LORD MILNER'S SECOND WAR

The Rhodes-Milner Secret Society
The origin of World War I
And the start of the

NEW WORLD ORDER



John P. Cafferky

Why did European diplomacy fail to avert World War I? Revisionist historians have long suspected that the President of France and the Russian Ambassador to France cooperated in bringing about the war, but they failed to identify the British partner to the plot. Lord Milner's Second War exposes the role played by the Rhodes-Milner secret society in fomenting World War I. Lord Milner and his friends staged a coup in British foreign policy, culminating with the appointment of Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary, Richard Haldane as War Secretary, and General Sir Henry Wilson as Director of Military Operations. With his team in place, Milner painstakingly prepared Britain for war.

Lord Milner inherited his secret society from its founder, Cecil Rhodes, and he dedicated himself to implementing Rhodes' dream of a world state based on the British Empire. He started the South African War, demonstrating he had the ruthlessness to start a war and the determination to finish what he had started. After his first war, Lord Milner set his sights on a Great War to eliminate European opposition to the hegemony of his Anglo-American Banking cartel. Victory in his second war allowed him usher in the New World Order, an alliance of elites that since 1919 has accumulated immense power and has exercised unprecedented influence in world affairs. This is the story of how the New World Order began.

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NEW WORLD ORDER

John P. Cafferky

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To George Orwell
in appreciation of
Nineteen Eighty-Four

And

To Bridjette
in gratitude for
Your Unwavering Support

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Introduction

The Rhodes-Milner secret society (The Milner Group), based in England, colluded with President Poincaré of France and Ambassador Izvolsky of Russia to foment the seminal event of the twentieth century—the 1914-18 First World War. Izvolsky destroyed Czarist Russia; Poincaré led a million-and-a-half of his countrymen to their graves; but victory for the Milner Group left this secret organization of imperialists and financiers wielding enormous influence in world affairs. The primary source on the Rhodes-Milner secret society is Carroll Quigley, a Georgetown professor. He wrote two books, *Tragedy And Hope* and *The Anglo-American Establishment,* in which he revealed the existence of this secret society, and partially revealed what they do and the enormous influence they wield. In the former he says:

> There does exist, and has existed for a generation, an international Anglophile network . . . I know of the operations of this network because I have studied it for twenty years and was permitted for two years, in the early 1960s, to examine its papers and secret records. I have no aversion to it or to most of its instruments. I have objected, both in the past and recently, to a few of its policies . . . but in general my chief difference of opinion is that it wishes to remain

> unknown, and I believe its role in history is significant enough to be known.[1]

In his later work, *The Anglo-American Establishment,* Quigley examines the "Anglo" side of the organization and he makes the following claims about the Rhodes-Milner secret society:

> For these men were organizing a secret society (in 1891) that was, for more than fifty years, to be one of the most important forces in the formulation and execution of British imperial and foreign policy.[2]

> The power and influence of this Rhodes-Milner group in British imperial affairs and in foreign policy since 1889, although not widely recognized, can hardly be exaggerated.[3]

> Any effort to write an account of the influence exercised by the Milner Group in foreign affairs in the period between the two World Wars would require a complete rewriting of the history of that period.[4]

Quigley claims he read the secret documents of this organization. His claim leaves no wriggle room: either we dismiss him as a crank or we test his claim against the historical record. I have written a monograph to test Quigley's assertions that a powerful secret society exercises enormous political and financial influence in the western world by examining the role the Rhodes-Milner Group played in bringing about the Great War. I concentrate on the Great War because it is both the defining event of the Twentieth Century and also immensely rich in documentary evidence. My monograph uses Quigley's revelations, hints, and subtle signposts to outline how the Rhodes-Milner secret society,

under the stewardship of Lord Milner, fostered the Great War. It is a case study in conspiracy theory in which I document the beginning of the Rhodes-Milner secret society, which continued as the Milner Group before and during World War I, which in turn evolved into the Anglo-American Establishment after World War I, and which finally matured as the New World Order and Bilderberg Group of the present. If you, the reader, accept the evidence and arguments presented in my work, perhaps you will give far greater credence to the imminent threat of totalitarianism posed by the New World Order and the Bilderberg Group. I use the term totalitarianism not in the sense of Stalinism but in the sense of Orwell's "Big Brother", absolute totalitarianism.

Legitimate secret political pursuits have nothing to do with conspiracy. Our society permits the secret association of individuals and groups who wish to influence elections and government policies. Not all secret pursuits are conspiracies, but all conspiracies are by their nature secret and they invariably clandestinely violate society's rules and laws. To reach the standard of conspiracy, the goals and the means used to achieve those goals must cross a liberally drawn line of what a modern society will tolerate. Therefore, most secret campaigns do not come close to meeting the standard of conspiracy, because what they are trying to achieve does not cross this all-important line of tolerance. Conspiracy implies rule-breaking and more often than not it implies flagrant rule-breaking.

Historians object to secret organizations and theories of conspiracy because these organizations do not open their archives to scrutiny. The professional historian argues that one cannot do history without documents. The absence of documents poses a serious challenge, but ignoring a possible conspiracy neither addresses the conspiracy nor the problem of gathering the evidence. Ignoring a conspiracy does not make the problems that suggested the conspiracy disappear, and that is the fatal weakness of the

academic's disdain. Having said that, conspiracy theorists must present a credible strategy to compensate for the lack of documents—the academic historian has a valid point.

The difficulty of keeping a conspiracy secret varies proportionately to its scale so the bigger the conspiracy the more likely exposure becomes. At a critical threshold, the conspirators must control history, and in the spirit of Samuel Butler "God cannot alter the past, though historians can," arrange for their version of events to become the official historical record. No major conspiracy can remain secret if the conspirators cannot control the writing of history. Therefore, the Rhodes-Milner secret society must have edited the historical record to both disguise their role and to promote their version of events. If history has been edited, there must arise instances when the official version of events does not accord with the historical facts.

Historians cannot alter the reactions of people caught up in the events. Whether great historical events just carry people along in their wake, or whether some significant individuals bring about great historical events, every individual involved experiences those events in the immediate now without foreknowledge of what will happen. Therefore, if history has been edited, the people caught up in some events must display inappropriate behavior, emotions and reactions when viewed through the lens of official history. In edited events, one can show incoherence between the historical accounts and the actual events.

Incoherence between the facts and the accounts of an event is sufficient proof of historical editing and editing proves the existence of an editor. Therefore, incoherence becomes the touchstone or standard for proving the existence of the conspiracy. With the conspiracy settled, one can begin revising the historical record. In the present case, if I can show a conspiracy, Twentieth Century history will require much revision. My plan of campaign is as follows:

In the first chapter I introduce the Rhodes-Milner secret society, outlining how it arose and introducing the philosophy of Cecil Rhodes, the architect of the organization. In the second chapter Lord Milner goes to South Africa as the British High Commissioner, and he provokes the South African War, also known as the Boer War. This chapter proves the secret society had both the capacity and the will to plan and to start a war. Not all secret societies have the enterprise, arrogance and audacity to start wars so this secret society already stands apart from the rest. In the third chapter I cover the scorched-earth policy whereby British soldiers destroyed every farm in the Transvaal and in the Orange Free State. I also introduce the infamous concentration camps in which 27,000 Dutch women and children died. If a young British woman, Emily Hobhouse, had not exposed the high mortality in the camps, the death toll would have been far higher. The chapter shines a light on the dark side of Milner's character, an essential characteristic for a man accused of fomenting a second war that would slaughter millions. Also in this chapter I introduce three liberal imperialists, Herbert Asquith, Richard Haldane, and Sir Edward Grey. Haldane and Grey belonged to the Rhodes-Milner secret society and from 1906 onward they carried out the Group's policy of fomenting a European war.

Sir Edward Grey, a member of the famous Grey family of England, is one of three Grey family members who belonged to the Rhodes-Milner secret society. His cousin Earl Grey helped found the secret society and he contributed to bringing about the Boer War. A younger cousin, Lord Halifax, promoted the appeasement policies of the interwar years that allowed Hitler to remilitarize the Rhineland and to march into Austria, sowing the seeds of the Second World War. Sir Edward Grey made a huge contribution to bringing Britain into the Great War of 1914-18. The Grey family deserves an exhaustive study in their own right.

Because he brought Britain into the Great War, Sir Edward

Grey is the central character in my story, but he is also the subject of extreme controversy. Anglo-American scholars portray Sir Edward as an honest, high-minded, decent, peace loving, honorable man, a man almost too honest and too honorable to be in politics. The Grey of Anglo-American textbooks never existed—in a case of "my country right or wrong" early scholars created the honorable man to explain away Grey's behavior in the 1914 July Crisis. However, I cannot explain why modern scholars go along with the academic fraud on Grey's character, but fraud it is. Sir Edward Grey's character matched that of Machiavelli's Prince. Grey separated his private morality, in which his behavior was above reproach, from his public morality in which "the end justified the means" guided his behavior. To advance his pro-war policies, Grey lied, deceived and disguised whenever necessary during the eight-and-a-half years before the outbreak of the Great War. It is difficult to find instances when Grey candidly disclosed the truth about British foreign policy to his Cabinet colleagues, to Parliament or to the British public. I see Sir Edward Grey as a thoroughly Machiavellian figure and I have failed to discover the honest man of the Anglo-American literature. I am more inclined to think of Grey and Milner as men without consciences—truly frightening men.

In eight different chapters, I offer an alternative to the Anglo-American scholars' portrayal of Grey as a peace-loving, humane, civilized, honest, honorable, principled, high-minded British gentleman. As a politician, Gray enjoyed almost unqualified trust from his friends, his colleagues in Parliament, and the British public. It is no exaggeration to claim that his contemporaries trusted him implicitly and he was a most trusted British politician. However, enjoying the trust of one's contemporaries proves neither honesty nor honor. Bernie Madoff enjoyed the total trust of his investors, but he was a fraud and his investors erred in trusting him. Likewise, Anglo-American scholars have difficulty distinguishing

between being trusted and being trustworthy because they confuse the trust Grey enjoyed from his contemporaries with being worthy of that trust.

In December 1905, the Liberals came to power, and Grey became the Foreign Secretary and his friend Richard Haldane became the War Secretary. Within weeks of his appointment, Grey authorized secret military talks with the French. Later, Haldane created the British Army's rapid reaction force, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), to meet the military needs arising from the secret military talks. The French wanted the British to mobilize as quickly as the German and French armies. The problem for Anglo-American scholars is that Sir Edward Grey never disclosed the secret talks to Parliament, and it took the Agadir Crisis in 1911 before he told the Cabinet. More egregiously, Sir Edward never enlightened his Cabinet colleagues on the influence these secret talks had on British foreign policy.

If a politician misleads the nation, it causes little surprise. Unfortunately, we have come to expect that behavior form our politicians; although, it can never be interpreted as honest behavior. If a politician misleads Parliament, the incident is more serious and troubling. If a politician misleads Cabinet, there is a major problem. The British system of government assigns executive authority to the collective of ministers that make up the Cabinet. Grey was part of the governing team, but he persistently withheld critical information from his colleagues. Remarkably, Anglo-American scholars do not treat this concealment by Grey as proof of his dishonesty—they simply admit his misbehavior without reevaluating his fundamental honesty and integrity. When Haldane brought his proposals for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to the Cabinet, he spent many hours discussing the BEF's role in the defense of India, but he never mentioned its intended role in a continental war. Grey took part in these discussions and he allowed his Cabinet colleagues waste their time discussing a nonexistent

foreign policy problem while he hid from them his foreign policy that called for the BEF. Nonetheless, Anglo-American scholars judge him an honest principled man.

Chapter 10 challenges the Anglo-American account of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the spark that ignited the conflagration. This chapter is where I build my case for incoherence in the historical record, a case that I conclude in Chapter 11. Anglo-Americans would have us believe that Serbian nationalists assassinated the Austrian Archduke and the Austrians used the assassination as a pretext for attacking Serbia. I argue that no Serbian nationalist in his right mind would have ever employed the tactics used in the assassination. To prove a conspiracy one must show incoherence: the actions and reactions of the Serbian nationalists caught up in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand do not accord with the Anglo-American version of events. One can only explain the Serbian actions and reactions if one proposes that Russia had approved the plot beforehand.

Of course, Russia would have needed a prior French guarantee before approving the assassination, and France would have required a prior British guarantee, the inference being that elements in all three governments had prior knowledge of the Archduke's assassination. That inference brings us to Chapter 11 to examine Sir Edward Grey's behavior during the first twenty-five days of the July Crisis. The deduction in Chapter 10 that Britain had approved the assassination demands that Sir Edward Grey behave and act consistently with that inferred approval. Grey gave a great performance, hiding the gravity of the crisis from Cabinet, luring Germany into taking irrevocable risks of war, and allowing Austria believe in the pipe dream of British neutrality. Grey's behavior is consistent with him wanting war, and inconsistent with him wanting peace.

If the Rhodes-Milner Group fostered the Great War, we need to search for their influence in Twentieth Century history. The Milner

group flourished after the Great War. They established Chatham House, they dominated the British Foreign Office, they set up the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, they have dominated the United States State and Treasury Departments, and they have exercised enormous influence over the economies of the world through the private banks that control the Federal Reserve System of America. After World War II, the center of operations moved to New York and Washington, with a reduced role allotted to the British bankers. It is a troubling story not least because the Group wants ever more power bit it lacks any hint of conscience. They are determined, but determined to do what? I am convinced Americans are deluded if they think that Middle East extremist or Muslims are their enemies: there is no external threat, the enemy is within.

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1 Quigley, Carroll. *Tragedy and Hope: A History Of The World In Our Time*. New York, Macmillan, 1966. 959.

2 Quigley, Carroll. *The Anglo-American Establishment*. San Pedro, California: G.S.G & Associates Inc., 1981. 3.

3 *Tragedy And Hope: A History Of The World In Our Time*, 133.

4 *The Anglo-American Establishment*. 227

1
The Secret Society of Cecil Rhodes

Cecil Rhodes personified British imperialism in Southern Africa. Born in 1853 in Hertfordshire, England, his early years gave no hint of his destiny. Academically, he displayed modest ability; nonetheless, he longed obsessively for an Oxford education. He expressed little interest in women, a disinterest stemming from boyhood; in contrast, he cultivated some long-lasting male friendships. Rhodes felt indifferent to his family, and in later years, he determined to leave none of his enormous wealth to his relatives. In 1870, a nondescript young Rhodes joined his Brother Herbert growing cotton in Southern Africa.

The Rhodes brothers arrived in Southern Africa during the Kimberley diamond rush. By 1871, both Rhodes brothers had abandoned cotton growing for diamond prospecting and mining. A year later Cecil Rhodes suffered a heart attack, after which he received a diagnosis of incurable, terminal heart disease. This encounter with mortality transformed Rhodes from the ordinary into the extraordinary.

From 1871 to 1886 Rhodes gradually won control of the Kimberley diamond fields, attended Oxford, and entered politics in the Cape. During this time, he met Alfred Beit, an unrivalled diamond expert in Southern Africa. Beit came from a rich and sophisticated European Jewish family, a circumstance that gave him access to important European financial houses, especially the

house of Rothschild. Although Beit formed his first partnership with Julius Wernher, he and Rhodes became and remained staunch allies: when it came to finance, Beit exercised the dominant role; when it came to politics, Rhodes asserted the leading role. Beit's brother Otto exercised a prominent role in the Rhodes-Milner secret society after the deaths of both Beit and Rhodes.

Rhodes amassed his first fortune in the Kimberly diamond mines of South Africa. He used his great wealth to give birth to his dreams, and the key to understanding Rhodes is to understand that he dreamed on a colossal scale. It took Rhodes many years to gain control of the De Beers diamond monopoly, and while thus occupied he analyzed the conduct of British imperialism, and found it severely wanting. He recognized the London politicians wanted their imperialism on the cheap, which resulted in imperialism lacking both resolve and vision. Rhodes decided the British Empire needed a savior.

Something about the culture at Oxford fascinated, seduced, and called Rhodes. While he amassed his fortune in Kimberley, he yearned for an Oxford degree, believing Oxford could make a man, and that all the top men came from Oxford.[5] Seduced, Rhodes gave credence to influences he encountered at Oxford, which in other circumstances he might well have resisted if not ridiculed.

At Oxford Rhodes read, and fell under the influence of Winwood Reade's *The Martyrdom of Man,* a book he described as creepy, but one that 'made me what I am'.[6] Reade extended Darwinian Theory to the social sciences with the objective of infusing scientific rigor into sociology and history. With the zeal of a scientific exorcist, Reade dismissed religious ideas in general and afterlife ideas in particular, replacing divinity's role in perfecting the human condition with the fundamental social Darwinian axiom that evolution brings about "perfection."

While assimilating Reade's Darwinism, Rhodes came under the influence of John Ruskin, the charismatic British imperialist. Ruskin promoted Britain "seizing every piece of fruitful waste

ground she can get her foot on" to "advance the power of England by land and sea." [7] Ruskin and Reade convinced Rhodes that an unknowable God had ordained evolution to produce human perfection. Human history recorded the Darwinian ascent of the Anglo-Saxon race, a race destined for mastery. Rhodes determined his destiny lay in expediting the triumph of the British Empire, a belief that developed into a quasi-religion. After entering the Masonic Lodge on 2 June 1877, Rhodes experienced something akin to a religious conversion, prompting him to write his confessions. The following is an excerpt:

> Confession of Faith by Cecil Rhodes (1877)
>
> It often strikes a man to inquire what is the chief good in life; to one the thought comes that it is a happy marriage, to another great wealth, and as each seizes on his idea, for that he more or less works for the rest of his existence. To myself thinking over the same question the wish came to render myself useful to my country ... I have felt that at the present day we are actually limiting our children and perhaps bringing into the world half the human beings we might owing to the lack of country for them to inhabit that if we had retained America there would at this moment be millions more English living. I contend that we are the finest race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race. Just fancy those parts that are at present inhabited by the most despicable specimens of human beings what an alteration there would be if they were brought under Anglo-Saxon influence ... I contend that every acre added to our territory means in the future birth to some more of the English race who otherwise would not be brought into existence. Added to this the absorption of the greater portion of the world under

our rule simply means the end of all wars ... Having these ideas what scheme could we think of to forward this object. I look into history and I read the story of the Jesuits I see what they were able to do in a bad cause and I might say under bad leaders.

In the present day I become a member of the Masonic order I see the wealth and power they possess the influence they hold and I think over their ceremonies and I wonder that a large body of men can devote themselves to what at times appear the most ridiculous and absurd rites without an object and without an end.

The idea gleaming and dancing before one's eyes like a will-of-the-wisp at last frames itself into a plan. Why should we not form a secret society with but one object the furtherance of the British Empire and the bringing of the whole uncivilised world under British rule for the recovery of the United States for the making the Anglo-Saxon race but one Empire ...

Africa is still lying ready for us it is our duty to take it. It is our duty to seize every opportunity of acquiring more territory and we should keep this one idea steadily before our eyes that more territory simply means more of the Anglo-Saxon race more of the best the most human, most honourable race the world possesses.

To forward such a scheme what a splendid help a secret society would be a society not openly acknowledged but who would work in secret for such an object ... A society which should have its members in every part of the British Empire working with one object and one idea ..." [8]

Rhodes' "credo" provides a valuable window to his psyche. He wanted Anglo-American world hegemony. His fervor for racial purity, racial supremacy and racial reproduction may leave one in need of a bromide; however, Rhodes not only subscribed to these racist ideals but transformed them into a personal religion. He crossbred his early Christianity (his father had been a churchman) with his later Freemasonry to produce a quasi-religious cult consecrated to the exaltation of the British Empire and the Anglo-Saxon race. Rhodes' dream combined social Darwinism, racism and megalomania, and unfortunately for humanity, he had the determination and magnetism to give life to his dream.

In 1886 Rhodes made his big moves. He finally wrestled control of the diamond mines, aided by Rothschild money, which Beit had arranged. In 1890, Rhodes finally convinced the Dutch in the Cape to accept an alliance. With Dutch backing, he became the premier of the Cape.

At first, Rhodes failed to recognize the Transvaal gold deposits held much of the world's known gold so he stood back while his former Kimberley competitors and friends, including Beit, picked up the best properties. Eventually, Rhodes moved into Johannesburg with his newest company, Gold Fields, and though late, he succeeded in creating a fortune greater than that made by his monopoly control of De Beers.

While his competitors struggled for fortunes, Rhodes schemed to expand the British Empire, especially in the lands comprising present-day Zambia and Zimbabwe. To achieve his goal he chose the imperial warhorse known as the chartered company. These companies constituted semi-sovereign entities empowered by the British government to exploit, develop and govern territories over which the British Crown had not yet set up jurisdiction. The company policed and taxed its territory without financial subsidy from London, yet the government influenced company activities by having a generous number of high society gentlemen appointed to the board. These gentlemen directors enabled frank communication

between government and company. As a rule, the chartered company allotted few of its resources to commercial ventures, while it assigned the bulk, to imperial pursuits.

Chartered companies enabled the government to advance imperial aims because they operated outside the oversight of Parliament, and they cost the Government nothing. Parliament constrained the scope of the government's imperial adventures but chartered companies could act swiftly and take risks because they answered only to their shareholders, who invested out of imperial sentiment. The company went by an unwritten rule that if all went well, the government would officially recognize its undertakings, while if the enterprise went awry, the government would officially reject its activities. In general, the chartered company at first cost the taxpayer nothing, but later the government would take over the company's responsibilities and debts. However, by that time the territory would invariably fly the British flag.

Rhodes in 1888 bought off the Irish party as a preliminary tactic in the pursuit of his charter. The Irish had no loyalty to either of the two great English parties; therefore they could cause enormous difficulty and could ask embarrassing questions in parliament. Rhodes neutralized the Irish threat with a £10,000 donation.[9]

While taking care of the Irish, Rhodes visited the Colonial Secretary,[10] who, never having heard of him, mistook him for the Imperial Secretary in Southern Africa. Rhodes, in an ill-advised suggestion, recommended reappointing Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner. When the Colonial Secretary eventually learned the identity of his visitor, he became suspicious of both Rhodes and Robinson, a suspicion that hardened when news leaked that Rhodes had made a large contribution to the Irish party, an organization anathema to unionists. Thus, the Colonial Secretary replaced Robinson with Sir Henry Loch.

On 27 June 1888, Rhodes made his third will in which he left his wealth to Lord Rothschild (cousin-in-law to Lord Rosebery). In a covering letter, Rhodes directed Rothschild to set up the society

of the elect: "take constitution Jesuits if obtainable and insert 'English Empire' for 'Roman Catholic Religion.'" By 1888, Rothschild knew Rhodes well. One may infer therefore that London's preeminent banker had agreed to administer the will according to Rhodes' instructions.[11] In this monograph, although the politicians receive most attention, it is well to remember the bankers who backed them, such as Lord Rothschild and J. P. Morgan, detested publicity but were never far from the action.

Rhodes returned to London in 1889 to lobby for his charter, and received much support from Lord Rothschild. Although the House of Rothschild always adopted a hardheaded practical attitude to business, Lord Rothschild took Rhodes' imperial dream of a chartered company seriously, though such a company had scant prospects of making profits. Rothschild opened doors for Rhodes, as did Rothschild's cousin-in-law, Lord Rosebery and Sir Hercules Robinson, the latter having just returned to England.

In a most curious turnabout, Rhodes gained favor with the Colonial Secretary, despite their inauspicious meeting of the previous year. Rhodes had influence with the elite of British society but it remains unclear how he got that influence in 1889. Nonetheless, Rhodes' influential friends ensured the authorities acted quickly to grant his charter. He presented the government with an ambitious plan for taking over the territory that became Rhodesia and is now Zimbabwe and Zambia, a plan that included developing the territory, building railways as far as the Zambezi, and exploiting mineral concessions. The Colonial Secretary supported the application, and Lord Salisbury encouraged Rhodes to take as much land to the north of the Cape Colony as he wanted—African rights had no influence over their deliberations.[12]

Following the normal practice with chartered companies, Salisbury stipulated for a quota of high-society lifetime directors. Surprisingly, Rhodes had no difficulty meeting Salisbury's demands. He persuaded the Duke of Abercorn to accept the chairmanship, and he persuaded the Duke of Fife (son-in-law of the

Prince of Wales), Sir Horace Farquhar, and Albert Grey to join the board.

Rhodes' ability to recruit from British high society close to the Prince of Wales suggests the mediation of powerful confederates. It remains unclear, why the future Lord Grey converted from an indignant critic of Rhodes into one of his most ardent allies. Winning over Albert Grey helped Rhodes align the interests of his secret society with those of the Grey family. What the historian Marlowe says of Albert Grey was true of all the Greys, including Lord Halifax, and Sir Edward Grey: "Grey was . . . one of those men in English public life, who . . . achieve an unshakeable reputation for honesty and straight dealing."[13] A primary aim of this monograph is to "shake" the reputation for honesty and straight dealing of Sir Edward Grey.

Rhodes achieved his objective on 29 October 1889 when Queen Victoria granted the British South Africa Company's charter. Quarreling with natives, intruding into Portuguese territory, waging an all-out war with the native Matabeles, Rhodes and his imperial company swept over the territory. The company paid no dividends in the first thirty-three years of activity. Nevertheless, it attracted thousands of investors in its first and all later issues of stock, investors motivated by patriotism, exhilarated by the talk of Empire, transfixed by the Rhodes brand of imperialism.

By 1890, Rhodes' achievements had earned him a place among the more extraordinary men of history. He ruled the Cape as prime minister; he directed the affairs of the British South Africa Company, which carved out a country that would bear his name; he founded and managed the affairs of Goldfields in the Transvaal, and he managed the De Beers diamond monopoly, making him one of the world's superrich, and affording him the access to, and the respect of British high society.

In South Africa, Rhodes built his fortune into the future treasury of his secret society; in London he recruited his organization's inner core, the "Society of The Elect." He first recruited W. T. Stead, the

most prominent journalist of his time. Stead resigned from the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1890, and with Rhodes' money he set up a new journal, the *Review of Reviews.* In 1891 Rhodes made his fourth will in which he directed Stead and Rothschild to administer his estate. Rhodes sent Stead instructions in the autumn of 1891 in which he promoted the "creation of a secret society" which would "gradually absorb the wealth of the world." He summarized his instructions with three essential elements, the third of which was the "the seizure of the wealth necessary."[14]

The last point above bears examining. Rhodes did not consider his personal wealth sufficient to fund the secret society—they had to "seize" the wealth necessary. In Rhodes' lifetime, the largest seizure of wealth occurred with the annexation of the Transvaal, which included the goldfields surrounding Johannesburg, an annexation that Rhodes inspired.

By the end of 1891 Rhodes' "Society of the Elect" consisted of Rhodes, Stead, Reginald Brett (who as Lord Esher was the *éminence grise* of prewar politics), Arthur Balfour (nephew and political heir to Lord Salisbury and more of an honorary member), Albert Grey (who brought the influence of the Grey family to the Group, and recruited his cousins, Edward Wood, later Lord Halifax and Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary 1906-116), Lord Selborne, (the son-in-law of Lord Salisbury), and, of course, Alfred Milner. In 1891, Stead was Rhodes' heir-apparent.

Rhodes' secret society differed from its Victorian counterparts in the unusual unity and fidelity of the inner core's three ablest members—Rhodes, Milner and Brett (Esher). These three committed to Rhodes' imperial dream. In its nascent years, the Group flourished owing to Rhodes' ability to think and dream on a colossal scale, and because of his drive and gumption to bring that dream to life. He provided the society with the finance to pursue its objectives, but more important, Rhodes did not suffocate its growth. He suffered from heart disease and the prospect of an early death spurred him to groom his successor. This unique

circumstance allowed the visionary genius of Rhodes to blend seamlessly with the practical genius of Milner.

Once he had become premier of the Cape Colony, Rhodes set in motion his grand strategy for imperial expansion, and committed all his power and prestige to forming a federation of South Africa. He first had to set up a customs union between the Transvaal and the Cape to begin federating South Africa. Again and again Rhodes courted Kruger, the president of the Transvaal; again and again Kruger rebuffed these advances. Frustrated, Rhodes tried to encircle the Transvaal. He could deny Kruger access to the sea through the Cape and Natal but he could not stop Kruger building a rail link to Portugal's Delagoa Bay. To complete the encirclement Rhodes persuaded the British government to buy Delagoa Bay.

Throughout 1894 Rhodes suffered a series of setbacks that eventually drove him to extreme measures. His heart continued to warn him that he had to make haste. Although only forty-one, he looked old, and probably felt a great deal older than he looked. In May, just as Kruger completed his railway to Delagoa Bay, the British government reported their failure to buy the port—Rhodes' encirclement of Kruger had failed. In September, he received dismal engineering reports on the mining prospects of Rhodesia, reports that only heightened the strategic value of the Transvaal's gold deposits. He made a final effort to persuade Kruger to enter a customs union with the Cape, but Kruger not only rebuffed Rhodes but also favored the rail link to Delagoa Bay at the expense of the Cape line—the opposite of a customs union. Desperate, Rhodes threw in his lot with the discontented expatriate miners (*uitlanders)* in Johannesburg, the mining capital of the Transvaal.

Once Rhodes allied with the *uitlanders* in Johannesburg, he and his lieutenant, Dr. Starr Jameson, devised a plan to topple Kruger.[15] The Rhodes-Jameson *coup d'état* ran as follows:

• The De Beers mine would smuggle rifles and other arms into Johannesburg, where they would be concealed by the Gold Fields Company.

• The *uitlanders* in Johannesburg primed by money from Beit and Rhodes would revolt.

• Jameson, stationed on the Bechuanaland Protectorate frontier with the Transvaal would ride to Johannesburg with a detachment of company policemen. The arrival of Jameson's 'professionals' would ensure the rising survived beyond the first few days.

• The British high commissioner would travel immediately to Pretoria and 'mediate' in the dispute.

• As the self-appointed mediator in the dispute, the British high commissioner would decree the crisis could only be solved by a plebiscite of all adult males living in the Transvaal. Rhodes and Jameson believed the British outnumbered the other ethnic groups in the Transvaal and they would vote for a republic under the British flag, but not necessarily a British colony.

• If Kruger gave in, Rhodes could stage a bloodless coup in South Africa. However, it was unlikely that Kruger would give in, for he was a stubborn man committed to Afrikaner independence. From here, the final stage of the Rhodes' plan called for the British government to intervene with troops and to annex the Transvaal.

While the Rhodes' plan bears much likeness to a plan devised earlier by High Commissioner Loch,[16] the last point sets the two plans apart. Over the previous four years, Rhodes had butted heads with Kruger often enough to know the old man would never surrender his people to British domination. Yet Rhodes deceived the *uitlanders* into believing that he supported an internal revolution, while expecting that success depended on the intervention of imperial troops. Imperial intervention meant imperial annexation.

Astutely, Rhodes had gauged that he could only unite the *uitlanders* in a revolt to secure internal reform, not imperial annexation. This subtle strategy led to conflict with the High Commissioner who insisted on direct annexation. Rhodes solved the dispute by arranging for Loch's removal. He also needed the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate to the company so

Jameson could marshal his men on the frontier. But Jameson had to have professionals to muster, so Rhodes also had to persuade the Bechuanaland police to enlist in the company's force. In 1894 Rhodes and Jameson went to London to negotiate with the Colonial Office for the transfer of the Bechuanaland Protectorate but they only received assurances for its future transfer.

While in London, Rhodes arranged with the directors of the company to increase the size of the company's police force. Aided by Lord Rosebery, he persuaded Lord Ripon to recall Loch and to reappoint Sir Hercules Robinson. Rosebery and Ripon considered Robinson's reappointment so sensitive that they kept it a state secret and presented it to Cabinet and Parliament only as a *fait accompli,* fully expecting severe denunciations from senior Liberals such as Harcourt and senior unionists such as Joseph Chamberlain.

Rosebery's government fell on 25 June 1894, and Salisbury rcturned to power, appointing Joseph Chamberlain to the Colonial Office. Chamberlain, a gifted orator, personified the assertive, forceful, pugnacious politician. He had made his fortune manufacturing screws and retired at thirty-eight with political ambitions. Elected mayor of Birmingham, Chamberlain built his political base and reputation by modernizing and reforming the city's administration. He graduated to the House of Commons and after just four years, he received an invitation from Gladstone to join the Cabinet. Over the following years he showed compelling leadership qualities, setting up a claim to succeed Gladstone as Liberal leader. However, he fell out with Gladstone over Irish Home rule, and he eventually joined Salisbury. In 1888 Chamberlain promoted an imperial, as distinct from a colonial policy in South Africa.[17] Looking at the Transvaal in 1889, Chamberlain asked, "Who is to be the dominant power in South Africa?"[18] When he chose the Colonial Office in 1895, Chamberlain set out to answer that question.

Rhodes made overtures to Chamberlain on 9 July 1895, and over the next few months Rhodes committed to staging the revolution for the benefit of the British flag. Chamberlain in return cooperated by transferring the Bechuanaland protectorate. Events moved quickly. Chamberlain's officials suggested to Rhodes on 20 December to hurry up because of impending trouble over Venezuela.[19] Of particular importance, the Rhodes Group honored their undertaking to stage the revolution for and under the British flag. Allies of Rhodes[20] traveled to Johannesburg to tell the would-be rebels the revolution must benefit the Empire. The coalition in Johannesburg collapsed. All the non-English *uitlanders* objected to fighting for the British Empire, and many English *uitlanders* only wanted a reformed Transvaal—not British rule. Chamberlain's insistence on immediately raising the British flag over the Transvaal had destroyed Rhodes' revolution.

Meanwhile, Rhodes had stationed Dr. Jameson at Pitsani on the Bechuanaland-Transvaal border, and had ordered him to wait for the uprising, an event that looked increasingly unlikely. However, Jameson decided to force the rebellion. As a part of the original plan, he had a letter from the rebel leaders, thoughtfully left undated, describing frightful conditions in Johannesburg and begging the doctor to ride to the rescue of the British women and children. Calling his men together, Jameson addressed them with great emotion, read the letter, and assured them London sympathized with the *uitlanders'* plight; then called for volunteers. Every man stepped forward. On 29 December 1895, Jameson led his men into Kruger's republic.

Jameson's heavily armed party might have reached Johannesburg if they had kept to the plan. However, they became embroiled in a fight for a town about twenty miles from Johannesburg, and on 2 January 1896 they had to surrender.

Simple stupidity led to the exposure of Rhodes' role. Kruger's men confiscated a briefcase that revealed the names of the Johannesburg conspirators, their allies and associates, and more

important, a key that deciphered the cables sent between Johannesburg and Cape Town. This intelligence windfall proved that Rhodes had orchestrated the uprising. Kruger's people interrogated their prisoners and repeatedly heard that Jameson had assured them the imperial authorities supported the raid. The consistent story form Jameson's men and the captured documentary evidence enabled Kruger to publish a Green Book on the raid in which he not only exposed Rhodes but supplied enough evidence to cast suspicion on the Colonial Office.[21]

More than suspicion fell on the Colonial Office. After Rhodes had set up a working relationship with Chamberlain, he sent the secretary of the BSA Company, Rutherford Harris to London to help Rochford Maguire and Earl Grey negotiate for the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Harris reported to Rhodes in Cape Town, reports providing important evidence against Chamberlain and the Colonial Office. Altogether, fifty-four cables passed between Harris and Rhodes, but the contents of eight so-called "missing telegrams" (they were actually suppressed telegrams) almost certainly incriminate Chamberlain. The full texts of these eight cables have been suppressed, so historians have to rely on summaries compiled by Chamberlain.

Two distinct interpretations of the Rhodes/Chamberlain intrigue have emerged: one Anglo-American, and the other South African. In the Anglo-American accounts, the extraconstitutional role of Chamberlain and his Colonial Office officials is rarely admitted. According to the historian Jeffrey Butler the South African scholars speak with one voice on the opposite side of the issue:

> South African historians, English-speaking and liberal on the one hand, and Afrikaans-speaking and nationalist on the other, are substantially agreed in regarding British statesmen as responsible for the Raid . . . Miss van der Poel's work is both an attempt to define Chamberlain's role more accurately on the

> basis of new material, and a substantial indictment of his conduct. J. S. Marais and Miss Drus, though more restrained in tone, also concentrate on Chamberlain, and leave little doubt as to their judgments.[22]

One may summarize the South African arguments about complicity in the attempted *coup d'état*.

Marais summarizes the charges against Chamberlain as follows:

> 1. Chamberlain was aware that Rhodes, prime minister of the Cape Colony and managing director of the BSA Company, was playing a principal part in the Johannesburg revolt and that such action constituted a breach of international good conduct. Chamberlain, did nothing to stop him in his capacity as the responsible Crown minister, but went so far as to suggest to Rhodes the date for the insurrection.
> 2. Secondly, Chamberlain intervened to ensure that the British flag was raised over the Transvaal, and that his intended intervention ran the risk of war with the South African Republic.
> 3. Chamberlain deliberately transferred land to Rhodes so as to enable him to station his men on the border with the South African Republic.[23]

Jean van der Poel says:

> But the British authorities did join in the conspiracy to bring about a *coup d'état*. This was to begin with a token rising, to be supported by the Chartered troops and to be clinched by the intervention of the High commissioner who would at once apply a prearranged 'settlement'. By these means, the Colonial Secretary intended to make the Transvaal a British Colony. It

> was he who made the whole plan possible by transferring the border zone and the police to the Company, knowing the purpose for which they were required. All this was culpable; but still more so was Chamberlain's direction, when the unready plotters hesitated, that they should act at once, do the deed without delay, hurry up and pull the trigger while Great Britain could still intervene effectively.[24]

Corroborating the South African conclusions, Earl Grey wrote to Chamberlain:

> If I am called before the committee and asked whether I informed you in any way of the impending Revolution at Joh, I shall be obliged, either to refuse to answer, or to say that I told you privately that the long expected and inevitable rising ... *will* shortly take place, and that being so it was desirable that an armed force sho*uld* be stationed on the Transvaal border for use if required. Altho' you declined to receive this information, which you said you wd be obliged to use officially, if it were pressed on you, the subsequent acts of the Govt showed that you agreed with our view that it was desirable to give the BSA Co. an opportunity of placing a force upon the frontier.
>
> For so much that Dr. Harris' cables show I must take my full share of blame, and if allowing Rhodes to be informed of this involved an abuse of confidence, I think you know it was done ... with the single-minded intention of helping on a patriotic cause ..."[25]

Earl Grey's letter corroborates that Chamberlain knew about the planned rebellion, that he supported the rebellion with some critical

decisions, and that he hid behind the pretense of distinguishing between official and private information.

The gulf between the South African interpretation of the Jameson Raid and the Anglo-American interpretation transcends the parochial importance of the Raid. In total, the arguments advanced by Marais, Drus, and van der Poel leave little doubt about Chamberlain's complicity. Whatever their motives, Anglo-American scholars have a pronounced disinclination to implicate Chamberlain in the Raid. This reluctance forces the following question: if scholars hesitate to connect Chamberlain in a long forgotten event such as the Jameson Raid, how much more will they hesitate to assign culpability in the seminal event of the Twentieth Century? In contrast to German scholars who have been forced by the Fritz Fischer School to reevaluate and defend their every assumption, Anglo-American scholars have preserved a set of assumptions that have enabled them to avoid or evade any uncomfortable soul-searching quest for the truth. In this context, one can only hope that some conspiracy theory might catalyze a much overdue review.

Note that as early as 1895 *The Times* gave unwavering support to Rhodes and Jameson, foreshadowing the close cooperation between the paper and the Milner Group leading up to the Great War. Quigley identifies *The Times* as one of the "fiefs" of the Milner Group.

Having the endorsement of Britain's most prestigious and influential newspaper enabled the Rhodes Group to salvage some honor from the fiasco. After Jameson's arrest, Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany congratulated president Kruger on his preserving the Transvaal's independence, a not unreasonable response to Jameson and Rhodes' attempted *coup d'état*. However, the Berlin correspondent for *The Times*, Valentine Chirol, belonged to the Rhodes Group, and he wrote a series of blistering articles, attacking the Kaiser's motives and railing at German intrigue. The ploy worked magnificently. An indignant British people turned their

anger on the Kaiser, forgave all the illegalities and promoted Jameson to British hero.

In South Africa, the raid brought political disaster for Rhodes—without Dutch support he had to resign as prime minister. In Britain political outrage threatened the charter of his cherished British South Africa Company. This latter penalty Rhodes would not accept, especially because he assigned much of the failure to Chamberlain's insistence on openly staging the rising under and for the British flag. In Southern Africa Rhodes had nothing left to lose politically, but in London he still had the charter to lose.

February 4, 1896, Rhodes arrived in London determined to defend the charter. In an extraordinary gambit, the Rhodes Group resorted to blackmailing Chamberlain, bartering their suppression of eight incriminating telegrams (the 'missing telegrams') for his protection of the charter.[26] Accordingly, Rhodes' solicitor, Bourchier Hawksley, dropped suggestions throughout London that the cables proved the Colonial Office and Chamberlain "were in it to the neck." In June 1896 Chamberlain demanded to see the proof. Hawksley prepared copies of all fifty-four cables for the Colonial Office, comprising the forty-six reviewed by the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, and the eight ('missing telegrams') that were suppressed. After perusing the evidence, Chamberlain resigned, but Lord Salisbury refused his resignation.[27]

All the publicity surrounding the Raid constrained the government to hold a parliamentary inquiry. As the inquiry drew near, Chamberlain and the Rhodes Group negotiated. Rhodes pledged to suppress the telegrams, while Chamberlain committed to protect the charter.[28] The two strongmen had surmounted their mutual mistrust and began cooperating on the future of Southern Africa. Both had lost confidence in the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, who had received a peerage, presumably to keep him quiet. The question that remains unanswered is whether Rhodes and Chamberlain agreed on appointing Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner of South Africa, but it seems likely. Milner

had to wait some months before taking up his appointment because Chamberlain kept Robinson in South Africa to prevent him testifying at the inquiry. Milner wrote to Stead in November 1896: "an earthquake which would engulf the committee at its first sitting would clearly be the best thing."[29]

Eventually the Committee of Inquiry tabled its report on 13 July: it cleared Chamberlain and the Colonial Office, condemned Rhodes but recommended neither punishment for Rhodes nor punitive measures against his company. When Lord Ripon saw the draft report in July he thought the decision not to extract the telegrams, not to call Grey and not to punish Rhodes left the Committee open to ridicule.

The Committee of Inquiry was nothing but a sham. Harcourt knew that Chamberlain was complicit in the Raid. His son Loulu wrote in 1914: "My father (and I) have always been satisfied of Mr. Chamberlain's complicity with preparations for a revolution in Johannesburg ..."[30]

At the outbreak of the Boer War, Harcourt demanded a new inquiry. He insisted that it had been impossible to continue the inquiry into the Raid without adjourning the Committee until 1898, and that, once adjourned "the authors of the raid had influence enough in this House and out of this House to have prevented the appointment of that committee eight months later."[31] Harcourt, a man who might have become Prime Minister of Britain, publicly declared in 1900 that the opposition liberals could neither contain nor restrain Rhodes and his supporters. One may infer that in ten short years the Rhodes-Milner secret society had established its influence in London, the centre of the world.

5 Flint, John. *Cecil Rhodes.* Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1974. Print. 23.
6 *Cecil Rhodes*. 24.
7 *Cecil Rhodes*. 28.
8 *Cecil Rhodes*. 248-252.
9 *Cecil Rhodes*. 102-103.
10 Lord Knutsford.
11 Not surprisingly, it is difficult to discover what Rothschild actually said as secrecy was his modus operandi. See Flint, John, *Cecil Rhodes*, Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1974, pages 92-93 for some discussion on the wills.
12 *Cecil Rhodes.* 110.
13 Marlowe, John. *Cecil Rhodes: The Anatomy of Empire* London, Paul Elek, 1972. Print. 122.
14 *Cecil Rhodes: The Anatomy of Empire.*210-211.
15 See Marais J., S., *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. Print. 61. The Rhodes/Jameson plan bore so much resemblance to a plan previously drawn up by High Commissioner Loch that it seems probable that it was a modification of the original.
16 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 61.
17 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 68.
18 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 69.
19 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 90.
20 Abe Bailey
21 Van der Poel, Jean. *The Jameson Raid,* London, Oxford University Press, 1951. Print. 170.
22 Butler, Jeffrey. *The Liberal Party And The Jameson Raid.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1968. 265-266.
23 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 94.
24 *The Jameson Raid.* 259.
25 Pakenham, Elizabeth. *Jameson's Raid.* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960. Print.173.
26 *Cecil Rhodes*. 202.
27 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 121.
28 *The Jameson Raid.* 196.
29 *The Jameson Raid.* 183.
30 *The Liberal Party And The Jameson Raid*, 182.
31 *The Liberal Party And The Jameson Raid.* 247-248.

2
Milner's First War

Thomas Pakenham, a Boer War scholar, pointedly remarks that he does not know why Chamberlain appointed Milner High Commissioner of South Africa. [32] By making an issue of the appointment, he suggests that Chamberlain had passed over more qualified candidates. Pakenham's hint of something unusual arouses one's curiosity because elsewhere he speaks of Milner's secret alliance with Rhodes' key allies and his 'nexus' of influential friends. Milner's friends included Lord Esher, and Lord Selborne, Chamberlain's secretary at the Colonial Office, but Pakenham knew about these connections so he must have had other concerns in mind.

