which statements acknowledged Germany's right to re-arm.

And on April 26, 1930, M. Paul Boncour wrote in "Le Journal" as follows: "After all, there is no need to be a prophet. It is sufficient to keep one's eyes open to be sure that Germany, which is otherwise freed from compulsion, will set about shaking off that disarmament, if the Disarmament Conference finally breaks down, or even if it is being continually adjourned, and will no longer alone submit to a restriction of armaments which the Treaty of Versailles itself designated not only as the condition,



but also as the promise of a general reduction of armaments. We have no choice."

The *Führer* however steadfastly refused to be diverted from the road he had taken.

When it became known that the French Chamber of Deputies would sanction the Soviet Pact, thus making it impossible for the Locarno Pact to operate at all, Adolf Hitler re-established German military sovereignty in the Rhineland on March 7, 1936.

The policy which France had adopted since the Barthou regime made the Locarno Pact meaningless. It was found how unfortunate it was that the men who made this Pact had believed in hampering the agreement—which was to be one of peace—with guarantees which in part were based on the unjust peace of Versailles and which Germany would never be able to tolerate permanently.

The restoration of German military sovereignty in the Rhineland brought forth a storm of indignation in France and there were many who pressed for war. But intelligent people kept the upper hand.

M. Domartial came forward as the spokesman of these intelligent circles and undoubtedly expressed the true public opinion in France on March 12, 1936—when war-mongering in certain circles in France had reached its zenith—by writing "If one had imposed conditions on France in 1871 similar to those imposed on Germany in 1919, then France, in its efforts to free itself, would have done exactly the same as Germany has done today. But in all probability France would not have waited so long. That is what one must bear in mind today if one wants correctly to judge German re-armament and German re-militarization of the Rhineland."

The re-militarization of the Rhineland was followed by the re-establishment of full sovereignty over German rivers and waterways. This policy of liberation was brought to a conclusion through the solemn and formal renunciation of the war guilt clause by the *Führer* in the course of a memorable meeting of

the Reichstag on January 31, 1937. On that date Hitler gave the country a report and an account of the work done in the past four years.

On taking office Hitler had asked the country to grant him four years. Hitler concluded his struggle for German honour and equality of status within that time. Solemnly he declared: "the time for surprises is past. Germany has been liberated."

When one looks back today on the *Führer's* policy for overcoming Versailles then one cannot understand why such a policy of honour and right finds so little understanding in France. It was the French government in particular, after the Peace of 1815, that presented the world with an example of a struggle that for tenacity and perseverance has seldom been equalled by any government.

On March 5, 1848, the French Minister M. Larmatine addressed a Circular to the representatives of France accredited to foreign governments (published in the "Moniteur Universel, Journal Officiel" of the same date) in which he wrote:—"You are requested to concentrate your thoughts on the following declarations in conformity with the principles which are the principles of France, fundamental motives, that is to say, which France can present to its friends and its enemies without fear and without defiance. The treaties of 1815 are no longer valid in the eyes of the French Republic. The territorial boundaries of these treaties are a fact, it is true, which France accepts as the basis and the starting point of its relations with other nations. But when the treaties of 1815 offer no actual support for changes on a basis of mutual agreement and when, on the other hand, the French Republic loudly and openly proclaims that it is her right and her mission to arrive at these alterations by regular and friendly means, then that is a testimony to the sound sense, the moderation, the conscientiousness, and the sagacity of the French Republic, and all that is a better and more honourable guarantee for Europe than the letter of these



treaties, which have often been violated or altered by Europe. As Ambassador, you are requested to apply yourself to the task of making this negative attitude of the French Republic towards the treaties of 1815 at once understandable and acceptable, and of proving that this frankness is not incompatible with the peace of Europe . . ."

At another place in the same Circular we read :—"The three words "freedom", "equality", and "fraternity", when applied to our foreign relations, are to be interpreted as follows. The liberation of France from the shackles which have hitherto been a burden upon its principles and its dignity. Recovery of the rank which it must occupy among the Great Powers of Europe, and finally a declaration of alliance and friendship with all nations."

Therefore France can blame herself if Adolf Hitler has had to act on the same principles as Lamartine laid down for the conduct of France.

And in France itself not all think alike on this matter. There is one group of people who insist on the sanctity of treaties and cling fast to all the advantages which the unjust Treaty of Versailles guarantees them. But there is an opposing circle of people who recognize that the Treaty of Versailles is not a Treaty which is calculated to maintain the peace and that therefore it ought to be revised.

\*

In point of fact, what do people mean when they talk about the sanctity of the treaties? Which treaties are to be considered as sacrosanct? The Preliminary Treaty of November 5, 1918, whereby all the signatories, including France itself, solemnly bound themselves to observe the Fourteen Points in the final treaty concluding the Peace? Or the Treaty of Versailles the terms of which violated a treaty already solemnly concluded?

In the *Revue Mensuelle*, of Geneva, M. Périch, the Serbian Professor of International Law, declared that since the *Vae*

*Victis* of Brennus to the defeated Romans there has never been in the history of the world a peace treaty which represented a grosser misuse of power than the Treaty of Versailles.

Hitler's fight against Versailles does not endanger the peace of Europe. On the contrary: Hitler is striving for real peace, a peace of justice, which Versailles failed to establish. His struggle is a struggle for the right. For Germany's right and Germany's honour, for her freedom and equality. A legal aim that is being pursued through legal means.