Milner's background included scholar, journalist, failed politician, private secretary to Sir George Goschen, colonial administration and chairmanship at the Inland Board of Revenue.[33] As with Rhodes, we have a window into Milner's thinking through his "Credo":

> I am a Nationalist and not a cosmopolitan ... A Nationalist is not a man who necessarily thinks his nation better than others, or is unwilling to learn from others. He does think his duty is to his own nation, and its development. He believes that this is the law of human progress, that the competition between nations, each seeking its maximum development, is the Divine Order of the world, the law of Life and Progress.
>
> I am a British (indeed primarily an English) Nationalist. If I am also an Imperialist, it is because the destiny of the English race ... has been to strike fresh roots in distant parts ... My patriotism knows no geographical but only racial limits. I am an Imperialist and not a little Englander, because I am a British Race Patriot...
>
> The wider patriotism is no mere exalted sentiment. It is a practical necessity ... England, nay more, Great Britain, nay more the United Kingdom is no longer the power in the world which it once was ... But the British Dominions as a whole are not only self supporting. They are more nearly self-sufficient than any other political entity ... if they can be kept an entity ...[34]

Milner shared Rhodes' belief in social Darwinism, British imperialism and the superiority of the English race, but Rhodes indulged in optimism whereas Milner succumbed to cynicism. Although a secular man lacking any feeling for the sacred, Milner somehow developed a semi religious dismal, desolate belief system. He subscribed to an unforgiving Divine Order, which condemned all races to an endless life-and-death struggle for mastery.

From 1902-1925, Lord Milner led the Rhodes-Milner secret

society. After the Great War, Milner formalized relations between his secret society and his American allies in J. P. Morgan and Company. Quigley saw this alignment between the Milner Group and J. P. Morgan as a natural development. The Milner Group always had close ties to Morgan and the Carnegie Trust, and Quigley says the description "international financier" applied to several members of the Group, especially Milner.[35]

These Anglo-American allies set up sister organizations to influence foreign affairs. The London branch they called the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the New York branch they eventually called the Council on Foreign Relations. This alliance of Milner's imperialists and London-American bankers has since dominated Anglo-American trade, foreign, and monetary policies.

Quigley stresses that Milner was an international financier. We know that J. P. Morgan asked him to manage Morgan Grenfell in 1899. Because of his South African commitments, Milner arranged for his close friend (and former roommate) Clinton Dawkins to take the position. Ironically, Dawkins' decision to accept the position with J. P. Morgan caused a stir in England because it suggested to some that Morgan's money had "corrupted" a promising imperial administrator.[36]

No record survives of how either Milner or Dawkins came to be on Morgan's list of trusted Englishmen. We know that both Clinton and Milner served as private secretaries to Sir George Goschen, and we know that Milner had close ties to Lord Rothschild, but we know precious little else. Our ignorance haunts us because of what Milner, who started life poor, wrote in 1893:

> If I were ever to return to active politics, it will be a very long way ahead, and I am inclined to think I never shall return. I feel that a man can do any amount of good work, and be of the greatest service, without joining in the fray—can in fact be of greater service because he keeps himself in the background ... I have

> an independent position, a great number of friends, and, I fancy, that sort of influence which disinterestedness always gives. On the other hand I am no partisan. My interests do not run on the lines of party and, if I can help, in however small a way, to carry out the objects I have at heart, I do not care two straws how the politicians are labelled who execute them."[37]

In this piece, Milner accurately identifies the method he would use in later years. He did exercise enormous influence thorough a wide circle of friends and close contacts, and as we are arguing, through his secret society. Also, he worked with politicians of both parties to achieve his goals, showing he had little if any party loyalty. He stayed in the political background. Because of this candor, he confounds historians when he declares that he had an "independent position."

Milner's biographer, Marlowe, struggles to understand how Milner could have arrived at an 'independent position', stating:

> Milner was to repeat this statement about an 'independent position' in a letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1897. I have been unable to discover from where the money required for this 'independent position' was derived. Most of what–ever money his mother left him was apparently lost by Mr. Malcolm. He was certainly hard-up when at Oxford, where he had to rely on his scholarships and some tutoring jobs and later, on his New College fellowship, worth £200 a year, which incidentally he put at the disposal of the Warden and Fellows on his appointment to Somerset house in 1892 ... But I have discovered nothing to explain his 'independent position'—which probably at that time denoted an income of at least £500 a year

for a bachelor—in 1893.[38]

The mystery surrounding Milner's sudden acquisition of wealth remains unresolved. Somebody provided for Alfred Milner in or before 1893. The only people who come to mind are Morgan, Rothschild, and Goschen, all members of the international financier community. These names prompt the suggestion the bankers had recruited Milner to take over Rhodes' secret society. Later in this chapter, we will see that Milner made a secret alliance with Werner, Beit & Co., an alliance that Rhodes and Rothschild supported. Thus, we are unsure who influenced Chamberlain to appoint Milner, and it could well have been more than one person.

After Chamberlain announced Milner's appointment in February 1897, the imperialist community gathered to honor the new High Commissioner with a splendid dinner. Asquith, Balfour, the Chamberlains, and Haldane attended the dinner, whereas Lord Rosebery and Sir Edward Grey sent their best wishes.

Milner outlined his imperial views at the dinner,[39] views that had much in common with those of Rhodes. He said that all his great ambitions lay in serving the "world state" of the British Empire, to serve as a "a civilian soldier of the Empire ... in a cause in which I absolutely believe ... Even if I were to fail, the cause itself is not going to fail."[40]

Pakenham places Milner's strategy in South Africa within the context of Milner's overall strategy in the "struggle for world supremacy." For Milner, the expansion of British power rested on "imperial unity" and a consolidated Empire. Consequently, he condemned the policy of granting self-government to the white colonies, a policy that in his eyes had eroded the Empire's power and influence throughout the world.[41] Milner believed that he had to halt the Empire disintegrating, and South Africa posed his first challenge, making Milner a dangerous Pro-Consul of the Empire.

From the moment he arrived in Cape Town, Milner inspired a hardening of Imperial sentiment among the English in South

Africa. Not surprisingly the Boers responded defensively to Milner's attitude, prompting Kruger to renew immediately his alliance with the Orange Free State, a sister Boer Republic. In short, the two Boer republics agreed to stand or fall together.[42]

Cooperating with Milner's hard-line, Chamberlain gave his blessing to the South African league, a loyalist organization of British colonists. From the start, the League fell under Rhodes' influence, and it echoed the policies of the English-language newspapers in South Africa that Rhodes, Beit, and their allies controlled. Those policies consisted in relentlessly attacking the Transvaal.

Milner preempted compromise in South Africa by ignoring Dutch concerns. He impugned the loyalty of the Cape's Chief Justice before he had even met the man. Also, he all but ignored Jan Hofmeyr, the most influential Dutch politician in the Cape. Milner's tough attitude convinced Hofmeyr "war must come."[43]

After the release of the Parliamentary report on the Jameson Raid in 1897, Chamberlain told Milner that Rhodes should "lie low for a time,"[44] effectively suggesting the High Commissioner should publicly keep his distance from Rhodes. Further, Chamberlain suggested that Rhodes could only unite the English at the expense of arousing the Dutch.[45] Milner followed Chamberlain's advice and never associated with Rhodes in public.

Meanwhile, Kruger won reelection to the presidency of the South African Republic in February 1898. In retaliation, Milner intensified his campaign against the Transvaal; he wrote to Chamberlain in February 1898, saying he would work up to a crisis, and that without reform in the Transvaal they would have to go to war.[46] Anticipating his "great day of reckoning" with Kruger, Milner compiled a pyramid of grievances to justify British action.[47] He told the leader of the Johannesburg Uitlanders "there is only one possible settlement—war! It has to come."[48]

As part of his working up to a crisis strategy, Milner made his infamous speech at Graaff Reinet in the Dutch heartland of the

Cape. Milner spoke bluntly. He made it clear to the Dutch that any sympathy they harbored for the Transvaal amounted in his eyes at least to disloyalty to Britain, saying: "What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case, what makes it stick and what makes people wince under it . . ."[49] Milner's unyielding stance at Graaff Reinet polarized South Africa, inflaming the English but frightening the Dutch. For his part, Rhodes echoed Milner's sentiments to the South African league, which rallied the loyalist faction to the flag.

Without alluding to any conspiracy,[50] Marais notes that Milner had replaced Rhodes as the leader of the British party, and that Rhodes had become Milner's lieutenant:

> From this time he [Milner] was regarded as the commander-in-chief of the 'British party'—the Cape's progressive party and the South African league—with Rhodes as his principal lieutenant.[51]

Marais, a South African scholar, in the above quote openly challenges the Anglo-American contention that Milner kept his distance from Rhodes in South Africa, suggesting instead that Rhodes and Milner acted in concert. Milner concealed his relations with Rhodes, even in his diaries. When he visited Rhodesia, Milner met Rhodes to discuss the future of Rhodesia, but he only noted in his diary that "Rhodes came round to see me after breakfast and I finished off the work I had with him."[52] Such Spartan economy of words suggests that Milner preferred to conceal his interactions with Rhodes, even in the privacy of his own diary.

International tensions and domestic politics combined to derail Milner's immediate plan of working up to a crisis. Chamberlain told Milner to back off but the latter only grudgingly obeyed. Milner despised the political need to pander to 'public opinion'. Milner's biographer, Gollin, remarks that the conviction that the "ordinary voter" should have no "share in the creation of imperial policy"

now became an "important element in his political outlook."[53] Although one risks oversimplifying a long, complicated process, one can earmark 1898 as the year when Milner began to reject the restraints of British Parliamentary democracy. Thereafter, Milner subscribed to the belief that the destiny of the Empire should rest solely in the hands of patriotic imperialists, men who shared his aspirations for the Empire.

After Graaff Reinet, Milner spoke candidly to his friends: "The Boer Govt. is too great a curse to all S. Africa to be allowed to exist, if we are not too busy to afford the considerable war, wh [ich] alone can pull it down."[54] He continued to Selborne: "The race oligarchy has got to go ... if it comes to a fight, we shall have to rely on British forces alone ..."[55] Milner saw the resolution of the South African problem with frightening clarity: either Kruger surrendered to British demands or the British Army would crush him and his republic. Compromise had no place in his strategy.

In Milner's calculations, war provided *full discretion to* resolve the imperial problems of South Africa. Surprisingly, he thought "The job is very easily done and I think nothing of the bogies and difficulties of settling South Africa afterwards."[56] He wanted to create a British majority. To this end, he proposed increasing British immigration, and far more ominously, settling the land with British farmers, though the Dutch had already settled all the suitable agricultural land. Evidently, he thought about ethnic cleansing of the Dutch, an extreme policy that could only inflame racial tensions.

Milner returned to England in November of 1898 to mobilize his political allies for war. He contacted all his Baliol friends, including Lord Selborne. He also met Margot Asquith, the wife of Henry Asquith future leader of the liberal party. In quick succession he met Lord Rosebery, Lord Rothschild, the Queen, Lord Sainsbury, and the Prince of Wales.[57] In addition, he courted all his old friends in the press, showing an acute awareness of the need to manipulate public opinion.

Milner put his case to Chamberlain for precipitating a crisis. He argued that time worked against Britain, that the Transvaal would continue to grow in strength, and that an armed Transvaal threatened the Cape, especially when international tensions distracted or diverted Britain. Chamberlain felt British public opinion would not support a buildup of tension. As a result, he made it clear to Milner the initiative had to be taken locally in South Africa. Milner explained to Selborne, in January 1899 that he understood that he had to push things locally and when the time comes the support would come.[58]

While Milner beat the war drums in London, a local brawl in Johannesburg resulted in the Transvaal police killing a British citizen. Wernher-Beit's local agent inflamed the incident by inspiring a series of provocative articles. When the public prosecutor of the Transvaal all but cleared the police, the South African league incited outrage in the English population. The league appealed to the Imperial government, but Milner's stand-in, general Butler, commander in chief of British forces in South Africa, ignored the appeal because he believed it was "all a prepared business" by Rhodes.[59]

Although Butler understood enough to point the finger at Rhodes, he failed to recognize that Rhodes had enlisted a network of allies, such as Beit, to carry out his plans. Decades later, Pakenham found crucial evidence the firm of Werner-Beit had secretly colluded with Milner's bellicose strategy stating: "it was this secret alliance, I believe, that gave Milner the strength to precipitate war."[60] Milner's secret alliance with Beit translates into a secret alliance with Rhodes and the bankers in the City. Pakenham's discovery verifies the claim that Rhodes and Milner secretly colluded to bring down Kruger's republic.

In London, the Milner-Rhodes Group arranged for *The Times* to align itself with the Johannesburg *Star,* a paper under the control of Rhodes, Wernher and Beit. *The Times* transferred an editor to the *Star*[61] [62] and after that the two papers integrated their South African

policies and commentaries. This coordinated voice on South African policy spread to all the English-language papers controlled by Wernher, Beit and Rhodes. Thus, Milner and his allies infused their propaganda into the news of South Africa in both London and English South Africa.

In March and April of 1899, Milner sent Chamberlain a series of increasingly intemperate dispatches. By mid-April he openly advised aligning with the *Uitlanders*, arguing the Boers would not yield to anything less than the threat of war. Persuaded, Chamberlain invited Milner to submit a publishable report on English grievances. Milner responded with a telegram arguing that "The case for intervention is overwhelming ..." He went on to declare that Kruger kept "thousands of British subjects"... "permanently in the position of helots ..."[63]Milner's helots telegram ranks among the most intemperate dispatches ever sent by a British Viceroy,[64] publication of which would commit the Cabinet to toppling Kruger, by peaceful means if possible, by military means if necessary.

In May 1899, Chamberlain prepared for war by getting Cabinet approval to issue a strong dispatch to Kruger. As Marais says, 'the cabinet had crossed the Rubicon'.[65] Chamberlain cabled Milner: "the dispatch approved. We have adopted your suggestion." Milner had Kruger cornered. If Kruger refused to give British imperialists satisfaction, the affront to British pride and the threat to British supremacy would lead to war.

Before Chamberlain could publish Milner's helots telegram, the South African Dutch pushed for a conference. Although not pleased, Chamberlain accepted the political challenge of the Bloemfontein conference, and he outlined areas for negotiation. In stark contrast, Milner disdained all political compromise, arguing that Kruger had to surrender either through peaceful persuasion or through military force.

Milner prepared for the conference by ousting General Butler and by seeking the transfer of competent officers to organize the

defenses of the frontier.[66] He went to the Bloemfontein conference where he intended to "screw"[67] Kruger. He would start the conference in a studiously moderate position, but once Kruger publicly sought a settlement, Milner intended to tighten the screw until it became unbearable. As Pakenham says: "Milner wanted a war leading to annexation."[68]

In his first ploy at the conference, Milner restricted participation to just himself and Kruger, thereby expelling the Dutch voices of conciliation. Talking to Kruger, Milner gave no ground; to the exclusion of all else he pressed the franchise issue. He demanded seven seats for the *Uitlanders* and the franchise after five years. However, he had no intention of stopping at just seven seats. Once Kruger yielded on this issue, a list of all *Uitlanders* voters would have to be compiled. When he had the voters list Milner intended to demand one man one vote in the Transvaal, firmly believing that British men comprised an outright majority.[69]

Jan Smuts, a legendary figure in South African, described Milner at the conference: "Milner is as sweet as honey, but there is something in his very intelligent eyes which tell me he is a very dangerous man."[70]

On Monday 5 June, Milner curtly stopped the conference saying "This conference is absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation on either side arising from it." Kruger retorted: "It is our country you want."[71] After the conference failure, Chamberlain wanted to issue an ultimatum to Kruger, but even Milner thought that was going too fast. Instead, Chamberlain published a 243 page blue book outlining British complaints, including Milner's 'helots' telegram and Chamberlain's indictment of the Transvaal.[72]

In July, Julius Wernher told Milner's agent in London the financiers were "quite prepared for war," insisting that "the situation must be terminated now." The Rhodes Group spread the rumor throughout London that the sending out of troops would force Kruger to stand down. Rothschild passed on the message to Balfour in September. Rhodes told it to anybody who would

listen.[73] Both Rhodes and Rothschild deliberately misrepresented Kruger's position—nobody really believed old Kruger would surrender all he had lived for without a fight.

Pakenham recognizes the organization in London that gave Milner such great support, but he calls it Milner's nexus of support rather than a secret society:

> Without Willie Selborne's help at the Colonial Office, Milner would have achieved nothing. Selborne kept influencing Chamberlain to take Milner's line. He also had periodic chats with A. J. B. to keep him sound and he 'had it all out' with the Prime Minister (his father-in-law). The results were 'wholly pleasing'. George Wyndham was also reporting to Milner behind Lansdowne's back. Wyndham was the ex-chairman of the South African association— the principal jingo pressure group in England – and continued (privately) to manipulate this lobby according to Milner's instructions. Wyndham wrote to Milner on 18 May 1899: "The press are ready and under complete control. I can switch on agitation at your direction. The French and German shareholders of the [gold-mining companies] are in line ... [we] are in your hands and we shall wait and be patient, or charge home, just as you decide." Milner also had the support of the Liberal imperialists. Asquith wrote to him: "You do not need to be told that you have the sympathy and good wishes of your old friends in your difficult task", after Grey had shown him Milner's letter that disclaimed any warlike intentions. [74]

Pakenham's nexus of friends strongly mirrors Quigley's Rhodes-Milner secret society. The difference in interpretation arises because Pakenham concentrated on the Boer War while Quigley

concentrated on Milner's Round Table movement, which allowed Quigley analyze Milner over a longer period and a much broader political environment.

On 28 July in the House, Chamberlain bitterly condemned the Transvaal. Salisbury and Balfour spoke on the same day to emphasize that Chamberlain spoke for the Cabinet. Salisbury told Selborne that 'of course the real point to be made good in South Africa is that we, not the Dutch are Boss.'[75] Selborne immediately cabled Milner that he enjoyed the support of the Cabinet, an appraisal that his old patron, Goschen, independently verified.[76]

On 12 August Kruger backed down and agreed in principle to the conditions set by Milner at Bloemfontein. However, he set three conditions.[77] Chamberlain poured acid on Kruger's offer on 26 August saying Kruger dribbled out reforms "like water from a squeezed sponge." He wrote to Milner that the public now understood "that our supremacy in S. Africa and our existence as a great power in the world are involved in the result of the present controversy." Furthermore, he assured Milner that they could count on sufficient support for war in South Africa. [78]

At least Chamberlain admitted that the war had little to do with *Uitlanders* rights and had all to do with preserving British supremacy. Although he looked forward to the coming war, Chamberlain conceded that 'the technical *casus belli* was weak.'[79] He replied to Kruger, accepting one of the conditions and rejecting the other two. Kruger responded on 2 September by withdrawing the offer.[80] Marais takes a strong stand against British historians who interpret Chamberlain's reply as a conditional acceptance. Marais says: "The simple truth is that Pretoria read as a refusal what was intended to be a refusal."[81] Negotiations had ended.

The British Cabinet on 29 September agreed to an ultimatum that included: the repeal of all legislation affecting the rights of *Uitlanders*, the grant of home rule to the inhabitants of the Rand, arbitration without third parties in all disputes, the surrender of the right to import arms via Mozambique and a final demand for the

Transvaal to disarm.[82] Kruger saved the British from justifying their ultimatum by issuing his own ultimatum on 9 October. After the Boer ultimatum, Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of War, wrote to Chamberlain: "Accept my felicitations. I don't think Kruger could have played our cards better than he has ... My soldiers are in ecstasies."[83]

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32 Pakenham, Thomas. *The Boer War* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979. Print. 13.

33 Alfred Milner, was born in Germany, and received his early education at Tübingen. His mother sent him to England to receive an English education at King's College School. He attended Balliol College under the legendary master Benjamin Jowett. Because his family had modest means, Milner chased scholarships to supplement the cost of his education. At Oxford, he formed a close friendship with Arnold Toynbee, which led him to develop sensitivity for social issues.

Milner was called to the bar in 1881, but he joined the *Pall Mall Gazette* under John Morley, becoming assistant editor to William Thomas Stead. His friendship with Stead lasted until their falling out over the Boer War. In 1885 he left journalism but not the lessons of journalism to start a political career. He became Sir George Goschen's private secretary, and through Goschen he became known to the City. Through Goschen Milner became the third ranking British official in Egypt. While in Egypt he formed a cordial relationship with Lord Cromer (of the Baring family). In 1892, he became chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue.

34 Gollin, A. M. *Proconsul in Politics: A Study Of Lord Milner In opposition And In Power.* London, Anthony Blond, 1964. Print. 128-129.

35 *The Anglo-American Establishment,* 183.

36 *The New York Times,* Sunday December 3, 1905, Pictorial section page 7

37 Marlowe, John. *Milner: Apostle Of Empire.* London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976. Print 22-23.

38 M*ilner: Apostle Of Empire,* 22-23.

39 *Milner: Apostle Of Empire*, 38-39.

40 *Milner: Apostle Of Empire*, 38-39.

41 *The Boer War*, 19-21.

42 Marais, J.S. *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. Print. 148.

43 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 177.

44 Headlam suppressed the piece about Chamberlain advising Milner that it would be best if Rhodes lay low for a while. Headlam must have felt uncomfortable with the implication that Milner could approach a man as strong as Rhodes and

simply ask him to refrain from actively pursuing a goal in Cape politics. It is obvious that Chamberlain understood that Milner could make such an approach to Rhodes without any offence being taken.

45 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*, 166.

46 Headlam, Cecil. *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1897 – 1899*. London, Cassell & Company, 1931. Print, 220-224.

47 Porter, A.N. *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*. Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1980. Print. 144.

48 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*,146.

49 *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1897 – 1899*, 244-246.

50 Marais notes the suppression by Headlam of some significant details, but he never suggested that a 'conspiracy' or something of this nature was responsible. Quigley reveals that Headlam was a member of the organization.

51 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*, 208.

52 Thompson, J. Lee, *Forgotten Patriot: A Life Of Alfred, Viscount Milner Of St. James's And Cape Town, 1854-1925*, Cranbury, N.J. Associated University Press, 2007. Print. 117.

53 *Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner In Opposition And In Power*. 34.

54 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*, 166.

55 *Milner: Apostle of Empire*. 48.

56 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*, 171.

57 *The Boer War*, 32.

58 *The Milner Papers: South Africa 1897 – 1899*, 302.

59 *The Boer War*, 50.

60 *The Boer War*, xvii.

61 William Monypenny

62 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*, 181.

63 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 267.

64 *The Boer War*. 59.

65 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 270.

66 *The Boer War*. 68.

67 *The Boer War*. 64-65.

68 *The Boer War*. 64.

69 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 284.

70 *Milner: Apostle of Empire*. 73.
71 *The Boer War*. 68.
72 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 286.
73 *The Boer War*. 88-89.
74 *The Boer War*. 87.
75 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*. 228.
76 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*, p. 304.
77 *The Fall Of Kruger's Republic*. 308-310.
78 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-189*. 241.
79 *The Origins Of The South African War: Joseph Chamberlain And The Diplomacy Of Imperialism 1895-1899*. 245. Porter notes that Headlam suppressed this detail.
80 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 313.
81 *The Fall of Kruger's Republic*. 316.
82 Farwell, Byron. *The Great Anglo-Boer War*. New York, Harper & Row, 1976. Print. 46.
83 *The Great Anglo-Boer War*. 47.

3
Milner's Arithmetic

Fielding half-a-million men, the British Army steamrolled through the Dutch republics. However, the Dutch had expected the British steamroller. They conceded the towns and the mines and headed into the backcountry to wait out the British.[84] They formed small bands of "commandos" or guerrilla units, and using tactics before their time, they harried the British across this vast land. Unable to seal the final victory, an enraged Milner pressed his generals, Roberts and Kitchener, to retaliate against the guerrilla tactics.

Britain's descent into shame began when General Roberts rounded up women and children to send across the front line in a tactic of burdening the guerrillas and crippling their military capacity. By September 1900, he had driven 2,500 women and children into Barberton, the last stronghold of the Boers. General Botha, spoke for the Dutch when he called this tactic: "An attempt to revenge the determination of myself and my burghers to persevere in the struggle upon our wives and children."[85] Botha correctly understood that Roberts had no misgiving about using noncombatant women and children as pawns in the war. Roberts' officers strongly believed expelling the women would "not be without its effect on diminishing the strength of the enemy's commandos."[86] Milner and his generals had succumbed to the great lie "that the end justifies the means," and they progressively

took more extreme means to achieve that end.

Roberts intensified his war on noncombatants with a scorched earth policy (Kitchener made the term "scorched earth" popular during the Boer War) that led the British Army to destroy every farm it came across. As the South African scholar Burridge Spies comments:

> Roberts, and subsequently Kitchener too, came to accept these tactics, together with the destruction of supplies, as a means of preventing the commandos operating in certain districts, but there can be little doubt that they were also calculated measures that used the sufferings of women and children as a lever to induce men to surrender. Roberts, in September 1900, declared:
>
> "Unless the people generally are made to suffer for misdeeds of those in arms against us the war will never end."
>
> In October 1902 Milner admitted that as many as 30 000 farmhouses had been destroyed during the war; in addition, a number of villages had been razed to the ground.[87]

The tragedy of the Boer War lay in the political support Milner received for his war on noncombatants. He not only enjoyed the unqualified backing of the Conservative Party and the conservative government but he also enjoyed the firm loyalty of the Liberal Imperialists, especially Haldane, Asquith and Grey. Haldane belonged to the Rhodes-Milner secret society while Asquith[88] was an old friend of Milner's. Furthermore, Asquith's wife Margot had had an affair with Milner in Egypt, and she remained devoted to him. However, the support of Sir Edward Grey was more valuable.

The Grey family, an old aristocratic Whig family that had not deserted the Liberal Party over Irish Home Rule, had great standing

in the party. Sir Edward was one of three Grey family members intimately involved with the Rhodes-Milner secret society. His cousin Albert had founded the organization, and his younger cousin Edward Wood, 1st Earl Halifax, joined Milner's kindergarten and later became the leader of the organization (the appeasers) before World War II. When the Boer War began, Grey wrote to Milner saying: "in my opinion the end does justify the view you have taken of the South African question from the beginning."[89] On 1 February 1900 Grey declared to the House of Commons: "we are in the right in this war. It is a just war. It is a war which is being forced upon this country."[90]

Gray's pro-war stance endeared him to Chamberlain. As the war continued, the so-called "khaki" general election took place in October 1900. Chamberlain venomously attacked the Liberals, arguing a seat lost by the government amounted to a seat won by the Boers. However, he exempted Grey.[91] Chamberlain's approval of Grey testifies to Sir Edward's wholehearted support for the war.

Sir Edward Grey's character transcends the parochialism of the Boer War. Simply put, one cannot interpret the origin of the Great War without first discovering Sir Edward Grey's attitude to war. Was Grey a man of virtue, a champion of peace, a cultivated human being of high-minded ideals? Alternatively, was Grey a man of iniquity, a man with a dark side? Anglo-American scholars would have us believe the former but Grey's support for the war undermines his peace-loving reputation. Further, the esteem Grey enjoyed among contemporary warmongers such as Chamberlain, Haldane, and Milner suggests he harbored a greater will to war than scholars have admitted.

In November 1900 Campbell-Bannerman, (CB) the Liberal leader, wrote to Lord Ripon that Asquith, Grey and Haldane the "Balliol set" supported the Tory South African policy because of their "Milner worship." Furthermore, he thought Milner the "worst man" for the job in South Africa, and he could not "vote black white" to save Milner and his devotees.[92] Confirming Campbell-

Bannerman's assessment, Asquith warned that an attack on Milner would split the party in pieces. Asquith believed that party unity carried the greatest weight with Campbell-Bannerman.[93] Haldane assured Milner the "bulk of the opposition" had their complete confidence in his actions.[94]

Asquith, Grey, and Haldane gave Milner freedom of action, despite Milner's chilling extremism. A pure racist, Milner intended to set up British racial supremacy in South Africa for the sake of "unborn generations":

> About things political *don't yield to the temptation* to leave a vestige, or a fragment, of a Boer state anywhere—not even in the Zoutansberg. *Delenda est,* even if it takes 2 years of guerrilla warfare. We owe it to the unborn generations...[95]

Delenda est leaves no room for confusion for it is a grim Latin phrase from Roman history that denotes annihilation of one's enemies. The Romans used *delenda est* for the total destruction of Carthage, enslaving the entire population and the salting of the surrounding countryside so inhabitants could not return. *Delenda est* is the refined language of an absolute extremist.

Beatrice Webb, of Fabian Society fame, supported Milner's policies in South Africa. However, she records meeting Milner in 1905:

> I had a long talk with Milner after dinner. He has grown grim and, perhaps temporarily bitter, obsessed too with a vision of non-party government without having invented any device for securing it...His thesis is that the war itself, the dragging out of it, the unsatisfactory character of the settlement, the barely averted disaster—all were the result of the party system which forced half the political world to be

> against him. He is sufficient of a fanatic not to see that there was a genuine cleavage of opinion among the thinking people, that it was not merely a knot of cranks that disapproved of his policy.[96]

Webb, who knew Milner well, recognized that, three years after the Boer War had ended, Milner's fanaticism had not subsided in the least.

Milner's decree of *delenda est* set the political context in which generals Roberts and Kitchener prosecuted the war: both generals intensified their military reprisals, carrying out a scorched earth policy on every farm in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In September 1900, Milner's generals set about crushing the Boers. They rounded up and interned Boer women and children in concentration camps, camps they located in occupied territory far from prying eyes,[97] keeping away from the far better facilities, and the shorter transport lines in the Natal and the Cape colonies. The British Army first made these women and children destitute by burning their homes, breaking their farm tools, ruining their crops, destroying their seed, killing or carrying off their livestock, and wherever possible poisoning their wells by filling them with carcasses. Then the Army selected unsuitable sites for the concentration camps, providing poor shelter, little or no sanitation, and no medical support. From the start, the purpose of these camps was the death of their inmates.

In late September Kitchener, who succeeded Roberts, ordered the camp authorities to divide the inmates into two categories:

> 1st: Refugees and the families of neutrals, non-combatants and surrendered burghers.
> 2nd: those whose husbands, fathers or sons are on commando. The preference in accommodation, etc. should of course, be given to the first class.

Kitchener's order demolishes the claim the Army had set up the camps for humanitarian purposes while it corroborates the charge the camps had a vindictive purpose.[98]

On 28 February 1901, generals Botha and Kitchener discussed peace terms at Middelburg, but Milner intervened, demanding an unconditional surrender. Kitchener wrote to the Secretary of State for War:

> I did all in my power to urge Milner to change his views, which seemed to me very narrow on the subject ... Milner's views may be strictly just, but to my mind they are vindictive, and I do not know a case in history where, under similar circumstances, an amnesty has not been granted.
>
> We are now carrying on the war to be able to put 2-3000 Dutchmen in prison at the end of it. It seems to me absurd, and I wonder the Chancellor of the Exchequer did not have a fit.[99] ... an amnesty or king's pardon for the two or three hundred rebels in question (carrying with it disenfranchisement which Botha willingly accepted) would be extremely popular amongst the majority of the British and all of the Dutch in South Africa; but there no doubt exists a small section in both Colonies who are opposed to any conciliatory measures being taken to end the war, and I fear their influence is paramount; they want extermination, and I suppose will get it ...[100]

Kitchener's words condemn Milner and his supporters. He confirms the charge of vindictiveness. Further, without mentioning Rhodes by name, he accused the Rhodes faction in the Cape and Natal of wanting to exterminate the Boers, avowing that this small group had huge influence on Milner, and would therefore achieve their objectives.

Spies, a South African historian, states that 27,927 women and children died in the camps, almost double the number of men killed in action. In total, the camps killed almost 14% of the Boer population in the two republics.[101]

The Boer general, De Wet, remarked:

> Anyone knows that in war, cruelties more horrible than murder can take place, but that such direct and indirect murder should have been committed against defenseless women and children is a thing which I should have staked my head could never happen in a war by the civilized English nation. And yet it happened.[102]

De Wet accused Milner and his generals of 'direct and indirect murder' in the camps and the evidence supports his accusation. All fifty camps suffered from at least one serious deficiency such as water supply, good exposure, shelter, insect infestation and good drainage. Aggravating the problems of location, all the camps lacked enough tents, medical services, and a functioning hygiene system. De Wet correctly understood the function of these camps—they served as instruments of extermination.

Eliminating the future generation by killing off the present child-bearing cohort conformed to social Darwinian strategy—it was efficient. The motive for the concentration camps lay in Milner's obsession about the relative numbers of Briton and Boer. He wrote on 27 December:

> On the political side, I attach the greatest importance of all to the increase of the British population ... If ten years hence, there are three men of British race to two of Dutch, the country will be safe and prosperous. If there are two of Dutch to two of British, we shall have perpetual difficulty ...[103]

Again on 8 November 1901 Milner wrote: "Absolutely everything depends upon starting the new self-governing Confederation with a British minded majority."[104] Milner estimated the population breakdown at the end of the war at 496 000 Dutch, 368 000 British, and 76 000 other whites. He faced an intractable problem in his racial ledger, a problem that he described as having the 'greatest importance' and on which "absolutely everything depends."

In his racial ledger, Milner needed to apply credits of 50,000 English immigrants per year to the British population, a formidable political and logistical challenge. However, he could get the same relative population adjustment by applying "debits" to the Boer population, a neat solution made possible by the camps. Fortunately, political opposition in London prevented the camps from causing a Boer "debit" of 100,000 women and children. A Boer debit on that scale would have made the two white populations equal, and it would have given the British a clear lead in children and childbearing women for many years.

Milner returned to headquarters, as he called London, on 24 May 1901 and stayed in England until 10 August. When his ship docked at Southampton, he was greeted by most of the Cabinet with Lord Grey and Sir Edward Grey. That the Greys went to the trouble of traveling to Southampton to greet Milner leaves us in no doubt about their commitment to the war. The government and the King stressed their approval of Milner's war by honoring him with a peerage; Sir Alfred Milner became Lord Milner.

Milner's unopposed moment of public adulation lasted but a few weeks. A young English woman, Emily Hobhouse, had also traveled back from South Africa on the same ship as Milner. Unlike almost everybody else, Hobhouse had seen a sample of the camps; she had worked inside them; she had witnessed the deprivation and the extreme mortality rates. A witness, Hobhouse immediately exposed conditions in the camps to her radical friends. Her firsthand accounts of the camps anguished the national liberal

conscience.

Hobhouse discussed the camps with the liberal leader, Campbell-Bannerman:

> The interview ... remains vivid in my mind. Of all whom I saw at that time ... he alone ... Seemed to have the leisure and the determination to hear and understand everything ... I was enabled to pour out to him more fully than to anyone else I met the detailed horrors of those camps. For nearly two hours he listened with rapt attention now and then putting a question to elucidate a point. As I dwelt upon the wholesale burning of farms and villages, the deportations, the desperate condition of a burnt out population brought in by hundreds in convoys, the people deprived of clothes, bedding, utensils and necessities, the semi-starvation in the camps, the fever-stricken children lying ... upon the bare earth ... the appalling mortality ... he was deeply moved—and now and again murmured sotto voce 'methods of barbarism, methods of barbarism'. He was right ... He left the abiding impression of a man who spared no time or pains to arrive at truth and in whom wisdom and humanity were paramount.[105]

On 14 June Campbell-Bannerman made the most famous speech of the war—and of his career—asking of the government:

> What is that policy? That now that we had got the men we had been fighting against down, we should punish them as severely as possible, devastate their country, burn their homes, break up their very instruments of agriculture ... It is that we should sweep—as the Spaniards did in Cuba; and how we

> denounced the Spaniards!—the women and children into camps ... in some of which the death-rate has risen so high as 430 in the thousand . . . At all events, it is the thing which is being done at this moment in the name and by the authority of this most humane and Christian nation ... Mr. Balfour treated us with a short disquisition on the nature of the war. A phrase often used is that 'war is war', but when one comes to ask about it one is told that no war is going on, that it is not a war. When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa.[106]

Campbell Bannerman's speech enraged the Liberal imperialists, especially Asquith, Grey, and Haldane.[107] They felt their leader had crossed the threshold of decency with this language, and Grey gave Gladstone a "stiff 10 minutes" over the "methods of barbarism" accusation.[108]

Lloyd George followed up Campbell Bannerman's condemnation of the camps saying:

> I say that this is the result of deliberate and settled policy. It is not a thing which has been done on twenty-four hours, for it has taken months and months to do it. The military authorities knew perfectly well it was to be done, and they had ample time to provide for it. They started clearing the country about six months ago, and it is disgraceful that 5 or 6 months after that, children should be dying at the rate of hundreds per month.[109]

In the same debate, Campbell Bannerman repeated his "methods of barbarism" phrase. Incensed, Haldane defended the policy of the camps and the conditions prevailing within them with icy

intellectual indifference to the human tragedy. When the House voted, Asquith, Grey, and Haldane abstained.

Milner responded to the criticisms of his camps with a memorandum in their defense:

> Every farm had become a supply depot for the enemy, enabling him to concentrate at will and refit his commando with food and munitions of war ... To have denuded the farms and left women and children to subsist as best they could would have been entirely within the military rights of the British. Even had the civilian population remained neutral such a course would not have been in opposition to the established usage of war, but so far from preserving such an attitude, the women had actively assisted the combatants by furnishing them with exact information regarding all British movements. The military situation demanded that the enemy should be deprived of such a system of intelligence, and humanity induced the British Commander to remove the inhabitants from the farms and assemble them in concentration camps, where they have at all times received food similar to that provided for the British soldiers, as well as shelter and other comforts ... To allege that in the conduct of the war "noble and generous traditions have not been followed,' and that 'measures of warfare which belong to a past age' have been employed, is a very grave misrepresentation, which can in no single respect be substantiated by actual fact.[110]

One feels revulsion at the mind of a man who described the conditions inside the camps as "comforts."

In late June Asquith, Grey, and Haldane tried to stage a revolt

against Campbell Bannerman. Some senior liberals intervened to bring about a truce. Milner wrote to Haldane on 1 July 1901:

> There is an ingenious suggestion much fostered in some quarters, and to my mind *most dangerous*, that the Liberal split should be patched up by both sides agreeing, *not to differ* on the South African question, *but to unite on a middle or compromise policy* ... The bargain could only be that the pro-Boer, having agreed to chuck independence, should be compensated by the support of a united party in attacking the Government whenever necessity compelled it to run counter to any humanitarian or constitutional fad. Refugee Camps ... would be one subject of attack.... My point is that, whilst I have no wish to hinder or in any way interfere with Liberal reunion, I am compelled, in the national interest, to put any little obstacle I can to the achievement of reunion by compromise which would hamper and might ruin the course of the national policy in South Africa ... I claim to be myself, at bottom, a Liberal. My 'Imperialism' is too liberal, too advanced, to be understood to-day. If measures apparently harsh, are adopted, with my approval *or without my protest,* it is because I think them inevitable ... But if we are to build up anything in South Africa, we *must disregard* and absolutely disregard the screamers. [111]

Milner admitted that he either approved or did not protest the harsh measures taken—including the mortality in the camps. In fact, Milner never hesitated to criticize his generals for interfering with his civilian rule, yet he never condemned them for the scorched earth policy and the camps.

Haldane's reply on 6 July was equally indifferent:

> I wanted to show your letter to Asquith and Grey. We know we may have huge difficulties in getting the average Liberal to take the view which you put and which we emphatically . . . share. Anyhow I entirely share your view as to the madness of a compromise policy. Whatever the result of this split, I do not think you need fear *that* with Grey and Asquith. Grey is like a rock, and Asquith's insight is so great that, now that he is free and responsible for directing his own group, he is an unlikely person to lose sight of what is the real great objective ...[112]

Untroubled by the horrendous death toll in the camps, Asquith, Haldane and Grey continued to support Milner.

On 18 July 1901 *The Times* reported Grey's speech at Peterborough in support of the war:

> The other feeling in our minds is consternation at the difficulties our soldiers have to face, and admiration of the spirit and the energy with which they are facing them. Very well. Let me say at once that I believe that this war has not only been carried on by civilized and legitimate methods, but that it has , on the whole been conducted by more humane and more civilized methods than previous wars. I believe that if you were to read the accounts of the Civil War in America, if you were to read the accounts of the Franco-Prussian war as closely as you read the accounts of the present war you would realize that in the last half of the last century civilian and humane ideas have made progress, and that they have not been without their effect even in the very theatre of war in causing it to be carried on more humanely than previous wars ...

> I say that if it is proved, as it was proved undoubtedly in the case of our own hospitals, that there has been mismanagement and breakdown, which has caused great suffering—even then that is no reason for saying that this war is not being properly conducted, and I will give no vote in the House of Commons, and I make no speech which in any way lends colour to what I believe to be an unworthy imputation on our troops, that the war is not being conducted by legitimate methods ...

Despite Grey's reputation as a humanitarian and high-minded man, he left no ambiguity at all in how he felt about the war, the scorched earth policy, and above all the high mortality rates in the camps. He considered the conduct of the war both legitimate and civilized, and that presents his apologists with some difficult obstacles to overcome.

Serendipitously on 5 August, a renowned British war hero, the lion-hearted retired Field Marshal Sir Neville Chamberlain, rebutted Grey in the same paper:

> Sir, in a speech lately delivered by Sir Edward Grey at Peterborough, he expressed the opinion that there must be room for free speech ...
>
> On that equitable basis, I, as a Liberal, feel bound to differ with the conclusion drawn by Sir Edward, that the war in South Africa has been conducted throughout in accordance with the accepted rules of civilised warfare. I dissent because the necessity has never been made clear to the nation to justify a departure from the recognised laws of international warfare.
>
> I mean the frequent injudicious, if not reckless, burning or sacking of the farmsteads or

> homes of the Boers, the removal or the destruction of the food stored in their houses for the maintenance of their families, the sweeping away of all cattle and sheep, the destruction of mills and implements of agriculture, as also the forcible removal into camps of all women and children, and their being kept in bondage.
>
> I do not wish to imply that extreme measures are never justified during war, but I do assert that the daily reports which have appeared in the press during the past seven or eight months indicate that a great wave of destruction has been spread over the Orange and Vaal states, such as has never before been enacted by our armies ...
>
> It surely can never become a recognised episode in war for wives to be forcibly torn from their homes and to know not what had become of their children; for women about to become mothers, to be forced into railway trucks, and to have to travel tedious journeys, and then to remain in camps devoid of the comforts needed for maternity; for women and children to be sent to live in bare tents, and often exposed to sleeping on the wet ground or to be drenched under leaky tents, or for mothers to see their little ones dwindle and die, for the want of suitable nourishment ...

Sir Neville Chamberlain (no relation to the Colonial Secretary) personified the stereotypical British gentleman, the exact mold into which Anglo-American scholars try to fit Sir Edward Grey. However, the Field Marshal's denunciation of the camps casts a shadow over Grey's reputation, compelling one to wonder how any supposedly civilized and high-minded man could have defended the unfolding human tragedy. The scholars have the unenviable

task of trying to argue that Grey did not know how bad the camps were when the Field Marshal obtained that information from the newspaper.

As late as 21 December, Grey refused to consider the camps as 'methods of barbarism'.[113] In contrast, the public pressure forced Chamberlain to demand change from Milner.

Chamberlain wrote to Milner on 4 November 1901:

> The mortality in the concentration camps has undoubtedly roused deep feeling among people who cannot be classed with the pro-Boers. It does not seem to me to be a complete answer to say that the aggregation of people who are specially liable to infectious disease had produced a state of things which is inevitable ... We ought to give some evidence of exceptional measures when the concentration has the results shown by recent statistics ...[114]

Chamberlain increased the pressure in mid-November:

> It is necessary ... that I should be satisfied that all possible steps are being taken to reduce the rate of mortality, especially among children, and that full and early reports should be sent to me ...[115]

The new tone from London diverted Milner from his racial ledger. He noted the women and children in the camps would:

> All be dead by the spring of 1903. Only I shall not be there to see as the continuance of the present state of affairs for another two or three months will undoubtedly blow us all out of the water.[116]

Presumably, Milner would have preferred to keep the camps until the spring of 1903 but he confronted a problem: either solve the racial problem and destroy himself or allow the remaining Boer women and children live and save himself.

Facing political termination, Milner abandoned his principles of strong imperial leadership, and appeased his political masters, men he despised for pandering to public opinion. He wrote to Chamberlain on 7 December 1901:

> The black spot—the one very black spot—in the picture is the frightful mortality in the Concentration Camps. I entirely agree with you in thinking, that while a hundred explanations may be offered and a hundred excuses made, they do not amount to an adequate defence.[117]

Immediately after the "frightful mortality" quickly ceased. The bitterest irony in Milner's letter is that he forgot to send a copy to Sir Edward Grey who continued defending the camps.

Sir Edward Grey's support for the Boer War, the scorched earth policy, incarcerating Boer women and children, and his complete indifference to the "frightful mortality" in the concentration camps, is the only window we have on the man's moral philosophy of war. Nevertheless, it is enough. The historical Sir Edward Grey contradicts and challenges the scholarly fiction of a virtuous, high-minded man of peace found in Anglo-Americans textbooks. One may presume the misrepresentation of Grey by the scholars is deliberate and necessary, deliberate because it contradicts the evidence, necessary because it helps to explain away his behavior on the eve of the Great War.

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4
Splendid Isolation Abandoned

As the twentieth century dawned, Britain ruled a quarter of the world, but as the extent of her Empire waxed, the confidence of her rulers waned. She faced challenges from the United States in the Americas, from France throughout the world, and from Russia in Asia, especially along the Indian frontier. She shored up Canada's exposed border by conceding the Americas as Washington's sphere of influence. She contained her ancient rival France with a series of reactive steps. But the Russian bear presented the specter of an unanswerable challenge. As the Russian bear crept relentlessly overland toward the Indian frontier, the greatest naval power in history lacked an effective response to this land based challenge. As a result, British Russian policy merged into British Imperial policy.

On 30 January 1902, Britain allied with Japan to shore up their position in the Far East. Six months later France proposed an Anglo-French Entente covering Siam and Morocco that intentionally excluded Germany from both regions. Lord Lansdowne, the British Foreign Secretary, balked at the proposal, believing that any attempt by Britain and France to liquidate Morocco without Germany's consent would lead to complications.[118]

Concurrent with these foreign policy stirrings, the Milner Group

began their takeover of the British Foreign Office. In 1899 they staged a coup in *The Times* newspaper by ousting the fair-minded director of the foreign department and installing their man, Valentine Chirol. Before he became a journalist, Chirol started his career in the Foreign Office. Now, as the foreign editor of the most prestigious newspaper in Britain, he had unfettered access to his former colleagues. But Chirol did not confine himself to discussing policy with Foreign Office officials: he influenced careers, especially the career of his friend Sir Charles Hardinge, whom he primed to take the permanent undersecretary's position. With Chirol running *The Times'* foreign department, and Hardinge directing the British Foreign Office, the Milner Group began incrementally to control British foreign policy.

The Milner Group could consider taking over the Foreign Office only because they worked from within the ruling elite: no outside group could even get into the Foreign Office let alone stage a takeover. Lord Esher typified and personified this assault from within. He had infiltrated the Royal family's inner circle from the mid-eighteen nineties, and when Edward ascended the throne, Esher had the run of the Palace. In 1901 Esher became the deputy Governor of Windsor Castle. After this appointment he declined cabinet appointments to both Tory and Liberal governments, testifying to the enormous influence he wielded as King Edward's leading courtier.

Unfortunately for Edward, nature had not matched his high social rank with a correspondingly high intelligence, a defect he made worse by preferring the role of social playboy to that of apprentice monarch. Thus, he ascended the throne an old novice, unversed in the kingly arts. Unsure of his powers and authority, Edward relied on his handlers and advisers, especially Lords Knollys and Esher. On constitutional and political problems, he listened to Esher's advice above all others so the brilliant Esher all but directed the political affairs of the Palace.

Esher proved crucial in Hardinge's rise in the Foreign Office.

He advised the King that a constitutional monarch retained influence over the appointment of ambassadors. Following Chirol's advice, Esher promoted Hardinge's merits to the monarch, and he prompted Hardinge to cultivate a friendship with the King. Esher's strategy worked. With the backing of the crown, Hardinge first became assistant undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, then ambassador in St. Petersburg. [119]

By 1905, Hardinge and his allies predominated in the key European portfolios. Of particular importance, they controlled the powerful ambassadorships to France and Russia from where they intended to influence British foreign policy. In 1906, Hardinge finished the Foreign Office takeover by capturing the permanent undersecretary of state's position. Underscoring his triumph, Hardinge sent his ally, Arthur Nicolson, to fill the St. Petersburg vacancy.[120] Completing this takeover of the Foreign Office, the Milner Group in December 1905 secured the appointment of Sir Edward Grey as Foreign Secretary. For the following four-and-a-half years, Grey and Hardinge acted more as equal colleagues than superior and subordinate as they jointly carried out Milner Group foreign policy under the guise of British foreign policy.

The influence of the Milner Group on British foreign policy was radical. Over a short number of years the Group orchestrated a realignment of British diplomacy. Britain abandoned her long-standing policy of "Splendid Isolation" or nonalignment with continental powers in favor of a military understanding with Russia and France aimed at Germany and Austria. Critically, the military dimension to this disturbance in the balance of power was secret. The secrecy of these commitments that altered the European balance of power was a primary cause of the Great War.

A fundamental claim of this book is that during the July Crisis of 1914 French and Russian statesmen made their grave decisions fully expecting British military support. Conversely, the statesmen of Germany and Austria made their decisions unaware that Britain had committed, believing they had a reasonable chance that Britain

might stand aside. Thus, Britain's secret commitments promoted French and Russian aggression while they did nothing to deter German and Austrian ventures, effectively maximizing the risk-taking of European statesmen. Worse still, the secrecy prevented any internal British political process that might have sought alternatives to conflict because the Liberal Radicals did not know the Liberal Imperialists had embarked on the road to war. The catastrophic outcome was neither accidental nor unforeseen.

In 1902 Lord Lansdowne agreed to negotiate with France on the understanding they would exclude Germany from Morocco. Although Lansdowne did not harbor any anti-German feelings, his advisers did. Lord Lansdowne's agreement to enter these negotiations provides us with an excellent reference date for the beginning of a clear anti-German thrust to British foreign policy.

The Milner group had to persuade the British people to make friends with their long-standing enemies France and Russia, while disowning their equally long-standing friends, Austria and Germany. With this difficulty in mind, they manipulated King Edward's popularity with the public to legitimize the notion of Anglo-French friendship. They hoped the King's approval of Anglo-French friendship would both clarify and lead British public opinion.[121]

King Edward's "surprise" goodwill visit to Paris in 1903 was his most important attempt to lead British public opinion to friendship with France. The visit was planned by Esher and the King with the help of the French President, and the British Ambassador to Paris.[122] After visiting Portugal, the plan called for the King to announce suddenly his plan of visiting Paris. However, when the King traveled abroad, he routinely took a minister of the Crown along with him. To overcome this obvious difficulty, King Edward requested that Hardinge accompany him. Lord Lansdowne naturally resisted this unusual request, but somehow his Majesty had his way. Hardinge traveled as minister plenipotentiary,[123] though he was only an assistant undersecretary of state. After

visiting Portugal, the Royal yacht left Lisbon on 7 April, and while at sea Hardinge and the King set in motion the "surprise visit" to Paris.

On entering Paris the King experienced a frosty reception, but his warmth and geniality won over the Parisians. On leaving, he received a rapturous farewell. By taking the lead in showing goodwill toward France, King Edward began the thaw in Anglo-French relations; by supporting Anglo-French friendship, he legitimized an official Anglo-French Entente.

Lord Lansdowne wanted to balance his negotiations with France by making an overture to the Germans. He approved British bankers participating in the Baghdad railway, a project dear to the Kaiser. However, Lansdowne's wish for good relations with Germany conflicted with the Milner Group's need to pit Germany against Russia. As a result, the Milner Group orchestrated such a ferocious press campaign against British involvement in the Baghdad railway, that Lord Lansdowne felt compelled to revoke his approval, which only further damaged Anglo-German relations, much to the satisfaction of the Milner Group.

The press attack over the Baghdad railway project made up only one incident in a long and orchestrated campaign. As Oron Hale, an American historian, remarks:

> The Entente Cordiale (the Anglo-French entente) could never have been effected without the methodically organised press campaign, from the beginning of 1901, by the most authoritative organs of the conservative party ... the *Times, Spectator,* and *National Review* . . . first they seized every occasion to reveal to their compatriots a French success or quality ... But ... with equal perseverance each of these three organs, in a different form, exerted itself to destroy as far as possible the memory of former sympathies for the German empire. The *Times* applied

> itself to signalling the articles and caricatures in which our neighbours from across the Rhine gave expression to their ardent jealousies. The *Spectator* applied itself to an analysis of the Anglophobe propaganda in the German universities. Finally, the *National Review,* in its monthly studies, signalled to the public the dangers of Pan-Germanism ... As soon as an incident—diplomatic, economic, or military—occurred ... the three organs, with common accord, insisted upon the danger and hostility of Germany, and the utility of friendship with France.[124]

Hale omitted identifying those who "methodically organized" this press campaign against Germany but the inference remains that methodically organized campaigns need organizers. This assertion accords with Quigley's charge that *The Times* had become a fief of the Milner Group between 1896 and 1912. Quigley states that *The Times* was the most influential paper in Britain because the Milner Group fostered close ties between the paper and the British Foreign Office.[125] Further, Quigley admits (admit because Quigley was a Germanophobe) that from 1895 *The Times* deliberately fostered hostility to Germany.[126] To have an authority like Oron Hale corroborate Quigley's claims adds credibility to the case for conspiracy.

As part of the campaign to turn British public opinion against Germany, the Milner Group orchestrated and encouraged a series of national scares, consisting of spy scares, invasion scares, fifth column scares, naval scares, and a campaign for national service [conscription]. Through all these scares ran the twin themes of the dangerous state of British defenses and the existence of a treacherous enemy lurking just beyond the horizon.

No evidence has ever surfaced to support the claim for a German fifth column in Britain. Nonetheless, the press frequently alarmed the British public with stories of German infiltrators who

marched and drilled all over England. These German fifth columnists were supposed to have had arsenals of weapons and explosives stockpiled throughout the land, and they just awaited the command of the German Kaiser to fall upon their peaceful British hosts. Although there were fewer than fifty-thousand German male and female nationals living in England, estimates of the number of German spies/fifth columnists/trained saboteurs ranged from 100,000 to 300,000 men. Not surprisingly, this poison ate away at the historical British goodwill toward Germany. A most striking if overlooked asymmetry in Anglo-German relations is that Germany lacked any comparable scaremongering about British nationals, and British fifth columnists.

Even more troubling, no evidence ever surfaced that the German army considered or planned a military invasion of Britain. The German invasion rumor had some source but it could not have come from German leaks. Nonetheless, the British press insisted the demonic Kaiser and his generals only awaited their opportunity to pounce on the peaceful British. Some contemporaries, Churchill included (1909), understood that unless Britain undertook a more objective appraisal of German policies, Germany would inevitably have to play her assigned role. However, most British citizens gradually came to believe that a hostile Hun lurked just beyond the horizon.

Driving home the point, the Milner group collaborated in engineering a heated, drawn-out debate over conscription, which reinforced the growing national susceptibility to the anti-German message. Drawing on the invasion scares, the national service campaign highlighted Britain's long undefended coastline, and brilliantly conflated the notion of an undefended coast and a defenseless coast. Speech after speech, article after article, ominously carried explicit and implicit warnings against the German menace, a tirade that gradually indoctrinated the public to associate the ideas of hostility, enemy, and invasion with Germany. J. A. Farrer, an author whom the Milner group found particularly

disagreeable, has this to say:

> In any case, the continual dripping of such hints of terror into the public ear had the intended effect of representing Germany as an enemy State with which sooner or later we were bound to be at war. It was by such a process of national self-suggestion that war ultimately developed from imagination into actuality.[127]

Farrer's main claim is that the anti-German sentiment in Britain came about through the efforts of a small group clustered around King Edward and his court. He was correct. Hardinge and Esher had huge influence in the Edwardian court.

However, all these scares pale to insignificance against the great naval scare: the British navy provided both physical security and psychic security to the nation. By conflating the threat of a German invasion with the growth of the German Navy, the Milner Group had not only struck a national nerve but also had hit upon the mother lode of propaganda issues. They convinced the British population that a strong German Navy threatened Great Britain. At the peak of the naval scare, Balfour alleged that Germany had accelerated her building program, claiming that she would have twenty dreadnoughts in 1911. In fact, Germany started 1911 with fewer than half Balfour's estimate.

Balfour's public alarm contradicted the private estimates of the Admiralty. Britain's First Sea Lord, Adm. Fisher, on 21 March 1909 wrote to Lord Esher that the British Navy had:

> Now culminated with two complete fleets in home waters, *each of which* is incomparably superior to the whole German fleet mobilised for war ... This can't alter for years even if we were supinely passive in our building.[128]

Men like Balfour and Admiral Fisher who knew better did not state the truth publicly: alarming the public suited them politically. And alarmed people became. They clamored in the streets for eight more dreadnoughts: "We want eight, and we won't wait."

As the naval historian Marder notes: " ... already, in the summer and autumn of 1904, talk of the inevitability of an Anglo-German war was in the air."[129] Concerning the Anglo-German naval race, Marder recognizes the supremacy of the political factor:

> Behind the naval rivalry lay the true cause of British Teutonphobia and suspicion of the German navy ... In the last analysis, the political factor was the true explanation of the British reaction to the expanding fleet across the North Sea, yet it is remarkable how this tended to be obscured and how the continual growth of the German Fleet had *per se* become as early as 1905-06 the great stumbling block and 'only obstacle' to satisfactory Anglo-German relations. [130]

The political factor lay at the heart of the Anglo-German naval race, yet few scholars make the political factor the centerpiece of their analysis.

Admiral Fisher, as the First Sea Lord, occupied the most powerful naval post on Earth. He mocked the idea of a German naval threat, but he so detested the Germans that he connived in the illusion of that threat. Marder says of Fisher:

> Above and beyond all else was Fisher's violent hostility to Germany. He shared the Teutonphobia of friends and associates like the journalist Arnold White, the Portuguese Ambassador Soveral, and Lord Esher.[131]

Fisher concentrated the British fleet in home waters, aiming 80% of its guns directly at Germany. Not surprisingly, the Germans sensed a real threat from Britain.

Fisher's political superiors permitted him to make outrageous verbal attacks on Germany. He twice suggested (1904 and 1908) making a preemptive strike to "Copenhagen" (sink) the entire German navy. Bellicose comments from other senior admiralty figures reinforced the message. Because Fisher's political superiors tolerated his anti-German remarks, one may infer that he openly promoted what they secretly espoused. By degrees, the Milnerites infused and fostered an anti-German culture in the thinking of Britain's elite. Expressing anti-German views became fashionable, which in turn allowed the Milnerites to ratchet up the anti-German rhetoric.

Marder follows the well-worn Anglo-American path of downplaying the seriousness of Fisher's bellicosity. However, he concedes:

> Regrettably ... the legend was far more important than the fact. Many Germans in responsible positions, the Emperor among them, really believed that Fisher planned to attack, a feeling reinforced by occasional preventive war speeches and articles in England.[132]

Anglo-American scholarly work suffers an epidemic of such carefully crafted dismissive spin. Slipping through the Anglo-American narratives is the growth of the anti-German culture—this is the real prewar story because the anti-German environment enabled the Milner Group to steer Britain into war.

Marder gives us a glimpse of this anti-German culture:

> The Russo-Japanese War led to a sharpening of Anglo-German relations. The story was current in England that the Germans were behind all the trouble,

> trying to embroil England with the French and the Russians. Even the Admiralty gave credence to this hallucination, for such it was. Fisher wrote to Lady Fisher: "things look very serious. It's really the Germans behind it all . . . Peace seems assured tonight, but one never knows, as that German Emperor is scheming all he knows to produce war between us and Russia."[133]

In using the term "hallucination," Marder deftly sidesteps explaining why the story was current in England.

An infamous North Sea incident involved Russian ships firing on British fishing trawlers. Britain had every right to hold Russia accountable. Instead, the British Foreign Office blamed the incident on Germany, accusing her of having warned Russia that Japanese torpedo boats patrolled the North Sea. The Foreign Office lie triggered a bitter press war between Britain and Germany.[134]

The organized press campaigns against Germany were but one front in the Milnerite grand strategy of befriending Russia. A more important factor in that strategy was cultivating France. Milner's great friend and former superior in Egypt, Lord Cromer (Evelyn Baring), advised Lansdowne to conclude an Anglo-French agreement that would convert Morocco into a French province.[135]

Lord Cromer belonged to the Baring family that controlled the Baring Bank in the City. He got his first Egyptian post, commissioner of the public debt, through the patronage of Sir George Goschen. Afterwards, Cromer and Goschen developed a close friendship.[136] Goschen later arranged for his greatest disciple, Sir Alfred Milner, to become Director-General of Accounts in Egypt. Not surprisingly, Milner and Cromer became close friends.

Cromer wanted Britain to offer France control of Morocco in exchange for abolishing the Caisse de la Dette in Egypt. As Monger notes, France made excluding Germany the price of her friendship:

> France, he [Lansdowne] noted was ready to recognise Spanish interests if 'other Powers'—by which he meant Germany—were excluded. This was the French condition, and if Lansdowne wanted an understanding at all he must accept it.[137]

As the negotiations over Morocco and Egypt continued, Cromer spelled out for Lansdowne the anti-German implications in the proposed deal. Lansdowne replied:

> I quite see your point about Germany. I have felt from the first, and so has Cambon, that we shall have to reckon with Germany ...[138]

Lansdowne, and presumably the Foreign Office staff, expected his anti-German agreement to provoke German resentment.

Cromer did not conceal from Lansdowne the wider scope of the Entente:

> Cromer continued to remind Lansdowne of the wider meaning of the entente. On 12 December he wrote that 'one of the main attractions in the whole business to the authorities of the Quai d'Orsay is the hope of leading up to an Anglo-Russian arrangement and thus isolating Germany'. Nothing could be plainer;[139]

Elements within the French Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office had a mutual understanding that included an Anglo-French entente, an isolated Germany and an Anglo-Russian agreement.

On 4 April 1904 Britain and France signed the Entente Cordiale. The agreement settled disputes about Siam, the Newfoundland fisheries, West Africa, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides.

Naturally, the entente alarmed the Sultan and the Moorish government; they complained of British abandonment. However, the British minister in Morocco, Arthur Nicolson, advised the Sultan to cooperate with the French, and then stonily wrote to the Foreign Office the Sultan did not realize "French advice and assistance would be effective and permanent."[140]

Whereas British diplomats knew that Britain had given France a free hand in Morocco, the British public believed the Entente Cordiale represented a noble effort to advance the common good in Morocco. In the public version of the agreement Britain and France committed to recognize the Sultan's sovereignty, to preserve Morocco's territorial integrity, and to preserve an open door trading policy. In public, Anglo-French goals were honorable.

The secret clauses of the agreement clarified the meaning of the diplomatic support mentioned in the public clauses. Article II of the secret clauses reads:

> His Britannic Majesty's government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of capitulation's, or in the judicial organisation of Egypt.
>
> In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty's government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.[141]

Even dressed up in the euphemistic niceties of diplomatic language, Britain had agreed to a French annexation of Morocco.

Furthermore, France undertook to negotiate with Spain on dividing Morocco, and to communicate this agreement to Britain.

As promised, on 3 October 1904 France and Spain signed an innocuous public accord on Morocco. However, they had secretly agreed on how they would divide the pillage. Lansdowne had stipulated that Spain should obtain the coastline of Morocco opposite Gibraltar to prevent either Germany or France from threatening the approaches to the Mediterranean. Anderson comments:

> In fact, had the secret articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the Sultan were complete shams.[142]

Describing the British, French and Spanish assurances as "shams" is an unusually sharp and pointed remark for a scholar, but shams they were, and everybody in the British Foreign Office knew it.

As expected, Germany objected to the annexation of Morocco. On 31 March 1905 the German Emperor landed at Tangier and proclaimed German support for Moroccan sovereignty. The first Moroccan Crisis had begun.

While Lansdowne, Balfour and the French took the Kaiser's visit to Tangier in their stride, the Milnerites set off a press war:

> *The Times* and most of the British press, in sharp contrast to their French counterparts, immediately treated the Kaiser's stop as a deliberate maneuver to wreck the growing Anglo-French friendship. On April 4 *The Times* called Willhelm II an agent provocateur and urged France to stand firm ...[143]

The Foreign Office inspired *The Times,* and shortly afterward most

of the British press followed their lead.

As the Moroccan Crisis intensified, France's Foreign Minister Delcassé succumbed to the political pressure and resigned; then he immediately withdrew his resignation. This wavering in Paris prompted the Foreign Office to buttress Delcassé. Mallet wrote to Bertie (the British Ambassador) in Paris:

> When I saw Delcassé's resignation I wrote to Lord Lansdowne to say that I thought things looked serious for the entente and asked him what we should do supposing Germany pressed home her victory and asked for a port. I urged him to let you tell the French government that we should see them through. Lord L. answered 'consult Admiralty', so I went over to see Fisher.
>
> He [Fisher] said, "of course the Germans will ask for Morgador and I shall tell Lord L. that if they do we must have *at least* Tangier– of course it is all rot and it would not matter to us whether the Germans got Morgador or not but I'm going to say so all the same." ... He is a splendid chap and simply longs to have a go at Germany. I "abound in his sense" and told him I would do all I could with Lord L.[144]

Fisher and Mallet not only sought friendship with France but also longed for war with Germany.

When Fisher's official communication arrived in the Foreign Office, Mallet described it as "stunning." The admiral officially advised the Foreign Secretary that a German port in Morocco would be 'vitally detrimental' to British interests. Fisher concluded:

> This seems a golden opportunity for fighting the Germans in alliance with the French so I earnestly hope you may be able to bring this about ... All I

> hope is that you will send a telegram to Paris that the English and the French fleets are one. We could have the German Fleet, the Kiel Canal and Schleswig-Holstein within a fortnight.[145]

Admiral Fisher, the most powerful sailor on Earth had advised the British Foreign Secretary to declare war on Germany over an issue he avowed was 'all rot'. Just as unsettling, Lord Lansdowne's private secretary, Mallet, betrayed his political superior by collaborating in Fisher's deception. This misbehavior amounted to sedition.

As the Moroccan crisis deepened, *The Times* leveraged its authority and credibility to persuade the British public that their statesmen had acted nobly and that German statesmen had revealed deep-seated hostility to Britain. Trusting *The Times,* the British public resented this German belligerence and with careful nurturing anti-German suspicion began eating away at a century of Anglo-German goodwill.

To highlight the virulence of the British press campaign against Germany, Oron Hale notes:

> A *Daily News* correspondent in Kiel noted that in future when some historian wrote the history of Anglo-German relations during this period he would assuredly head one of his chapters somewhat as follows: "Was there in the year 1905 a conspiracy within a large portion of the English Press to provoke an Anglo-German war? No one who carefully studies *The Times* will answer this question with a very confident negative. If war should come, a terrible guilt will rest on those men who have so persistently used the great engines of our press, whether purposely or carelessly towards that issue."[146]

Note the *Daily News* correspondent introduced the word 'conspiracy', and that Oron Hale chose to quote him. This was not an accident. Scholars dare not mention conspiracy in their papers, but they can always quote somebody who did.

Hale notes the English and French press often misled their readers by quoting a hostile article and describing the paper as an official organ of the German government:

> In London *Times*, June 7, 1905, appears Wickham Steed's report from Vienna on Delcassé's resignation, in which he records an attack of the *Neuie Freie Presse* on the former foreign minister. The *Neuie Freie Presse* was designated as "Count von Bulow's Vienna organ," thus making the Berlin Foreign Office responsible for the attack of an Austrian paper upon a French statesman. This was a malicious supposition. Bulow's directions to the press bureau, on June 6, were to restrain German papers.[147]

Simply put, *The Times* invented charges against Germany.

The key historical fact is the Foreign Office, *The Times,* and the political elite only succeeded in inflaming British passions against Germany by suppressing the secret articles. However one evaluates the Entente Cordiale in general, the Moroccan part was an unsavory and publicly indefensible pact of aggression.

When the secret clauses finally leaked in 1912, the contemporary English radical, E. D. Morel, summarized the betrayal of the public trust:

> The British people have been systematically misled and misinformed as to the part played by Germany in the Morocco question. And for these reasons; first, because the genesis of German action has lain in the existence of secret conventions and arrangements

> between the British, French and Spanish Governments, withheld from the knowledge of the British people, who have therefore, been induced to form their judgement upon incomplete data; secondly, because a concerted effort, inspired by certain influences connected with the British diplomatic machine, and conveyed to the British public through the medium of powerful newspapers, has been consistently pursued with the object of portraying German policy in the Morocco question in a uniformly sinister light.[148]
>
> All through 1905 the clamour continued, and—no careful student of the journalistic literature of that period can entertain the slightest doubt upon the subject—was incited both in England and in France by the 'diplomatic machine' concerned in working for and executing the secret arrangements of 1904.[149]...
>
> I commend a perusal of the foreign pages of *The Times* of this period – say from May to November, 1905. They make astonishing reading. The insults and threats to Germany mingled with personal abuse of the Emperor William, in the Paris and Berlin telegrams especially the Paris telegrams, are incessant.[150]

Morel highlights an overlooked dimension to the Moroccan dispute: Britain won the diplomatic duel with Germany by betraying the British people. When one considers the huge sacrifice the people had to make during 1914-18, the term victim seems right. One therefore finds it troubling that so few Anglo-American scholars highlight how the British Government and *The Times* duped the British public into believing the Moroccan agreement represented British nobleness.

In the middle of the Moroccan Crisis, Balfour's ministry

collapsed. Chirol spoke for the Milner Group when he expressed a desire for the Liberal Imperialists to capture the key portfolios in the incoming Liberal government.[151] Anticipating the fall of the Conservatives, Mallet viewed the prospect of a Liberal Foreign Secretary with extreme anxiety, but he expressed total confidence in Grey—Grey was "sound."[152] Mallet tried to persuade any Liberal he knew to support Grey's candidacy.[153] The Milner Group had great confidence in Sir Edward Grey taking the Foreign Office, despite his limited experience, and nonexistent knowledge of Europe. Given the virulence of Mallet's anti-German views, his endorsement of Sir Edward Grey speaks a great deal about Grey's attitude to Germany.

118 Monger, George, *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 –1907.* London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1963. Print. 77

119 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 99-101

120 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 102-103.

121 Anderson, E. N. *The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930 Print. 84-85

122 The evidence indicates that quite a bit of advanced planning went into King Edward's 'impromptu' visit to Paris. See Busch, Briton Cooper, *Hardinge Of Penshurst: A Study In Old Diplomacy,* Hamden, Archon Books, 1980. Print. 57 for evidence that the French president and the British ambassador co-operated in the venture.

123 See Busch, Briton Cooper, *Hardinge Of Penshurst: A Study In Old Diplomacy,* Hamden, Archon Books, 1980, p. 54 for Hardinge's less than believable account of how the famous Paris visit occurred.

124 Hale, Oron James, *Germany And The Diplomatic Revolution: A Study In Diplomacy And The Press*, 1904-1906. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931. Print 20

125 *The Anglo-American Establishment,* 113.

126 *The Anglo-American Establishment,* 116.

127 Farrer, J. A. *England Under Edward VII.* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1922. Print 215-216

128 *England Under Edward VII,* 237-245

129 Marder, Arthur, J., *From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow.* London, Oxford University Press, 1961.Vol I Print. 108-109

130 *From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow,* Vol I 123

131 *From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow,* Vol I 26

132 *From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow,*Vol I 112-113

133 *From The Dreadnought To Scapa Flow,*Vol I 111

134 See Morris, A.J.A., *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914.* London, Routledge & Keegan Paul. 1984. Print. 63

135 Anderson, E. N. *The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930 Print. 90

136 Spinner, Thomas J., Jr. *George Joachim Goschen: The Transformation Of A Victorian Liberal.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1973. Print. 52

137 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 128
138 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 145.
139 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 145.
140 Nicolson, Harold, Po*rtrait Of A Diplomatist: Being The Life Of Sir Arthur Nicolson First Lord Carnock, And A Study Of The Origins Of The First World War.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Company. 1930. Print. 110
141 *The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906,* 102 - 104
142 *The First Moroccan Crisis 1904-1906,* 125

143 Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 1969. Print. 34
144 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 189
145 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900-1907,* 189
146 *Germany And The Diplomatic Revolution: A Study In Diplomacy And The Press,* 1904-1906. 9
147 *Germany And The Diplomatic Revolution: A Study In Diplomacy And The Press, 1904-1906,* 9
148 Morel, E. D. *Morocco In Diplomacy.* London, Smith, Elder & Co. 1912 Print. xix
149 *Morocco In Diplomacy,* 84-86
150 *Morocco In Diplomacy,* 88
151 *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914,* 68
152 *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 –1907,* 257.
153 *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914,* 70

5
The Relugas Intrigue

Throughout 1905, Balfour and his Tories suffered a withering series of by-election defeats. With support for the Tories crumbling, the Milner Group prepared for a change in government, preparations that highlight how effective and influential the Group had become.

Esher persuaded the King to promote the principle of continuity in foreign affairs, a principle that when stripped of all its niceties rejected outright the right of an elected Liberal government creating a Liberal foreign policy. Continuity demanded the Liberal government adhere to the foreign policy of the previous Tory government.

The principle of continuity was but one side of a comprehensive plan. To reinforce continuity, Milner sought to increase the authority of his allies, the Liberal Imperialists, in Campbell-Bannerman's government. At first, Milner wanted to control three essential portfolios: the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of War. He ignored the Colonial Office, suggesting that by 1906 he had subordinated his interest in the Imperial Parliament to the immediate need to condition the Empire for war. Thus, the Milnerites set out to promote Asquith's claim to succeed Campbell Bannerman as Prime Minister, Sir Edward Grey's claim to the Foreign Office, and most surprising of all, Haldane's claim to

the War Office.

Haldane, who in common with many of Milner's inner circle had ingratiated himself with the King, records that in late July 1905 he slept overnight at the Palace. His motives for the visit were political. Upon arrival, he spent well over an hour discussing politics with Lord Knollys, the King's private personal secretary. At dinner that evening, he expounded to the King on the overall state of British politics, describing in detail the Liberal Party factions.[154] Haldane contended that because of Balfour's impending defeat, the defense of the Empire would fall to the Liberal Imperialists.

After his meeting with the King, Haldane met Grey and Asquith in late September at Grey's Relugas fishing Lodge. The trio made a pact to stand together in the imminent negotiations with Campbell-Bannerman. Haldane summarized their agreement as follows:

> We agreed ... that if Campbell-Bannerman became Prime Minister he should take a peerage, and that Asquith should lead in the commons as Chancellor of the Exchequer. We resolved that we could not join Campbell-Bannerman's government unless our schema was carried out in substance. What we thus resolved on we used afterwards ... to speak of among ourselves as the 'Relugas compact'.[155]

One has to distinguish between legitimate political maneuvering and improper, perhaps unconstitutional, plots. Three politicians uniting their efforts to gain political advantage is legitimate in politics. However, those politicians stray off the acceptable path when they involve the monarch in their plots as Haldane did when he outlined the Relugas pact to Knollys:

> When I had some confidential conversations with you in the end of July you asked me to let you know if any new development took place in the situation

of the opposition.[156]

... I have no knowledge of the attitude ... of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. ... I have just returned ... from a private consultation with Asquith and Grey. We had, as you know, formed the view strongly that Sir H. C. B. might ... go to the Upper House leaving Asquith to lead the Commons with Grey by his side. But we have within the last few days been made aware that this course will not be acceptable to a certain section of the party. ... Pressure will doubtless be put on Sir H. C. B. to retain his lead in the Commons. ... Asquith, Grey, and I feel that were this to happen we could in office render no real service ... and we have decided, in such case, that it would be best for us to intimate to Sir H. C. B. that we should stand aside. 157... We believe that the opposition cannot emerge from its present position unless we can, with our friends and followers, to some extent shape policy. To do this implies that our group should form a sufficiently strong and important minority in the Cabinet. ...'[158] What is proposed is that Asquith should, in as friendly and tactful way possible, and without assuming that Sir H. C. B. is adverse, tell him of the resolution we have come to. ... What we would try to bring about is that ... Sir H. C. B. ... should propose to the King the leadership of the House of Commons with the Exchequer for Asquith, either the Foreign Office or Colonial Office for Grey and the Woolsack for myself. ..."[159]

Knollys responded:

Many thanks for your important and interesting letter ... which I presume you will not object to my showing

> confidentially to the King. ... A Cabinet of which Sir H.C.B. was the head, without the moderates, would it appears to me, be disastrous both for the Country and the Party ... what the King would desire would be the presence of a restraining influence in the Cabinet ... men like yourself, Asquith and Sir E. Grey ... would not you be better able to advance the ... welfare of the country and the Liberal Party, by joining Sir H. C. B.'s Government, even if he remained in the House of Commons ...?[160]

Knollys' response makes it clear the Palace had accepted the need to ensure a strong Liberal Imperialist presence in Cabinet—why?

Early in October the King summoned Haldane, Balfour and Esher to discuss the future of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID).[161] Haldane revealed that Campbell-Bannerman opposed the committee, while he, Grey, and Asquith supported it.[162] Later in the meeting the King suggested to Balfour appointing Milner and Esher as permanent members of the CID, a suggestion that echoed an earlier recommendation of Esher's.[163] Balfour sympathized with the King's proposal and immediately agreed to appoint Esher, but he balked at appointing a man as controversial and polarizing as Milner. Although the Milner Group only succeeded in getting Esher appointed, they evidently considered control of the CID a key objective.

Haldane exulted to Asquith:

> The plan is thoroughly approved in all its details. ... I think that K. will ask C. B. to Sandringham in Nov. and say that he doubts, from recent observations, whether anyone but a young man can be both P.M. and Leader in his H. of C. ... This leaves it open to C.B. to think that Ld. S. may be sent for, and later on will enable the K. to suggest a peerage to H. C. B.

> meantime both he and Knollys ... wish you to go into general policy with C. B. but not to go as far as to let him surmise any connection between your con–versation and what may (be) done here.
>
> They are fully alive to the importance of secrecy and reticence. If only tongues are held (and I have done all that can be done to secure this) I think ... that we have secured very cordial and powerful assistance. ...[164]

The evidence shows Balfour, the King, Knollys, and Esher (a leader in a secret society) colluded in shaping the incoming Liberal Government, a collusion that at best was constitutionally suspect, and at worst was outright conspiracy. Balfour's complicity in strengthening the hands of the Liberal Imperialists explains the great mystery behind his extraordinary tactical decisions later in December to resign, but the entire affair raises serious questions about the Liberal Imperialists.

To whom or to what did the Liberal Imperialists pledge their allegiance? In the years that followed, Grey consistently confided in Balfour, and consulted him regularly on foreign policy, confidences and consultations he withheld from his Cabinet colleagues. One has to feel discomfort with a Liberal Foreign Secretary disclosing everything to the Leader of the Opposition while simultaneously withholding crucial, information from the Cabinet, the collective that had the constitutional task of governing Britain. Grey and Haldane subverted the political system by not giving their allegiance to the Cabinet.

In late 1905, Balfour's exhausted ministry could no longer even limp forward. The time had come to put Esher's plan into effect. Instead of asking the King to dissolve Parliament, Balfour and his colleagues resigned, forcing Campbell Bannerman to take office in the old Parliament.

As calculated, Campbell-Bannerman felt differently about the

Liberal Imperialists before the election in contrast to after. Going into the election he preferred to present a credible united front to the electorate. Thus Balfour's resignation enormously strengthened the hand of Asquith and Grey—the price they commanded before the election exceeded anything they could have commanded after.

Hearing rumors that Balfour might resign in the old Parliament, Campbell Bannerman discussed forming a Liberal Cabinet with Asquith. Faced with the prospect of damaging his claim to succeed Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister if he refused to work for party unity, Asquith adapted his Relugas commitments, and declined to ask Campbell Bannerman to go to the Lords. To his credit, Asquith insisted on including Grey and Haldane in the Cabinet, which, while doing little for Grey, strengthened Haldane's claim to a seat in the Government.[165]

Balfour resigned on 4 December 1905 and Knollys wrote to Campbell-Bannerman:

> Dear Sir Henry,
> Mr. Balfour having just placed his resignation & that of the Government in the hands of the King, I am desired by His Majesty to acquaint you that he would be glad if you would have the goodness to come to Buckingham Palace at a quarter to eleven tomorrow (Tuesday) morning.
> Believe me,
> Yours vy truly,
> Knollys.[166]

Reacting to Balfour's resignation, many Liberals advised Campbell-Bannerman not to take office in the old Parliament. However, the palace had a plan to pressure Campbell-Bannerman. Through Loulou Harcourt (a close friend of Esher) the King threatened Campbell-Bannerman that he might call on Lord Rosebery to form a Liberal Government:

> The K. says if you refused he would be compelled very unwillingly to send for Rosebery. So of course you will accept. ..."[167]

On the same day, Lord Esher pressured Campbell-Bannerman to return to London.[168]

Although Asquith had altered the original Relugas compact, Grey went in the opposite direction, revealing the tough edge to his character. Astutely, Grey sensed that he and his Liberal Imperialist friends could drive a hard bargain so he refused to join the Campbell Bannerman ministry.

Haldane tried to bridge the difference between his two friends. Following Asquith's lead, he negotiated with Campbell Bannerman without insisting on the leader going to the Lords. Campbell-Bannerman in return offered Haldane the Attorney General's office and Grey the Foreign Office. This was a real concession given Haldane's unpopularity as noted by Loulou Harcourt:

> The feeling against Haldane being in the Cabinet is very strong with our rank and file. I don't share it, though I have no reason to love him. I expect the King will want him somewhere in the inner circle.[169]

Harcourt had clearly noticed the palace pressure to have Haldane in the Cabinet.

Campbell-Bannerman's offer delighted the Milnerites because it settled Haldane's claim to a Cabinet seat, but Grey continued to pressure the Liberal leader to leave the House of Commons so Asquith could lead. He confronted Campbell-Bannerman brutally as the Leader recalled:

> At ten that Monday night Grey went to see Campbell-Bannerman. The interview was short and sharp. Sir

> Henry described Grey as coming to him 'all buttoned up and never undoing one button' to demand that he go to the House of Lords.[170]

Grey left the meeting determined that Campbell-Bannerman pay dearly for the respectability and credibility the Liberal Imperialists could bring to the Government. If nothing else, this confrontation gives us a glimpse of Grey as a hardheaded ruthless politician, a ruthlessness that has been lost in the Anglo-American literature. We see a lot of Grey the refined English gentleman in the literature, but we rarely if ever see the tenacious and formidable opponent that had made him a tennis champion in his youth.

On 5 December before accepting office, Campbell-Bannerman told Asquith of the talk he had with Grey the night before. Asquith replied that he thought the job of Prime Minister and Leader of the House was too much for one man. He also said that Grey was his dearest friend and supporter and that it would be a personal pain to work without him in the government. Asquith then went to see Grey and found him in a "three-cornered humor."[171] Despite Asquith's desire to compromise, Grey still believed he could push Campbell-Bannerman out of the House of Commons.

At the palace, Campbell-Bannerman's moment of triumph shriveled away when the King suggested he go to the Lords. Campbell-Bannerman declined, "sore and wounded." He credited the King's attitude to the influence of Haldane and Grey, and this had increased his distaste for falling in with their views: "was he to be dictated to and kicked upstairs by the youngest of the new ministers, a man who had hitherto been no more than an under-secretary?"[172]

The Times on 5 November voiced the propaganda of the Milner Group:

> Sir Edward Grey would be in the Cabinet the chief guarantee to the country that the rash world of his

> leader (C. B.) would not be allowed to bring forth fruit in action, and further, that due continuity would be maintained in foreign affairs.[173]

Following Grey's lead, the Milnerites increased the pressure on Campbell-Bannerman. *The Times* weighed in on 6 December with an article suggesting that Campbell-Bannerman go to the Lords while Asquith appealed to Campbell-Bannerman in the same vein. Shaken, Campbell-Bannerman asked his wife's advice and she firmly refused to have her "Henry" humiliatingly shelved by his enemies. Bolstered by his wife's vote of confidence, he decided to fight.[174]

On 7 December, *The Times* continued the pressure:

> The opinion gains ground that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman will eventually waive his objections ... to his elevation to the upper house ... it is becoming plain that he cannot otherwise secure the inclusion in his Cabinet of ... the men ... upon whom he must depend. ...[175]

These sentiments from *The Times* prove the paper took direction from the Milner Group and cooperated in Grey's attempt to break Campbell-Bannerman, confirming the close bond among *The Times,* the Milner Group and Sir Edward Grey.

However, Campbell-Bannerman did the breaking. He persuaded Asquith to join his government as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Asquith tried to disguise the crack in the Liberal Imperialist ranks by trying to persuade his dearest friend to join him in government, but Grey refused to budge.[176]

Despite Grey's bravado, Asquith had fatally undermined the attempt to oust Campbell-Bannerman from the Commons. Thus, when Grey and Haldane reviewed their position, Grey agreed to abandon the attack. Given his earlier nasty confrontation with the

leader, Grey sent Haldane to negotiate with Campbell Bannerman. The leader knew he had won, and he generously improved his offer to Haldane. Once more, he offered Grey the Foreign Office, but he sweetened his offer to Haldane by offering him the Home Office, a senior Cabinet post for which he was qualified. To Campbell-Bannerman's shock and astonishment, Haldane rejected this prestigious portfolio, requesting instead the War Office.[177]

King Edward openly applauded Haldane's appointment, applause echoed by the Prince of Wales who characterized Haldane as a great imperialist. Other imperialists voiced their satisfaction: George Clarke, secretary of the CID and to all extents and purposes Lord Esher's underling, said on 9 December 1905: "I prophesy as a result of the last hour's meeting that this will turn out the greatest appointment that has been made for a generation."[178] The tenor and import of Clark's language strongly suggest the Milnerites planned making important changes at the War Office.

Haldane's sudden interest in the War Office demanded a credible explanation. He had built a lucrative practice in colonial law, giving him some knowledge of colonial affairs. He had an avid interest in education, especially higher education, and the possibility of promoting national efficiency through education. He had also applied himself to the study of philosophy, becoming an authority on some German thinkers. Thus, Haldane was qualified to take the education, the colonial or one of the legal portfolios. In stark contrast, he knew little about the Army,[179] and to make matters worse, the War Office ranked among the least desirable Cabinet positions. When Haldane became Secretary of War, Esher wrote: "after our talks at Balmoral you can imagine the pleasure with which personally I see the idea which germinated there, come to fruition. The King is delighted."[180] In Milner's strategy, control of the War Office complemented control of the CID. Haldane put out the story that King Edward had advised him to forget his ambition of becoming Lord Chancellor because Sir Robert Reid had the stronger claim, and to take instead the War Office. What

Haldane had not explained, and what scholars eagerly overlook, was why the King should have wanted him Secretary of War.

Struggling with the difficulty of concocting a plausible explanation for his sudden interest in the War Office, Haldane adopted the tactic of spinning stories such as that to a close friend on 22 December 1905:[181]

> I have been lunching today with Haldane. ... Haldane's account is this. The first office which C.B. filled was Asquith's chancellorship. ... Then C. B. wrote to Haldane: ... he offered him all the other positions to choose from and suggested three Cabinet offices, ... Haldane gave an hour of careful thought to it, and then went to see Grey. ... Then Haldane ... answered that sacrifices must be made for public uses ... we must choose the very hardest jobs which are going. In this government there are two places of paramount importance, where it is all kicks and no ha'pence. These are the War Office and the Foreign Office. If you will take the F. O., I will take the War Office. Grey at last consented ... Haldane went down in person to C. B. when he said that he had come not merely to accept the War Office for himself but had brought Grey back into the fold also, C. B.'s gratitude and delight knew no bounds. Next day (Saturday) Lord Esher came to Haldane with a message from the King, to express his warm approval.[182]

Although renowned for his command of language and argument, Haldane merely stated the importance of the War Office without giving any specific reason. Given that few if any of his contemporaries shared this estimation of the War Office, one must conclude that Haldane had great plans for the War Office—but he

knew nothing about the Army so where did he get those plans?

Lord Fisher reflecting on the historic importance of this intrigue to promote the Liberal Imperialists wrote:

> Had Campbell-Bannerman only known what a literally overwhelming majority he was going to obtain at the forthcoming election, he would have formed a very different Government from what he did, and I don't believe we should have had the War [183]

What a pity that Lord Fisher's opinion has been ignored. Another measure of the intrigue's importance came from Campbell-Bannerman. He told a friend that if he had formed his government after, instead of before the election, "the constituencies and the New House of Commons" would not have agreed to include the "Liberal Leaguers."[184] Echoing Lord Fisher, one can say that without the Relugas compact, Balfour's resignation and King Edward's pressure on Campbell-Bannerman, there would have been no Great War—the Relugas intrigue deserves a special mention in the history books.

On 11 December 1905, Grey became the British Foreign Secretary. In general, Anglo-American scholars proclaim Grey's high-mindedness, decency, and integrity; however, the Grey we encounter in history confounds these scholarly accolades. Throughout the years leading up to the Great War, Grey persistently misled the British people, the British Parliament, and his Cabinet colleagues about his foreign policy. Because the scholars barely touch on this darker side of Grey's character, the man becomes an historical enigma: Grey was the honorable and honest man who behaved dishonorably and dishonestly.

As Foreign Secretary, Grey inherited the Moroccan Crisis, and his first test came at the Algeciras international conference, called to settle the dispute. At Algeciras Grey supported France unequivocally. He extended and enlarged the commitments made

by Lord Lansdowne in the original Anglo-French agreement. It is well known that Britain enlisted the support of the American delegate, Henry White, but what is less well known is that Henry White sympathized with the Milner Group, joined the organization and became a leading figure in the American round table movement. At Algeciras Britain and the United States of America created a united front that forced Germany to concede point after point, turning the Algeciras conference into an embarrassing diplomatic defeat for Germany. As this Anglo-French victory at Algeciras emerged, Grey wrote to Arthur Nicolson, the British representative at the conference:

> The recovery of Russia will change the situation in Europe to the satisfaction of France' ... and 'an *entente* between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary to check Germany it could be done.[185]

Grey had written plainly. He intended to create the Triple Entente of Russia, France and Britain, patiently nurture its growth and strength, and when the suitable time came, he intended to "check" Germany.

All the European Powers and the USA signed the Treaty of Algeciras. Sontag sums up its significance:

> Superficially, the Treaty of Algeciras embodied the essentials for which Germany had been striving. The independence and integrity of Morocco were solemnly reaffirmed. The bank was international; the police were international. At the head of the police was an inspector, a Swiss who was to make periodic reports to the powers. In reality Germany had been defeated. The police in the ports were French and Spanish; each country was supreme in the area

> allotted to it by the secret treaties of 1904.[186]

On behalf of the British people, Grey had confirmed the treaty of Algeciras, a treaty whose preamble solemnly affirmed the sovereignty and integrity of Morocco. However, these noble affirmations of Moroccan sovereignty conflicted with the secret British pledges to assist France and Spain in partitioning Morocco. Thus, we see the contradiction between the Grey of the scholars and the Grey of history.