The same principle of legality to which Hitler owes his ascension in domestic politics is the guide for his further conduct. Whoever uses legal means in striving towards a legal goal will finally reach that goal. Such is Hitler's belief. In this belief he has the support of the whole nation. The German people cannot permanently be denied the right to national unity and freedom which is denied to no nation.

Thus Hitler's work is a work of peace and conciliation, as Hitler himself clearly explained in his great speeches of May 17 and October 14, 1933. As representative of the soldiers who fought in the front line trenches and experienced all the horrors of war, he has no wish for war, just as the whole German people wish only for peace. But he wants a just peace, which will guarantee the honour of the nation and its right to equality of status. Such a peace alone can have a lasting existence.

\*

Never was his struggle for a just peace so finely described as in his memorable peace speech of May 17, 1933, in which at the same time he mercilessly laid bare the failure of Versailles :

"As the European States evolved through the centuries and gradually fixed permanent frontiers they were exclusively actuated by the idea of the State. But during the nineteenth century the principle of nationality became predominant. States which had been founded under other conditions failed to take practical account of the new idea. This failure was the seed of future discord.



"When the Great War had come to an end such a condition of affairs ought to have been clearly recognized, and no nobler task could have been undertaken by the Conference than to attempt to bring about, under the light of this recognition, a territorial and political readjustment of the European States wherein the principle of nationality would have been treated with the fullest possible measure of justice. The more this readjustment succeeded in identifying the ethnical frontiers with the political frontiers of the various States the more surely would have been eliminated a whole series of grievances affording grounds for future quarrels. Yes, this territorial readjustment of Europe in accord with the actual national boundaries would have been a genuine historical solution, and would have made such wise provision for the future that both conquerors and conquered alike might well feel that the sacrifices of the Great War had not been in vain, inasmuch as they would have given to the world the foundations of a real and abiding peace. But what really happened was otherwise. Through ignorance and passion and hatred the measures adopted were so unjust and so contrary to common sense that they actually gave rise to new grounds for discord."

\*

On October 24, 1933, the Führer once again solemnly declared himself as the champion of peace. "A world order cannot endure if it be built on the principle of hate", he said. And he added: "Before the whole nation I hereby declare that we are ready to offer the hand of conciliation to the French people."

The National Socialist Movement has shown its courage by openly coming forward on behalf of Germany's unquestionable rights; but at the same time it has always fully acknowledged the similar rights of other nations.

And Hitler emphasised this point also in his speech on May 17, 1933. He said:—

"Speaking at this moment as a German National Socialist, I declare in the name of the National Government and the

whole National Revival that in this new Germany we are inspired with a deep understanding for similar feelings and opinions and claims that are based on the vital interests of other peoples."

Thus Hitler's peace policy signifies a guarantee for European peace. No political movement of great magnitude has ever more definitely emphasised the principle of *suum cuique* as the rule of international relations than Hitler's movement.

As regards France, Hitler has declared that since the settlement of the Saar problem there can no longer be any territorial questions between Germany and France. Through the Naval Pact he has given practical assurance to Great Britain that her special rights and interests will be respected.

Why then, it may be asked, did Germany leave the League of Nations?

For Germany the League of Nations is not an instrument of peace. In the League of Nations we see rather an instrument of the peace dictated by the victors at Versailles. It is a misfortune that the League of Nations is so closely connected with the Versailles Peace Treaty.

Wilson wanted disarmament allround. It was Wilson's idea that the League of Nations should serve to carry through a general and simultaneous disarmament of the nations. Wilson had also seen that the peace which was being made at Versailles was not a just peace, such as the public in all countries had hoped for. Therefore he made the League of Nations a part of the Peace Treaty. Mr. Baker, who was Wilson's secretary and published President's memoirs, says that Wilson's idea was that true peace could not be achieved except through a gradual revision of the oppressive clauses in the Treaty as soon as the spirit of hatred and unreason had passed away.

The League of Nations has failed to fulfil the task which Wilson assigned to it. It has not carried out disarmament. Nor has it ever seriously applied the Revision Clause of Article 19 of the Covenant.



why the  
United Nations?  
maybe his  
right

The League of Nations has become more and more the guardian of the status quo, guaranteeing the continued existence of the injustice established through Versailles. For that reason Hitler left the League. And the whole German nation has sanctioned this step.

At the same time Hitler has not refused to take part in an international collaboration for peace allround. On the contrary, he has taken every opportunity that offered itself to help in the organization of international peace.

Slogans like "collective security" and "indivisible peace" get nowhere. Indivisible peace may easily lead to an indivisible war, while collective security signifies nothing else than the League of Nations and the status quo of Versailles.

Adolf Hitler has overcome Versailles. He has restored to Germany her equality of rights, her freedom and her honour.

Free and strong, the new German State is willing to live in peace and friendship with every other free and independent State. ??

\*

#### ERRATA

Page 6, line 13 from top, read between nations  
Page 7, line 15 . . . . . independence  
Page 10, line 2 . . . . . Covenant  
Page 11, line 10 . . . . . potentialities  
Page 12, line 17 . . . . . from  
Page 13, line 28 . . . . . as  
Page 14, line 12 . . . . . agreement  
Page 14, line 12 . . . . . which  
Page 15, line 14 . . . . . perseverance  
Page 15, line 16 . . . . . Lamartine  
Page 15, line 20 . . . . . concentrate  
Page 15, line 31 . . . . . it is  
Page 19, line 27 . . . . . the President's

Printed in Germany

Published by the Terramare Office, Kronenstrasse 1, Berlin W 8  
Printed by the Terramare Press, Dresdener Str. 43, Berlin SW 19