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156 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 147

157.. *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 426-429

158 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 147

159 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,* 426-429

160 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 429

161 Fraser, Peter, *Lord Esher: A Political Biography.* London, Hart-Davis, MacGibbon Ltd, 1973. Print. 175

162 *Lord Esher: A Political Biography,* 176

163 *Lord Esher: A Political Biography,* 163

164 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 430

165 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,* 430-431

166 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 441

167 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 436

168.. *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 436

169 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,* 443

170 Robbins, Keith, *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography Of Lord Grey Of Fallodon*. London, Cassell, 1971. Print. 121

171.. *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 443-444

172 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 445

173 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 442

174 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,* 446

175 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 450

176 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 450

177.. *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 154

178 Sommer, Dudley, *Haldane Of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* . London, George Allen &Unwin Ltd. 1960, Print.151-152

179 *Haldane Of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* 166

180 *Lord Esher: A Political Biography*, 426

181 Edmund Gosse

182 *Haldane of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* 151

183.. *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman*, 458

184 *CB: A Life Of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman,* 458

185 Monger, George, *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 –1907.* London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1963. Print. 280

186 Sontag, Raymond James. *European Diplomatic History: 1871-1932.* New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933. Print. 110

6
Secret Military Talks

After Prime Minister Campbell-Bannerman dissolved parliament and the politicians went off campaigning, the military correspondent for *The Times*, Colonel Repington, discussed Anglo-French military cooperation with the French military attaché, Huguet.[187] Repington reported his discussions to Lord Esher and to Sir George Clarke, secretary of the CID. Following Repington's initiative, Clarke conducted talks with Huguet[188], a decision approved by Esher.

Late December, less than three weeks after Grey took office, Repington wrote to him outlining the military discussions.[189] On January 6 Grey warned Haldane the War Office should prepare for emergencies arising out of the Moroccan crisis.[190] Three days later Grey received a briefing from Clarke on the secret discussions with the French, discussions that Clarke suggested should be kept secret, as Williamson relates:

> Pointing to the necessity for secrecy in these matters, Clarke confided that he 'had said nothing to C. B. [Campbell-Bannerman] and he [Grey] seemed to think it was better not to do so at this stage. Of course if Grierson will play up loyally and intelligently there is no need in involving the P. M. just now.' Grey thus

> gave his approval, not only to Clarke's furtive contacts with the French, but also to concealing them from the leader of the Cabinet.[191]

In short: Esher's creature, Sir George Clarke, the permanent secretary to the CID, invited the Foreign Secretary to hide from the Prime Minister their secret Anglo-French military negotiations.

Worse, Grey consented to Clarke's deception. He sent the Prime Minister, campaigning in Scotland, a report that Williamson has summarized as follows:

> "Matters stand [with the French] as Lord Lansdowne left them. I have promised support in accordance with Article IV, and have let it be known at Madrid and Rome that we shall give this. I have not said a word of anything more and the French have asked no inconvenient questions." But there were reports, wrote Grey, that indicated the Germans were preparing for war; he thought the "steps taken imply precautions, but not intentions" and doubted there would be war. But he told Campbell-Bannerman the War Office ought "to be ready to answer the question what could they do if we had to take part against Germany if, for instance, the neutrality of Belgium was violated. ..." Grey assured the Prime Minister that at present he had no difficulty "as to what to say or do, but I am apprehensive of what may happen at the Conference when I may have to ask for a decision at a critical moment."[192]

Grey had deceived the Prime Minister by suppressing the secret military talks.

The following day, Grey suggested to the French Ambassador, Cambon, that British public opinion would probably support France

in a war with Germany. Grey promised Cambon to put the Anglo-French military conversations on an official footing. Thus, on 12 January, Grey arranged with Haldane to order General Grierson to begin military talks with Huguet. He sent a summary of his conversation with Cambon to the Prime Minister, but omitted the military talks, closing his letter "I assume that you will have a Cabinet directly the Elections are over to decide what I am to say."[193] In stark contrast, Grey informed Bertie, the British Ambassador to Paris, that Haldane had authorized the talks between the French military *attaché* and General Grierson of the British General Staff.[194] Continuing his deception, Grey violated established Foreign Office practice by ordering his staff not to send a summary of the Bertie telegram to the Prime Minister.

On January 15, General Grierson held the first "official" military talks with Huguet, official by virtue of the Foreign Secretary's authority and not the Cabinet's. In superb scholarly understatement, Grey's biographer Robbins concludes: "Grey and Haldane had moved adroitly to gain their point before the Prime Minister knew of the position."[195]

When scholars discuss the origins of the military conversations they concentrate on Grey and overlook Haldane and Esher. Overemphasizing Grey's role and all but erasing Haldane's allows scholars to avoid explaining how Haldane knew enough about the War Office to provide the generals required for the talks, and to provide them secretly. Haldane did not act alone when he provided the British generals for the talks—he had the assistance of Lord Esher. The need of the Milner Group to control the War Office becomes easier to understand if one assumes they had these talks in mind.

Haldane, a member of Cabinet and a practiced constitutional lawyer, knew that British constitutional tradition and the collective responsibility of Cabinet compelled him to inform the Cabinet about these military talks. As Williamson notes, a letter from the palace on January 18 alerted Grey and Haldane to the constitutional

problems.[196]

Perhaps inspired by the King's letter, on 19 January Grey spoke to Asquith about the military talks. That Asquith, an experienced lawyer, did not advise Grey to disclose the talks to the Prime Minister is both troubling and suggestive, troubling because he failed to correct Grey's constitutional error, suggestive because he agreed with Grey that they could pull off this coup.

On January 21 Campbell-Bannerman suggested to Grey that they hold a Cabinet to discuss how the government should respond to the French approaches. Grey demurred, saying he preferred to speak to the Prime Minister before the Cabinet.[197] Grey arranged to meet Campbell-Bannerman on 27-29 January at Windsor Castle where he could count on the support of King Edward, Knollys and Lord Esher. The King and Grey somehow persuaded the Prime Minister to accept the military talks as a *fait accompli.* Because all the participants suppressed the details of their meeting, one will never know how the King persuaded Campbell-Bannerman to accept Grey's behavior.

Williamson quotes from Cambon's dispatch of 1 February, 1906 to the French Foreign Ministry:

> At Windsor during the weekend of January 27-29 Edward, Campbell-Bannerman and Grey had agreed to conceal the talks from the Cabinet. They feared that the extension of the Anglo-French accords 'must give rise to a Cabinet discussion and that at present this consultation would have some inconveniences, for certain Ministers would be astonished at the opening of official talks between the military administrations of the two countries and of the studies which they have worked out in common. They have thus thought that it was better to keep silent and to continue discreetly the preparations which would put the two governments in a position to plan and act rapidly in

> case of need.[198]

Cambon's dispatch suggests the King and Grey persuaded Campbell-Bannerman to hide the talks from the Cabinet because the Cabinet would not sanction them. One would dearly like to know what argument persuaded Campbell-Bannerman to betray his friends in Cabinet and side with his political enemies, the Liberal Imperialists.

At the first Cabinet on 31 January 1906, the Prime Minister, Grey and Haldane suppressed the military conversations. Immediately after the Cabinet, Cambon pressed Grey for assurances of British aid if war broke out with Germany. Grey summarized for Bertie:

> At present France had an absolutely free hand in Morocco, with the promise of English diplomatic support; but, if England extended her promise beyond this, and made a formal alliance which might involve her in war, he was sure the British Cabinet would say that England must from time to time be consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to ask for alterations in French policy to avoid war. Was not the present situation so satisfactory that it was better not to alter it by a more formal engagement?[199]

Grey plainly admitted that his Cabinet colleagues would interfere in French policy to avoid war. Here then is one of the foundations for the Great War: Grey spent the following eight years disguising the true direction and thrust of his foreign policy from the Cabinet and the Liberal Radical members of Parliament. This secrecy enabled him to neutralize the peace faction in his own party. Without disclosure, the Radicals did not recognize the threat to peace, leaving Grey free to foster the disaster of 1914.

Campbell-Bannerman's friend, Lord Loreburn has the following to say:

> To make plans with one Power for a common war against another Power, should necessity for it arise, is a serious matter, and whatever reservations may be expressed as to preserving freedom of action, the attitude of the one country toward the other will be indelibly affected by such intimate co-operation. It does not create but it portends a future alliance, and indeed makes such a conclusion almost unavoidable.[200]

Loreburn rejects Grey's defense that because of the current election, he could not consult the Cabinet on the talks and he could only speak to Campbell-Bannerman, Haldane and Asquith. Loreburn closes: "... this concealment from the Cabinet was protracted, and must have been deliberate. Parliament knew nothing of it till 3rd August 1914, nor anything of the change of policy which the suppressed communication denoted."[201]

Morris in *Radicalism Against War* comments on the talks:

> It is incontestable that the Foreign Secretary had kept his colleagues in the dark because otherwise they certainly would have criticised if not opposed his actions. ...Campbell Bannerman and Ripon were not blameless for this episode as Grey's biographer is quick to point out. However, the abiding and significant fact was Grey's deviousness with his colleagues in pursuing the policy he desired, and his gross constitutional impropriety in not consulting them.[202]

In *Twenty-Five Years* Grey defends his position as follows:

> We must be free to go to the help of France as well as free to stand aside .... If there were no military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the assistance of France in time. ... we should in effect not have preserved our freedom to help France, but have cut ourselves off from the possibility of doing so.[203]

A. J. P. Taylor in *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* rebuts Grey's position:

> This was a good argument. But it would not have appealed to the radicals in the British Cabinet; and that for a simple reason. However strong the technical justification, the military talks were a political act. There was no pressing danger of war in January 1906, despite the Spanish alarm; and the Moroccan affair was, in fact, fought out at Algeciras purely with diplomatic weapons. Though the French accepted Grey's statement that 'no British government will ever commit itself on a hypothesis' the talks were the substitute for an alliance—and in some ways a more decisive one. Once the British envisaged entering a continental war, however remotely, they were bound to treat the independence of France, not the future of Morocco, as the determining factor.[204]

Sommer comments:

> The importance of the conversations, however, cannot be denied, and whatever the reasons may have been for failure to inform the Cabinet it was certainly a remarkable omission, not easy to reconcile with the practice of Cabinet responsibility. Grey himself later

> admitted that the Cabinet ought to have been informed at once.
>
> So began the 'military conversations' with France, of which Haldane said that "without the guidance we derived through the conversations we could not have been ready in July 1914."[205]

Haldane confirms that the talks were preparation for war.

A British officer involved in the talks was Major General John Spencer Ewart, who replaced General Grierson in October 1906 as Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. He wondered why:

> High-minded and sincerely patriotic men like Grey and Haldane, well aware of the strategic implications of the joint Franco-British military talks, should apparently refuse to divulge this information to other members of the Cabinet. [206]

Significantly, General Ewart knew Grey and Haldane had hidden the talks from Cabinet. He could only have known this if he had been told so we must infer he was ordered to keep quiet.

The gag order on the senior officers proved so effective the Cabinet as a whole only learned of the talks in 1911, after the Agadir Crisis. But the intrigue involved the collusion of more than Grey and Haldane. The talks remained secret for five years, showing the Foreign Office staff, the General Staff, Lord Esher and his CID colleagues and senior opposition conservatives privy to the talks colluded in hiding them. Nobody goes to these extreme lengths to suppress trivial talks. On the same theme, is it credible to argue that two inexperienced ministers, Grey and Haldane, could compel so many officials and politicians without organized support? Answering the last question leads to the central argument of this book—Grey did not act alone for he had powerful organized

help.

The Anglo-French military talks were the linchpin of Milner Group strategy. They aimed to set up the Triple Entente of Russia, France and Great Britain, and when that entente became strong, they would check Germany. The strategy integrated political and military components. By starting the talks during the crisis of 1906, the Milner Group intended to condition the French to think of a final military solution—the *revanche.* However, they knew the French were not suicidal: the Austro-German alliance was militarily dominant in 1906, 1908 and 1911 so despite talk to the contrary there was no likelihood of war. France would only take irreversible actions when Russia had regained its full strength and had fully committed to the war. Eventually, the Triple Entente would choose the time of war.

Grey's secret military talks are a cause of the Great War. They represent the secret policy of a small minority. That they took place so soon after Grey and Haldane assumed office suggests that Grey and Haldane had planned the talks.

Esher and the Milner Group orchestrated Balfour's resignation, and the King's support for the Relugas compact which enabled Grey and Haldane take their portfolios. The grand strategy behind the talks explains why the Milner Group insisted on Haldane becoming Secretary of War. Esher's influence, and that of the Milner Group, help explain how two inexperienced ministers could have deliberately designed this plan, subverted Cabinet collegiality, deceived Parliament, prosecuted the plan, compelled officials to remain silent about this momentous change in British policy, took secret steps to place the military conversations on an "official footing" without the Prime Minister's prior agreement, persuaded the King to support these secret initiatives, enlisted the King's aid in pressuring the Prime Minister to give in on the talks and to hide them from Cabinet. Even a seasoned senior intriguer would have struggled to pull this off, much less two inexperienced Cabinet ministers.

In orchestrating these secret military talks, Esher, Grey and Haldane covertly colluded with others to prepare for war with Germany, secret actions that subverted British democracy, conduct that goes by one name—conspiracy.

As an epilogue to this chapter, one must point out the most important part of Grey's policy is that he created a secret quasi-alliance. The secrecy fostered three conditions that contributed to the outbreak of the Great War. First: Grey gave France a free hand, by which he meant free from the restraining hand of the British Cabinet. Thus, French foreign policy grew more forward and aggressive because France enjoyed the benefits of an alliance without the restraints. This French freedom induced Russia to take a more aggressive line. Second: The target of Grey's secret policy, Germany and Austria, never learned that Britain had made military commitments to France. Consequently, in the July Crisis of 1914, Germany and Austria believed in the reasonable possibility that Britain would stand aside—a disastrous miscalculation. In short, because the Anglo-French quasi-alliance remained secret, it could not deter either the Germans or the Austrians. Third: As mentioned already, Grey's Cabinet colleagues, and more important the Liberal Radicals in Parliament could not prevent, forestall or ward off war because they never understood that Grey had committed Britain to military intervention on the continent. Without the secrecy, there would have been no war to discuss.

187 See Monger in *End to Isolation* for a comprehensive review of the question whether the talks first occurred during Lansdowne's tenure or Grey's tenure. Monger points out that it was Grey who first aired the notion that the talks had begun in Lansdowne's time in his memoirs which were published in 1925, almost twenty years after the fact. Also, all the papers of the Balfour ministry are now available and none of them contain a reference to talks with the French while the papers of the new Liberal ministers do. He also cites French sources that imply that Huguet, the Military attaché in London, had estimated the correct size of the British army without any input from the British War Office. On 20 December, 1905, Cambon told Edward VII that Britain and France had not held any meetings to discuss military plans. The Conservatives resigned on 4 December and the Liberals took power on 11 December. Clarke, the Secretary of the CID, wrote to Esher on 15 December suggesting that four strategic questions should be discussed; including a question of what proposals should be made to the French. This leads one to the view that the military conversations were initiated in the time of the Liberals and not in the time of the conservatives.

188 Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare for War, 1904-1914.* Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 1969. Print. 66

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191 *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* 72.

192 *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* 73,

193 Morris, A. J. Anthony. *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914 : The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* London, Longman 1972 Print. 36-37

194 *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography Of Lord Grey Of Fallodon.* 145-146

195 *Sir Edward Grey: A Biography Of Lord Grey Of Fallodon.* 145-146

196 *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare*

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199 Fay, Sidney, Bradshaw, *The Origins Of The World War.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930 Print. 205

200 Loreburn, the Earl, *How the War Came.* London, Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1919. Print. 78

201 *How The War Came.* 78

202 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914 :The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 38-39

203 Sommer, Dudley, *Haldane of Cloan: His Life and Times 1856-1928.* London, George Allen &Unwin Ltd. 1960. Print. 160

204 *Haldane Of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* 160

205 *Haldane Of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* 161

206 Morris, A.J. Anthony, *The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914.* London, Routledge & Keegan Paul. 1984. Print. 115

7
Haldane and the British Expeditionary Force

With Haldane and Grey in two key ministries, the Milner Group began infusing military muscle into their foreign policy. According to A. J. Morris:

> Grey was acutely aware of the military implications of the policy that he was pursuing towards France and Germany. ... But Grey knew that it was imperative that a policy of Army reform should be pursued by Haldane as the necessary complement of the direction he was imparting to Britain's foreign policy. From the beginning, Grey was 'more aware of the close relationship of foreign policy and military strength than his predecessors of the 1890s'.[207]

Grey's secret foreign policy and Haldane's covert military preparations and Army reform developed out of same strategy.

When Haldane took over the War Office he candidly admitted his military failings—he knew little about the Army. He was Esher's proxy. Esher placed his former private secretary, Colonel Ellison, as Haldane's personal military secretary. Thus, Esher remained current on War Office policies and thinking. Esher and the Milner Group wanted control of the War Office to continue reforming the British Army and to prepare it for a continental war.

As Morris says above, it was imperative that Haldane followed a policy of Army reform to complement Grey's secret foreign policy.

Haldane confronted the difficulty of his mission when the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) reported that Britain needed two months to field eighty thousand men on the continent. Contemporary military experts believed that with such a sluggish mobilization a continental war would have ended before the British Army arrived. In fact, the French wanted help to arrive in the first week of hostilities.[208] Haldane's technical mission entailed transforming the British Army into a rapid reaction force, the so-called British Expeditionary Force (BEF).

The political problems confronting Haldane far exceeded the technical, the most stubborn of which was the cleavage among the imperialist factions. At one imperial extreme, the Milner Group envisaged engaging in a Franco-German war with both the Army and the navy. At the other, the big navy imperialists (such as Admiral Fisher) envisaged engaging in a Franco-German war with just the navy. Given that among the Great Powers, Britain had the mightiest navy and the puniest Army, the Fisher view made total sense so Haldane and the Milnerites faced difficulties arguing for Army involvement on the Continent.

Despite the common sense of Fisher's naval strategy, it did nothing to encourage French militarism, suffering as it did from the glaring inequity of calling for British courage and French blood. Fisher's approach attracted and persuaded most imperialists, men who considered war between Germany and Britain as desirable but not essential. In contrast, the Milner Group considered war between Germany and the Triple Entente (Russia, France and Britain) as an imperative. Thus, the Milner Group encouraged French militarism (revanchism) by putting the British Army on the front-line where it would share in the military sacrifice.

In 1916 Haldane revealed the purpose of his army reforms:

> The Expeditionary Force ... was intended as a possible

> help to France if we made an agreement with Russia. But that was a state secret. The Cabinet hardly knew it. But down to 1914 there was little fear of a breach with Germany; it was only an emergency that we were providing against.[209]

For the record, Grey and Haldane initiated their secret military pact before Grey had concluded his agreement with Russia—the secret military "talks" prepared the ground for the diplomatic agreement.

Haldane, in saying "the Cabinet hardly knew it" ought to have said the Cabinet did not know it. His choice of words is intriguing because one usually refers to a secret action or policy sanctioned by Cabinet as a "state secret", and to a secret action or policy hidden from Cabinet as an intrigue or a conspiracy. That Haldane thought the secret military talks and the army reforms formed a "state secret" suggests that he believed that he and his imperialist colleagues could somehow disregard the authority of Parliament and the Cabinet.

Haldane's comment "down to 1914 there was little fear of a breach with Germany" reveals the Milner Group had adopted a long-term military strategy. They started the military talks in 1906 when Haldane and Grey knew that the Austro-German alliance so overshadowed the Franco-Russian, that it would have been suicidal for France to start a war. Precisely the same argument applies to the crises of 1908 and 1911, although in each crisis Grey assured France of Britain's military commitment, assurances that gradually transformed fragile French trust into hardy confidence. The war would come when Grey's Triple Entente was ready. One of the striking inconsistencies of British policy lay in the Foreign Office portrayal of Germany as a menacing aggressor on the one hand, and on the other, the complete absence of Foreign Office apprehension about a German preemptive strike against France.

The breach with Germany could only take place after Russia had regained her military strength. As he formed the Triple

Entente, Grey stated that Russia's recovery would change the distribution of strength in Europe. He believed a Russian-French-British entente could check Germany.[210] After forming the Triple Entente he prophesied that "a combination of Britain, Russia and France may be able to dominate Near Eastern policy".[5] Of course, by "Near Eastern" Grey meant Turkey and the Balkans so it is no accident the Great War grew out of the third Balkan War.

Haldane had to prepare the British Army for a war in Europe. As his biographer, Dudley Sommer asks, "how was Haldane to secure approval of a scheme which actually envisaged (one is almost tempted to say 'foresaw') continental intervention?"[211] Although Sommer exercised reticence, clearly Haldane did foresee "continental intervention" for the British Army. Haldane foresaw the conflict because he and the Milner Group planned it.

From his first address to the House, Haldane set the pattern for deceiving Parliament and the Cabinet about Army reform:

> The primary task which rests on the British Army is to maintain the defence of the Empire which extends over 12,000,0000 square miles. ... The first purpose for which we want an Army is for overseas war ... our expeditionary force ought to be moulded for overseas warfare ...Our business is to maintain an expeditionary force just as large as to form a reserve which may enable us swiftly and resolutely to reinforce the outposts of our forces, which are the outposts of the Empire, and which act as its police ... the force at which we aim ... is six big divisions ... and represents a total of 150,000 men.[212]

He omitted the continental intervention, and the BEF's ability to mobilize alongside the French Army in days. He had masked the most important details of his Army reforms.

Samuel Williamson recognizes that Haldane hid the BEF's

purpose from Parliament.[213] He further allows that Haldane could not even discuss European commitments at Cabinet for fear of alarming the Liberal Radicals.[214] By October 1908 the CID confirmed the focus of the British Army lay in Europe.[215] However, the Cabinet did not receive this critical CID report.

Grey settled the critical agreement with Russia in August 1907. With the Indian frontier protected by diplomacy, Liberal members thought the government should reduce the size of Haldane's army. In March 1908, Mr. Luttrell MP pressed Haldane asking: "Whom did they intend to strike with the Expeditionary Force?' Mr. Byles MP asked, "The essential question [was] why had they never been told why the country wanted 160,000 men as an Expeditionary Force?" Haldane refused to respond.[216] Repeatedly, Haldane could have told Parliament about his reforms instead he suppressed their purpose.

Haldane created a backup force called the Territorials. He justified his new force to Parliament as a home defense force, rather than as a reserve force for the BEF. Colonel Repington of *The Times* explained that Haldane "could not at this time so much as hint that we might ever be engaged upon the continent of Europe" so Repington hit upon the "Hearth-and-Home idea".[217] Repington casually admits deceiving the British Parliament and public about the purpose of the Territorials. It never occurred to Haldane and his associates that they ought to have asked Parliament to approve their war preparations. Morris makes the point succinctly: "The Radicals never understood the implications of Haldane's scheme. That was some measure of the success of Haldane's deception. ..."[218] In plain sight, Haldane created a rapid reaction force for operations on the continent without the House or the British public ever realizing his purpose.

The *Manchester Guardian* attacked Haldane from September 1906 - June 1907 for not disclosing the purpose of his Territorial army. They suspected that service overseas lay at the core of his plan. The paper suggested that to pry out the truth the Commons

should oppose the scheme until Haldane explained the intended role of the new forces.[219] However, the Cabinet agreed to Haldane's reforms thanks to the support of John Morley, the Secretary of State for India.

Morley helped win Cabinet approval for the Army reforms without ever suspecting much less understanding the European implications of the BEF.[20] All the Cabinet debates on Army reform concentrated on the manpower needed to defend the Indian frontier.[220] To Morley's chagrin, when the Great War began Haldane boasted that he had foreseen the war, implying he had brought in the Army reforms anticipating the conflict. Morley protested that Haldane had never mentioned his foresight to the Cabinet. Morris agrees with Morley's accusation, saying Haldane never explained to the Cabinet or Parliament that he had created the Expeditionary Force to face the German army on the Belgian frontier.[221]

Haldane and Grey wasted hours of the Cabinet's time discussing the nonexistent problems of Indian defense. The spectacle of these two men sitting smugly at the Cabinet table while their colleagues discussed nonexistent Indian problems because their collusion had suppressed the real concern of a continental engagement confronts us with the unacceptable face of conspiracy. These two men chose to lead Britain to war by corrupting the spirit of democracy and the Parliamentary tradition of Cabinet collective responsibility. One wonders how Grey and Haldane justified their behavior. Their loyalty to their secret society eclipsed any loyalty they had to British Parliamentary tradition, but they also must have felt contempt for their colleagues. How could any man repeatedly deceive his colleagues without the deceit corroding his entire moral compass? However lightly the scholars criticize Grey and Haldane (their behavior has scarcely been criticized), one cannot deny that they made a mockery of Cabinet responsibility.

Lord Milner and his Group of imperialists passionately believed the empire's survival depended on the dominions shouldering an

increased share of its defense. Milner organized *The Round Table* and its associated movements to prepare the dominions for the 'coming war'.

Haldane complemented the thrust of the *Round Table* movements by linking the military institutions of the dominions with the mother country. On 23 April 1907, Haldane spoke to the colonial Premiers. He told them of the general principles on which he was reorganizing the British Army and he urged them to copy his reforms. He also urged forming a General Staff that would encompass all the forces of the Empire, an Imperial General Staff.[222] The dominions agreed to the proposed reorganization.[223] Frederick Maurice believes the Imperial General Staff contributed substantially to British military readiness for the Great War.[224]

While still on the radical side of the Cabinet, Lloyd George and Churchill attacked Haldane's army reforms. In 1908 at the climax of the Churchill-Haldane struggle, Esher became alarmed and wrote to Knollys urging the King come to Haldane's rescue to prevent the Radicals reducing the size of the army. On 18 June Churchill criticized the size of Haldane's army. Haldane replied on 25 June saying "after all, we had certain Treaty obligations which might compel us to intervene on the continent".[225] It is unclear to which treaty Haldane had referred. He might have meant Belgium, but one suspects he had unintentionally referred to the new promises to France.

All the deceptions perpetrated on their Cabinet colleagues paid high dividends for the Liberal Imperialists. When Haldane let slip about a continental obligation, his Radical colleagues never dreamed for a moment that Britain had entered any new commitments so they failed to grasp the significance of the remark. In fact, all Radicals believed that Britain remained free of treaty bonds on the Continent. Deceived like all the other Radicals, Morley stoutly defended Haldane and Grey, believing the purpose of the Expeditionary Force was to defend India. Secrecy and deceit does pay.

Throughout, Haldane could always count on Esher's support. In 1909, he had a fight in getting the Army Annual Bill passed. The King invited him to Windsor and in the conversations, Haldane recognized Esher's influence, "I see Esher's hand in this; he has been a very stalwart ally."[226]

Morris summarizes Haldane's extraordinary success:

> Haldane had achieved his object ... he had provided Grey with the necessary force to implement the entente with France should that eventuality arise. He had explained the size of the forces he retained in Great Britain by quoting the Cardwell system at his critics. ... There was no mention here of Europe, and he always justified the number of troops by talk of India's requirements.[227]

One cannot deny Haldane' success or his ability, but his achievements seem dark and his ability seems depraved, dedicated to serving his secret society and the gods of war.

When the war eventually came, anti-German hysteria forced Churchill to remove Lord Louis Mountbatten as First Sea Lord. Haldane became the focus of sustained attack from the jingoes in the press because of his open admiration for German philosophy and efficiency. Defending Haldane, Grey wrote to Lord Derby on 25 January 1915:

> To him (Haldane) especially, more than to the whole of the rest of the Cabinet put together, it is due that, when the war broke out, we had the Territorials at home and an Expeditionary Force to send abroad. The actual decision of the Cabinet to send the Expeditionary Force to France when it was sent was, of course, one on which Kitchener, who was actually in the War Office at the time, had specially to advise

> the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister to guide it; but, apart from that, to Haldane's opinion as ex-Minister for War, under whom the Force had been created and organized, it was due—more than to any other individual member of the Cabinet—that the decision was taken to send the Force to the continent on the outbreak of the war. To Haldane and those who worked under him in the War Office when he was there as Secretary of State for War, it was due not only that we had an Expeditionary Force to send abroad, but that we had artillery, ammunition and other equipment for it, which enabled it to be the efficient fighting force it has proved itself to be ...."[228]

Grey's comments are clear – they corroborate Haldane's post war admissions that he had, with total premeditation, created the BEF to fight a continental war, and when the time came he advised sending the force to France.

The Milner Group, through Grey and Haldane, deliberately prepared for war. Instead of accepting the Home Secretary's portfolio, Haldane had asked for the War Office to carry out the Army reforms and prepare the Army for a continental engagement. Although Haldane knew little about the Army, he carried out a detailed plan that had been prepared by others before he took office. The secret military talks and the Army reforms were just two sides of the same strategy, a strategy brought to fruition by conspiracy.

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208 Maurice, Frederick, Sir. *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane of Cloan K.T., O.M.* London, Faber and Faber Limited, 1937. Print.

209 Wilson, Keith, M., *The Making and Putative Implementation Of A British Foreign Policy of Gesture, December 1905 To August 1914: The Anglo-French Entente Revisited.* Canadian Journal of History, XXXI, August, 1996, Print. 227-255

210 Monger, George, *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 –1907.* London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1963. Print. 280

211 Sommer, Dudley, *Haldane Of Cloan: His Life and Times 1856-1928.* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1960. Print. 170

212 Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy of Peace and Retrenchment. 89

213 Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. *The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 1969. Print. 91

214 *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* 93

215 *The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914.* 101

216 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 90

217 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 91-92

218 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 96

219 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 93

220 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 230

221 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 76-77

222 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 211

223 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 254

224 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan*

K.T., O.M. 254

225 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 82

226 *Haldane 1856-1915: The Life Of Viscount Haldane Of Cloan K.T., O.M.* 249

227 *Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment.* 94

228 *Haldane of Cloan: His Life And Times 1856-1928.* 219-220

8
General Sir Henry Wilson

The absence of Cabinet consent for the Anglo-French military talks, forced Grey, Haldane, and Asquith into an uneasy alliance with an anti-Liberal. They needed a general who would complete their Anglo-French military plans in secret. Unable to recruit a Liberal general, the trio resorted to General Wilson, possibly the most anti-Liberal officer in the British Army.

Allying with Wilson had advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, Wilson believed in war with Germany so he needed little coaxing to build an understanding with the French. On the negative side, Wilson despised the Liberals, and he openly scorned the Liberal government's policies, violating the Army tradition of active duty officers masking their political feelings and affiliations. Had Asquith behaved as a normal Prime Minister, and Haldane, a normal Secretary of War, they would have rewarded Wilson's political behavior with a posting to some godforsaken outpost of the empire. However, the Liberal Imperialists did the opposite. They endured all of Wilson's vexations and insults because of the General's pivotal contribution to developing the secret Anglo-French military talks, talks so important to the Liberal Imperialists that they willingly risked the continuance of Asquith's ministry.

Henry Wilson, through contact with a French governess in his early years, achieved mastery in French but he failed to shine in

other academic pursuits. Wilson gave three years trying to enter the army, but the modest entrance examination proved insurmountable, despite having professional tutors to help him 'cram'. He failed the examinations five times in a row.[229]

Wilson resorted to spending time in the militias, which qualified him to join the regular army. In 1885 he was posted with the 1st Rifle Brigade in India. Later, his brigade transferred to Northern Burma to crush the remnant of a local resistance movement. On patrol Wilson recklessly exposed himself, resulting in his receiving serious injuries.

All Wilson's enthusiasm for active duty on the Empire's frontier evaporated with his Burmese wounds. He decided to stay in England. As a first step in delaying his departure from England, Wilson schemed and wormed his way into the Staff College at Camberley. At Camberley Wilson ingratiated himself with his fellow Anglo-Irish soldier, the legendary General Lord Roberts, and preserved this profitable friendship until the older man died in 1914.

When Wilson graduated from the college, the army posted him to India with the rank of Captain. However, he immediately petitioned the medical board for a reprieve, receiving four months.[230] Using this respite, he befriended Charles à Court, later known as Colonel Repington, the famous military correspondent for *The Times*. Repington arranged for Wilson to replace him in the Military Intelligence Department at St. Anne's Gate.[231] On 24 June 1895, Wilson became a staff Captain. At Queen Anne's Gate, he worked in the French section.[232]

Wilson shipped out for South Africa in October 1899. After seeing modest action, he joined the General Staff in Pretoria. He accompanied Lord Roberts to London when the latter assumed command of the Army. Wilson was Roberts' assistant military secretary. True to form, he took pains to ingratiate himself with Lord Roberts' family.[233]

In London Wilson associated with two influential reporters from

The Times, Bron Herbert and Leo Amery.[234] Both men belonged to the Milner Group. Bron Herbert was a Liberal imperialist, and he became Haldane's private secretary in 1906, while Leo Amery was a Tory, and he became Lord Milner's political heir. Wilson got on well with Amery and introduced him to Gerald Ellison.[235] Ellison became Lord Esher's secretary when the latter reformed the British Army. Later, Ellison became Haldane's private military secretary. Wilson came to know Lord Milner well, and he helped Milner when the Irish Home Rule question arose. Despite all his connections to the Milner Group, Wilson never received an invitation to join the Group; nonetheless, the Milner Group had plans for Wilson.

In December 1901, Wilson became a major, and in April 1902 he transferred to the educational department of the War Office. During this time, Lord Esher's committee, acting like a despotic triumvirate, purged the Army, making and breaking careers at will. However, Esher and Ellison protected Wilson. Ironically, considering his dismal record in passing examinations, Wilson received an appointment to the new office dealing with the Staff College and promotion examinations.[236]

After Lord Roberts retired, Wilson kept the General posted on War Office developments. Lord Roberts used the Lords as a bully pulpit to disagree with the War Office over conscription and Army reform. The active cooperation between Wilson and Roberts and the passing of sensitive War Office information[237] came to the attention of General Lyttleton, Chief of the General Staff. General Lyttleton thought Wilson's behavior unacceptable.

The post of Commandant of the Staff College came open but to obtain it Wilson had to overcome General Lyttleton's objections:

> When Haldane proposed him in preference to two candidates favored by Lyttleton, Lyttleton objected that he was too friendly with Roberts and had too many enemies ... "Is it possible," asked Haldane

> smoothly, "that to have some men as enemies may be a sign of wisdom?" Lyttleton tried hard to prevent Wilson from getting the Staff College post, but Haldane, Esher, Roberts, Nicholson and French all supported him. Lyttleton had to give way and Wilson obtained the post with a promotion to Brigadier General.[238]

Haldane supported Wilson despite the latter having vigorously and openly opposed Haldane's own reforms, just one of many instances when Haldane failed to act as a Liberal politician and minister. Haldane's loyalty to the Milner Group and its objectives surpassed his loyalty to his fellow Liberals and the Cabinet.

In January 1907, Wilson became Commandant of the Staff College. In six years, a man who had failed six examinations had risen from Captain to Brigadier General and commanded, of all things, the Staff College. Wilson's association with the Milner Group had paid handsome dividends.

At the Staff College, Wilson preached the 'inevitable war' doctrine. Esher gushed approvingly about Wilson: "when others prattled of peace, he prepared their souls for war; not for an indefinite war, as men barricade their doors against imaginary thieves, but for a specific struggle with the German nation."[239] Wilson displayed his zeal for Anglo-French military cooperation by communicating with the French military attaché, Huguet, and later with General Foch in Paris.

While at the Staff College, Wilson cooperated closely with Roberts in the conscription campaign. Both men condemned Haldane's proposals for a territorial force as inadequate for England's needs. With briefs supplied by Wilson, Roberts attacked Haldane's proposals for the Territorials in a series of well-reported speeches. Amazingly, Wilson blatantly associated with Roberts, with the Tories, and with the conscription campaign, flagrant behavior that naturally antagonized the Liberal press but seemed

not to offend his political masters. In March 1909, the *Westminster Gazette* attacked Wilson for his political activities, but Asquith, Haldane and Grey protected the General. Wilson just ignored the assaults of the Liberal press and continued to lecture at the Staff College in favor of conscription.[240]

General Henry Wilson practiced insubordination, intrigue, and politics, earning a reputation as a strong opponent of the Liberal government.[241] Rather than discipline Wilson, Haldane promoted him Director of Military Operations (DMO).

To understand Haldane's decision one should recall General Ewart's dislike of the secrecy surrounding the Grey-Haldane military talks. Ewart, it happens did no more than pay lip service to Haldane's orders to conduct secret military negotiations with the French, frustrating the junta's plans for four, long years. When Ewart moved on, Haldane sought a more "cooperative" Director of Military Operations. Despite all their military connections, the Milner Group and Haldane could not find British generals eager to engage in extra-constitutional assignments. If the junta had received Cabinet consent for the talks, Haldane could have chosen from a slate of competent generals, but without that sanction his potential candidates dwindled to one.

Haldane set one indispensable qualification for the new Director of Military: he had to have no qualms hiding the secret military conversations with France from the Cabinet. For once, Henry Wilson passed the test *summa cum laude*. Wilson detested the Liberals in general and the Radicals in particular, and he loathed the Radical majority in Cabinet. Consequently, the absence of Cabinet sanction for the Anglo-French military preparations made the promotion all the more attractive to Wilson because he had the added satisfaction of scorning the Cabinet Radicals.

On appointment, Wilson immediately discovered the depth of General Ewart's reservations—Ewart had refused to make any plans to send the BEF to France.[242] Wilson's diary entry of January 20, 1911:

> Haldane asked me to lunch at 28 Q. A. Gate. No one else there. He wanted to discuss my minute. I told him exactly what I thought of the state of unpreparedness we were in, I said it was disgraceful and could be, and should be, remedied at once. He said that Nick had already been to him about the railways and that he (Haldane) had seen Grey, and Grey agreed we could go to the railway companies. This is good. I told him the horse question was in a disgraceful state. He said he was doing all he possibly could. I said it was no business of mine, but until it was put on a proper basis we could not mobilize. He asked me what else was required, and I enumerated the points I made in my minute to Nick, and I hope now we will get on with some practical work. ...I don't think Haldane is told the truth by the Council,[243]

Wilson seems to have missed the absurdity of Haldane seeking the Foreign Secretary's approval to approach domestic railway companies to arrange the transportation of the BEF to domestic ports.

Wilson met Foch on October 13, 1910:

> He (Foch) has been to Russia as the Tsar's guest. He tells me that the Russian army is getting on, but very slowly; he tells me that the Russian secret service report that the Germans think the French army very fine.; he says that he doesn't think Russia would actively interfere if Germany and France were to fight over Belgium, but Russia would do all her possible if war broke out through the Balkans; ...[244]

In this diary entry, Wilson pinpointed the critical weakness in Grey's Triple Entente—Russian infidelity.[245,246] One cannot

overstate how much this realization influenced Anglo-French strategy. The British and French realized that if they wanted Russian help in a war with Germany, the war had to break out over a Russian quarrel. The Great War broke out not by accident but by design, and French and British strategists had long nurtured the Russian quarrel that eventually led to war.

General Wilson developed a close relationship with Lord Milner. Finding two more dissimilar friends would present a challenge. Expedience and convenience may have formed the basis of the friendship. They often dined together, and after Wilson became DMO, Milner introduced him to a key ally in the Foreign Office, Arthur Nicolson, the new Permanent Under-Secretary. On the strength of Milner's approval, Nicolson extended a standing invitation to Wilson to visit the Foreign Office. Wilson became a regular visitor and often reviewed the European situation with Nicolson, Tyrell and Crowe.[247] Few other generals enjoyed this unrestricted access to the Foreign Office.

Although Grey and Haldane had convinced Wilson that Britain had committed to France, they declined to avow that commitment. Wilson wanted Grey to support a synchronous mobilization of British and French forces but Grey refused to get into the specifics of war plans. Collier writes:

> Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, was a harder nut to crack. The difficulty was that he was not only genuinely ignorant of military affairs but that, with a diplomatist's instinctive revulsion from embarrassing knowledge, he fought shy of enlightenment. Maintaining that strategy was not his business, he professed to believe, and perhaps did believe, that 'the military men' would know what to do with the Expeditionary Force when the time came, and could safely be left to do it. As one of the chief instigators of the first staff talks in 1906, he could scarcely

> pretend not to know that they had taken place; but as long as he was careful not to learn too much, he could at least plead ignorance of their scope and outcome.[248]

Obviously, Collier has some difficulty believing in Grey's military innocence but even more interesting, Collier states that Grey went to significant lengths to cover up the military talks.

Collier's understated skepticism about Grey's ignorance in military matters is corroborated by Robbins, Grey's most recent biographer. Robbins notes that Grey spoke on Army reform and won the praise of Leo Amery. On a more general note, Robbins says that Grey had a greater interest in Army affairs than scholars concede.[249] Given Grey's interest in military affairs, one cannot imagine two close friends such as Grey and Haldane not repeatedly discussing the role of military preparations in foreign policy. Thus Grey's refusal to avow Britain's commitment to France stemmed from calculating that a secret and not a formal agreement better served his purpose.

Wilson consecrated himself to his mission. Morris comments that Wilson:

> Devoted his energies with a singular preoccupation to the problems of England's involvement in a continental war with Germany. ... through incessant efforts, and with the help of Grey, by March [1911] Wilson had effected tentative arrangements for the embarkation of an expeditionary force from Southampton by the ninth day of mobilisation.[250]

Williamson makes even stronger statements about Wilson's determination to prepare the British army for war with Germany:

> (Wilson) promised Huguet that the staff talks guaranteed the certainty of British assistance. This

> attitude would, of course, more than offset the scrupulous lip service Wilson paid to the proposition that the conversations were noncommittal.[251]

Williamson's comments place the reader in a difficulty. Did General Wilson behave as a rogue general (as some scholars believe) or did he act as the faithful servant of his political masters? If a rogue, why did Haldane promoted him so generously? If a faithful servant, can one dispute the gravity of Wilson's assurance to the French of "guaranteed British assistance"? However one resolves this difficulty, one cannot escape the reality that the DMO conducted military conversations with his French counterparts that had enormous political overtones. The political overtones of Wilson's assurances convinced the French of Britain's sincere commitment to war.

By degrees, Wilson convinced the French of Britain's commitment to war. He created French expectations of British help without Grey having to commit to any written contract. A written treaty would have better safeguarded the peace but Grey could not get Cabinet consent for a treaty with France nor had he any interest in limiting either French aggression in Morocco or Russian adventures in the Balkans. Grey devised a better plan. By the judicious withholding of information, he convinced his Cabinet colleagues that Britain kept a free hand with France, and with Wilson's constant assurances, he convinced the French that they could count on Britain as an ally. It was during the third Moroccan crisis—the Agadir Crisis—that Wilson overcame any lingering French doubts about British fidelity.

Agadir, the third Moroccan Crisis, arose unavoidably from the previous crises. The Treaty of Algeciras entangled Britain and France in international law. As signatories, they had accepted Moroccan integrity and the Sultan's sovereignty, creating recognition in international law for Morocco. However, they had secretly agreed to the French absorption of Morocco with suitable

compensation given to Spain and Italy. Obviously, these secret agreements contradicted the formal international recognition of the treaty. By design, the Anglo-French deal cut Germany out.[252]

In 1908 the German consul in Casablanca came to blows with French soldiers when he tried to shield German deserters from the Foreign Legion. Tensions rose as Germany served notice that it intended to defend the Algeciras Act.

During the Casablanca crisis, Grey, Haldane and Asquith assured France of British aid, including military intervention. Esher believed the French had behaved well and felt Grey "was touched" by French self-restraint. Esher concluded that the perfecting of the British Army and Navy was more imperative than ever.[253] However, Esher had spoken disingenuously. He knew that France would avoid war because Germany enjoyed an overwhelming military advantage. That was the military reality of 1908 (and 1906 and 1911). Without Russia, British intervention would be worthless, and Esher, Haldane, Grey, and Asquith knew it. They made their low-risk commitment to France as a down payment on their long-term strategy of nurturing French confidence in Britain's commitment to war.

In 1910, the Sultan of Morocco succumbed to relentless French pressure, and by the end of the year his authority collapsed, plunging Morocco into anarchy. By February 1911, tribesmen revolted, supplying France the pretext for sending troops to defend Europeans living in the capital, Fez. Notably, the French adventure received no encouragement from Madrid or Berlin. On the contrary, the French Ambassador to Berlin warned his government that the Germans would ask for a port if the French destroyed the Act of Algeciras. The Spanish felt the French expedition forced them to assert their rights under the secret clauses so they sent troops to Larache and Alcazar.

Grey commented on the French occupation: "We are already skating on very thin ice in maintaining that the Act of Algeciras is not affected by all that has happened." [254] Nonetheless, Grey

publicly accepted the French Foreign Minister's assurances that France only intended a temporary occupation of Fez. Of course, Grey did not believe a word of it as Barraclough comments:

> It casts a bright, and not very flattering light on the moral standards of the age, and in particular on those of the ruling class. Prevarication, half-truth, double-talk, and a double standard of morality, were other characteristics of the imperialism of the time,"[255]

In mid-May Grey defended the French intervention at Fez and promised full British support. By 9 June he expected France and Spain to partition Morocco.[256]

Thus by June 1911, France and Spain, with the connivance of Great Britain, had torn up the Treaty of Algeciras. In Britain, the radical press recognized the truth. They rebuked France for her irresponsible behavior. *Nation* dismissed the French claims about protecting the Europeans in Fez as:

> A pretext as mendacious as the legends by which Dr. Jameson sought to excuse his rush to Johannesburg'. Self-righteous avowals of 'ideals' and claims about 'peaceful penetration' were worthless. Everyone knew that in Morocco France was 'engaged in a sordid imperialistic venture.[257]

On the other side, Morris says *The Times* congratulated France on her honesty, and the paper reassured its readers the French did not intend to stay:

> Laying her plans so frankly before the world, confident in their honesty and without fear that they can give rise to any rational misgivings of her purposes.' Readers were assured that French troops

> would stay only so long as was 'absolutely necessary'.[258]

The Times knew that France and Spain, having committed one hundred thousand troops to Morocco, intended to stay.

On 1 July 1911 a small German gunboat, *The Panther,* with 125 men onboard moored at Agadir. Uproar followed. Grey displayed indignation and moral outrage, accusing the Germans of knowing no law outside force. Grey's outburst captured the essence of the man: He could look the members of Parliament and the British people in the eye as he expressed his moral indignation at Germany while he secretly acceded to and supported French aggression—vintage Grey hypocrisy. Grey's most trusted adviser at the Foreign Office, Tyrell, wrote to Hardinge during the crisis: "The French game in Morocco has been stupid and dishonest, but it is a vital interest for us to support her."[259] Grey would never have allowed truth and honesty interfere with "vital" interests.

At the Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Nicolson and Sir Eyre Crowe (senior clerk of the Western Division and brother-in-law to Spenser Wilkinson, who was a member of the Milner Group) advised taking a firm line with the Germans over Morocco.[260] Crowe wrote that Germany was 'playing for the highest stakes' and had embarked on a 'trial of strength' to test the solidity of the entente between England and France. Nicolson concluded it was necessary:

> To range ourselves alongside of France, as we did in 1905 and 1906, and show a united front to German demands. Otherwise, 'the whole Triple Entente would be broken up', England would be faced by a triumphant Germany and an unfriendly France and Russia and our policy since 1904 of preserving equilibrium and consequently the peace of Europe would be wrecked.[261]

Hysteria comes to mind when trying to capture the flavor of Nicolson and Crowe's communications at the Foreign Office. Their constant attacks on Germany without making the slightest effort to understand the German position make for weary reading. Somehow these two gentlemen could ignore a blatant annexation of Morocco by their friends, then invoke the German menace to excuse and justify their cooperating in that annexation despite Britain's solemn treaty duty to uphold the sovereignty of that state. Right and wrong simply did not exist in the mind of Nicolson and Crowe. They constantly justified the excesses of Britain's friends however irrational their arguments became. During the July Crisis in 1914, Nicolson and Crowe brought this attitude to its logical conclusion and unreservedly committed to France and Russia, leading one to suspect that they deliberately adopted their anti-German hysteria to justify their anti-German policies.

The merits of the quarrel meant nothing to Grey and his staff. The historian Ewart remarks on British attitudes in the Agadir Crisis:

> The great significance of that attitude was, and is, that (as in 1914) the merits of the quarrel were immaterial. Whether France or Germany was right, the British government was determined to support France.[262]

To defend French aggression in Morocco, the British Foreign Office had to transform a localized colonial dispute between France and Germany into an international trial of strength.[263]

On 11 July Grey approved France and Germany entering compensation negotiations. Foreign Office officials became alarmed when they learned that Germany had asked for most of the French Congo. Grey wanted the Cabinet to sanction his forcing Germany to attend an international conference on Morocco, but the Radicals felt this might lead to war. On 19 July the Cabinet divided into Grey's war party minority and the Radical majority.

During the crisis, General Wilson reassured the French of British reliability. On July 20, he briefed General Nicholson and Haldane about the prospective battlefields in a Franco-German war, after which he traveled to Paris to talk to the French General staff.[264] In Paris Wilson assured Huguet the staff talks guaranteed British support in a war, and he signed an accord with the French Chief of Staff outlining the composition, departure and placement of the BEF. According to Williamson:

> In many respects the signed statement resembled a de facto military convention. More importantly, despite its 'noncommittal' clause, the agreement encouraged the French to expect British help, as would the Grey-Cambon letters of 1912, and this expectation in turn influenced the formation of French strategy.[265]

Grey and Haldane forced Wilson to work in a strange twilight world where he reassured the French with every possible instrument other than the written binding commitment they most wanted. Whatever his difficulties, Wilson proved effective in allaying French doubts.

Wilson insisted on the French showing up Germany as the aggressor, arguing that British public opinion would not otherwise support an immediate intervention.[266] On September 9, Wilson reemphasized to Huguet his Paris message: British intervention depended on the public perceiving German aggression. He explained to Huguet that once the first intervention had occurred, Britain would throw all her resources into the war.[267] One wonders at the subtlety and political refinement of Wilson's advice about British public perception. He did not concoct the public perception strategy on his own—the subtly came from the Milner Group. The merits of the quarrel did not matter: all that mattered was the British public perceived German aggression and wrongdoing. If the Milner Group had decided this in 1911, is it any wonder the British

denied that Russia had mobilized against Germany and Austria at the climax of the July Crisis? The Milner Group understood that perception outweighed fact.

On 21 July, without consulting the Cabinet, Asquith and Grey approved the text of Lloyd George's Mansion House speech:

> But if a situation were to be forced upon us, in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position England has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Great Britain to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account in the cabinet of Nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure.[268]

Lloyd George's speech escalated the Agadir dispute into an international crisis.

On 9 August 1911, Haldane invited Grey, Wilson and Crowe to his house to discuss the crisis. Grey tried to enlighten Wilson about the importance of Russia's attitude but the General suffered from tunnel vision about the overriding importance of British participation, proving that he lacked the intellectual ability to produce subtle political strategies.[269] On 14 August, Haldane discussed strategy with Grey, Churchill and probably Lloyd George. They decided that "anything practicable to accelerate a counter-stroke [should Germany attack France] must be done."[270] Their discussions led to three results. Grey spoke to Cambon in such a strong fashion that he convinced the Ambassador that Britain considered herself the ally of France. In addition, on 16 August, Grey told the Russian ambassador: "In the event of war between Germany and France, England would have to participate." The most important result occurred on 23 August at a 'secret' meeting of the CID. [271]

At the famous (infamous?) 23 August meeting of the CID, Asquith silenced the Cabinet's peace party by excluding all Radical ministers. In the morning session, Wilson argued for sending the BEF to the continent. His arguments impressed Churchill, leading the two men to develop a closer friendship.[272] In truth, Asquith had arranged for Wilson to speak to the converted. When the admiralty came to present its position, it had few sympathizers present. Besides, Asquith had contrived to exclude the two strongest Admiralty voices, Sir John Fisher and Lord Esher so the Admiralty's arguments proved ineffectual. Asquith, Grey and Haldane wrapped up the meeting by adopting Wilson's war plans. Remarkably, the CID never called another meeting to analyze Wilson's plan for a continental war—it was a decided issue.

The Cabinet war party had now expanded to include Churchill and to a lesser extent Lloyd George. The war party realized that Britain could not send troops to the continent without the Admiralty's cooperation. However, the First Lord of the Admiralty refused to cooperate with Wilson's mobilization scheme without the Cabinet approval so the Admiralty had no plans to transport the BEF anywhere. Asquith fixed the Admiralty problem by ousting McKenna and appointing Churchill first Lord.

Asquith had thrown down the challenge to the Radicals in Cabinet. When the Radicals confronted the choice between holding onto the perks of office or holding onto their high principles, they chose the perks of office. The Radicals might well have remembered the admonitions of an earlier Whig, Edmund Burke: "All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing."

Under Lord Loreburn, the Radicals objected to the new arrangements, but they balked at resigning. Asquith had no further difficulty defeating the Radicals, incurring only the mildest checks on his war policy. The mildness of the check is revealed in the Grey-Cambon letters exchanged in 1912 with Cabinet approval:

> From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.
>
> You have, however, pointed out that, if either government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
>
> I agree that, if either government had a grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other, whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

The plans of the General Staffs continued uninterrupted and the Admiralty arranged to transport the British Army to France.

The 23 August CID approval of Wilson's plan for the BEF represented a turning point. The secret war policy of the Milner

Group had gained official status—the secret war policy was now government policy, albeit still secret and undisclosed. In addition, the division in imperial ranks had been forcibly closed. The navy faction had to accept that British policy from 23 August entailed sending the BEF to France.

Of even greater importance, the decisions of the meeting reassured the French. From the French perspective, the August 23 meeting confirmed Wilson as a trusted representative of the British government. Within a month of their military accord with General Wilson, the French witnessed the entire CID, presided over by the British Prime Minister and attended by senior ministers and service chiefs approving the joint war plans. Although France still had nothing in writing, she had every reason to expect Britain to honor her commitments as laid down in the accord.

General Wilson recorded the praise and support he received from Haldane in October 1911:

> Haldane sent for me this morning, I found old Nick in his room. Haldane told me there was no question of my being asked to leave the W. O. On the contrary he twice told me how 'amazingly' well I had done, and how impressed his colleagues at the meeting of August 23. The fact was, he told me, that there was a serious difference in the Cabinet. Asquith, Haldane, Lloyd George, Grey, and Winston on one side, agreeing with my lecture of Aug. 23, whilst Morley, Crewe Harcourt, McKenna, and some of the small fry were mad that they were not present on Aug. 23 (McKenna, of course was, and got kicked out for his pains), and were opposed to all idea of war, and especially angry with me, Morley and others quoting my teaching at the S. C. and so forth. The Government fear that there may be a split, but Haldane told me he had informed Asquith that if there

> was a change of policy he would go. They will stop my going to Paris, I think, but not much else.[273]

Haldane could not have expressed himself more forcibly in favor of Wilson's continental strategy.

Williamson cogently summarized Asquith's actions during the crisis:

> Asquith constantly said that he was opposed to war and that he did not think highly of Wilson's scheme for committing the BEF on the Continent. Yet he switched McKenna and Churchill, even though he knew that Churchill was fully in favor of the continental strategy of Wilson. This change in naval leadership ensured the British commitment to the Wilson strategy.[274]

In brief, Asquith spoke for peace and acted for war. From August 1911 onward, war with Germany only needed a revival of Russian strength and the right crisis.

Given Haldane's warm praise of Wilson one should remember the General's breach of military tradition when he supported the opposition Tories on conscription, the Territorials, Army reform, and the Irish question. Williamson comments:

> Curiously and unaccountably, the Liberal government made no direct move to curtail Wilson's blatant participation in Roberts' campaign. In November 1912 Colonel Repington, who with cause bore personal animosity toward Wilson, privately complained to Haldane of the General's 'constant intrigues'. Repington suggested removing Wilson and warning army officers to stay clear of the conscription issue. Haldane and Asquith ignored him.[275]

Williamson has spotlighted a crucial problem. Simply put, when one reviews Wilson's position through the conventional scholarly lens, Asquith's refusal to discipline the General is both intriguing and unexplainable. However, the nonconventional lens shows that Wilson had become an indispensable part of Liberal Imperialist strategy. Removing Wilson would have seriously undermined French confidence in Britain's commitment so if they wanted a continental war, they had to endure General Wilson.

Wilson went on to cause grief for the Liberal Imperialists. He and Lord Milner actively incited resistance to the Irish Home Rule Bill. Milner and Wilson negotiated with the Ulster Unionists to oppose the Liberal Government, but at the end of 1913, they also convinced the Ulstermen to pledge their forces to England if international complications broke out.[276] How on earth did Wilson, a man deeply embroiled in the emotions of the Ulster question, foresee international complications in late 1913 much less make provisions for them? One sees Milner's hand in this prescient arrangement, but one suspects the prescience had little to do with crystal balls and much to do with detailed planning.

Asquith's tolerance of defiance from General Wilson fostered an atmosphere of insubordination in the Army. The deterioration in civilian authority reached a head in March 1914, when fifty-seven British officers stationed in the Curragh, Ireland, effectively refused to coerce Ulster. General Wilson's indiscipline had pioneered the way for this confrontation between the Army and its civilian masters, making him the spiritual father of the Curragh Mutiny. Worse still, Wilson encouraged the mutineers, advised them, negotiated for them and supported their cause with senior British officers. In fact, the seriousness of the Curragh Mutiny had little to do with the fifty-seven men in the Curragh, and had everything to do with the support the mutineers received from senior officers such as Haig, French, Ewart, and of course Wilson.

Scholars downplay the importance of the Curragh Mutiny but it stands as the most serious civilian-military clash since the Glorious

Revolution in 1688. Asquith's response lacked conviction. He disciplined two leading Generals, French and Ewart, and he dismissed his Secretary of War, Colonel Seeley. (Seeley, a loyal friend of Churchill, had replaced Haldane at the War Office in 1912.) But Asquith left Wilson alone.

By right, Asquith should have removed Wilson as well as the leading officers. Given Wilson's record of insubordination, few knowledgeable contemporaries would have believed him innocent in the affair. Had Asquith removed Wilson he would have seriously undermined French confidence in Britain, and with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand no more than three months away, one doubts there would have been a war. Perhaps one can put it down to serendipity but it is more likely that Asquith knew better than to get rid of Wilson at this late stage.

General Wilson advised General French during the resignation negotiations. An extraordinary detail of French's resignation is that Wilson persuaded him to negotiate his reinstatement as the commander of the BEF if the force were sent to France. A little over four months later, General French led the BEF into France. Wilson's biographers make no claim for his prowess as a clairvoyant but somehow the General foresaw an imminent continental crisis, an impending crisis that some French diplomats also foresaw but one which no German or Austrian politician or diplomatist foretold.

Asquith made one further extraordinary decision. He did not appoint a new Secretary of War. Asquith took the portfolio himself. This turned out to be most serendipitous for Britain, because when the war broke out Asquith appointed Lord Kitchener Secretary of War. What is less well known is that Kitchener received a promotion in the peerage to Earl Kitchener on 29 June, which meant he was scheduled to be in London in late June 1914 for many weeks beforehand. He wanted to return to Cairo immediately. Serendipitously (again), Asquith kept Kitchener in Britain by declaring vaguely that his services might be needed, but without

specifying in what capacity.[277] Lord Milner fully approved Lord Kitchener's appointment.[278] Perhaps Asquith shared Haldane's ability to "foresee" the Great War and the need to appoint a vigorous Secretary of War. To add to this string of serendipitous events leading up to Britain's engagement in the war, the admiralty decided to stage maneuvers in July 1914. Thus when the assassination occurred, Britain had already mobilized her Navy. Either Britain was extraordinarily lucky at the outbreak of World War I or she was just well prepared.

229 Callwell C. E. Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: BART., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life And Diaries. London, Cassell and company, Ltd., 1927. Print. 2

230 Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: BART., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life And Diaries. 15

231 It is interesting that Wilson and Repington did not remain friends. Repington became involved with a married lady. He gave an undertaking to his superiors that he would break off the relationship, but resumed it when he thought the other party had broken their commitment. In 1902, Lord Roberts forced Repington to resign because he had violated this undertaking. Repington thought that Wilson would testify on his behalf to the effect that the aggrieved husband's subsequent actions had nullified the conditions of his promise. Although this is a classical "he said, she said" situation, it is widely believed that Wilson betrayed Repington, his personal friend and benefactor, because testifying would have alienated powerful officers who might be beneficial to his career.

232 Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: BART., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life And Diaries. 17

233 Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: BART., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life And Diaries. 42

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236 Brasshat: A Biography Of Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson. 87

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239 Brasshat: A Biography Of Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson. 101. The opening quotation from Lord Esher.

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254 From Agadir To Armageddon: Anatomy Of A Crisis. 68
255 From Agadir To Armageddon: Anatomy Of A Crisis. 68
256 The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914. 141-143
257 The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914. 286
258 The Scaremongers: The Advocacy Of War And Rearmament 1896-1914. 286
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260 The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914. 144
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262 Quoted in Lutz, Hermann. Lord Grey And The World War. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1928. Print. 123-125
263 From Agadir To Armageddon: Anatomy Of A Crisis. 112-113

264 Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson: BART., G.C.B., D.S.O.: His Life And Diaries. 96

265 The Politics Of Grand Strategy: Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914. 177

266 Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy Of Peace And Retrenchment. 284

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268 From Agadir To Armageddon: Anatomy Of A Crisis. 131

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9
Fabricating the Austrian Menace

December 11, 1905, Sir Edward Grey became British Foreign Secretary. Ten years earlier he had voiced the Milner Group's foreign policy goal:

> The fact is that the success of the British race has upset the temper of the rest of the world and now that they have ceased quarrelling about provinces in Europe and have turned their eyes to distant places, they find us in the way everywhere. Hence a general tendency to vote us a nuisance and combine against us. I am afraid we shall have to fight sooner or later unless some European apple of discord falls among the Continental Powers, but we have a good card on hand to play and I think a bold and skilful Foreign Secretary might detach Russia from the number of our active enemies without sacrificing any very material British interests.[279]

According to Grey, the future of the British Empire depended on two Eurocentric objectives: 1) dividing the continental Powers and pitting them against one another. 2) Harmonizing relations with Russia and taking the Russian side in the continental struggle. In

hindsight, we now know he meant to woo Russia with a free hand in the Balkans and the Straits at the expense of Austria and Turkey.[280]

Lord Selborne summarized the Milner Group's strategic understanding of Britain's position as follows:

> We remain with all the difficulties and responsibilities of a military Power in Asia. That is the crux for us. It is easy with compulsory military service to be a great military Power for home defence or European warfare. It is easy to be a great naval Power of a natural and continuous growth such as ours. It is a terrific task to remain the greatest Naval Power when Naval Powers are year by year increasing in numbers and in naval strength, and at the same time to be a military Power strong enough to meet the greatest Military Power in Asia.[281]

An agreement with Russia directed against Germany formed the Holy Grail of Milnerism. In September 1906 Grey reached an agreement with Russia on Persia, which both countries signed in 1907. They partitioned Persia into a northern Russian and a southern British sphere, leaving an enfeebled center to the Persians. An essential element in the Anglo-Russian Convention was the agreement to exclude Germany from Persia.[282]

Grey promoted his partition of Persia as a beneficial agreement to all concerned, to which Lord Curzon acerbically remarked: "I am almost astounded at the coolness, I might even say the effrontery, with which the British Government is in the habit of parceling out the territory of powers whose independence and integrity it assures them, at the same time, it has no other intention than to preserve."[283] Grey reacted to criticism of his Anglo-Russian agreement by declaring: "Our agreement with Russia is a mutual self-denying ordinance recognizing Persian independence." The

historian, Sontag, commented on Grey's remarks: "It is hard to believe Grey really meant these words. Russia soon proved them false."[284] Another historian, Remak, scorns Grey's agreement with Russia: "It was imperialism at its bluntest as well as at its most hypocritical."[285] The partitioning of Persia revealed a flinty ruthlessness in Grey that most scholars prefer to ignore. If Grey had any scruples, he could suppress them at will.

During the Anglo-Russian negotiations, Grey hinted at a future deal over the Straits while he granted Russia an immediate free hand in the Balkans. Trevelyan, an enthusiastic admirer of Grey's, considered this *free rein* decisive in clinching the deal: "Grey's willingness to give Russia a free hand in the Balkans induced the Russians to commit themselves fully to the Triple Entente."[286] In keeping with his pattern on the secret military talks, Grey hid his concessions to Russia from the public, Parliament, and the Cabinet majority. Thus, from the beginning of his tenure as Foreign Secretary, Grey masked the true intent of his foreign policy so his policy always had secret aims that were absent from the version he publicized.

Sontag summarizes the risks inherent in Grey's policies:

> Here lay great danger. The conflicting aspirations and fears of the powers and of the Balkan states made changes to the Near East hazardous to European peace. Fear blinded the directors of the British policy to the danger. They welcomed the entente with Russia because it practically eliminated the possibility of a Russo-German alliance. Therefore as Russia soon perceived, the British government was willing to make great sacrifices to prevent the agreement from breaking down. Hypnotised by fear of a Russo-German alliance, the British actually welcomed the thought of a Russian advance. "I hope," wrote the British Under-Secretary [Hardinge] in October 1907,

> "the developments of Russian foreign policy in the near future may show themselves in the Near-East, where it will not be easy for Germany and Russia to work together."[287]

Grey had sown his "European apple of discord ... among the Continental Powers." His Anglo-Russian Agreement would not only preempt any Russo-German agreement, but would also ensure a Russo-Austrian clash. His policy had all the potential of leading to a Great Power clash, and the consequent triggering of the European alliances.

Grey's agreement with Russia disturbed many Radicals because it yoked them to the harsh Czarist regime, which in the past they had so often condemned. Thus, when rumors reached London about a brutal Russian intervention in Persia, Grey reacted to Radical sensitivity by deceiving Parliament about the Russian oppression. Specifically, Grey responded to questions in the House by evading the question when possible, and by suppressing the most objectionable details of Russia's abuse when necessary.[288]

Throughout 1906-1914 Grey carried out his aim of aligning his Triple Entente against Germany and Austria. To justify his policy, Grey and his allies had to transform Germany into the menace of Europe. As mentioned previously, the Milner Group had fanned the great scares to poison British goodwill towards Germany. Farrer quotes the Belgian Minister in Berlin who wrote on June 8, 1908:

> It is not only the cheap papers which stoop to play this part; *The Times* has carried on for many years a campaign of slander and falsehood. Its Berlin correspondent ... stirs up the hatred of the English against the Germans by attributing to the Imperial Government ambitious plans of which the absurdity is evident, and by accusing it of shady intrigues of which it has never dreamt.[289]

The Belgian Ambassador accused *The Times* of carrying out a long-term campaign of "slander and falsehood" against Germany. But a long-term campaign suggests the existence of a directing hand, which supports Quigley's thesis on the role of *The Times* in promoting war.

Churchill, before he switched sides, commented in 1909 on the antagonism between Britain and Germany:

> If a serious antagonism is gradually created between two peoples, it will not be because of the workings of any natural or impersonal forces, but through the vicious activity of a comparatively small number of individuals in both countries and the culpable credulity of larger classes.[290]

Note that Churchill accused an influential group in the ruling class of "vicious activity."

Remak suggests the "near-hysteria" of the British Foreign Office would force the role of antagonist on Germany:

> Some of the British documents of the period convey an impression of near-hysteria in the face of a rising Germany. Reaching from a British admiral's simple suggestion, ..., to sink the German fleet without warning, to the more erudite memoranda of some of the senior officials of the Foreign Office decrying the German menace. Unfortunately, if one nation imagines for long enough that another is a menace—"the natural enemy" of Sir Eyre Crowe's phrase—the likelihood is strong that the other nation will some day have to play the role it has been assigned.[291]

On 2 February 1912 the chief of the War Staff, Admiral Troubridge, wrote "the international situation as between Great

Britain and Germany and her allies is to all intents and purposes a state of war without present violence."[292] The Admiral's statement was both extraordinary and true.

Wilson says the Foreign Office portrayal of Germany went beyond all reasonable bounds of skepticism about her avowed goals. He asks "surely the German menace" rested on firmer grounds than the vague suspicions of some officials. He continues:

> It would, of course, be one thing to say that the Foreign Office simply, and genuinely, mistook German policy. That would not be outside the bounds of possibility. ... It would be quite another thing to maintain that elements of the British Foreign office, and the Foreign Secretary, *deliberately* mistook the aims and objectives of Germany, and credited her with intentions they did not believe her to possess. Yet towards this conclusion much more than the lack of correspondence between the presentation of Germany as a threat to Europe and the extent to which her behaviour justified it inexorably points.[293]

Wilson supports the claim that Grey invented the German menace, although he leaves the impression that Grey and his Foreign Office officials acted alone. In reality, Grey always enjoyed the support of *The Times* and the Milner Group, an influential alignment that enabled Grey to fulfill a secret foreign policy with deadly success.

In branding Germany an enemy state, Grey could at least point to a believable enemy, but transforming Austria into a menace presented a different kind of challenge, not least because contemporaries could not believe in an Austria threatening anything. Most inconveniently for Grey's newfound hostility, Britain had kept friendly relations with Austria for over a century, relations that had produced enduring goodwill in both countries. Austria's Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, socialized with the British

upper class for sixteen years without ever becoming aware of either systemic British hostility or Austria's newfound status as a menace. In fact, hostility to Austria emanated solely from the organs of the Milner Group, principally the Foreign Office and *The Times*.

Sixty years before Grey became British Foreign Secretary, Austria began a twenty year period of setbacks that eventually led her to the strategic calculation that the risks in war far exceeded the risk of peace. Europe's year of discontent, 1848, saw uprisings in Italy, Vienna, and Hungary that threatened the collapse of the Austrian Empire. Russia intervened in 1849 to help quash the Hungarian revolt, preserving the Austrian Empire from break-up.

Four years later in a foolish miscalculation, Austria turned on her Russian benefactor during the Crimean War. Not surprisingly, the Russians never forgave Austria. With Russia alienated, Austria stood alone in central Europe, losing in 1859 her control of northern Italy to Italian nationalists and losing in 1866 her leadership of the German Confederation to Prussia at the battle of Sadowa. Recoiling from the disaster, Austrian statesmen resolved to preserve the rest of the Empire with diplomacy, mobilizing diplomats rather than soldiers, opting for the negotiating table instead of the battlefield.

One of Austria's principal diplomatic objectives lay in containing the Russian advance on the Straits (Istanbul). When Russia defeated Turkey in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, she forced the Turks to agree the treaty of San Stefano, which turned Bulgaria into a Russian satellite, and created an autonomous Bosnia. Alarmed, Austria called for a conference of the Powers—the Conference of Berlin. Succored by Britain, Austria forced Russia to reduce the size of Bulgaria and won the agreement of the Powers to occupy the Bosnia and Herzegovina provinces. The junior British representative, the future Lord Salisbury, considered it both justifiable and inevitable that Austria should annex the provinces.

Russia blamed her reverses at the Treaty of Berlin on Bismarck.

Responding to worsening Russo-German relations, Bismarck proposed an alliance to Austria. Ironically, Austria so valued her friendship with Britain that she stipulated that any alliance had to be directed only at Russia. Bridge comments that: "Andrássy was determined that any alliance ... must be directed solely against Russia, and should not in the slightest jeopardize or restrict Austria's relations with the Western Powers."[294] At first, the German Kaiser, William I, refused to sanction an explicit alliance against Russia but he relented under Bismarck's pressure. The Austro-German alliance, signed on 7 October 1879, was defensive in nature and aimed at containing Russia. In another piece of irony, Lord Salisbury described the alliance as "glad tidings of great joy"[295]

Perhaps Austria's greatest challenge consisted of containing her internal ethnic tensions, especially Slav unrest in the Balkans. To this end, she negotiated a détente with Russia in 1897, which by 1902 worked well. Upholding the détente, the Austrians avoided exploiting Albanian unrest, and avoided interfering with the bloody 1903 *coup d'état* in Serbia. When Macedonia erupted in sectarian outbursts that led to a failed Christian uprising, the Czar and the Austrian Emperor negotiated the so-called Murzsteg Punctuation. They agreed to preserve the *status quo* through joint mediation, and if necessary, intervention. Until 1906 the Austro-Russian détente worked well.

In 1906 Austria appointed a new Foreign Minister, Baron Aehrenthal. He wanted to keep the alliance with Germany as a safeguard of last resort but he also wanted to improve relations with Austria's enemies. He first made up with Italy. Then he made a serious effort to improve relations with Russia, presumably hoping to restore the Three Emperors' alliance of Austria, Germany and Russia.

Anglo-Austrian relations had remained cordial throughout this period. When Britain's Ambassador to Vienna prepared to leave his post in 1905, he wrote that the Austrians were as keen as ever for

friendship with Great Britain. His successor, Sir Edward Goschen (Sir George's brother), immediately reported that Austria wanted to maintain the *status quo.* [296] However, Goschen's attitude changed markedly after Hardinge became the Permanent Under-Secretary—hostility replaced goodwill.

Because the Foreign Office could not credibly portray Austria as a threat to anybody, they attacked her association with the German menace, suggesting that she had declined into a German vassal. Consider Bridge's comments:

> Like Hardinge, Bertie and Nicolson, Goschen belonged to the rising school of Germanophobe diplomats and his suspicion of German intrigues pervaded all his despatches. From the beginning, he was convinced that Aehrenthal was a slave of Berlin and he must bear much of the blame for the misconceptions of Edward VII and the Foreign Office in this respect. He sometimes showed considerable ingenuity in explaining Austrian policy into this pattern, a task in which he was ably assisted by his friend and confident, *Times* correspondent, Wickham Steed.[297]

Goschen invented evidence to portray Austria in a sinister light, a false portrayal that found its inspiration in the new Foreign Office orthodoxy under Grey and Hardinge.

To foster good relations with Russia, Grey had to dislodge Russia from the Austro-Russian détente. He used every opportunity to derail the Austro-Russian agreement on Macedonia, including delay tactics in negotiations, false accusations, disruption of ambassadorial conferences at the Port, and direct challenges to the Austro-Russian cooperation in Macedonia.

On 27 January 1908, Aehrenthal made it easy for Grey when he announced the building of a railway line through the Sanjak of

Novibazar to join the Turkish lines farther south. Russia objected strenuously to the proposal much to the delight of Hardinge, who noted: "the struggle between Austria and Russia in the Balkans is evidently now beginning and we shall not be bothered by Russia in Asia ... the action of Austria will make Russia lean on us more and more in the future."[298] This sinister minute seemed to foresee the coming disaster: the Foreign Office welcomed Austro-Russian hostility.

Exploiting Austria's railway proposal, British diplomats orchestrated and promoted an anti-Austrian campaign. Grey's secretary, Louis Mallet, somehow detected German expansionist ambitions in the project, while Steed and Goschen in Vienna invented the story that Austria-Hungary, at Germany's instigation, wanted to test the Anglo-Russian entente.[299] Half a world away in St Petersburg, Nicolson, worked earnestly to foster a Russian press campaign against Austria. Bridge says the British portrayed Austria as Germany's cat's paw, which misrepresented the Austrian position.[300] By 1908 at the latest, deliberate misrepresentation of Austria formed part of the Foreign Office's arsenal for transforming Austria into an enemy state.

The concerted efforts of British diplomats paid dividends. Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky signaled he preferred to work with the British. The Foreign Office welcomed the Russian overtures.[301] Once Grey had won over the Russians, he shut out the Austrians.[302]

Hardinge admitted the anti-Austrian thrust in British foreign policy:

> Hardinge was also pleased; by conceding control of the reform machinery to the Turks, Britain and Russia had, he told himself, completely taken 'the wind out of the Austrian sails'.
>
> This last remark is indicative of the *schadenfreude* which pervaded Hardinge's view of the British

> approaches to Russia. On 21 March he informed Edward VII that 'the chief characteristic of Izvolsky's scheme is its complete break with Austria in ... the Balkans, and Aehrenthal will probably be more angry than ever'.[303]

As Anglo-Russian relations improved, British hostility to Austria reached 'pathological' proportions,[304] but Grey and Hardinge kept their hostility a state secret.

Goschen proved himself so faithful to Hardinge's orthodoxy that in 1908 the Foreign Office rewarded him with a transfer to Berlin, replacing him with Sir Fairfax Cartwright. Although Cartwright had expressed all the correct anti-German sentiments while serving in Germany, when he arrived in Vienna he reported the Austrians wanted British friendship, suggesting that Austria could be brought into the British orbit. Bridge comments:

> His [Cartwright's] ideas of winning Austria over to the entente were given short shrift by the Foreign Office.[305]
>
> Cartwright had little influence with the Foreign Office, and Crowe and other officials relied more on Wickham Steed for their information.[306]
>
> In 1910, Steed reported obscure articles in the Austrian press as semi-official which led to a vicious anti-Austrian campaign in the British press.[307]
>
> By 1910, Crowe was defending the objectivity of Steed and Seton Watson against the opinions of the British officials in Austria-Hungary.[308]

The above quotes highlight Foreign Office determination to view Austria with hostility. However much Austria wanted good relations with Britain, Grey's grand strategy required Austria become an enemy state. Thus, the Foreign Office ignored all

Austrian overtures, and where necessary, supplanted the embassy dispatches from Vienna with the inventions of journalists. Grey aimed to sow an "apple of discord" among the European Powers. That quarrel had to happen between Russia and Austria.

Sir Edward Grey had turned on Austria. His predecessors, Lords Lansdowne and Salisbury had viewed Austria as a friendly state. Cold calculation led Grey to label Austria a menace, revealing a flinty ruthlessness beneath the cultured exterior. However, the more important complaint against Grey is not that he was too ruthless ,but, too secretive. Whatever one thinks about Grey turning Austria into an enemy state, one cannot excuse his hiding this new policy from the Cabinet, the Parliament, the people or indeed Austria.

During the Young Turk seizure of power in Turkey (June/July 1908), British diplomats reported rumors that Austria considered annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. Grey and Hardinge fiercely opposed any Austrian annexation. But when King Edward visited Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria, at Ischl on 12 August 1908, he did not caution his "good friend" about the annexation.

While King Edward played mum with the Austrian Emperor, Hardinge, who had accompanied him, gave a brilliant diplomatic performance. In a long meeting with Aehrenthal, he not only masked Britain's 'pathological' hostility but also approved the desirability of strong Anglo-Austrian relations. Hardinge did not even hint at British objections to any change in the *status quo,* much less an annexation. Once again Bridge is at a loss to explain British behavior:

> Clearly the British were aware of the situation. What is surprising about their attitude, in view of their outbursts after annexation, is their complete passivity during the weeks preceding it.[309]

In fact, Hardinge's masterly performance led Aehrenthal to believe

Austria enjoyed such friendly relations with Britain that he could anticipate a sympathetic British response to the annexation.

This "passivity" of the Foreign Office insidiously enticed their quarry to take dangerous gambits in the mistaken belief that Britain would remain neutral. The tactic amounted to a lethal form of "gotcha." Adding to this deadly tactic, senior statesmen assured the Austrians of their goodwill, assurances that lured their prey into taking dangerous foreign policy initiatives. Success depended on the Foreign Office's ability to cloak Britain's unswerving hostility.

On 2 July 1908 Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, proposed to Aehrenthal that if Austria supported Russian efforts to gain special rights in the Straits, Russia would not object to Austria annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 15 September 1908 Aehrenthal and Izvolsky negotiated at Buchlau for six hours, agreeing to the main points of Izvolsky's original proposal. Because the Buchlau partners chose not to put their accord in writing, one cannot verify whether they contracted to hold a conference to confirm the annexation, as Izvolsky would later claim. However, the evidence clearly shows the Russian did not object though he knew the date of the annexation.[310]

Aehrenthal planned the annexation of Bosnia oblivious of Grey's hostility. He hinted to the Bulgarians about his plans, and they responded on 5 October by declaring their independence from Turkey. On 6 October, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, without having received the prior approval of either Italy or Germany.

Though they knew about the annexation in advance and did nothing, Grey and Hardinge responded to it with moral indignation. Trevelyan justifies the British attitude:

> The British angrily protested the Austrian action as a breach of the Treaty of Berlin, and as a blow to the prestige of the new Turkish government. Grey in the name of international law and right, demanded that

> the matter be brought before a Conference of the Powers. That a single power should be allowed to tear up a treaty as a scrap of paper, seemed to him a precedent too dangerous to pass unchallenged.[311]

Trevelyan set the tone for future generations of Anglo-Americans, portraying Grey as always upholding the highest principles, but ignoring his double standards in the Moroccan and Persian treaties.

Grey knew that Izvolsky had intrigued with Aehrenthal. However, he focused his moral outrage on the Austrian, excusing the Russian's behavior for strategic reasons— ethical and moral considerations having no influence on his decision. Izvolsky arrived in London seeking British support for a new arrangement over the Straits. Grey refused outright to consider the Straits, but he agreed to back the compensation claims of Serbia and Montenegro, and he readily agreed to a conference to review the annexation.

In a deliberate snub to Germany, Grey did not consult Berlin on the terms of the proposed conference. Predictably, Germany took offence and rallied behind the Austrians.[312] This German immaturity drove Russia into the waiting arms of the British. Grey had won a major diplomatic duel by driving a permanent wedge between the Central Powers and Russia.

Grey pressed Turkey's claims for compensation from Austria and Bulgaria, but strategic considerations led him to declare Bulgaria the less culpable.[313] He cooperated with Izvolsky in keeping the Bulgarians within the Russian orbit. In the settlement, Russia agreed to write off part of Turkey's war indemnity, and Britain persuaded the Turks to accept the Russo-Bulgarian compensation package. By keeping the Bulgarians friendly, Grey had won another magnificent diplomatic victory. According to Bridge, the British Foreign Office had directed its efforts for the first time against the "Austrian Menace."[314] In reality, the "Austrian menace" only existed on Grey's chessboard.

Backing Serbia's compensation claims more vigorously than

Russia, Grey envenomed Austro-Russian relations. Bridge says that from the start the Russian position was "exceedingly weak", and that it was surprising that Grey promised Izvolsky his diplomatic support for Serbia's claims to territorial compensation. More important, Grey told the Serbs of his promise.[315]

Grey exceeded Izvolsky's requests intentionally: he officially told Serbia of Britain's support, and he inspired the British press to proclaim that support to the world. By design, Grey's strategy both raised expectations and inflamed passions among the Serbs in particular and the Slavs in general. Acting in tandem with Grey, Nicolson incited Slav feelings of outrage in the Russian capital. He warned Izvolsky the Russian public would not accept a "whitewashing conference" and that Russia had to take a firm stand against Austria.

No Russian Foreign Minister could stand aside while his British counterpart stoutly defended Russia's little Slav brothers: Grey had Izvolsky in a vise. By adopting a more pro-Slav stance than the Russians, Grey forced Izvolsky into a hopeless diplomatic duel. Too weak to threaten Austria, Russia had to endure the unavoidable humiliation of diplomatic defeat. Embittered Russian statesmen vowed vengeance. With this day of reckoning in mind, the Russians encouraged the Serbs to prepare for a more favorable date.[316]

During a parliamentary debate on the Bosnian crisis, Mr. Dilke MP pointed out that Lord Salisbury had advised Austria in 1878 to annex the Provinces of Bosnia Herzegovina. Dilke argued that because of this advice from a British Prime Minister, Britain not only had no moral case against the annexation but was morally obliged to support Austria. Grey crushed Dilke's case. He quoted from an Austrian diplomatic letter that guaranteed Austria would not add to or extend her rights. Triumphantly, Grey argued that the Ambassador's undertaking imposed a far greater moral obligation on Austria not to annex the Provinces than Salisbury's advice imposed on the British government to recognize the annexation.

After Grey had carried the debate, Dilke discovered the Foreign Secretary had misrepresented the Austrian undertaking. The Austrian letter guaranteed Austria would not advance on Salonika and it gave no undertaking about Bosnia. Grey had lied to Parliament, and was caught out. Nonetheless, he calmly delayed retracting his lie until he had won the diplomatic battle with Austria.

While the Bosnian Crisis inflicted serious damage on Austro-Russian relations, it had a traumatic effect on Izvolsky who took setbacks personally. He came away from the diplomatic defeat with his position in St. Petersburg lessened, and even more important, with his self-esteem and his vanity deeply wounded. Unnoticed at the time, Izvolsky transferred Ambassador Nicolai de Hartwig, a pan-Slav extremist, from Persia to Belgrade. He directed Hartwig to promote a Balkan League. From the time of his arrival, Hartwig pushed Belgrade into an anti-Turk and anti-Austrian stance.[317] After he had made the first moves for a Balkan League, Izvolsky arranged his own transfer to the Paris embassy where he worked tirelessly to bring about war between Grey's Triple Entente and the Central Powers.

From 1909 until the outbreak of the war, Izvolsky's animus against Austria continued unabated. He danced for joy when the Great War broke out, exclaiming "*C'est ma guerre.*" Bridge says:

> For Aehrenthal's success was not unqualified: he had raised many demons. Isvolsky's frenzy for revenge was now boundless and he busied himself with his plans for a Balkan League. In this he was supported by Grey ... who was more than ever determined to hold on to Russia ... "If the Russians have an eye to the future, they will lose no time ... in preparing for the conflict which must inevitably follow if Germany intends to pursue the policy of domination of Europe."[318]

Grey could now speak confidently about Russia 'preparing for the coming conflict' and from this time onward, he backed the Russians in the conflict ridden Balkans.[319] He entered this relationship with Russia aware that it must lead to an Austro-Russian clash.

After the Bosnian crisis, the Balkans simmered quietly until 1911, when France cashed the British pledge to help them in absorbing Morocco—the Agadir Crisis. In response, Italy cashed the French pledge of compensation: a free hand in Tripoli. On 29 September 1911, Italy declared war on Turkey, announcing on 5 November they had annexed Tripoli. The Italian actions de–stabilized Europe, a destabilization deeply rooted in the secret articles of the Anglo-French accord on Morocco.

As the Tripoli War progressed, Austria declared neutrality and proposed general mediation by the Powers. Germany gave general support to Italy, while Russia, France and Britain stood aside. Once more, Grey's reputation for great integrity and principles does not accord with the facts. All in all, Grey practiced extreme moral relativism: he set few standards for himself or his friends while he set the highest moral standards for Austria and Germany.

Consistent with Austria's Bosnian annexation, the British press erupted in outraged indignation at Italy's blatant belligerence, and the lash of their scathing denunciations threatened to sour Anglo-Italian relations. Contrary to the Austrian case, the Foreign Office interceded with the British press to tone down their violent criticisms of Italy; *The Times* immediately softened its reproof.[320]

Meanwhile, Russia continued to pressure Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece to form a Balkan League. Aehrenthal ignored Russia's efforts and declined a military convention with Turkey. Unfortunately for Europe, Aehrenthal died on 17 February 1912, and Austria appointed their Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Berchtold, Foreign Minister.

As the new Austrian Foreign Minister took office, Russia's

efforts in the Balkans began to bear fruit. Ambassador Hartwig, who had gained enormous influence in Belgrade, persuaded the Crown, the politicians and the military to enter a Serbo-Bulgar alliance. His relentless work paid off on 13-15 March 1912, when Serbia and Bulgaria signed a secret treaty. The secret agreement contained defensive clauses directed against Austria, and an annex that called for the partitioning of Macedonia after they had expelled Turkey.

Under increased Russian pressure, Serbia and Bulgaria transformed their agreement into an offensive alliance.[321] A point to consider in analyzing the assassination of Franz Ferdinand is that Hartwig had the authority to create an offensive alliance so he had both access to the senior ruling factions in St. Petersburg and their approval for his actions. Thus, Hartwig and Izvolsky enjoyed significant access and influence within the ruling circles of the Russian government.

The Balkan League's assault on Turkey started on 8 October 1912 with Montenegro declaring war, and within a week Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria joined the conflict. Turkish forces crumbled. Serbia tried to reach the Adriatic by driving through Albania to the alarm of Austria and Italy. Notably, Serbia had no fear of either Austria or Germany because she had received Russian approval for her advance.[322] (A precedent worth remembering for the crisis two years later in 1914—Serbia engaged in a high-risk gambit when she had assurances of Russian support). In December, Turkey sued for peace.

Russia's Balkan League was an instrument of aggression. Lafore explains this newfound aggressiveness in the Triple Entente as follows:

> In 1908, the French had expressed great hesitation in supporting the Russians in their policy of hostility towards Austria. In 1912, they were actually egging the Russians on. The principal reason ... Raymond

> Poincaré became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in 1912 ... But now a perceptibly different tone entered French diplomacy ... Nor was it unconnected with fears about the solidity of the Russian alliance; it was thought in some quarters that if there were to be a war it had better be one precipitated by Russia for its own interests; if war should start in the West, it was not entirely certain that the Russians would feel compelled to honour their commitments to France ... the French urged upon the conciliatory Sazanov a stronger line than he was himself inclined to take ...[323]

Russian infidelity to Grey's Triple Entente compelled France and Britain to goad Russia into an Austro-Russian clash in the Balkans.

When Turkey sued for peace, the secrecy of Grey's policies paid unexpected diplomatic dividends. Neither Germany nor Austria appreciated that British hostility was both permanent and implacable. Operating under the delusion that Grey represented a force for peace, Austria's Berchtold and Germany's Bethmann-Hollweg (German Chancellor) chose to have the Powers meet under Grey's direction in London. In the gravest of miscalculations, Bethmann-Hollweg forced Austria to make all the concessions, and he allowed Grey to take all the credit, effectively crowning Grey as the great peacemaker, freeing him from the restraint of the Liberal Radicals both in Cabinet and in Parliament.

On 17 December 1912 Grey called the ambassadors in London to the conference. Given the firm resolve of Austria and Italy to oppose a Serbian port on the Adriatic plus the French and British desire to maintain good relations with Italy, the conference quickly agreed to exclude Serbia from the Adriatic. They established a new state of Albania and granted Serbia free access to the Adriatic through Albania.

However, when the conference came to determine the Albanian

frontiers, Austria suffered a series of humiliating defeats. Austria gave way four times on the frontier issue, but refused to yield on Scutari. Eventually, the Concert agreed to let Albania have Scutari. However, Montenegro captured Scutari on 23 April 1913, and defied the Concert.

Berchtold stood firm over Scutari. On 2 May, Austria mobilized her forces in Bosnia to coerce Montenegro; on 5 May the Montenegrins left Scutari. Berchtold's unilateral decision had right on its side; however, Bridge notes:

> But Berchtold might have done well to note how, in the moment of truth at the end of April, the Triple Entente had almost automatically displayed its solidarity. As Grey told Cartwright, if Austria-Hungary invaded Montenegro, 'we should have to consider not the merits of the question of Scutari, but what our interests required us to do in a European crisis'.[324]

Berchtold's unilateral decision marked the end of his faith in concert diplomacy.[325] It is a critical moment to recall when analyzing the July 1914 Crisis and Berchtold's refusal to put Austria's dispute with Serbia before the Concert.

In a moment of weakness, Grey had articulated the guiding principle of his foreign policy: "We should have to consider, not the merits of the question of Scutari, but what our own interests required us to do in a European crisis." Right and wrong made no difference to Grey—all that mattered was the dictates of grand strategy or "our interests" as he called them. Neither France nor Britain could precipitate war directly owing to the restraint of strong internal forces for peace. They solved the problem by pushing Russia into a highly aggressive policy in the Balkans. When Russia's Balkan adventures got her into trouble, both France and Britain intended, regardless of culpability, to join her in arms.

Russia basked in the triumph of the first Balkan War only briefly. More divided than united her Balkan League. Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria bickered over Macedonia. Bulgaria proved blind to geopolitical realities by failing to recognize Serbia's strategic role as the cat's-paw of the Triple Entente. The Bulgarians challenged Serbia and Greece in Macedonia, convinced that as the cornerstone of Russia's Balkan League they enjoyed Russian protection. Bulgaria was crushed in the Second Balkan War by the combined forces of Serbia, Greece and Romania while Russia stood aside.

The Second Balkan war ended with the treaty of Bucharest, signed on 10 August 1913, in which Bulgaria surrendered a large tract of Macedonia. Austria failed to influence the outcome of the Second Balkan War. Bridge notes that this impotence, especially impotence in the face of Serbian provocation, persuaded Austria that unilateral action was the only means of safeguarding its interests.[326] Berchtold decided that Concert diplomacy could no longer protect Austria.[327]

The test of Berchtold's resolve came swiftly. In October 1913, the Serbs sent army units into Albania, intending to destabilize the new state, and to seize some of her territory. The Concert, especially Britain France and Russia, declined to enforce the London Conference's territorial decisions. On 17 October 1913—eight months before the July Crisis began—Berchtold served notice to the world that Austria would not tolerate Serbian provocation. He issued an ultimatum to Serbia. Because Austria had enforced the decisions of the Concert, Britain and France could not present a credible case for going to war. Russia forced the Serbs to back down.

Austria and Serbia did not go to war in 1913 but they coexisted in a state of high tension. Serbia continued sponsoring anti-Austrian propaganda and terrorism among the South Slavs of the Empire. From Austria's vantage, the terrorist problem among the South Slavs would not have been serious if the Serbs were not there

to protect the terrorists, and the Russians there to protect the Serbs.[328] Instead of calming her client state, Russia's Foreign Minister, Sazanov, inflamed Serbian passions with assurances that "Serbia's promised land lies in the territory of present-day Hungary."[329] Lafore says that Sazanov's words "constituted a program and even a proposal. And they were accompanied on other occasions, by solemn promises of support for future aspirations."[330] Lafore concludes that "it was clear to almost everyone" that Serbia had become an irreconcilable and an extremely dangerous enemy of Austria.[331] "Almost everyone" included the British Foreign Office.

Britain's Ambassador to Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, warned the Foreign Office that the tension between Austria and Serbia could lead to a "general conflict." The following extract can leave no doubt how serious Cartwright considered the hostility between Serbia and Austria had become:

> As soon as peace is restored in the Balkans, the Austrian authorities anticipate that Serbia will begin a far-reaching agitation in the Serb-inhabited districts of the dual Monarchy, and as this country cannot allow any dismemberment of her provinces without incurring the danger of the whole edifice crumbling down., we have all the elements in the near future of another violent crisis in this part of the world, which may not unlikely end in the final annexation of Serbia by the dual Monarchy. That however, will lead to a war with Russia, and possibly to a general conflict in Europe.[332]

In another letter, Cartwright wrote:

> Serbia will some day set Europe by the ears, and bring about a universal war on the continent. I cannot tell

> you how exasperated people are getting here at the continual worry which that little country causes to Austria under encouragement from Russia. It will be lucky if Europe succeeds in avoiding war as a result of the present crisis. The next time a Serbian crisis arises, I feel sure that Austria-Hungary will refuse to admit of any Russian interference in the dispute and that she will proceed to settle her difference with her little neighbour coute que coute.[333]

Cartwright's replacement at Vienna, DeBunsen, also alerted the Foreign Office that Austria viewed the ferment in the Balkans with "extreme nervousness."

Williamson says that by June 1914, the Austrians felt threatened by the combined efforts of France and Russia in the Balkans:

> What gave the Russian presence more effectiveness was French money, which could easily recreate a new Balkan League. At the very least the Franco-Russian allies might neutralise both Bulgaria and Turkey, leaving Vienna with no alternative counterweights against Serbia. Above all else, if Rumania went into the Russian camp, the strategic position of the Danubian monarchy would be thoroughly compromised.[334]

For the first time since Sadowa in 1866, Austrian statesmen feared peace more than war. Successive ambassadors to Vienna alerted the Foreign Office the pressure of the Triple entente via Serbia had created a flash point in the Balkans. Thus, the Foreign Office knew that because of the extreme tensions between Serbia and Austria, a major incident could easily intensify into a European war. Unfortunately, the Foreign Office not only failed to relieve the tensions but also continued to feed the flames with continued

support for Russia and France.

The tensions in the Balkans eventually led to the Third Balkan War, which developed into the Great War. To understand the origins of the Great War, one must first have an honest picture of the architect of British foreign policy, Sir Edward Grey. The historian Sontag gives us this analysis:

> Even Grey's most admirable qualities, his love of truth and his sense of fair play, were warped by the conflict between his guiding principles. He demanded the same ethical standards in public and private affairs. The diplomacy of no state could measure up to such a standard, but Grey could not abandon his convictions without loss of self-respect. The inevitable result was distorted vision. He focussed the white light of moral indignation on the sins of Germany, which were numerous enough. Unconsciously he shut out of his field of vision policies or actions of the Entente powers which could not be reconciled with his sincere devotion to honourable actions.
>
> ...Once embarked on the slippery path of casuistry, Grey slid insensibly from self-deception to deception of his colleagues in the Cabinet, of Parliament, and of the British people.[335]

On the surface, Sontag's analysis of Grey would appear harsh. However, while he speaks of self-deception leading to general deception, this harsh criticism does not inform the body of his work. Herein lies the enigma of virtually every academic scholar: Every historian admits some instances of Grey's deceptions, they are often different instances, and the admissions never inform their overall analysis of the man's character and the events in question. For the Anglo-American scholar, Grey is primarily an honest, honorable, pacific, high-principled man despite volumes of

evidence that contradict that assertion.

Sontag's analysis above is full of assumptions about Grey's character, and excuses for his behavior. He says that Grey "unconsciously" applied double standards of morality. One can agree wholeheartedly that Grey did apply a double moral standard, but one must challenge the "unconscious" assertion because it lacks evidence to support it. Sontag says that Grey had a "love of truth," a "sense of fair play," and a "sincere devotion to honorable actions." These are beautiful characteristics in any man, but neither Sontag nor any other historian has ever substantiated the claim that they applied to Grey. In truth, Grey, (and his cousin Albert) enjoyed the confidence of his contemporaries, who considered him an unusually honest politician. However, having the confidence of his contemporaries leaves Grey open to the suspicions that he might have abused their trust, making Grey's honesty a legitimate target for historical analysis. In fact, Grey could never have executed his secret foreign policy if people had not trusted him so completely. However, there is nothing in the historical record to support the assertion that Grey was unusually honest, decent, or honorable, while many incidents suggest that Grey was Machiavellian, deceitful, and exploitive.

The inconsistency between the historical Sir Edward Grey and the Anglo-American portrayal of him emanates solely from the exigencies of the July Crisis. Scholars cannot allow that a Machiavellian Foreign Secretary directed British foreign policy in July 1914 because Grey did nothing to avert the disaster, and did much to mislead both Austria and Germany that Britain might stand aside, resulting in the Central Powers taking risks they might otherwise have avoided. If one sees Grey as a Machiavellian, one must interpret his actions in the July Crisis as deliberately enticing Austria and Germany to take terrible risks. The problem with that interpretation is that it is impossible to justify the destruction and carnage that followed. Consequently, the scholars need an honest, decent peace-loving Foreign Secretary, who would never dream of

deliberately plunging Europe into a catastrophic war if they are to avoid making Britain culpable for the war.

Grey's character presents scholars with an excruciating problem. They cannot deny that he supported the Boer War, the burning of the farms, and the dreadful concentration camps. That support undercuts the proposition that Grey favored pacific policies and solutions. It also shows that he seems not to have suffered any uneasiness with the death rates among the women and children in the camps, which undermines the claims that Grey was a man of conscience devoted to honorable actions. In addition, scholars cannot deny that Grey misled the British people and Parliament with various exaggerations, suppressions, and deceptions that allowed him to prosecute his policies without having to disclose their substance and implications. As already mentioned, Grey lived by a double moral standard which allowed him to impose high moral standards on Germany and Austria, and to impose hardly any standards on his friends, France and Russia. However, the crowning problem for the scholars will always be Grey's relationship with his Cabinet colleagues. Unlike the American model of an executive president, British Parliamentary democracy assigns the governing authority to the collective of the Cabinet. Grey violated that collective principle when he hid the secret military talks from his colleagues. In effect, he betrayed the Cabinet in general and his colleagues in particular. If Grey were so honorable as the scholars maintain, he was honor and duty bound to either disclose his policies or resign. That he did neither fundamentally cripples the Anglo-American assertion that he was a man of the highest principle and virtue. The Anglo-American portrayal of Sir Edward Grey as a model of virtue is not just a fiction; it is both academic and historical fraud.

279 Steiner, Zara, S., and Neilson, Keith, *Britain And The Origins Of The First World War*. London, Palgrave Macmillan, second edition, 2003, Print. 42.

280 Britain's isolation during the Boer War confirmed Grey in the wisdom of seeking an accord with Russia. In 1924, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Eyre Crowe, explained how the diplomatic lessons learnt during the Boer War influenced British foreign policy:
It was largely the danger then appearing of a possible Franco-German-Russian coalition against Great Britain which, in his estimation, 'made the British government seek an accommodation with France ....'
British strategy aimed at pre-empting the combination of Germany and Russia by creating the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia aligned against the Austro-German alliance.

281 Wilson Keith, *The Context Of Britain's Imperial Problems*. In Wilson, Keith, ed. *The International Impact Of The Boer War* Chesham, Acumen Publishing Limited, 2001. Print. 200-201

282 Monger, George, *The End Of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900 –1907*. London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd. 1963. Print. 288-89

283 Lutz, Hermann. *Lord Grey And The World War*. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1928. Print. 134

284 Sontag, Raymond James. *European Diplomatic History: 1871-1932*. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1933. Print. 114

285 Remak, Joachim, *The Origins Of World War I: 1871 –1914*. New York, Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1967. Print. 45

286 Trevelyan, George Macaulay, *Grey Of Fallodon*. London, Longmans. 1937. 195

287 *European Diplomatic History: 1871-1932*. 115

288 Wilson, Keith, *Grey*. In Wilson, Keith, ed. *British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War*. Wolfeboro, New Hampshire, Croom Helm, 1987. Print. 188-189

289 Farrer, J. A. *England Under Edward VII*. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1922. Print. 53

290 Ewart, John S. *The Roots And Causes Of The Wars*, New York, George H. Doran Company, 1925. Print. 18

291 *The Origins Of World War I: 1871 –1914*. 141

292 Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. *The Politics Of Grand Strategy:*

Britain And France Prepare For War, 1904-1914. Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press. 1969. Print. 265

293 Wilson, Keith. *The Policy Of The Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904-1914.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985. Print. 105-106

294 Bridge, F. R. *From Sadowa To Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy Of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* London, Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1972, Print. 105

295 *From Sadowa To Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy Of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 107

296 Bridge, F. R. *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1972, Print. 1

297 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 18

298 *From Sadowa To Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy Of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 298

299 Bridge, in Hinsley, F. H. *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey:* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977. Print. 172

300 *From Sadowa To Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy Of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 298.

301 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 83-84

302 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 88

303 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 90

304 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 99

305 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 18

306 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 19

307 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 33

308 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 37

309 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 107

310 Williamson, Samuel R. Jr. Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War. London, Macmillan, 1991. Print. 68-69

311 *Grey of Fallodon.* 223

312 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 116, provides a less critical analysis of Grey's dealings with Izvolsky.

313 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 124

314 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 125

315 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 117

316 Fay, Sidney, Bradshaw, *The Origins of the World War.* New York, The Macmillan Company, 1930. Print. 396-405

317 *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.* 104

318 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 137

319 *Great Britain and Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 1137.

320 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 181. Bridge does not mention the Milnerite influence in *The Times.*

321 *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.* 117

322 *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 347

323 Lafore, Laurence, *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I*, Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1965. Print. 174

324 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* Print. 201-202

325 *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 352

326 *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914.* 358-359

327 *Great Britain And Austria-Hungary 1906-1914: A Diplomatic History.* 203

328 *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I.* 181

329 *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I.* 178

330 *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I.* 178

331 *The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I.* 178

332 Nicolson, Harold, Po*rtrait of a Diplomatist: Being the Life of Sir Arthur Nicolson First Lord Carnock, and a Study of the Origins of the First World War.* Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Company. 1930. Print. 283. Cartwright to Nicolson on May 23, 1913.

333 Po*rtrait of a Diplomatist: Being the Life of Sir Arthur Nicolson First Lord Carnock, and a Study of the Origins of the First World War.* 283 Cartwright to Nicolson, January 31, 1913.

334 *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War.* 174

335 *European Diplomatic History: 1871-1932.* 133

10
Two Shots at Sarajevo

On the morning of 28 June 1914 Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Heir Apparent to the throne of Austria-Hungary, visited Sarajevo, Bosnia. Along his lightly guarded route, seven young assassins, mere boys mostly, waited to kill him. Their leader, who assigned himself no fixed position, moved up and down the line encouraging his young accomplices as the Archduke's motorcade approached. Slowly, Franz Ferdinand passed the first assassin[336] but he froze. Then the motorcade came abreast of the second.[337] This young man cracked and hurled a grenade. The Archduke's driver accelerated; the bomb bounced off the car, exploded on the road and injured several spectators and the occupants of the following car. After an ill-advised delay, the police brought the wounded to hospital while Franz Ferdinand continued to the Town Hall, passing safely by the other would-be assassins.

Meanwhile, the bomb-thrower jumped into the shallow river and following instructions swallowed a cyanide capsule. However, in one of a suite of mysteries pervading the Sarajevo assault, the poison burned him internally, made him ill, but failed to kill him. Within minutes, onlookers caught him and held him for the police.

Franz Ferdinand arrived at City Hall, where, shaken, he berated the mayor and other dignitaries. After regaining his composure, he rearranged his schedule to visit his wounded officials at the

hospital. In the confusion, orders for the change of route did not reach the drivers. As Franz Ferdinand's motorcade left City Hall, the driver of the first car followed the original route and turned; Franz Ferdinand's car followed. They were ordered to stop. Franz Ferdinand's car halted alongside one of the seven assassins, Gavrilo Princip. Stepping forward, Princip fired two shots. Franz Ferdinand's wife[338] died immediately while the Archduke died within the hour.

Princip turned the gun on himself but bystanders stopped him. While struggling, he swallowed his cyanide capsule, but as with his friend, the poison burned him, made him ill, but did not kill him. He too was apprehended alive.

Remak notes the importance of the 'defective' cyanide without which there would have been no Great War:

> Just as in Čabrinović's case, the poison was ineffective. All it did was to cause him a severe stomach pain and much vomiting. The poison given them by their Belgrade employers had been too old. The consequences of this bit of negligence were truly momentous. Had Čabrinović's and Princip's suicide attempts succeeded—both of them did take their poison—the Austrians might have remained entirely in the dark about the background of the crime, in which case, there would very likely have been no Austro-Serbian crisis, and hence no World War in 1914.[339]

The information provided by Princip started a chain of events that eventually ended in the great catastrophe. However, Remak's suggestion that the cyanide lost its potency owing to its age is pure speculation that has no supporting evidence. We do not know why the cyanide failed and it may have been the intent of the "Belgrade employers" to give out nonlethal cyanide to the assassins: the

purposes of the "Belgrade employers" forms the central mystery of the Sarajevo assassination.

The team of assassins consisted of three distinct groups. Three of the seven belonged to the angry youth of Bosnia but they had no direct contact with Serbian terrorist organizations. Another three moved in the 'Young Bosnia' circles that had fallen under the influence of extreme Serbian nationalist propaganda. Gavrilo Princip engaged in 'Young Bosnia' activities, but he also moved on the margins of the Black Hand organization, an elite, secret, Serbian-terrorist organization. Princip had formed a close and trusting friendship with Danilo Illić, the leader of the assassins.

Illić, a commander in 'Young Bosnia', was at twenty-four the oldest of the assassins, and their undisputed leader. He had planned the assassination. Illić knew well the nominal head of 'Young Bosnia,'[340] a man who belonged to the Black Hand. In 1913, Illić visited Serbia and contacted a captain[341] who was also a member of the Black Hand's Central Executive Committee (CEC). Illić told the captain the youth of Bosnia had reached a ferment of discontent and they wanted to strike at the Habsburg monarchy. The Captain advised caution but provided Illić with money and papers to travel to Belgrade where he could talk to the leader of the Black Hand, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, alias Apis, whom Illić had met previously.[342] One may infer that Illić belonged to the Black Hand, and that he ranked as a 'professional' terrorist.

The puzzling feature of the assassination team in Sarajevo is that it comprised one professional terrorist and six amateurs. Why did Illić recruit six schoolboys to assassinate the Archduke when he had hundreds of Bosnian veterans of the Balkan wars available? It is equally puzzling that Illić, the best trained and oldest of the assassins, did not take one of the attack positions. Instead, he moved up and down the line without committing to the attack. At first glance, one might suspect that he did this to protect himself, assigning the more dangerous roles to the younger boys, but he later displayed so much courage and determination that one cannot

believe he preserved himself out of cowardice. One suspects that Illić had received special instructions that were unknown to the other six. He planned all the details in Sarajevo, and his surviving the attack formed a critical part of the plan—his mission came after the attack.

The Black Hand grew out of the 1908 Bosnian crisis. Serbian rage over the annexation led prominent Serbs to form Narodna Odbrana, a secretive nationalist organization. Founding members included the Serbian Foreign Minister, some cabinet ministers, state officials and military officers. Narodna Odbrana's mission "was to enlist and train partisans, for a possible war against Austria, to carry out anti-Austrian propaganda in Serbia and abroad, and to enlist reliable spies and saboteurs in those Austrian provinces Serbia wanted to annex."[343] Narodna Odbrana developed a superb organization, quickly setting up agents and transportation networks, known as underground railways,[344] throughout the south Slav Austrian territories.

After Russia yielded over Bosnia, Austria pressured Serbia to suppress Narodna Odbrana. Bowing to geopolitical reality, the Serbian government forced Narodna Odbrana to supplant its sponsorship of terrorism with a program of cultural propaganda. As Narodna Odbrana reorganized, a group within the organization assumed control of the terrorist network, forming the Black Hand. Remak points out the Black Hand was an elite organization with 2500 members, which had no problem recruiting new members.[345] A solid core of army officers joined the Black Hand, giving it a high-level of military expertise.

Because the Black Hand developed inside the larger Narodna Odbrana, many members belonged to both organizations, which promoted the transfer of the terrorist organization, and it allowed the Black Hand to infiltrate the larger organization without opposition. Thus, the Black Hand freely employed Narodna Odbrana's network of agents and underground railways in Austrian territory. Thus, whenever Austrian police uncovered subversive

activities, they regularly arrested Narodna Odbrana agents. It never occurred to the Austrians that a second more secretive terrorist organization worked within the secretive organization they knew as the Narodna Odbrana.

In 1914, the Austrians arrested many Narodna Odbrana members who helped the assassins, convincing them the organization had carried out the attack. The truth, however, lay submerged in the complex, interconnected relations between Serbian nationalist and terrorist organizations. The leader of the Black Hand, Colonel Apis, had used agents from both the Narodna Odbrana and the Black Hand to carry out the attack, but responsibility for the attack did not necessarily rest with either organization.

Control of the Black Hand rested with a ten-man Central Executive Committee (CEC) based in Belgrade. Below the CEC, the organization consisted of local cells in which members of one cell rarely knew members of another. Remak describes the organization as follows:

> To achieve its aim, the Black Hand used methods of organisation that combined the paraphernalia of Masonic ritual with the practical efficiency of a mail order catalogue. ... In those Austrian and Turkish territories which the Black Hand meant to join to Serbia, and where it operated as well as in Serbia proper, the basic group was often larger and had more freedom of action. "Major revolutionary action," however, the statutes prescribed, "shall be made dependent upon the approval of the Central Committee in Belgrade."[346]

One reason to question the Black Hand's responsibility for the assassination is the absence of CEC approval.

Collusion with the Serbian High Command allowed the Black

Hand to post their members at important Austro-Serbian border crossings. These frontier officers coordinated local espionage for the War Ministry, and they supervised local terrorism for the Black Hand. They also served as key links in Narodna Odbrana's underground railway,[347] witnessing to the close connection between the two organizations. A leading member of the Black Hand, a frontier guard,[348] testified in 1917:

> I believed that (the High) Command saw better and farther than I and knew more. For instance, a telegram would arrive: fifty rifles and two boxes of bombs arriving from Valjevo. Receive and keep them until so-and-so comes. Help him to send these to the place he indicates in Serbia or abroad. Each such dispatch had a confidential number, a seal, and a signature ... of someone I knew and trusted. Most often Dragutin (Apis) had signed, but he concealed this by adding: "On orders of the Chief of the General Staff."[349]

"Abroad" meant Austria. Of singular relevance to the assassination, the guard's testimony proves the Black Hand not only could send, but also habitually did send, arms into Bosnia by the underground railway.

In any analysis of the Sarajevo plot, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević, alias Apis, emerges as the principal character. Remak describes him:

> Personal magnetism, great intelligence, and utter discretion combined to make Apis a wonderful organizer of whatever intrigue he happened to be pursuing at the moment. Brave, incorruptible, modest, vastly patriotic, and totally ruthless ...[350]

All scholars agree that Apis had ability and intelligence, and that he

showed professionalism as a terrorist. Therefore, one must work from the premise that Apis was a skilled terrorist. Thus, reconciling Apis' general skills as a terrorist and his methods in the assassination becomes a central goal of the event's analysis and interpretation.

Apis took a leading role in the May 1903 coup in Serbia, the murder of King Alexander, and the placing of King Peter on the Serbian throne, a role that established his influence with the army and the new dynasty. After 1903, his fellow officers who took part in the *coup*—the May conspirators—held him in high esteem. Furthermore, the barbarity of the May coup had so repulsed the British that they broke off diplomatic relations. In 1906, Grey stipulated removal of the most senior May conspirators as the price for restoring relations. With the more senior men dismissed, Apis assumed the leadership of the group. Operating from this base, Apis spread his influence into the rest of the Serbian army until he became the most influential officer in Serbia.

Remak describes how contemporaries viewed Apis:

> Although there was nothing despotic about him, his suggestions and wishes were treated as commands. He was one of the founding members of the Black Hand - #6. One saw him nowhere, yet one knew that he was doing everything ... There was no Minister of War who did not have the feeling of having another, invisible minister next to him.[351]

Dedijer concedes the army exercised extensive political influence after 1903, a circumstance he describes as militarism. He describes Apis' position within this political militarism:

> Colonel Apis was the initiator of this kind of militarism in Serbia. Although he was regarded after the 1903 *coup d'état* as the real minister of war of Serbia, a kind of *éminence grise* of Serbian political

> life, he himself held a rather modest position; in 1909 he was only the chief of staff of the Drina division. At that time the first steps were made for the organization of his secret society Ujedinjenje ili smrt (Black Hand).[352]

The low rank of colonel masked the great influence Apis exercised in Serbian affairs.

Apis helped in reorganizing the Serbian army, equipping it with modern arms and reforming the army's mobilization procedures. After the Bosnian humiliation, Apis either formed or joined the Black Hand (scholars are unsure).[353] He told Foreign Minister Milovanović about the new organization and the minister responded: "Place, young friend, your 'Black Hand' at my disposal, then you will see what Milovanović will do for Serbia."[354] Apis worked closely with Milovanović during 1911-12, and MacKenzie remarks: "During the winter of 1911-12, the 'Black Hand' became almost an instrument of the Serbian Foreign Ministry."[355] By the fall of 1911 Cabinet ministers, politicians, the press and senior officers knew of the Black Hand's influence.[356]

In early 1911, Apis worked closely with Crown Prince Alexander, and the Prince contributed generously to setting up *Pjiémont,* the Black Hand's newspaper. By late 1911, the two had quarreled leading Apis to boycott the palace[357]. When the King became seriously ill in 1912, Apis and the army dictated terms of succession to Prince Alexander: any future War Minister must be a friend of the May conspirators and the Prince's entourage must be loyal to army leaders.

Apis influenced completing the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912, which in turn led to the First Balkan War:

> However, with the CEC's (Central Executive Committee of the Black Hand) blessing, Apis was working in full accord with Milovanović who briefed

> him fully on the progress of Serbo-Bulgarian talks ... Apis assisted Milovanović, considering the Bulgarian alliance an essential precondition for war against Turkey. ... During 1911-12 Major Apis encouraged the sophisticated but timid Milovanović to adopt a more decisive foreign policy. ... Impressed with Apis, ... Milovanović ... grew much bolder.[358]

Russia's ambassador to Belgrade, Hartwig, worked relentlessly to forge the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Given the Serbian power structure, one may infer that Hartwig and Apis collaborated. Certainly, Hartwig had the highest esteem for the Black Hand:

> Vladimir Lebedev, Navy Minister in Russia's Provisional Government established in March 1917, wrote in June: 'During the last days of my stay in Salonika they began arresting the best Serbian officers such as Dimitrijević [Apis], Vemić, etc.' The late Russian ambassador, N. G. Hartwig, noted Lebedev, had characterized "Black Hand" as "most popular, unselfish, idealistic and patriotic and whose aim was solely unification and liberation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian peoples."[359]

Hartwig could hardly hold such a high opinion of the organization without holding the same of its leader.

In June 1913, Colonel Apis became head of Army Intelligence. He inherited his principal spy in Austrian territory, Rade Malobabić from his predecessor. All evidence suggests that these two men had not met before this date. Within the shortest time, Apis and Malobabić became fast friends and loyal comrades. Apis ordered Malobabić to assemble a network of trusted agents in Austrian territory.

After the Balkan Wars, the Serbian government under Prime

Minister Pašić clashed with the army over governing the newly won Macedonian territories. A united officer corps opposed the government ruling the territories by decree. In May 1914, the confrontation became a crisis but Russia's Hartwig intervened:

> Russian intervention largely saved the Pašić cabinet. ...When he could govern no longer ... Pašić submitted his resignation. Russia stepped in to prevent his fall. Ambassador Nicholas Hartwig, with vast influence in Belgrade, declared Russia's Balkan policies required Pašić in office. The French hinted a Serbian Opposition regime might not receive their financial backing. ... Thus ended the May crisis. The chief winners were Pašić and Alexander, both now hostile to Apis. But Pašić had prevailed less from personal ability and Radical strength than from Russia's support.[360]

Apis succeeded in forcing Pašić to resign but Hartwig restored Pašić to power—everyone in Serbia, including Colonel Apis, submitted to Hartwig.

Hartwig considered Prime Minister Pašić essential to Russia's Balkan policies. Why? Apis and the army wished to form a ministry from the opposition, all of whom were strong nationalists. Also, Hartwig is on record for approving the policies of the Black Hand, and the army's argument over Macedonia was better than the government's. Nonetheless, the Russian Ambassador exerted himself to restore Pašić to power. Hartwig had snatched victory out of Apis' hands but surprisingly, Colonel Apis gave in to the Russian's interference with complete docility.

Given the assassination four weeks later, Hartwig's intervention stands out as most providential. To understand its importance, imagine that Apis had replaced Pašić with the government of his choosing. How could Sir Edward Grey have persuaded Britain that

the rise to power of a Serbian ministry backed by "barbaric regicides" had nothing to do with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand just four weeks later? Even the eloquence of Grey and *The Times* could not have risen to such a challenge. In contrast, Hartwig restored the more respectable Pašić ministry, allowing Grey to ignore Austrian charges of official complicity in the assassination: Grey could never have brought Britain into the war had Apis put an extreme nationalist government in power. A most serendipitous intervention.

The story of the assassination starts in the late summer of 1913 when the Governor of Bosnia[361] invited Franz Ferdinand to review the troops near Sarajevo. The Archduke accepted.[362] One cannot discover how soon foreign governments and agents learned of this decision but one may presume they learned fairly quickly because the visit was not a state secret.

In early November, Danilo Illić crossed into Serbia to discuss revolutionary work with Apis.[363] Some months later Illić organized the assassination. One is struck by the anomaly that Illić's great friend Princip led the assassination team in Belgrade. In 1913-14, Belgrade teemed with young Bosnian Serb veterans of the Balkan Wars, brave men with proven military expertise, men whom Colonel Apis could readily recruit. Instead, Apis recruited Princip, an untried schoolboy with no combat experience, a boy whom Major Tankosić (Apis' lieutenant) had rejected for active combat in 1912 because of active tuberculosis. Presumably, Illić recommended the sickly Princip for the mission (and Colonel Apis approved) because he had something which the scores of brave young Bosnian Serbs lacked. That something was the total trust of Illić, and a wish for a martyr's death. Princip had much in common with modern suicide bombers.

Remak says the exact details and evolution of the plot remain unknown. Those who knew either kept quiet or confused the issue by telling different stories. Remak says that he is certain Apis masterminded the assassination.[364] Mackenzie says that in the

spring of 1914 Apis "became preoccupied with preparations to "greet' Archduke Franz Ferdinand appropriately in Sarajevo."[365] Remak suggests that Major Tankosić recruited Princip and his two companions in Belgrade.[366]

However, the story the assassins told runs as follows: Once Princip heard about the expected visit of Franz Ferdinand to Sarajevo he decided he would assassinate him. He, and his two friends agreed to carry out the plot and they approached a veteran of the Balkan Wars, Ciganović, to help them get arms. Ciganović[367] approached Major Tankosić. After some days, Tankosić approved the scheme, interviewed one of the students, and promised four revolvers and six grenades. The dates and other circumstances lead one to suspect Princip's story. The evidence suggests that Major Tankosić and Princip collaborated more than the youths ever admitted.[368]

Being three young amateurs, Princip and his friends needed training for their mission. Tankosić assigned this task to Ciganović. The training took place in a public park on the outskirts of Belgrade. Princip proved himself the best shot because of his brief military training. On 27 May, Ciganović gave the boys the four revolvers and the six bombs. The revolvers were new while the bombs were Serbian grenades from the recent Balkan Wars.[369]

All along Princip kept Illić abreast of developments in Belgrade, while Illić planned the assassination in Sarajevo. Illić recruited three Bosnian youths to add local involvement to the plot. Princip and his friends enjoyed one advantage over more experienced men–not having a police record, they could move about Sarajevo without arousing suspicion.

On 28 May, Princip and his companions met Captain Rada Popović at Sabac, a small Serbian border post. A day earlier, Popović, a Black Hand officer, had received orders to help the youths. Popović gave the youths letters of introduction to Captain Prvanović, another Black Hand officer and the frontier officer at Loznica: "Try to receive these people and to guide them where you

know your way,"[370] From there they were introduced to more frontier guards before they made their way to Sarajevo via the underground railway of the Narodna Odbrana. They left the bombs and revolvers in Tuzla with a senior Narodna Odbrana agent. Dedijer discovered that Tankosić had ordered Princip and his friends to carry their weapons into Bosnia via the underground railway.[371]

Princip and his two friends arrived in Sarajevo on 4 June and separated. Princip contacted Illić, and then went out of town to see his brother. On 6 June, Princip returned to Sarajevo, and moved in with Illić and his mother. Next, Princip registered with the local police, giving Illić's address. It is inconceivable that Princip did this without Illić's knowledge, and highly probable that he did this on Illić's instructions. On 14 June, Illić went to Tuzla to collect the weapons, and displayed skill in evading police checkpoints.[372] Illić provided Princip with modest living expenses.

During his first interrogation, Princip told the police he had stayed at Illić's home, an admission that directed them to his closest friend. Princip was fearless, yet his revelation led to the arrest that afternoon of Illić. Time was of the essence. Any ordinary comrade would have bought time for his friend to escape the city but Princip was not ordinary— he was brave. He could easily have stalled the Austrians for twenty-four hours, but he did not.

Illić's behavior complemented Princip's. Four of the seven assassins easily escaped from Sarajevo[373], but astonishingly, Illić never even tried. At twenty-four, he faced the gallows if arrested; he knew the plot had succeeded; he knew the police had arrested his friend Princip, and he knew that Princip had registered with the police. As a leader of 'Young Bosnia', Illić had access to many safe houses in the region, but to reach safety he had to flee the city immediately. Instead, he calmly returned to his home and waited. Just hours later, the police arrested him. One must infer that Illić, the chief organizer of the plot, had allowed the police catch him: Princip had not betrayed his great friend—he had followed

instructions.

Dedijer says that during the police interrogations of 29 and 30 June, Illić denied knowing anything about the plot.[374] Thus, between 28 and 30 June the chief investigating officer for the Austrian authorities, Pfeffer, knew almost nothing. He did not know there had been five other assassins in the streets of Sarajevo or that anyone other than Princip and Čabrinović had taken part in the crime. He might never have found out. However, on 2 July Princip and Illić agreed to confess.[375] Illić revealed the names of the conspirators, the Narodna Odbrana agent in Tuzla and Major Tankosić. With this information, the Austrian police arrested some of the other boys and a host of minor Narodna Odbrana agents.

Princip and Illić's decision to tell the authorities was premeditated. Illić believed in martyrdom. Previously, he had told the Sarajevo revolutionary groups: "...To us the mission is designed to educate the new generation with our martyrdom and our full public confession about our deeds." Dedijer maintains that on 2 July Princip and Illić's behavior confirmed the authenticity of this statement.[376]

Remak believes that Apis had rehearsed the story that Princip and his friends would eventually tell the police: "Whether Apis had rehearsed Čabrinović, Princip and Grabež in their story beforehand is a point on which we possess no direct evidence, but it is difficult to imagine how else they could have agreed on it so neatly and conveniently otherwise."[377] Remak is correct. The boys predetermined which names they would reveal and which they would hide, and they adhered to their story with remarkable courage and tenacity. What Remak overlooked is that Apis not only anticipated the arrest of Princip and Illić but also gave them such a damaging story to tell.

The problem with the story the boys told the Austrian police is one of detail. Remak remarks on their story: "What it had not brought out – for here even Illić managed to keep silent – was that the origins of the conspiracy lay in Belgrade, that it involved an

organization called the Black Hand, and that the crime's instigator was the Chief of Serbian Army Intelligence."[378] If Illić had cracked under interrogation, he would surely have revealed the role of the Black Hand, the name of Colonel Apis, the name of Malobabić and other incriminating details. One must therefore infer that he volunteered selective information. One also infers that Illić, the only definite member of the Black Hand, had orders to give the Austrian authorities enough details to trace the crime to Belgrade. Thus, one may infer that Apis had ordered Illić to give the Austrian police on 2 July a predetermined story, including the names of his associates and collaborators.

One irony in the entire assassination story is that Colonel Apis had little faith in his young assassins. Illić's team consisted of five students and one slightly older but hardly more experienced young man. They were mere boys, enthusiastic amateurs, not skilled assassins. They had a low probability of killing the Archduke and a high probability of falling into the hands of the police; thus, Colonel Apis "believed that such an attempt could not succeed and that perhaps they would not even undertake it."[379] One wonders why Apis ordered Princip and Illić to rehearse the story they would tell in captivity, especially such an acutely damaging story.

Apis ran the Black Hand on a 'need to know' basis, strengthening security by using multiple isolated cells where members of one cell knew little about the assignments of neighboring cells. Yet, he allowed or ordered Illić to reveal the name of Major Tankosić who was a partisan leader known to the Austrian authorities. Even more bewildering, Apis allowed Illić to betray the Black Hand border guards and the members of Noradna Odbrana's underground railway who had helped Princip get to Sarajevo.

In late May 1914, Colonel Apis faced the simple task of sending three boys home to Sarajevo. A convention between Belgrade and Vienna allowed people cross the frontier with almost any piece of identification.[380] Princip and his two friends were Austrian citizens

with a clear police record. At most, Apis had to provide the train fare. However, he could just as easily have ordered them to go home the same way they had come—walking—and that would have cost him nothing.

Even Princip, an amateur terrorist, had expected the Black Hand to transport the weapons to Bosnia. According to Cassels, "Ciganović told Princip and his friends that they must take this armory with them: there was not, as they had hoped, any possibility of forwarding it separately to Sarajevo."[381] Apis had regularly sent quantities of weapons and bombs into Bosnia. Dedijer quotes an official document in the Serbian archives where it states Apis had ferried six cases of grenades into Bosnia.[382] If Apis could smuggle cases of grenades and rifles into Bosnia, he could have smuggled six bombs and four revolvers into Sarajevo.

No terrorist of even modest ability, let alone a skilled terrorist, would have compromised Major Tankosić, the Black Hand border guards, and the Narodna Odbrana underground railway by mistake. If it is inconceivable that Apis compromised his people in error, he must have done so on purpose—he set out to provoke Austria.

Inferring that Apis deliberately provoked the Austrians demands the following corollary: Serbia could not challenge Austria independently so Apis must have had complete confidence in Russian support. However, he could only have this confidence if he had discussed the details of the assassination with the Russians. The inference is that Russia had sanctioned the assassination to provoke Austria.

All too often, writers blame the Black Hand for sponsoring the assassination, but the evidence does not support the accusation. Yes, Black Hand agents took part in the assault, as did agents of the Narodna Odbrana, but one would never claim that the Narodna Odbrana sanctioned the plot. The statutes of the Black Hand required CEC approval for any major terrorist operation, and assassinating the heir to the Austrian throne qualified as a major terrorist act. However, Apis waited until 15 June before disclosing

his plot to the CEC. Every member of the Council was a 'professional' terrorist, suffering no scruples about killing, yet, except Tankosić, they voted unanimously to reject the plan. Apis argued all evening but failed to get CEC support for his assault despite his undisputed preeminence in the group.[383] These men feared the assassination would provoke Austria to war.

Recall that Apis wore two hats: He was both the Chief of Serbian Army Intelligence, and the Chief of the Black Hand. Given the CEC of the Black Hand had not approved the assassination, it must have originated within Serbian Army Intelligence.

Princip and Illić never revealed to the Austrians the name of Rade Malobabić, Apis' main spy in Austria. Malobabić had often gathered intelligence in Sarajevo, and smuggled weapons into Bosnia[384] so he knew the region well. In the final days of June, Apis sent Malobabić to Sarajevo. He found Princip and Illić, and they discussed the details of the plot, showing the three knew one another. Presumably, Malobabić went to Sarajevo to supervise the assassination.

After the assassination, Malobabić returned to Belgrade for further instructions but the Serbian police arrested and imprisoned him. Apis never found out about the arrest despite his having an extensive network of agents and informers in Serbia. It seems clear the Serbian authorities (Prime Minster Pašić and Prince Alexander) arrested Malobabić with extreme caution, hiding the arrest from Apis' network of informers. In stark contrast, at much the same time, Pašić openly arrested Major Tankosić. From the difference between the two arrests, one infers that in arresting Malobabić, Pašić feared somebody other than Apis—and that somebody was the Russian Military Attaché.

Because Pašić knew exactly who to arrest, one infers that he knew the details of the plot. One may presume that Pašić supplemented his knowledge of the plot by breaking Malobabić in jail. When the Serbian authorities finished with Malobabić, they

shackled his hands and his feet, and left him on a concrete floor, an imprisonment that destroyed his health. Malobabić described his ordeal as follows: "A living corpse, I beat my head on the floor and prayed to God to die. Often I howled from pain and my tears flowed because I had never deserved this from Serbia."[385] In October 1915, a senior Black Hand officer found Malobabić and brought him to Apis. Apparently, Malobabić was in appalling physical condition, with infected wounds covering his entire emaciated body. As he could not allow his agent fall into the hands of the Austrians, Apis took him with the retreating Serbian army.

In March 1917, Crown Prince Alexander and Pašić had Apis arrested on trumped-up charges of plotting to kill Alexander, an arrest that began the infamous Salonika trial. They also had Malobabić arrested. As Dedijer remarks: "But the Serbian police had succeeded in breaking Malobabić, and he accused Apis of the plot [to assassinate Prince Alexander]. They tried to do the same with Mehmed Mehmedbašić, but he was very stubborn."[386] Malobabić testified against Apis at Salonika on 9 April 1917, accusing him of directing an attack on Prince Alexander.

Dedijer tells us about Malobabić's last days:

> Before his death, Malobabić confessed to a priest in the Salonika prison: "They ... ordered me to go to Sarajevo when that assassination was to take place, and when everything was over, they ordered me to come back and fulfill other missions, and then there was the outbreak of the war." [387]

From independent sources, Dedijer corroborated that Malobabić was in Sarajevo.

When Malobabić testified, Dedijer says that Prince Alexander's agents negotiated with Apis:

> At this stage, Alexander made another move through

> his main political adviser, General Peter Živković, the leader of the Bela Ruka [White Hand]. Through a jailer, Živković established contact with Apis, sending him messages that he should not worry, that everything would be all right in the end. After the Serbian authorities extended the indictments to include Malobabić and Mehmedbašić, Živković hinted that the whole trial could be ended at once if Apis would give the full story of the Sarajevo assassination.[388]

Apis wrote the following report on the assassination:

> As the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff, I engaged Rade Malobabić to organize the information service in Austria-Hungary. I took this step in agreement with the Russian Military Attaché Artamanov, who had a meeting with Rade in my presence. Feeling that Austria was planning a war with us, I thought that the disappearance of the Austrian Heir Apparent would weaken the power of the military clique he headed, and thus the danger of war would be removed or postponed for a while. I engaged Malobabić to organize the assassination on the occasion of the announced arrival of Franz Ferdinand to Sarajevo. I made up my mind about this only when Artamanov assured me that Russia would not leave us without protection if we were attacked by Austria. On this occasion I did not mention my intention for the assassination, and my motive for asking his opinion about Russia's attitude was the possibility that Austria might become aware of our activities, and use this as a pretext to attack us. Malobabić executed my order, organized and

> performed the assassination. His chief accomplices were in my service and received small payments from me. Some of their receipts are in the hands of the Russians, since I got money for this purpose from Artamanov, as the General Staff did not have funds available for this increased activity.[389]

Throughout the Salonika trial, Apis had adopted a puzzlingly frank attitude. Eyewitnesses told of his candor and forthright statements. "Lieutenant Protić confirmed Apis' remarkable frankness in court and private conversation."[390] His codefendants complained that he "spoke too honestly."

Apis first two sentences suggest that Malobabić was a Serbian/Russian agent. Also implicit in these sentences is the notion that Apis needed Artamanov's authorization before carrying on any operation against Austria. As Serbia was Russia's client state, one would expect the Russian to keep Apis in a subordinate role.

Apis reveals that he had ordered Malobabić to assassinate Franz Ferdinand. Scholars have corroborated independently that Malobabić went to Sarajevo before the assassination and spoke to among others, Illić and Princip. Apis discusses Malobabić's assignments under the heading of Serbian Army Intelligence, and he never suggested that he had organized the assassination as a Black Hand operation. The implication throughout is the assassination was a joint Serbian/Russian military operation.

Apis admitted the extreme tensions between Serbia and Austria when he said "Feeling that Austria was planning a war with us." In response to these fears of an Austrian attack, he thought rightly or wrongly, that killing the Archduke would postpone hostilities. He engaged Malobabić to carry out the assassination only after he received a Russian guarantee of Serbia's protection. Thus, Apis treated the attack on Franz Ferdinand as a serious matter. While this latter point may appear self-evident, a surprising number of

scholars have great difficulties in admitting the seriousness of the assassination in the climate of extreme Austro-Serbian tension.

Apis' statement "Austria might become aware of our activities, and use this as a pretext to attack us" unambiguously shows that he knew he had engaged in a provocative act. We know the attack on Franz Ferdinand was the most extreme anti-Austrian measure Apis had undertaken. Thus, although Apis says he did not explain to Artamanov why he feared an Austrian attack, he admits that just being caught planning the assassination would precipitate that attack.

Apis uses the phrase "On this occasion I did not mention my intention for the assassination" seemingly to protect Artamanov. However, the phrase "On this occasion" strongly suggests there were following occasions when he and Artamanov discussed the assassination, and that Artamanov had reiterated Russia's guarantee of Serbia.

The use of the word 'receipts' and the phrase "since I got money for this purpose from Artamanov" shows that Apis had invoiced Artamanov for the assassination since the referent of 'purpose' was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. For Artamanov not to know about the assassination, Apis would have had to lie about the use of the funds. Furthermore, Apis is explicit that he would kill Franz Ferdinand only if he had Russian assurances. The crux of Apis' report concerns this Russian guarantee—for any Russian guarantee to be of value the Russians had to know what they were guaranteeing. A client state, Serbia, cannot trick a Great Power, Russia, into guaranteeing anything. The corollary is that Apis had to make certain the Russians knew exactly what they were guaranteeing.

There is one piece of evidence that the Russians knew exactly what they were guaranteeing. The Russian diplomat, Eugene de Schelking, draws attention to a meeting on 14 June 1914 between the Czar and the King of Romania. He recalls that senior aides to Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov told him that their superior,

Sazanov, thought they could safely get the Archduke "out of the way":

> I was there at the time ... as far as I could judge from my conversation with members of his entourage, he was convinced that if the Archduke were out of the way, the peace of Europe would not be endangered.[391]

That senior aides of the Foreign Minister spoke in this vein fourteen days before the assassination shows the Russian Government not only knew but also approved the plot.

After the assassination, Apis expressed the following confidence in Russia's protection:

> I was convinced positively the Russians would fight if Austria attacked us. When the ultimatum was submitted, I went to see Tankosić who was under arrest because of the ultimatum, at the staff of the Danube Division command. There I told Tankosić, to comfort him, not to fear because of his arrest, informing him that our brother Russians would surely fight.[392]

Apis' expressed this confidence in Russia despite Russia having failed Serbia over the annexation of Bosnia, a port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and Albania. Further, Apis displayed no worries about the Czar's anathema for regicides.[393] All of this suggests that Apis had carried out the assassination on Artamanov's instructions.

Unquestionably, the inference that Russia sponsored the assassination alters the standard Anglo-American interpretation of the Great War's origins. One needs, therefore, to marshal supporting arguments. It is instructive to consider who else knew about the plot. From the July Crisis onward the official Allied line was that Serbian officials knew nothing. This cozy world of denial

blew apart in 1924 when Pašić's former minister of education (in 1914), Ljuba Jovanović, revealed that the Prime Minister had told the Cabinet about the plot.

In 1924 Jovanović was still active in Serb politics, serving as president of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Parliament. Despite stipulating that he would not reveal everything, he made the following unwelcome revelation, unwelcome because the allied victors had done all in their power to blame the Germans for the outbreak of the war:

> At the outbreak of the World War I was Minister of Education in M. Nikola Pašić's Cabinet....I do not remember whether it was at the end of May or the beginning of June, when one day M. Pašić said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protić, who was Minister of the Interior; but he said this much to the rest of us) that there were people who were preparing to go to Sarajevo to kill Francis Ferdinand, ... As they afterwards told me, the plot was hatched by a group of secretly organised persons and in patriotic Bosno-Herzegovenian student circles in Belgrade. M. Pašić and the rest of us said, and Stojan agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to deny a crossing to the youths who had already set out from Belgrade for that purpose. But the frontier 'authorities' themselves belonged to the organisation, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions, but reported to him (and he afterwards reported to us) that the order had reached them too late, for the young men had already got across.[394]

When Ljuba heard of the actual assassination, he says:

> Even though I knew what had been prepared there, nevertheless I felt, as I held the receiver, as though someone had dealt me an unexpected blow; and when a little later the first report was confirmed from other quarters I began to be overwhelmed with grave anxiety. ...Not for a moment did I doubt that Austria-Hungary would make this the occasion for declaring war upon Serbia; and I considered that the position both of the Government and of the country in regard to other states would become very difficult, and in every way worse than after 29th May/ 11th June, 1903 (The date of the assassination of King Alexander and Queen Draga) or during the time of our more recent disputes with Vienna and Budapest.[395]

The second quotation shows that contemporary Serbs in high places believed the assassination would provoke Austria to war. Colonel Apis received the same unambiguous assessment on 15 June 1914 from his comrades on the CEC of the Black Hand, and he admitted the fact in his 1917 confession. There can be no doubt that every contemporary Serbian official understood the assassination would probably lead to a violent rupture in Austro-Serbian relations.

The crucial point occurs in the first quotation. Pašić, Prime Minister of Serbia, knew about the assassination plot by early June. Pašić denied the claims. However, Dedijer discovered a Serbian government document containing critical evidence.[396] The first part of the document confirms the frontier guards helped Princip and Grabež to cross illegally into Bosnia. Pašić made a handwritten summary of the first part.[397] This summary in Pašić's handwriting compelled Dedijer to declare the document of 'paramount importance' because it independently corroborates Jovanoić's assertion that Pašić, Interior Minister Protić and the Serbian Cabinet knew about the assassination plot. Dedijer's evidence is paramount because it makes the Serbian government an accessory

to the assassination. However, proving the Serbian Government was an accessory to the assassination suggests a far more serious possibility.

An obvious inference arises with Jovanović's story. Pašić ordered the youths stopped at the frontier and the frontier guards replied it was too late because the youths had already crossed. Obviously, the authorities must have known the identity of the youths to order them stopped and for the border guards to reply that they had already crossed.[398] This inference shows that Prime Minister Pašić had detailed knowledge about the Sarajevo plot. This explains how he knew to arrest Malobabić secretly.

Jovanović tells us unintentionally one further piece of information known to the Serbian government. When he said: "But the frontier 'authorities' themselves belonged to the organization, and did not carry out Stojan's instructions," he points out the government knew the frontier guards belonged to the Black Hand.

The information Pašić received was so specific and alarming that he began an investigation. More importantly, he asked General Putnik, the Chief of the Serbian General Staff, to investigate Apis.[399] However, Putnik refused. One must presume that Pašić told the general about the planned assassination; otherwise, the general would have had nothing to investigate. Clearly, Putnik accepted the risk of an Austrian attack on Serbia, yet the Serbian army had just fought two wars and was exhausted, ill equipped, and in no condition to take on the far larger Austrian army. It is a reasonable inference that General Putnik and the Serbian General Staff would not have tolerated the assassination unless they had received assurances of Russian support.

In early June 1914, Prime Minister Pašić realized the reckless actions of his archantagonist, Colonel Apis could easily precipitate a war with Austria. Pašić would never have allowed Apis risk Serbia's existence with a mad assassination plot. His Interior Minister had failed to stop the assassins at the frontier. Pašić had exhausted all the avenues he had to stop Apis, except that of

turning to his Russian protector, Hartwig. While Pašić suppressed the details of this period, we know that he went off to the Serbian countryside in his election campaign, unconcerned about the impending assassination. One infers that Hartwig assured Pašić of Russian protection if Austria should attack.

In 1915 Austrian, German and Bulgarian armies overran Serbia. It was a national catastrophe for Serbia with over one hundred thousand men lost and the homeland occupied. If Colonel Apis bore sole responsibility for the assassination, he would have faced the most bitter condemnation and excoriation from all his contemporaries who knew about the plot. Never in the history of nationalism has a junior figure carried out a rogue operation that not only led to war and the death of over a hundred thousand men but also led to the overrun of his entire homeland. Nationalist bitterness against Apis would have been overwhelming.

From late 1915 through 1916 when the outlook looked bleak for Serbia, no member of the Pašić's Cabinet or Prince Alexander's entourage or the Serbian General Staff condemned Colonel Apis. Not one of these passionate Serbian nationalists, men willing to die for Serbia, had erupted in rage at the man who brought such catastrophe on the homeland.

All this unnatural reticence from Apis' enemies took place in an atmosphere of deep distrust, rancor and feuding between factions loyal to the Black Hand and factions loyal to Prince Alexander and Pašić. The Black Hand had promoted a preemptive strike against Bulgaria but the government had rejected the suggestion. When the Bulgarians took part in the overrun of Serbia, Apis bitterly criticized the government. Nevertheless, the government never countered that Apis and his Black Hand had brought catastrophe on Serbia. It would not have been human for Prince Alexander, Pašić and their senior supporters to endure the bitter barbs of the Black Hand unless something prevented them from attacking Apis. That something was the shared knowledge that Apis carried out the assassination with Russian approval, and therefore enjoyed the

protection of the Czarist government.

In March 1917, Czar Nicholas abdicated, and Apis lost his protection. As the Serbian government pondered military defeat in 1917, and sent out cautious feelers to Austria, they realized that Colonel Apis knew far too many secrets. Apis could not only have implicated the Russians in the assassination, but he could also have revealed the Serbian authorities knew about the plot. Prince Alexander and Prime Minister Pašić arrested Apis, and orchestrated his 'legal' murder on the trumped-up charges of plotting to murder the Prince. At this Salonika Trial, the court forbade witnesses from speaking about the Sarajevo assassination yet Prince Alexander persuaded Apis to write his confession. As his reward, the Prince executed Apis on 26 June 1917.

Russian collusion in the assassination explains the behavior of the principal participants in Belgrade. Apis did not single-handedly risk destroying Serbia with his assassination plot—he had a Russian guarantee. Over time, the plot evolved from simple assassination to an attempt to provoke Austria; thus, Apis, the master terrorist, left a trail of evidence that even the Sarajevo police could follow. To lay down this trail of evidence Apis needed martyrs. This explains why he chose Princip over the more qualified candidates in Belgrade. It also explains the faulty cyanide, and all of Illić's behavior, especially his reluctance to save his life after Princip had killed the Archduke. Without Illić's evidence, the Austrian police would have had little to go on, but it cost Illić his life to both enrage the Austrians and point them toward Belgrade.

Back in Belgrade, Hartwig used his great influence to reassure Prince Alexander, Pašić, and General Putnik that Russia would defend Serbia. With the lands of the Austrian South Slavs as their prize, the Serbs were more than willing to go to war alongside their big Russian brother. Hartwig intervened to quash Apis' coup against the Pašić ministry because Russia wanted an internationally acceptable Serbian government at the time of the assassination. This sequence of events explains why Apis accepted Russian

interference in his coup with such docility, yet eight weeks later felt confident that Russia would defend Serbia. Most importantly, it also explains why Prince Alexander and Pašić did not criticize Apis when Austria overran Serbia and why they waited for the fall of the Czarist government to kill him.

The thesis that Russia sponsored the assassination carries enormous implications. In provoking a war with Austria, Russia faced certain war with Germany. Thus, the Russians needed an absolute assurance that France would join them in arms. However, France would only commit if she in turn had a guarantee from Britain. In short, Russian complicity in the murder of Franz Ferdinand implicates France and Britain in precipitating the Great War. This scenario accords with Anglo-French grand strategy, a strategy that since 1910 called for Sir Edward Grey's Triple Entente going to war with Austria and Germany over a Russian quarrel. Thus, it fell to Izvolsky's agent in Belgrade, Hartwig, to precipitate the much-needed quarrel—it was a prearranged catastrophe.

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336 Mehmedbašić. The evidence is unclear whether Mehmedbašić belonged to the Black Hand but it appears unlikely.
337 Čabrinović
338 Countess Sophie
339 Remak, Joachim, *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder.* New York, Criterion Books Inc. 1959. Print. 139
340 Gaćinović,
341 Captain Popović
342 Dedijer, Vladimir. *The Road To Sarajevo*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1966. Print. 283
343 *Sarajevo: The Story of a Political Murder.* 43
344 These networks were known as kanali.
345 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 44
346 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 45
347 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 48
348 Čedo Popović,
349 MacKenzie, David. *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. New York, East European Monographs, 1989. Print. 103
350 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 53
351 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 49-52
352 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 372
353 *Apis: The CongenialCconspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević,* 67
354 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 69
355 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 70
356 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 72
357 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 83
358 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 88-89
359 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 275
360 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 121
361 General Oskar Potiorek,
362 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 28- 29
363 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 283-284

364 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 54
365 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 124
366 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 58
367 Many scholars think that Ciganović worked as a spy for Pašić
368 It is almost certain that Ciganović was a spy for Prime Minister Pašić yet the Prime Minister only found out about the plot at about the time that Ciganović trained the youths to shoot the revolvers. This would suggest that Ciganović was not in the loop any earlier.
369 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 67
370 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 68
371 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 294.
372 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 304
373 Mehmedbašić escaped Sarajevo on 30 June, 1914. See Feuerlicht, Roberta Strauss. *The Desperate Act: The Assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo*. New York, McGraw-Hill book Company, 1968. Print. 134
374 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 332
375 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 331
376 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 330
377 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 195
378 *Sarajevo: The Story Of A Political Murder*. 196
379 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 136
380 Cassels, Lavender, *The Archduke And The Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. London, Freidrich Muller, 1984. 151
381 *The Archduke And The Assassin: Sarajevo, June 28th 1914*. 147
382 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 388-389
383 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 293
384 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 102
385 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 143
386 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 397
387 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 399
388 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 398
389 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 398
390 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević*. 270
391 de Schelking, Eugene. *Recollections Of A Russian Diplomat,*

The Suicide Of Monarchies, McMillan Co, New York, 1918, Print. 194-195

392 *Apis: The Congenial Conspirator. The Life Of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević.* 140

393 See *The Road To Sarajevo*. 430-431. The problem with Apis' confidence is that the Czar and his Court had urged King Peter to get rid of the regicide officers. According to Dedijer, the conspirators became alarmed that King Peter might get rid of them in 1911. Thus Apis was aware of the Czar's dislike of the regicides. He could hardly have expected the Czar to cheer at the assassination of the Archduke. Yet he remained extremely confident of Russian support.

394 Jovanovich, Ljuba, M., *The Murder of Sarajevo,* Belgrade, KRV Slovenstva (the Blood of Slavdom), Print 1924. 1(A translation from the British Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, E, W, 1.)

395 *The Murder of Sarajevo*.4

396 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 388-389 Dedijer provides extensive notes on this document. The evidence leads one to conclude that Pašić and Protić knew about the assassination.

397 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 388-389

398 Durham, M. Edith. *The Serajevo Crime.* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1925. Print. 128

399 *The Road To Sarajevo*. 391

11
Grey's Non-Response

The evidence in chapter ten led to the deduction that Britain (read Sir Edward Grey and Lord Milner) had given a green light to provoke Austria with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The present chapter aims to corroborate and verify this deduction by examining Sir Edward Grey's behavior during the July Crisis.

In the July Crisis, the European diplomatic system that had averted war in all previous crises failed, and failed spectacularly. Something had changed. The thesis in this work is that Sir Edward Grey and his Entente allies had premeditated war to settle their differences with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria. Thus, Grey and the Entente diplomats made no effort to avert disaster. On the contrary, Grey, who represented the only Great Power not committed by formal military alliance, subtly lured Germany and Austria into taking extreme risks with beguiling hints of British neutrality. Anglo-American scholars struggle to explain away Grey's lack of candor, inertia and non-response during the early phase of the crisis and no scholar has made a convincing case for Grey's innocence.

A huge anomaly of the July Crisis is the contemporaneous failure of the British Foreign Office and the French Foreign Ministry to caution that the assassination might develop into a full-blown crisis. This simultaneous failure occurred among the most experienced diplomats in Europe. In contrast, most other European

statesmen, from the novice to the most seasoned, having endured two Balkan Wars, the London Conference, Scutari, and multiple crises in Albania, had no difficulty understanding that Austro-Serbian antagonism had the potential to destroy European peace. Therefore, the historical challenge lies in explaining how the best of Europe's diplomats, especially those in the British Foreign Office, could have missed or ignored the ominous omens of war during the first stage of the July Crisis.

The omens of war surfaced soon after the news of the Franz Ferdinand's death reached Vienna where hostility toward Serbia had simmered for months. Suspicion of Serbian complicity in the atrocity pervaded the capital. Within days, reports from Sarajevo incriminated the Narodna Odbrana, a notorious (to the Austrians), secret, Serbian organization that promoted extreme nationalism. Worse still, Narodna Odbrana's atrocity implicated Serbian officials, frontier guards, and Major Tankosić in Belgrade. Independently, the military attaché in Belgrade explained Tankosić's position in the Serbian military and "how Apis was also involved." Since the Bosnian Crisis, Austrian officials had repeatedly charged the Serbian government with condoning Narodna Odbrana outrages and now the evidence implicated Serbian officials in the outrage. Suspicion of Serbian complicity hardened into conviction.[400]

Alarm over the Empire's survival preoccupied Austrian statesmen. If Austria submitted to a Serbian sponsored assassination, she would forfeit her Great Power prestige and worse, such supine passivity might promote a South Slav upheaval that could lead to the ethnic dissolution of the Empire. For the first time since 1866, the Austrians calculated the risks of peace far outweighed the perils of war. Even at the risk of war with Russia, Austria had to check Serbia. But their calculations suffered from an egregious flaw: Austrian officials still imagined Britain a friendly Power.

Independently, the Kaiser and his Chancellor, Bethmann-

Hollweg, determined that Austrian prestige had plummeted with the Serbian gains in the Balkan Wars, and the assassination threatened to stifle what little remained of that prestige. Austria, if she were to remain a Great Power and a German ally, had to check Serbia. German support for decisive Austrian action risked antagonizing Russia[401] but the Chancellor gambled he could localize an Austro-Serbian war. When Austria asked Germany to support strong measures against Serbia, on 6 July Bethmann-Hollweg officially agreed[402], an undertaking known as Germany's blank check.

On 5 July, the German Ambassador to London, Lichnowsky, returned from Berlin and hand-delivered to Haldane a letter from a German shipping magnate.[403] Haldane summarized his discussions with Lichnowsky for Grey:

> My Dear E.
> Lichnowsky, who has just come back from Berlin, came to see me yesterday. He appears to be very worried about the state of opinion in Germany. Austria, he says is in a white heat of indignation over the murder of the Archduke and is contemplating drastic action. I asked him if he meant by this war, and he replied that this would depend upon Serbia, but that Austria felt strongly that Serbia must be publicly humiliated. The general feeling in Berlin was, he said, that Serbia could not be allowed to go on intriguing and agitating against Austria and that Germany must support Austria in any action which she proposed to take. There was naturally apprehension in Germany that Russia would support Serbia and that led him on to say that he had heard the opinion expressed in authoritative quarters that we had entered into a naval treaty with Russia. I told him that that was nonsense and advised him to see you at once and tell you what

> he had told me. He brought me a letter from Ballin, which was the reason for his visit, and Ballin too takes a pessimistic view and evidently thinks that Austria may drag Germany into trouble.[404]

Lichnowsky could hardly have been more candid. A European crisis had developed, and there was imminent danger of war erupting.

Grey recounted Lichnowsky's visit the following day:

> The Ambassador then went on to speak to me privately, he said, but very seriously, as to the anxiety and pessimism that he found at Berlin. He explained that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had excited very strong anti-Servian feeling in Austria, and he knew for a fact, though he did not know details, that the Austrians intended to do something and that it was not impossible they would take military action against Servia.[405]

Lichnowsky then told Grey that Germany worried about the Russian build-up of arms and felt uneasy about the Anglo-Russian naval agreement. He said the mood in Germany was tilting toward having the war now rather than later.

Grey continued:

> I was disturbed by what the Ambassador had told me about the form of anti-Servian feeling might take in Austria. If trouble does come, I would use all the influence I could to mitigate difficulties and smooth them away, and if clouds arose, to prevent the storm from breaking. ...[406]

Grey's dissembling had reached a fine art. He simply assured

Lichnowsky that "if trouble does come ..." he would do his best to preserve the peace. By ignoring Lichnowsky's point that trouble had already come, Grey evaded having to disclose candidly Britain's commitments to France, enabling him to cast Britain as a neutral and benign onlooker. This misleading behavior resembled the tactics the British Foreign Office used leading up to the Bosnian crisis when they convinced Austria's Foreign Minister of their goodwill while simultaneously harboring feelings of extreme hostility. Britain pounced only after Austria had irreversibly annexed Bosnia. Grey employed the same procedure during the July Crisis as he waited for Austria to take irreversible risks.

The British Ambassador to Vienna, de Bunsen, confirmed Lichnowsky's warnings with a letter to Nicolson on 3 July, and a dispatch to Grey on 5 July (which arrived on 9 July). In his letter de Bunsen warned Nicolson that feelings in Austria ran high and he feared the Austrian Army might be unleashed. He admitted the Serbian press behaved 'shamefully' in portraying the assassins as 'martyrs sacrificed in a holy cause' and that 'ordinary decency' should have prompted them to pretend some degree of sympathy. He also mentioned the problems of Albania. In his reply on 6 July, Nicolson pointedly ignored Lichnowsky's warnings and de Bunsen's comments about the Austrian feelings of outrage:

> My dear de Bunsen.
> Many thanks for your letter of the 3rd. The crime at Serajevo was certainly a terrible one and shocked everybody here. I trust it will have no serious political consequences, in any case outside of Austria-Hungary. I suppose we must be prepared for a strong campaign against Servia, but I am glad to see from your letter that the more reasonable journals in Vienna deprecate making a Government and a country responsible for crimes of certain revolutionaries. [407]

Nicolson continued his reply with an analysis of the Albanian problems suggesting "Otherwise we have no very urgent and pressing question to preoccupy us in the rest of Europe." He continued his letter by underlining the good relations Britain enjoyed with Russia. As a whole, Nicolson's letter reads as a subtle anti-Austrian directive, stressing the importance of Anglo-Russian relations while depreciating the importance of the assassination.

However, the reality in Austria compelled de Bunsen to alert his superiors about a growing consensus among the legations in Vienna that a major crisis had developed, a crisis that might end in war:

> I had some conversation to-day with M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador ... He cannot believe that the country will allow itself to be rushed into war, for an isolated combat with Servia would be impossible and Russia would be compelled to take up arms in defence of Servia. Of this there could be no question. A Servian war meant a general European war ...
>
> Such indications as have reached me ... point certainly to the existence, even in the Ballplatz, of a very angry sentiment against Servia, and I cannot at present share M. Schebeko's inclination to believe that the commercial, and generally the middle classes of this country are indifferent to the question. I fear there is ground to regard almost all sections of the population as being just now blindly incensed against the Servians, and I have heard on good authority that many persons holding usually quite moderate and sensible views on foreign affairs are expressing themselves now in the sense that Austria will at last be compelled to give evidence of her strength by settling once and for all her long-standing accounts with Servia, and by striking such a blow as will reduce that country to impotence for the future. In

> military circles these views certainly prevail, and it would perhaps not be wise to exclude altogether the possibility that the popular indignation at the terrible crime of the 28th June may force the Government to take up an attitude from which it would not be easy to withdraw ...
>
> M. Dumaine, my French colleague, is full of serious apprehension. His country is known to be in sympathy with Servian aspirations and he is in a position to know what is being said and done by Servians in Vienna. He has repeatedly spoken to me during the past week on the dangers of the situation, which he fears may develop rapidly into complications from which war might easily arise.
>
> **Minutes.**
>
> I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take an action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over. M. Schebeko is a shrewd man and I attach weight to any opinion he expresses. A. N. [408]

Dumaine's warnings were so specific that the compilers of the British *Blue Book* suppressed the offending passage.[409] However, the whole dispatch is full of warnings. De Bunsen and Dumaine both made grim assessments, and the Russian Ambassador made it clear that Russia would intervene on Serbia's side.

Note how early the Russians had guaranteed Serbia. De Bunsen sent this dispatch on 5 July, which would suggest the Russian Ambassador to Vienna had received his instructions by 4 July at the latest, and possibly some days earlier. How suspicious the Russian Foreign Ministry should have assured Serbia so quickly on an issue the British Foreign Office refused to admit even mattered.

Albertini singles out Nicolson's minute to de Bunsen's dispatch for special comment:

> But at the British Foreign Office, Sir Arthur Nicolson, remained deaf to Lichnowsky's warning. His annotation to Bunsen's dispatch runs: "I have my doubts as to whether Austria will take any action of a serious character and I expect the storm will blow over"[410]

Given Lichnowsky's warnings, Nicolson's assessment that "the storm will blow over" made no sense. It was not just Nicolson. All the senior Foreign Office staff, by 1914 a veritable nest of Germanophobes, adopted the same benign attitude toward Germany in July 1914. From 1906-1914 the British Foreign Office perceived Germany as a European menace or "the natural enemy" who sought the hegemony of Europe through brute force and they perceived Austria as little more than Germany's client. Normally, the Foreign Office team resorted to imagination and creativity, often tinged with hysteria to find the brutish German threat in situations but this time was different. No less a figure than the German Ambassador told them outright that a grave problem had arisen and events might spin out of control. The British, French and Russian Ambassadors in Vienna independently confirmed Lichnowsky's pessimistic assessment. Yet Nicolson thought "things would blow over"; Sir Edward Grey thought he could prevent the storm form breaking and not one of the rest thought for a moment the Germans were up to their usual tricks and misbehavior. Leopards do not change their spots. Likewise one cannot satisfactorily explain away this abrupt disappearance of Foreign Office antagonism towards Germany.

Occasionally, a comment leaps out of the page at you. Nicolson's brief communication to the British Ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, on 30 June is an example:

> The tragedy which has recently occurred at Sarajevo will, I hope, not lead to any further complications;

> though it is already fairly evident that the Austrians are attributing the terrible events to Servian intrigues and machinations. As far as the internal situation of Austria-Hungary is concerned though it may seem a little brutal to say so it is possible that the new heir will be more popular than the late Archduke. Of course he is very little more than a mere boy, still he has quite an open mind and is not bound by any hard set prejudices or predilections.[411]

Nicolson is right—it was a brutal comment. But this brutal comment communicated clearly to Ambassador Buchanan Foreign Office hostility towards Austria.

Brutality and callousness aside, what leaps out at you is Nicolson's remark "though it is already fairly evident that the Austrians are attributing the terrible events to Servian intrigues and machinations." One cannot find the source for this remark in the British documents. Nicolson had not suspected, he had declared the above statement, and Sir Arthur Nicolson chose his words with care. The British consul in Bosnia laid the blame on Serbian irredentists but he did not allude to Serbian intrigues and machinations. In Vienna, Ambassador de Bunsen did not refer to Serbian intrigue in his first reports. In fact, the Austrians essentially knew nothing about the circumstances of the assassination until Illić made his confession on 2 July. By stating the Austrians had begun attributing the assassination to Serbian intrigues and machinations on 30 June, Nicolson anticipated the Austrian reaction by at least two days.

Clearly, Nicolson understood on 30 June that the assassination would lead to heightened tension between Austria and Serbia, correctly predicting Austria's suspicion of Serbian complicity. If, without specific information, he could foresee the Austrian response, the specific warnings communicated by Lichnowsky, de Bunsen, and Dumaine must have confirmed him in his first

assessment. Therefore, he deliberately ignored the imminent danger of war.

Grey's behavior fully complemented Nicolson's. A grave European crisis had developed but Grey only consulted the Cabinet's war party consisting of Asquith, Haldane and Churchill, while he waited eighteen days to alert the Cabinet's peace party, consisting of eighteen ministers. This selectivity on Grey's behalf reflected his preferred method: he often gained advantage over his Cabinet colleagues by suppressing important information. Just as troubling, Grey did not consult the French. In 1912 he exchanged letters with Cambon (the French Ambassador to London) where both parties agreed:

> I agree that, if either government had a grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other, whether both governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so what measures they would be prepared to take in common.[412]

Surely this undertaking obligated Grey to alert the French that trouble in the Balkans might threaten the general peace. It also obligated the French to alert the British if they thought the general peace was in danger. Both sides would appear to have reneged on their obligations. How convenient.

The Italian historian Albertini provides valuable commentary because he devoted so much of his life to explaining Italy's participation in the war (from his side), and to proving Germany's overall responsibility for the conflict. Thus when he criticizes Triple Entente statesmen one may assume that his criticism is the minimum warranted. Albertini says of Grey:

> All sorts of criticisms can be made against Grey. It

> can fairly be said that he was deficient in political intuition and that his handling of the situation in 1914 was so inept and dilatory that it failed to avert the catastrophe. But there exists no shadow of a doubt that he was an upright and straightforward character, perhaps even too upright and straightforward.[413]

Albertini's remarks deserve a second reading. He states that Grey lacked "political intuition" but the evidence of Grey's political career firmly contradicts that notion. Sir Edward Grey had been a first-rate British Foreign Secretary for eight years so his "inept and dilatory" handling of the July Crisis was out of character. The truth of Albertini's predicament is that he cannot satisfactorily explain Sir Edward Grey's "inept" handling of the July Crisis so he fudged by both suggesting Grey was incompetent and was supremely honest. Both statements are historically false. Anglo-American scholars have not improved on Albertini's defense of Grey.

Without knowledge of the warnings and without benefit of professional advice, Lloyd George discerned the danger:

> When I first heard the news of the assassination of the Grand Duke Ferdinand, I felt that it was a grave matter, and that it might provoke serious consequences which only the firmest and most skilful handling could prevent from developing into an emergency that would involve nations. But my fears were soon assuaged by the complete calm with which the Rulers and diplomats of the world seemed to regard the event. Our Foreign Office preserved its ordinary tranquillity of demeanour and thought it unnecessary to sound an alarm even in the Cabinet Chamber.[414]

Lloyd George recounts that a prominent Hungarian lady had told

him the assassination had provoked outrage in Austria and unless some satisfaction were given, Austria would go to war with Serbia irrespective of the consequences. Lloyd George says "However, such official reports as came to hand did not seem to justify the alarmist view she took of the situation."[415]

"Our Foreign Office ... thought it unnecessary to sound an alarm even in the Cabinet Chamber," Lloyd George's language suggests bitter skepticism toward Grey and the Foreign Office. His skepticism is echoed by the comments of the historian Calleo: "And, if, in truth, Britain wished to stop the war, its diplomacy was culpably incompetent."[416] Culpable incompetence to stop a war and calculated inactivity to promote it differ only in the intention of the statesmen involved.

The Austrian council of ministers met on 7 July. As Bridge remarks:

> Only after Sarajevo did the statesmen in the Ballhausplatz, weighing much the same argument for war and peace as their predecessors ever since Sadowa, decide that the balance had changed for the first time; and that the risks of peace were now greater than the risks of war.[417]

Critically, however, the council of ministers ended in deadlock. Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, who had detested Franz Ferdinand, argued that settling with Serbia would lead to conflict with Russia so he refused to sanction war.

On 9 July, Grey told Lichnowsky that he had been trying to "persuade the Russian Government ... to assume a more conciliatory attitude toward Austria." He assured Lichnowsky that Britain had no agreement or duties toward either France or Russia; although he admitted military conversations had taken place with the French but he omitted all mention of the detailed military plans that had grown out of these innocuous sounding conversations.

Incredibly, Grey then told Lichnowsky that "he saw no reason for taking a pessimistic view of the situation."[418]

Even when facing their greatest crisis, Austrian officials could not overcome the deadening inertia that paralyzed their country. Foreign Minister Berchtold received the Emperor's consent to take strong measures against Serbia. Later, the Emperor told the German Ambassador the time had come to deal with Serbia, but Germany feared Austria would delay and urged taking immediate action while she enjoyed the sympathy of the world. Much as Germany feared, the Austrians waited for their troops to return from harvest on 25 July before issuing the ultimatum. Nobody could have foreseen or expected this Austrian inertia. The supreme irony is that Austria's inertia forced Grey to do nothing and to uphold his charade of fairness for weeks, inaction that has challenged the creativity of Anglo-American scholarship to explain away.

Meanwhile, the legal counselor at the Austrian Foreign Ministry, Wiesener, returned from investigating the Sarajevo crime and reported that he had found no evidence the Serbian government directly promoted propaganda against Austria or that it was accessory to the crime. He found that the Serbian government tolerated the movement that had perpetrated the crime and that elements in the Serbian government were also responsible. The Governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek, attached his report to Wiesener's. He held the 'alternative government' in Serbia, especially elements in the army, responsible for the assassinations.[419] Both reports highlighted the Serbian government's indulgence of the terrorist organization that attacked Austria continuously and had killed the Archduke. These reports confirmed Austrian determination to suppress Serbia.

On 14 July, the Prime Minister of Hungary, Count Tisza, reversed his antiwar stand, and consented to strong measures against Serbia. He had become agitated by the abuse and vitriol coming from the Serbian press, and the more Belgrade hurled insults and challenges at the Dual Monarchy, the more alarmed

Tisza became about the ethnic stability of Hungary. Finally, Tisza decided that left unchecked, a strong Serbia would foment ethnic dissension in Transylvania. Thus on 14 July the July Crisis passed a critical juncture with every Austrian statesman agreed that going to war with Serbia was less dangerous than allowing Serbia stoke ethnic fires within the Dual Monarchy, despite the risk of precipitating war with Russia.

By right, the provocative press commentaries coming from Belgrade during the July Crisis should attract much discussion and analysis, but in English language works, they barely receive a mention. Recall, that Apis, in his Salonika confession, said removing the Archduke, the leader of the Austrian war party, would gain a reprieve for Serbia. Yet, when he had succeeded in his objective, he allowed his newspaper to hurl a tirade of insults at Austria. The contradiction is self-evident: Instead of soothing, Apis deliberately provoked Austria. The real significance of this point is that all the power factions in Serbia followed Apis' lead. Pašić and his Cabinet, Prince Alexander and his faction, General Putnic and the General Staff, the Opposition leaders, all knew that Colonel Apis, the Chief of Serbian Army Intelligence, had arranged the killing, yet they did not compel the press to soothe rather than to taunt. Given what the Serbian authorities knew, this is no small omission. I consider the Serbian failure to muzzle the press incoherent, by which I mean the people involved could not have behaved in this manner without some other factor coming into play. That other factor is the Russian guarantee.

All moral issues in the Great War are overshadowed by the war guilt clause (Article 231) of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919:

> The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the

> war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.
>
> Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919

This article assigns all culpability for the war to Germany, allowing the Anglo-Americans to claim the moral high ground.

Anglo-American scholars faithfully affirm that Austria used the assassination as a pretext for attacking Serbia, yet they preserve an equally faithful silence about the provocation in the Serbian press after the assassination. Since 1924 the world has known the Serbian authorities, and Ambassador Hartwig not only knew Colonel Apis had arranged to assassinate Franz Ferdinand but also permitted the attack to take place. This inaction made them accessories to the murder of the Archduke. However, their failure to muzzle the Serbian press after the successful killing of the Archduke transcends mere culpability: it was a morally reckless disregard for the peace of Europe. Before labeling the Austrian reaction a pretext, scholars must explain the failure of the Serbian authorities to halt the provocation. The provocation was permitted because Russia had from the start guaranteed Serbia.

Hartwig died of a heart attack on 10 July at the Austrian legation. The British Foreign Office received on 20 July a dispatch (written on 13 July) from their Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade outlining some of Hartwig's reactions to the assassination:

> It appears that M. de Hartwig was desirous of offering to the Austrian Minister, who had returned to Belgrade the same day, a personal explanation in regard to certain rumors which had become public concerning his behavior and attitude subsequently to the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. I have no first-hand knowledge of what transpired at the interview and will therefore merely mention some of the reports which had been circulated, and which

> may have been discussed in the course of conversation.
>
> (1.) The *Reichspost* of Vienna had recently published an article attacking the Russian Minister for holding a bridge party on the evening of the Archduke's murder. It is true that M. de Hartwig was having a quiet game of bridge that evening with the Roumanian and Greek Ministers and the Italian Charge d'Affaires, but, under the circumstances, the article in the *"Reichspost"* seems to have contained some very unnecessary animadversions.
>
> (2.) The Russian Minister had been accused of not hoisting the Russian flag at half-mast on the day of the funeral service for the Archduke. Though M. de Hartwig himself affirmed the flag was flying, several of my colleagues state that this was not the case. The Austrian Legation took a strong view of the matter and doubtless the Russian Minister was anxious to smooth matters over.
>
> (3.) I regret to state that M. de Hartwig had recently been using very inappropriate and ill-advised language in regard to the private life and character of the present heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in the presence, among others, of my Italian colleague.[420]

By not lowering the Russian flag, Hartwig sent a clear signal to the Belgrade population that Russia sympathized with the perpetrators and not the victims of the assassination. Hartwig underscored this message by denigrating the fallen Archduke to his diplomatic colleagues. One can only imagine the extremism of what Hartwig said to his Serbian confidantes in private, when he used "very inappropriate and ill-advised language" with his diplomatic colleagues in public. These actions of Hartwig encouraged the Serbian press to adopt their provocative stance toward Austria.

Very clearly, the assassination did not surprise Hartwig: He would not have calmly played bridge if he did not know precisely who had carried out the attack. Belgrade was his fief, and nothing important transpired there without his knowledge. Anglo-American scholars will not concede that Hartwig had foreknowledge of the assassination. But is it conceivable that Colonel Apis blindsided Hartwig with the assassination, and Hartwig reacted by immediately offering Russian protection?

Just after Hartwig died of heart failure on 10 July, Pašić had warned that if Serbia were attacked by a Great Power other states would come to her aid.[421] Throughout the crisis Serbian officials communicated this certainty of Russian support to the British representatives in Belgrade. As early as 18 July, the General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign Office told the British Chargé d'Affaires that if Austria attacked, Serbia 'would not stand alone; Russia would not stand by and see Serbia wantonly attacked'.[422] Russia gave emphatic support to Serbia despite knowing that Apis had arranged the attack on Franz Ferdinand, and that raises awkward questions which Anglo-American scholars prefer to ignore.

Given what they knew about the assassination, Russia's failure to direct the Serbs to take a conciliatory stance toward Austria indicates a Russian willingness, even desire, to have a showdown with Austria and Germany. However, Russia would only have sought a Great Power conflict if they had received a guarantee from France, while France would only have guaranteed Russia if Britain had guaranteed France. Sir Edward Grey's remarkable inactivity during the early phases of the July Crisis dovetails with this interpretation of events—That is the incoherence referred to in the introduction.

On 16 July de Bunsen warned the Foreign Office that Austria intended to take serious measures against Serbia and the following day he reported:

> From all I hear the Ballplatz is in an uncompromising mood. ... the authority for the telegram I sent yesterday was Count Lützow, ex-Ambassador at Rome ... He had seen both Berchtold and Forgach at the Ballplatz the day before ... he put on a serious face and said he wondered if I realized how grave the situation was. This Government was not going to stand Servian insolence any longer. ... A note was being drawn ... demanding categorically that Servia should take effective measures to prevent the manufacture and export of bombs ... No futile discussion would be tolerated. If Servia did not at once cave in, force would be used to compel her. Count Lützow added that Count Berchtold was sure of German support and did not believe any country would hesitate to approve—not even Russia ... It all agrees strangely with the language of most of the Press, and almost all of the people one meets ... Count Lützow said Austria was determined to have her way this time and would refuse to be headed off by anybody ...[423]

Simultaneously in London, the Austrian embassy sent a similar message to Sir Eyre Crowe.

Albertini describes Count Lützow's communication as an 'indiscretion', meaning Berchtold unofficially sounded Britain on his proposed action against Serbia. Grey was free to choose how to respond. He could have talked directly with Mensdorff in London; he could have instructed de Bunsen to talk with the Austrians or to respond to Count Lützow; he could have sent Crowe to the Austrian embassy; he could have inspired a pro- or anti-Austrian article in the *Westminster Gazette* or *The Times*. Given the extreme action contemplated by Austria, these 'indiscretions' demanded from Grey a candid response, which Berchtold could not

misinterpret. To this end, Grey had to respond because Vienna might interpret diplomatic silence as tacit approval. If he had Responded with a stern warning, Grey would have disabused Berchtold of his British neutrality delusions, and it would forever have cleared Grey's name in history. However, Grey did the inexcusable—he did nothing.

Grey's inaction complemented the uncharacteristic silence of his officials. Where is the overwrought minute from Crowe responding to the assertion that Austria had the complete support of Germany? Similarly, one would expect strident hysterical anti-German minutes from Nicolson, but one finds instead this uncustomary silence. The entire British Foreign Office, from the Foreign Secretary down, dismissed the assassination, ignored Lichnowsky's warning, discounted de Bunsen's alarm and disregarded Count Lützow's 'indiscretions'. A review of previous anti-German and anti-Austrian hysteria from these officials highlights the sheer aberration of their silence.

However, the British Foreign Office did react to Lützow's 'indiscretions'. Ponting notes that the Serbian minister in London reported on 17 July:

> A 'well-informed source' (almost certainly the Foreign Office after they received de Bunsen's advice from Vienna) advised that Austria-Hungary's peaceful statements should not be believed and that it was planning 'momentous pressure' on Serbia and probably military attack.[424]

Count Lützow's 'indiscretions' prompted the Foreign Office to alert Serbia to a probable Austrian attack yet they did not prompt Foreign Office officials to write a minute outlining the great danger to European peace. The selectivity of the Foreign Office was sinister.

On 17 July the *Westminster Gazette* published a forceful pro-

Austrian leading article. Because the editor, J. A. Spender, was close to Grey, his commentaries on foreign affairs always caught the attention of the diplomatic corps. Having analyzed the 17 July article, Lichnowsky reported to Berlin that Grey had taken Austria's side. In Vienna, the press and the Russian Ambassador made the same conclusion, as de Bunsen reported on July 18:

> Russian Ambassador is afraid that article like the one quoted at length this morning in Vienna press from yesterday's *"Westminster Gazette"*(1) will encourage Austro-Hungarian Government to take severe action against Servia. Article is described as warning addressed to Servia by organ of British Government. I have told Russian Ambassador that article is certainly devoid of any official character or importance.
>
> Extract from article in "WESTMINSTER GAZETTE," July17, 1914.
>
> ... After the crime of Serajevo, we cannot deny that Austria-Hungary has a prima-facie case for desiring to clarify her relations with Servia. There is strong indignation in the Empire and it is widely believed that the anti-Austrian conspiracy which struck at the Archduke had its origin in Servia. The case has not been improved by the press campaign which has gone on in Servia since the assassination; and it is suspected in Vienna and Buda-Pesth that a deliberate attempt is being made to work on the population of Servian nationality in the Empire, in order to prepare their separation from the Monarchy, should an opportunity present itself. In such circumstances the Government cannot be expected to remain inactive; and Servia will be well-advised if she realises the reasonableness of her great neighbour's anxiety, and does whatever may be in her power to allay it, without

> waiting for a pressure which might involve what Count Tisza calls "warlike complications." ....
>
> Minute.
>
> I do not see that the article justifies the interpretation put upon it by the Russian Ambassador. He assumes the article to have been inspired by His Majesty's Government and asks himself what our object was in getting it written. It was not inspired by us at all.
>
> E. G. (Edward Grey)

On 20 July Grey disabused Lichnowsky of the notion that he had inspired his friend Spender to write the article. Unaccountably, Grey did not call in Mensdorff to make the same point, although he knew that at least two diplomats had interpreted the article in the same fashion. There can be little doubt that Grey deliberately encouraged Austria to delude itself about British sympathy, and British neutrality.

Bridge raises the Austrian belief in British neutrality:

> It also seems, however, that the Austrians were hoping that British neutrality might have a similar enervating effect on Russia's determination. It is difficult to say how far the decision-makers in Vienna and Budapest counted on this eventuality. Certainly, in a conference of ministers after the outbreak of the war Tisza spoke very sharply of the German invasion of Belgium, and blamed it for Britain's intervention ...[425]

Scholars regularly discuss the mistaken belief by Germany that Britain might stay out of the war, yet Austria erred worse than Germany. Until late July, Foreign Minister Berchtold made the disastrous mistake of assuming British sympathy and neutrality. By

not responding to Austrian feelers on 16 July, Grey subverted European diplomacy by luring Austria to presume blindly on British neutrality.

On 20 July the Austrian statesman, Count Hoyos, wrote to Haldane explaining Austria's position. Haldane wrote to Grey: "This is very serious. Berchtold is apparently ready to plunge Europe into war to settle the Serbian question. He would not take this attitude unless he was assured of German support."[426] Gamesmanship. Given all the warnings and Lützow's indiscretions, the Hoyos note surprised neither Grey nor Haldane. However, if by chance the note had surprised them, Grey could easily have called in Mensdorff for a frank consultation. Grey did nothing.

On 20 July, Grey mentioned Great Power involvement to Lichnowsky:

> I said that ... the more Austria could keep her demands within reasonable limits, and the stronger the justification she could produce for making any demand, the more chance there would be of smoothing things over. I hated the idea of a war between any of the Great Powers, and that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be detestable.[427]

This limp statement was indefensible because on 18 July Grey had received word from Buchanan that Russia would not stand aside so at this stage Austria's evidence didn't matter. Grey's statement did not even hint of British involvement.

On 23 July, Mensdorff briefed Grey on the forthcoming ultimatum to Serbia. Grey told the Ambassador that Austria had to make reasonable demands and not impugn the dignity or independence of Serbia. However, in his talk with Mensdorff Grey said:

> If as many as four Great powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia and Germany—were engaged in war,[428]

By omitting any suggestion that Britain and Italy might engage in the coming war, Grey had given Austria every reason to believe that Britain tacitly supported her policy.

Albertini has difficulty explaining why Grey mentioned only Four Powers at war:

> In his talk with Mensdorff he mentioned the danger that four of the Great Powers might become involved in war. This would mean leaving England and Italy out ... he was incapable of realizing that the murder of the Archduke revived the whole problem of Austro-Serbian relations which ... had on so many occasions threatened the peace of Europe. His failure to understand the danger seems still more inexplicable when one remembers the warnings given him by Lichnowsky and confirmed by Lützow's "indiscretions" to Bunsen ... It never entered his head that, in speaking to the Austrian Ambassador of a Four Power war, without so much as hinting that England might become involved, he was encouraging Berlin and Vienna to intransigence and war. ... Hence during this first phase of the July crisis at any rate, the hesitancy and ineptitude of British policy is not to be sought in Cabinet dissensions, the Irish question, fear of offending Russia and the like. A perusal of the documents shows that up to 23 July there is one explanation pure and simple; namely, Grey's utter failure ... to grasp that Austrian aggression against Serbia would bring in first Russia and then Germany and France.[429]

Albertini is in denial. Appealing to Grey's stupidity to explain his lack of candor is a desperate effort to whitewash the indefensible.

That evening in London, two dinner events further misled the Central Powers about British intents. Goschen dined with Mensdorff. While the Austrian candidly avowed that Austria meant to crack down hard on Serbia, the Englishman gave no warning that Britain might enter the war against Austria.[430] Also that evening, Albert Ballin, the German shipping magnate and confidant of the Kaiser, dined with Haldane, Morley (now the Lord Privy Seal) and Grey but he was misled as Ponting notes:

> A letter Ballin wrote to Haldane a few days after the dinner explains that Haldane told him "in your very clear manner" that Britain would only intervene militarily in a continental war "if the balance of power were to be greatly altered by German annexation of French territory."[431]
>
> This was compatible with Grey's statement to Mensdorff earlier in the day but in a more extreme form. Grey was present and does not seem to have intervened to correct any misapprehension Ballin may have gained. The views expressed at this dinner, and other indications given later, convinced Berlin to continue with its highly risky diplomatic policy, on the reasonable assumption that Britain would remain neutral in any major European war.[432]

Three times on the same day, the British lured the Central Powers with the bait of British neutrality.

Throughout this first phase of The July Crisis, Grey did nothing to alert the Central Powers that Britain would join her Triple Entente partners in war. Yet, in private conversations with Cambon

from 1906 onwards he repeatedly, 'over and over', assured the French that Britain would take the field if Germany attacked. In any Franco-German war the military experts expected Germany to attack France through Belgium. Thus Grey had verbally committed to France, yet he gave no warning of his pledge to the Central Powers. He also knew that Belgium would most likely become a *casus belli* for Britain, yet he made no mention of this to Germany. Williamson remarks:

> The impact of the Belgian issue on Britain's road to war merits additional comment. At least since 1911, Grey, Asquith, Churchill, Haldane, and others had accepted Wilson's predictions that Germany would attack France through Belgium, ... Grey ... perhaps fearing that if he played the Belgian card too early, the Germans might agree to respect neutrality, thereby leaving France truly exposed. ... His failure to argue the Belgian issue earlier may have hurt the chances for European peace. But it also kept open the chances for British intervention. Wilson might fret, but Grey was managing slowly to ensure British intervention.[433]

Williamson's comments lack ambiguity. Sir Edward Grey sacrificed peace to ensure British participation in the Great War. Grey, the great angler, used the Bosnian Crisis playbook to lure patiently and skillfully his prey into the trap he had carefully prepared for eight-and-a-half years.

It is time to review and summarize. In the previous chapter, we saw that the Serbian authorities knew by early June at the latest that Colonel Apis had arranged an attack on Archduke Franz Ferdinand. They neither stopped the attack nor warned the Austrians, making them accessories to the political murder. Contrary to all the Anglo-American scholarly disinformation, every contemporary, including Colonel Apis, knew that assassinating the Archduke risked

provoking Austrian retaliation. Nonetheless, the Belgrade leaders allowed the assassination. However, the Belgrade leaders did not try to contain the backlash to the assassination, a backlash they all expected. They did nothing to assuage or to conciliate the Austrians. On the contrary, by allowing the press to hurl insults at their larger neighbor, the Belgrade leaders consented to taunting the Austrians while knowing that their Chief of Military Intelligence had arranged the assassination. Therein lies the damning detail of their misbehavior.

Anglo-American scholars solve Belgrade's misbehavior by condemning Austria for using the assassination as a pretext for war. In shifting the blame to the victim, the scholars resort to a double standard. They condemn Austria for not producing irrefutable proof before launching a war against Serbia and risking a European conflict. In the same breath, they ignore the collective decision by the Belgrade leaders (including Russia) to risk the same European war by neither stopping the attack nor containing the subsequent backlash.

A parallel line of reasoning arises with the British Foreign Office. Attention falls on three individuals. First: Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary for eight-and-a-half years and a member of the Society of the Elect in Lord Milner's secret society. Second: Sir Arthur Nicolson, Permanent Undersecretary and friend of Sir Charles Hardinge and Lord Milner. Third: Sir Eyre Crowe, the leading German expert in the Foreign Office who was the brother-in-law of Spenser Wilkinson, the Milner Group's military expert. Grey spent eight years building the Triple Entente to "check Germany" because Germany was ostensibly aggressive and untrustworthy. Crowe wrote his famous 1907 memorandum (much of it culled from Wilkinson's work) in which he describes Germany as the "natural enemy." Sir Arthur Nicolson faithfully followed Hardinge's anti-German orthodoxy. In the eight years Grey spent at the Foreign Office, these three men scarcely uttered or wrote a favorable word about Germany. On the contrary, they were for all

practical purposes hysterically anti-German.

During the early phase of the July Crisis, the German Ambassador warned the Foreign Office the assassination had created a crisis. Albert Ballin, confidant of the Kaiser, gave a similar warning. The British Ambassador to Vienna gave a similar assessment on several occasions, and the French Ambassador to Vienna warned that war might break out. Most importantly, the Austrians signalled their intent to strike at Serbia through the feelers put out by Count Lützow.

For Grey, Nicolson and Crowe, anti-German suspicion had become a habit, yet all three ignored these unambiguous signs and warnings. This non-response is the critical evidence of the July Crisis because it ran so contrary to the behavioral pattern set over the previous eight years. These three hysterically anti-German statesmen regularly made out dangerous German plots even in harmless German policies. In their minds, every German action aimed to advance Germany's quest for world hegemony— German actions they always perceived as taken without the slightest concern for preserving the peace. Suddenly, for over three weeks these men received unambiguous warnings about German and Austrian intentions to go to war without one of them writing the usual denunciation of the German threat to peace and the German wish to dominate the world. The suspicion and distrust of all things German unaccountably disappeared, the same suspicion and distrust that had anchored and informed British foreign policy for eight years. It is simply impossible for three men to have simultaneously and spontaneously lost their distrust of the "natural enemy." As it stands, this summary points to incoherence— Something more is required to make sense of this behavior.

The only reasonable explanation for Grey, Nicolson and Crowe's non-response is that they deliberately chose to remain silent. They worked for and welcomed a European war. Thus, Russia and Serbia provoked Austria with and after the assassination while the Foreign Office lured Germany and Austria to risk war

with the prospect of British neutrality. It is now time to tie in the third member of Grey's Triple Entente—France.

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12
Poincaré

British and French grand strategy since at least 1911 hinged on the realization that a conflict with Germany in which Russia treacherously abandoned them must end in catastrophe. Thus, Anglo-French planning focused on getting Russia to commit first. Therefore, fighting had to start over a Russian quarrel. To this end, the British and French welcomed and encouraged an Austro-Russian conflict in the Balkans. For once, Lord Milner and his group could do nothing to speed up the onset of war—that privilege fell to France in general and to President Poincaré in particular.

In 1912 Poincaré became Prime Minister of France. Any revisionist history of the origin of the Great War must examine the changes brought about in the Franco-Russian alliance during 1912-1914. We need to analyze in detail Poincaré's Russian policy in relation to his friendship, dealings, and agreements with Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador. Also, we need to study Izvolsky's influence in Russia and the influence of his faction in the government, especially in Balkan policy and Ambassador Hartwig's policies in Serbia. Such a study would diverge from the present work's focus on the Milner Group's contribution to the War's origins. Thus, this chapter barely skims the French role.

The historian Schuman comments on the Poincaré/Izvolsky combination:

> Both Poincaré and Isvolsky were secretly or openly pursuing diplomatic objectives which could be realized only by a general conflict between the armed coalitions. Poincaré could not ... take the initiative. Russia would not fight for Alsace-Lorraine any more than she would fight for Morocco or the Congo. But if war came, Russian and British support was essential for success. And Russia might fight for other goals in the Near East. The degree of support which Poincaré gave to St Petersburg in pursuing these objectives is the measure of his willingness to face the prospect of a general conflagration ...[434]

France backed up her pro-Russian Balkan policy with large cash infusions into the region, infusions that provided teeth for Russia's policy.

As Poincaré increased the tempo of his Balkan policy, he sought a firmer commitment from Britain. To this end he negotiated the Anglo-French naval conventions, and he inspired the Grey-Cambon letters, exchanged on 22 and 23 November 1912 with the approval of both governments.[435] These Anglo-French exchanges convinced Poincaré that Grey had a sincere and genuine desire for war, and that Britain would neither double-cross nor abandon France when a crisis erupted.

Poincaré's support for Russia's Balkan policies conflicted with the views of France's Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Georges Louis. Contrary to his contemporaries, Louis realised that Russia's military needed years to modernize, and that French and British statesmen had hugely overestimated Russian military strength. Louis's disbelief in Russia's military readiness led him to contradict Poincaré's orthodoxy by opposing Russian aggressiveness in the Balkans, and he committed outright heresy by advising Paris to restrain her ally. Poincaré responded to Louis's dissent in 1912 by

trying to oust him but Louis appealed to his political base in Paris. In the following political trial of strength, Poincaré had to yield—temporarily.

When Poincaré heard about the Russian sponsored Serbo-Bulgar treaty,[436] he quickly visited St. Petersburg in August 1912. Poincaré examined the treaty and declared it an agreement for war as he recognized that Russia, having 'started the motor' in the Balkans, bore the primary responsibility both for starting the war and for whatever complications that arose. Those possible complications included a series of actions and reactions between Austria, Russia and Germany. Poincaré completed the chain when he promised immediate French military intervention if Germany intervened to save Austria.[437] After returning to Paris, Poincaré reiterated France's position:

> I repeated to M. Isvolsky what I had said to M. Sazanov at St Petersburg, that in the event of the terms of the alliance coming into play we should loyally perform our duty ... I drew attention to the terms of the treaty of Alliance: 'If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria with Germany's support, France will throw her whole strength against Germany.[438]

Most radically, Poincaré had suppressed any restraining test for provocation, thus infusing an offensive spirit into the Franco-Russian alliance.

While in St. Petersburg, Poincaré delighted Foreign Minister Sazanov with his enthusiasm for the alliance. Poincaré briefed Sazanov on the Anglo-French plans for naval and military cooperation, and explained to him the expected role of the British Expeditionary Force when war broke out. He urged the Russian to complete the strategic railways running through Poland to the German frontier. All told, Poincaré convinced Sazanov that Russia

could rely on French fidelity in the Balkans.[439]

In 1913, Poincaré ousted the pacific Louis from St. Petersburg and replaced him with Delcassé. The historian Keiger, a Poincaré apologist, has this to say about Delcassé:

> If anyone had encouraged Russian irresponsibility, it was the Germanophobe French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Delcassé. Paléologue claimed that the former Foreign Minister had told him, on leaving for the Russian capital at the beginning of 1913, that his sole aim would be to ensure that the Tsar's armies would be prepared to make any necessary offensive in fifteen days: "As for the diplomatic twaddle and old nonsense about the European equilibrium, I shall bother with it as little as possible: it is no longer anything but verbiage." ... By Christmas 1913 Paléologue was complaining that "Delcassé's patriotism is turning into a fixation, an obsessive exaltation, I would even say to monomania."[440]

Poincaré replaced a dove with a hawk. But what a hawk. Paléologue suggested the man experienced something akin to spiritual elation when pressing the Russians to achieve a fifteen-day mobilization: Delcassé thought of nothing but war. Selecting such a hawk for this sensitive ambassadorship speaks more clearly about the thrust of Poincaré's foreign policy than any number of diaries produced after the Great War.

Another historian, Hayne, corroborates Delcassé's belligerence:

> In St Petersburg he (Delcassé) fostered the notion that Austria-Hungary was to blame for all the problems in the Near East, and he seems to have hoped that her dissolution would soon occur.[441] ... Delcassé performed a great disservice to European peace by

> supporting and pushing to the forefront Russian aspirations in the Balkans and the straits. Poincaré himself found this policy quite unjustifiable. Indeed, so disturbed was the President about Delcassé's influence over the Russian court that his request to return to Paris was hastily agreed to. Delcassé seemed incapable of making the distinction between a legitimate defence of Franco-Russian interests and subservience to Russian adventurism. Nevertheless, despite his early departure from St. Petersburg, he became foreign minister in August 1914.[442]

Hayne's last sentence suggests he had difficulty believing his own interpretation. He claims Delcassé conducted his own program without regard to France's official foreign policy. Presumably this argument includes the belief that Delcassé had masked his extreme views from Poincaré before his appointment, though both men knew each other well, and Delcassé had served as Minister of Marine in Poincaré's Cabinet. However, Delcassé made his policies clear to Paléologue, a confidant of Poincaré, casting doubt on the latter's possible ignorance. Further, given that Paris made no effort to restrain the Ambassador, one suspects Delcassé openly promoted what Poincaré covertly espoused.

Hayne stressed that Poincaré accepted Delcassé's resignation with relief. Logical consistency would thus require Poincaré to ensure Delcassé's replacement would represent the official policy of France. That replacement was Maurice Paléologue, the close friend of Poincaré. Before accepting, Paléologue discussed foreign policy at length with Poincaré. Hayne remarks:

> From the time of his arrival in St Petersburg, Paléologue sought to convince the Russians that France would support its policy without reserve and wherever it led. From his first interview with the Czar

> in February 1914 he stressed the unqualified nature of French backing.[443]

In every sense Paléologue replaced Delcassé: one fervent warmonger replaced another.

Within a few weeks, Paléologue went from describing Delcassé's behavior in St. Petersburg as excessive exaltation bordering on monomania to adopting the same policy without the excessive emotion. The impetus for Paléologue's reversal came in his meeting with Poincaré. Supporting this conclusion is Paléologue's claim during his tenure in St. Petersburg that he enjoyed a special rapport and trust with Poincaré. Hayne admits that Paléologue's conduct contributed to the outbreak of war, and he suggests that Paléologue's flights of fantasy 'suggested a certain mental disequilibrium'.[444] It seems extreme to consign two ambassadors to the lunatic asylum because of their extreme hawkishness so we may portray President Poincaré as a more moderate hawk. The more reasonable interpretation is that the ambassadors reflected the views of their master.

In May 1914 France held a general election in which Poincaré's 'Three Year Service Law' had polarized the electorate. Opponents of Poincaré won the election. Alarmed, Paléologue returned to Paris to urge keeping the law. On 18 June Paléologue threatened the new Prime Minister, Viviani, that if the government repealed the law, he would resign.[445] During their discussion, Paléologue told Viviani that war would break out at any moment.[446] When Viviani asked how soon, Paléologue replied: "It is impossible for me to fix any date. However, I shall be surprised if the state of electric tension in which Europe lives does not end soon in catastrophe."[447] The Ministry of War shared Paléologue's foreboding of imminent catastrophe because they decided not to retire the exiting class of conscripts to the reserves, temporarily boosting the French Army with an additional year of recruits. (A suspicious mind might find it too serendipitous that Britain had its

fleet mobilized and France had four years of conscripts in uniform when the fighting started.)

Paléologue's "electric tension" comment contradicted Arthur Nicolson's celebrated remarks that the only problem he could see in European affairs concerned Albania. It is therefore an intriguing coincidence that de Schelking, a Russian diplomat, records that during the King of Romania's visit to Russia on 14 June, Foreign Ministry officials openly speculated about the "removal" of Franz Ferdinand. Paléologue urgently predicted an event of extreme importance and just ten days later the assassination of Franz Ferdinand took place. The problem for the Anglo-American scholars is that Paléologue could only have known about the assassination if the Russian Foreign Ministry had confided in him, but that infers the Russians knew about the assassination in advance.

In contrast to the sense of urgency felt by Paléologue and the Ministry of War, French Foreign Ministry officials adopted a sanguine attitude of supreme calm. These officials experienced a remission of their Germanophobia simultaneously with the remission experienced by their British counterparts in the Foreign Office. French officials displayed the same unconcern about the assassination as their British counterparts. They dismissed the reports from their Ambassador in Belgrade. Then they removed the Ambassador because he spoke openly of the Black Hand, leaving France at this critical juncture blind to developments in Belgrade. They also contrived to ignore the warnings of war from their ambassador in Vienna so no senior official reviewed the likelihood of an Austrian strike against Serbia. This lack of review is all the more extraordinary because the Franco-Russian Alliance committed France to fight in a Russo-German war. Consider Hayne's observation:

> The agenda of discussions drafted on 12 or 13 July by de Margerie for Viviani's and Poincaré's use during

> the forthcoming trip to St Petersburg indicated how lightly the Austro-Serbian dispute was taken by the Quai d'Orsay.[448]

Two Balkan Wars, the Scutari Crisis and the continuing Albanian tensions had occurred inside twenty months, each conflict exposing the fragility of European peace. Yet, the two most professional and experienced Foreign Ministries in Europe failed not just to anticipate but even to consider trouble breaking out over the assassination. This coincident failure is not credible. One must infer that British and French diplomats anticipated the Austro-Serbian conflict by deliberately allowing the tensions to build up.

The most inexplicable non-reaction to the assassination came from Paléologue. Ten days earlier he had described the tensions in Europe as 'electric', and he had predicted these tensions would lead to a European catastrophe. Paléologue had been the French Ambassador to Bulgaria in 1912 so he had witnessed firsthand the preparations for the Balkan war. Back in Paris he had experienced all the tensions of the Balkan crises, yet he failed to connect the assassination in the Balkans with his predicted catastrophe in Europe. Paléologue's silence and unconcern arose from deliberate calculation more than from his failure to recognize imminent danger.

During the lead-up to Poincaré's visit to Russia on 20 July, Paléologue sent just two telegrams to Paris explaining the Russian response to the assassination. It is extraordinary that he did not detail the Russian decision to extend her full protection to Serbia. Russia's protection of Serbia raised the likelihood of a Great Power conflict between Russia and Austria, which would draw in Germany and France. As France's representative, Paléologue had a duty to report to the French Foreign Ministry all that he knew and could learn. In this context one must note that Izvolsky reacted immediately to news of the assassination—he left for Russia on 29 June. One may presume that the bellicose Izvolsky returned to

Russia to drum up support for war among his faction at St. Petersburg.

We have no record of Paléologue and Izvolsky discussing the crisis before Poincaré's visit but one suspects they did, given their mutual commitment to war. However, these two gentlemen did meet during the visit, and they said good-bye on July 25:

> At seven o'clock this evening I went to the Warsaw station to say goodbye to Isvolsky who is returning to his post in hot haste. There was a great bustle on the platforms. The trains were packed with officers and men. This looked like mobilization. We rapidly exchanged impressions and came to the same conclusion:
>
> "It's war this time."[449]

Paléologue knew Izvolsky well enough to warrant seeing him off at the train station. It is inexcusable that Paléologue could agree with Izvolsky that Russia was preparing for war and choose not to report his impressions to Paris.

Albertini says that because Viviani lacked experience, Poincaré continued to dominate French foreign policy in the critical weeks before the outbreak of war.

> This [French foreign policy] consequently continued to be dominated by Poincaré whom the French pacifists saw with anxiety taking the road to the allied capital [St. Petersburg] for the second time in two years. As early as May, Georges Louis asked Caillaux to oppose this journey as likely to have serious consequences. After the Sarajevo tragedy the danger grew, and Jaurés vainly urged the Chamber to refuse the grant necessary for the visit.[450]

Contemporaries of Poincaré recognized danger in his scheduled visit to St. Petersburg. Unfortunately Louis was considered biased, Caillaux became involved in his wife's scandal and Jaurés was assassinated.

During his stay in Russia, Poincaré met the leaders of Russia, yet he neglected to keep records. He had plenty of time to record his meetings and his impressions on the long voyage back to France. Considering Poincaré's exceptional capacity for work, his tidy legal mind, and his voluminous diaries, one infers this omission was deliberate. Thus, the suspicion clings to Poincaré that he made broad military commitments. As Ponting remarks:

> It is highly unlikely that, given the information available in St. Petersburg, that the two allies did not discuss how to react to any Austro-Hungarian actions against Serbia. It is almost certain the French, especially Poincaré who was born in Lorraine and was a strong nationalist, made it clear that they would support Russia in taking a tough line. They may also have agreed that a Russian military response would be appropriate.[451]

An important controversy arises—did Poincaré give Russia a French blank check? As Ponting remarks:

> On the afternoon of 21 July there was a reception for the St. Petersburg diplomatic corps at the Winter Palace. The British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, spoke to Poincaré and said that he feared Austria-Hungary would send a very stiff note to Serbia and suggested direct talks between Russia and Austria-Hungary in Vienna. Poincaré rejected this idea as 'very dangerous' ... Poincaré then saw the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Szápáry, and warned

> him that Russia was a friend of Serbia and France was a friend of Russia. The threat of a wider war stemming from any crisis between Vienna and Belgrade was obvious.[452]

One must ask why Poincaré thought direct discussions between Austria and Russia "very dangerous," and to what or to whom were they dangerous.[453] One suspects Poincaré felt direct Austro-Russian talks would be dangerous to the prospects of war, not, peace. That evening, Poincaré followed up his warning to Austria by telling Paléologue that "Sazanov must be firm and we must support him."[454] Before leaving St. Petersburg, Poincaré had a long private conversation with the Czar and afterward, when the war was well under way, the Czar remembered and spoke of the emphatic words spoken to him by the French President.

Albertini comments on Poincaré's influence in St. Petersburg:

> There can be no doubt that the stiffening of Russia's attitude was in some measure due to the heated atmosphere arising from Poincaré's visit and to his promptings. ... certainly there were respected politicians and diplomatists in France who accused Poincaré of having used influence on Russia in favour of war. Louis's *Carnots* bring direct and indirect evidence that this view was held by Pichon, Deschanel, the two Cambons and the War Minister, Messimy. On 26 June 1915 Deschanel said to Louis: 'nobody speaks more severely than Messimy of the part played by Poincaré. ...The majority of the men who were ministers in July openly say that Poincaré is the cause of the war.' However Louis is not an impartial witness and though his statements have not been denied by those concerned, not even by Poincaré, it is fantastic to put the blame for the

> European war on Poincaré. No![455]

As usual, Albertini struggles with the evidence that does not indict Germany. He has enough integrity to raise the problem, and he concedes that "Poincaré's promptings" stiffened Russia's attitude.

Paléologue maintained a sanitized diary of Poincaré's visit. However, as a chauvinist, he had difficulty taking women seriously so he included comments on 22 July from well placed Russian Grand Duchesses that he would probably have suppressed had they come from Grand Dukes:

> I was one of the first to arrive. The Grand Duchess Anastasia and her sister, the Grand Duchess Militza, gave me a boisterous welcome. The two Montenegrins burst out, talking both at once:
>
> "Do you realize that we're passing through historic days, fateful days! ... At the review to-morrow the bands will play nothing but the *Marche Lorraine* and *Sambre et Meuse.* I've had a telegram (in pre-arranged code) from my father to-day. He tells me we shall have war before the end of the month...."
>
> At dinner I was on the left of the Grand Duchess Anastasia and the rhapsody continued, interspersed with prophecies . "There's going to be war . . . There'll be nothing left of Austria . . . . You're going to get back Alsace and Lorraine .... Our armies will meet in Berlin ... Germany will be destroyed . . . ." [456]

These duchesses, daughters of the King of Montenegro, belonged to the pan-Slav prowar Russian faction—the faction that Izvolsky would have courted before Poincaré's visit. These ladies were in the loop. Their father took them seriously enough to communicate in code, and the coded message he sent predicted (correctly) that war would break out by the end of the month, but

the Austrians had not yet delivered their ultimatum to Serbia. The ladies further reveal that they and the pan-Slav faction considered Paléologue a sympathetic ally. Paléologue proved their trust correct by not taking Viviani aside and warning him about the war fever in the Russian Court.

On the 23 July Paléologue and Poincaré reviewed the Russian military parade remarked on by the Grand duchess Anastasia:

> Review at Krasnoïe-Selo this morning. Sixty-thousand men took part. A magnificent pageant of might and majesty. The infantry marched past to the strains of the *Marche de Sambre et Meuse* and the *Marche Lorraine.*
>
> What a wealth of suggestion in this military machine set in motion by the Tsar of all the Russias before the President of the allied republic, himself a son of Lorraine!
>
> The Tsar was mounted at the foot of the mound upon which was the imperial tent. Poincaré was seated on the Tsaritsa's right in front of the tent. The few glances he exchanged with me showed me that our thoughts were the same.[457]

Paléologue and Poincaré did not share common thoughts of peace.

During the final stages of The July Crisis, Paléologue incited Russia to go to war with repeated promises of unconditional French support. According to Hayne:

> In the final days of the July crisis he (Paléologue) created an almost total communication blackout. His aim was essentially to keep the French government in the dark about Russian mobilization during 30 and 31 July. He could safely assume that as long as Viviani was unaware of these military preparations, he would

> make no concerted attempt to restrain Russia.[458]

Scholars accept that Paléologue promoted the war but they fudge the point by implying he acted more as a rogue ambassador than as a faithful disciple of Poincaré.

The failure of Paléologue and Poincaré to tell Paris what they saw in St. Petersburg was inexcuable. War was in the air; Russia had given her pledge to Serbia; Austria would attack Serbia; Russia would be drawn in. It was imperative that Britain supported France. Paléologue in his diaries noted the Czar recognized the importance of Britain:

> The Tsar sat silent and puffed at his cigarette. Then he said in a resolute voice:
>
> "It's all the more important for us to be able to count on England in an emergency. Unless she has gone out of her mind altogether Germany will never attack Russia, France and England combined."[459]

Of course the Czar was correct—Germany would not have taken on the Triple Entente, but Grey kept misleading the Germans with ambiguous signals about British neutrality. The critical point is that the French, especially Poincaré, did not share the Russian Czar's reservations about British fidelity. Between 20 and 23 July, Poincaré had committed France to supporting Russia against Austria. In effect this engaged the survival of the French Republic yet Poincaré neither sought British approval before egging Russia on to war nor had he launched a diplomatic assault on London to ensure British participation.

Although a nineteenth Century man, Poincaré had lost all sense of 'perfidious Albion' (faithless England), the scornful distrust of England common to members of his generation. For that matter, so had Paléologue. When they knew that war was imminent, the French exuded a calm confidence in Britain's fidelity. In fact, the

French Ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, a most capable diplomat, left London for a period in July. In a life-and-death context, this blasé confidence implies Poincaré had received, before his Russian visit, credible pledges that Britain would take part in the war.

There was nothing sinister in Grey pledging British support to the French. In fact the secret military talks that he launched in 1906 foreshadowed that support. The problem arises because he suppressed the effects of his secret military talks so not only his Cabinet colleagues but also the Germans and Austrians did not understand that Britain had aligned militarily with France. Thus, when Grey misled Lichnowsky about British intents at the start of the July Crisis, he led France and Germany to make their respective plans on irreconcilable and incompatible understandings of Britain's position. On the one hand, France understood that Britain would join her in arms so she encouraged Russia to go to war. On the other hand, Germany understood that Britain had not committed militarily to the Entente so she took calculated risks based on a strong possibility of British neutrality. This dichotomy between the German and French understanding of British policy during the July Crisis arose because of the foreign Secretary's skillful handling of the crisis, superb diplomacy that successfully led to the Great War.

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454 Lutz, Hermann. Lord Grey and The World War. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1928. Print. 234.
455 The Origins of the War of 1914. Vol. II. 196-197
456 An Ambassador's Memoirs, entry for 22 July 1914
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13
Mobilization

During the final stage of the July Crisis, Poincaré and Viviani spent five days returning to France by sea, which left Paléologue in a unique position to urge war on Russia. Simultaneously, Grey prevaricated with Germany and Austria about the possibility of British neutrality. Throughout, Grey avoided giving Germany a plain warning about British attitudes until it was far too late and he equivocated on Belgium as a *casus belli,* and this despite his having the most cordial and friendly rapport with the German Ambassador. He displayed no candor with the Austrian Ambassador.

At the Cabinet of 24 July, Grey minimized the danger of the crisis to the Cabinet. Fortunately for him, the Irish Home Rule question had engrossed his colleagues so he waited until the meeting's end before telling them the crisis was "the gravest event for many years past in Europe."[460] With deadpan duplicity, Grey and Asquith reassured the Cabinet that Britain faced no danger. In truth, Grey's determination to fight alongside France had never wavered so he deceived his colleagues with his assurances of Britain's safety. Of greater import, once more one sees Grey deftly suppress important information, a suppression that blinded the Cabinet at an important point in the crisis. Whatever else, Sir Edward, the great sportsman, never gave his loyalty to the Cabinet team because he had pledged his allegiance to Milner's team and

nobody can serve two masters.

After the Cabinet, Grey received a note from Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, explaining Germany's support for Austria's ultimatum. Grey assured Lichnowsky, that he had no interest in a localized Austro-Serbian dispute, a stance that reassured Germany. He mentioned a four-power clash in Europe, which the naïve and gullible Lichnowsky reported to Berlin:

> The danger of a European war will, if Austria enters Serbian territory, be brought into immediate proximity. The consequences of such a four power war, he expressly emphasised the figure four, and meant thereby Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France, would be entirely unpredictable.[461]

By keeping quiet about Belgium and by hinting at British neutrality, the great British angler lured Germany into continuing her high-risk strategy of localizing a Serbo-Austrian war. [462] Note that Grey "expressly emphasized the figure four," which under the circumstances could only suggest British neutrality.

Buchanan reported his meeting with Sazanov and Paléologue on 24 July, but the telegraph arrived late and was analyzed the following morning. Because this telegram alerted the Foreign Office that war was imminent, it is quoted in detail:

> Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned ... saying that ... ultimatum presented by Austria ... meant war, and he begged me to meet him at the French Embassy.
>
> Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador told me confidentially that result of the visit of the President of the French Republic had been to establish the following points:
>
> 1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted as

regards the maintenance of general peace and balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.

2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanation or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Servia which the latter would be justified in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

3. Solemn affirmation of obligations imposed by the alliance of the two countries.

Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed the hope that His Majesty's Government would proclaim their solidarity with France and Russia. He characterised Austria's conduct as immoral and provocative. Some of the demands which she had presented were absolutely inacceptable, and she would never have acted as she had done without having first consulted Germany. The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would not only give Russia strong diplomatic support, but would, if necessary, fulfill all the obligations imposed on her by the alliance.

I said that I could not speak in the name of His Majesty's Government, but that I would telegraph all that they had said. I could personally hold out no hope that His Majesty's Government would make any declaration of solidarity that would entail engagement to support France and Russia by force of arms. We had no direct interests in Servia, and public opinion in England would never sanction a war on her behalf. Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that the Servian question was but part of general European question and that we could not efface ourselves.

I said that I gathered that His Excellency wished

us to join in telling Austria that we could not tolerate her active intervention in Servian internal affairs. If she paid no attention to our representations and took military action against Servia, did Russia propose to declare war upon her? Minister for Foreign Affairs said that the whole question would be considered by a Council of Ministers to be held this afternoon, but that no decision would be taken till a further Council of Ministers had been held under the presidency of the Emperor, probably to-morrow. He personally thought that Russia would at any rate have to mobilise.

I suggested that the first thing to be done was to try to gain time by bringing our influence to bear to induce Austria to extend term of delay accorded to Servia. The French Ambassador replied that time did not permit of this; either Austria was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once. In either case a firm and united attitude was our only chance of averting war. I then asked whether it would not be advisable to urge Servian Government to state precisely how far they were prepared to go to meet Austria's wishes. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that some of the demands contained in ultimatum might no doubt be accepted, but that he must first consult his colleagues.

As they both continued to press me to declare our complete solidarity with them, I said that I thought you might be prepared to represent strongly at Vienna and Berlin danger to European peace of an Austrian attack on Serbia. You might perhaps point out that it would in all probability force Russia to intervene, that this would bring Germany and (?France) into the field, and that if war became general, it would be difficult for England to remain neutral. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he hoped that we would in

> any case express strong reprobation of Austria's action. If war did break out, we would sooner or later be dragged into it, but if we did not make common cause with France and Russia from the outset we should have rendered war more likely, and should not have played a *"beau role."*
>
> From French Ambassador's language it almost looked as if France and Russia were determined to make a strong stand even if we declined to join them. Language of Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, was not so (? decided) on this subject. ... [463]

Point three is important because it proves that before the Austrian ultimatum, Poincaré and the Russians talked war. Paléologue pledged French support, continuing what Poincaré had started. In fact, Paléologue spoke so emphatically that Buchanan thought it possible Russia and France would make a strong stand without Britain, and that is the key to the whole issue. Unless Poincaré had taken leave of his senses, he would not have entertained the idea of taking on Germany without British support. Thus, if we use the strength of the French support for a Russian hard-line as a proxy measure of the secret British commitment to France, Poincaré must have believed that he had secured a firm British guarantee.

Sazanov for his part spoke of war and the need for Russian mobilization but there is no explanation why Sazanov thought Russia had to respond immediately. As early as 24 July, one senses a Russian haste to exercise the military option.

After this meeting, Sazanov attended the council of ministers in the afternoon.[464] He criticized previous instances when Russia had surrendered to Austrian and German pressures, and urged the council to take a stand against Austria. The council recommended partial mobilization. Presumably, Sazanov could not have persuaded the council to recommend immediate general mobilization—by all means threaten Austria with a stick, but to

threaten Germany with anything was dangerous. The Russian Chief of Staff and the Chief of Mobilization were to prepare the plan for partial mobilization against Austria.

The Franco-Russian alliance empowered either ally to mobilize immediately in response to a German mobilization. However, if either ally mobilized against Austria or Italy, they had an "indispensable" duty to first consult the other partner.[465] Throughout The July Crisis, Russia neglected to consult France officially about mobilizing against Austria. In stark contrast, during the tensions of 1912, Sazanov admitted Russia's obligation to consult her ally. Because France never sought an official consultation, one infers that Poincaré had already approved a Russian military response, including mobilization. Not surprisingly, Anglo-American and French scholars vigorously dispute that conclusion because it implies Entente culpability for the war. Scholars notwithstanding, Poincaré inflamed the atmosphere in St. Petersburg, raising the question: Would Poincaré have risked Russia dragging France into a war with Germany if he harbored doubts about British participation? Unless Poincaré had lost his mind, the answer is no.

Paléologue sent Paris two misleading dispatches. In the first he omitted the plan for partial mobilization. In the second he dissembled by suggesting that Sazanov would work for moderation at his next meeting with the Czar.[466] Most important, he did not inform Paris that he had pledged unconditional military support to Russia—an extraordinary omission.

Early on 25 July, the Foreign Office analyzed both the note presented by Lichnowsky, and Buchanan's report which had arrived late the previous evening. One feature about the British documents is the ambivalence and distaste they show toward Serbia. In his discussions with both Lichnowsky and Mensdorff, Grey repeatedly stressed that he had no interest in an Austro-Serbian dispute, and that many Austrian charges against Serbia had merit. Foreign Office distaste for Serbia began with the 1903 regicidal coup,

which they condemned as barbaric. Grey's comments in 1908 to his Ambassador in Berlin underscore the poor opinion of Serbia:

> A strong Slav feeling has arisen in Russia. Although this feeling appears to be well in hand at present, bloodshed between Austria and Servia would certainly raise the feeling to a dangerous height in Russia; and the thought that peace depends upon Servia restraining herself is not comfortable.[467]

Given the Foreign secretary's misgivings about Serbia (especially his distaste for the regicides of 1903), one presumes the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Countess Sophie, offended him and his staff. However, this expected indignation is missing from the British documents. To this end, consider Assistant Permanent Undersecretary Crowe's minute of 25 July to the German Ambassador's note of support for the Austrian ultimatum, delivered the previous day:

> The statements made by Austria and now reasserted by Germany concerning Servia's misdeeds rest for the present on no evidence that is available for the Powers whom the Austrian Government has invited to accept those statements. Time ought to be given to allow the Powers to satisfy themselves as to the facts which they are asked to endorse. -- E. A. C. July 25.[468]

Crowe adopted a legalistic tactic of insisting that Austria prove its case against Serbia. By not even hinting at distaste or revulsion, Crowe communicated an unusual indifference to the atrocity.

Crowe's indifference to the atrocity highlights a missing element in the British reaction; namely, a feeling of exasperation that Serbia, by tolerating and encouraging bloody-minded nationalism, had provided Austria the perfect excuse to retaliate. Grey expected

this Austrian retaliation would set off a general war: "I have assumed in my conversations with Prince Lichnowsky that a war between Austria and Servia cannot be localised."[469] Logically, he could only expect ever-increasing pressure from his Triple Entente friends to take sides. Yet nobody in the Foreign Office voiced resentment at being dragged into a life-and-death struggle with Germany just because provocative little Serbia wanted to torment Austria. Consider Grey's comments about Russia's Balkan League made a few years earlier:

> We shall have to keep out of this and what I fear is that Russia may resent our doing so: the fact that the trouble is all of her own making won't prevent her from expecting help if the trouble turns out to be more than she bargained for. On the other hand Russia would resent still more our attempting to restrain her now in a matter that she would at this stage say did not concern us.[470]

Russia's behavior in setting up the Balkan League clearly irritated Grey but strategic considerations forced him to acquiesce in the scheme. One expects a similar response to the assassination, liberally seasoned with disparaging comments about Serbia, even if Grey felt British interests compelled him to acquiesce once more. Foreign Office officials made no such commentary. Serbia, as with all client states, never had a license to begin Great Power clashes, yet the Foreign office did not object to the provocation of Austria. An important piece of the puzzle is missing—the Foreign Office reaction is inappropriate.

Besides displaying an astonishing disinterest in whether Serbia had provoked Austria, the Foreign Secretary altered and adjusted his comments on the assassination to suit his audience. He repeatedly told the Austrians and the Germans that many charges against Serbia had merit and that he had no interest in an Austro-

Serbian war. However, when he spoke to the French and the Russians, he never referred to the legitimacy of Austria's complaints. Grey conducted two irreconcilable discussions. To France and Russia he spoke as an ally, and to Germany and Austria he spoke as an honest broker. As a result, he reassured France and Russia that Britain would join the war and he emboldened Austria and Germany with the prospect that Britain might stay out, a lethal inconsistency that could only bring on disaster.

Also on the morning of 25 July, the Foreign Office read Buchanan's report, to which Crowe added the following minute:

> The moment has passed when it might have been possible to enlist French support in an effort to hold back Russia.
>
> It is clear that France and Russia are decided to accept the challenge thrown out to them. Whatever we may think of the merits of the Austrian charges against Servia, France and Russia consider that these are the pretexts, and that the bigger cause of Triple Alliance versus Triple Entente is definitely engaged.
>
> I think it would be impolitic, not to say dangerous, for England to attempt to controvert this opinion, or to endeavour to obscure the plain issue, by any representation at St. Petersburg and Paris.
>
> The point that matters is whether Germany is or is not absolutely determined to have this war now.
>
> There is still the chance that she can be made to hesitate, if she can be induced to apprehend that the war will find England by the side of France and Russia.
>
> I can suggest only one effective way of bringing this home to the German Government without absolutely committing us definitely at this stage. If, the moment either Austria or Russia begin to

mobilise, His Majesty's Government give orders to put our whole fleet on an immediate war footing, this may conceivably make Germany realise the seriousness of the danger to which she would be exposed if England took part in the war.

It would be right, supposing this decision could be taken now, to inform the French and Russian Governments of it, and this again would be the best thing we could do to prevent a very grave situation arising as between England and Russia.

It is difficult not to agree with Sazonof that sooner or later England will be dragged into the war if it does come. We shall gain nothing by not making up our minds what we can do in circumstances that may arise to-morrow.

Should the war come, and England stand aside, one of two things must happen: --

(a.) Either Germany and Austria win, crush France, and humiliate Russia. With the French fleet gone, Germany in occupation of the Channel, with the willing or unwilling cooperation of Holland and Belgium, what will be the position of a friendless England?

(b.) Or France and Russia win. What would then be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean?

Our interests are tied up with those of France and Russia in this struggle, which is not for the possession of Servia, but one between Germany aiming at a political dictatorship in Europe and the Powers who desire to retain individual free dom. If we can help to avoid the conflict by showing our naval strength, ready to be instantly used, it would be wrong not to make the effort.

> Whatever therefore our ultimate decision, I consider we should decide now to mobilise the fleet as soon as any other Great Power mobilises, and that we should announce this decision without delay to the French and Russian Governments. -- E. A. C. July 25 [471]

Crowe's minute marks a turning point in the Foreign Office handling of the crisis. He saw that Sazanov had French support for mobilization and war so the problem for the British Foreign Office from 25 July became one of justifying Russia's mobilization.

Crowe dismissed the assassination by saying France and Russia considered the assassination a pretext and the real issue concerned the Triple Entente. In one stroke he had kicked away the centerpiece of Austria's case. By shifting the onus onto the German menace, Crowe evaded Britain's duty to warn Austria that Great Power considerations had superseded the immediate case against Serbia. But this artifice cannot go unchallenged. Once the Foreign Office had concluded that an Austrian invasion of Serbia would trigger a European war that would probably draw in Britain, they had a moral, political and diplomatic duty to warn the Austrians, not just the Germans. Perversely, the Foreign Office followed Crowe's advice and postponed warning Austria until after the latter had declared war on Serbia, an indefensible, deliberate tactic of delay and omission.

Perhaps the most inexplicable aspect of the Foreign Office handling of the July Crisis was how Grey, Nicholson and Crowe simultaneously suspended their animus to Germany, a suspension that allowed them ignore Lichnowsky's warning of imminent trouble between Austria and Serbia. When Crowe alleged Germany sought a dictatorship[472] of Europe, it marked a return to normal at the Foreign Office. He used the German menace to justify the notion that Britain could risk neither contradicting the opinions of her friends nor holding them back. Crowe argued that once France

and Russia went to war, Britain had no choice but to follow, renouncing all responsibility to prevent the war. Somehow one doubts that Britain had such negligible influence on her friends when she had such enormous influence over her enemies. Nonetheless, during the final phase of the July Crisis, Nicolson and Crowe avoided promoting peace.

Crowe argued that Britain could only hope to deter Germany by mobilizing the fleet. But his following paragraphs stray from the path of deterrence. Once the fleet mobilized, Crowe twice recommended informing the French and the Russians, but he never suggested alerting the Germans or the Austrians, the presumed targets of any possible deterrence. Given Crowe's ability, one must infer that he deliberately recommended encouraging, even inciting, the Russians and the French to mobilize while minimally deterring Germany and Austria, particularity Austria. Crowe's proposals encouraged war, and during the following tension filled days the Foreign Office adhered to his recommendations.

Grey met Lichnowsky on 25 July, and suggested the four less interested Powers should mediate when the Austrians and the Russians mobilized. This was Crowe's advice in action. By talking thus, Grey validated the idea of two Great Powers mobilizing against each other, a huge escalation over a Great Power mobilizing against a minor power. Grey then said he did not want to intervene in a purely Austro-Serbian dispute, another disastrous idea that implicitly supported the German belief they could localize the quarrel. But Grey was duplicitous because he noted the same day that an Austro-Serbian dispute could not be localized. He also said that he 'fully recognized the justice of the Austrian demand for satisfaction" and added: "nor were European complications a matter of indifference to Great Britain, although she was in no way committed by any sort of binding agreements."[473] An imminent European war threatened, yet Grey continued with the distraction of the "justice of the Austrian demand." Above all else, Grey did not warn Lichnowsky that Britain would take France's part in a

European war.

On 25 July Buchanan reported the Czar had approved mobilizing 1,100,000 men, with the necessary preliminaries beginning immediately. Paléologue told Sazanov that he had received communications from Paris which empowered him to state "that he was in position to give his Excellency formal assurance that France placed herself unreservedly on Russia's side." For the third time in two days, Paléologue had committed France to the military support of Russia.[474] However, no record exists of this alleged communications from Paris. In all likelihood, Paléologue received his instructions during Poincaré's visit.

Twice within two days Buchanan, as Germanophobic as any member of the British diplomatic corps, reported that he had tried to restrain Russia:

> All I could to impress prudence on minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him, if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once ...Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Servia and become predominant Power in Balkans, and, secure of support of France, she will face all risks of war.[475]

Buchanan succinctly summed up the problem of mobilization that seems so incomprehensible to many English speaking scholars.

Buchanan's common sense created a problem for the Foreign Office. His advice to Sazanov was sound but unwelcome. Grey subtly pointed his Ambassador to take a different approach with the following commentary:

> The brusque, sudden and peremptory character of the Austrian *démarche* makes it almost inevitable that in very short time Austria and Russia will both have

> mobilized against each other ... [476]

The Foreign Secretary stated that Austrian unreasonableness made unavoidable the expansion of the dispute into a Great Power/Great Power conflict. Albertini comments:

> Here was Grey telling Buchanan that the Russian mobilization was 'almost inevitable' and that Buchanan was to take this for granted in talking with Sazanov. This given Sazanov's state of mind was a most dangerous thing to say. Instead of restraining St. Petersburg, this was the very thing to drive it forward.[477]

Grey reinforced his message to Buchanan by recounting his conversation with the Russian Ambassador on 25 July:

> I said that I had given no indication that we should stand aside; on the contrary, I had said to the German Ambassador that, as long as there was only a dispute between Austria and Serbia alone, I did not feel entitled to intervene; but that, directly it was a matter between Austria and Russia, it became a question of the peace of Europe, which concerned us all. I had furthermore spoken on the assumption that Russia would mobilize, whereas the assumption of the German Government had hitherto been officially, that Serbia would receive no support; and what I had said must influence the German Government to take the matter seriously. In effect I was asking that, if Russia mobilized against Austria, the German Government, who had been supporting the Austrian demands on Serbia, should ask Austria to consider some modification of her demands under the threat of

> Russian mobilization. This was not an easy thing for Germany to do, even though we would join at the same time in asking Russia to suspend action. I was afraid, too, that Germany would reply that mobilization with her was a question of hours whereas with Russia it was a question of days; and that, as a matter of fact, I had asked that if Russia mobilized against Austria, Germany instead of mobilizing against Russia, should suspend mobilization and join with us in intervention with Austria, thereby throwing away the advantage of time, for if the diplomatic intervention failed, Russia would meanwhile have gained time for her mobilization. ...[478]

Grey delivered to the Russian Ambassador an incompatible message to that given Lichnowsky the previous day. To Lichnowsky he had spoken of a four-Power conflict, while to the Russian he insisted that he had "given no indication that we should stand aside."

Furthermore, Grey had now consented to Russia mobilizing against Austria before the Austrians had invaded Serbia, which represented a marked aggravation. Worse still, he signaled to the Russians that he wanted to use diplomacy to delay Germany while Russia mobilized. Unfortunately, the Russian Ambassador accurately relayed Grey's comments to his government.[479] Notably, Sir Edward expressed no concern for triggering the system of alliances,[480] and he showed a clear understanding of the consequences when he assumed Germany would mobilize when Russia mobilized against Austria.

Buchanan understood and obeyed Grey's instructions, ending his effort to restrain Russia. The removal of the British Ambassador's restraining influence represented a further intensification of the Crisis because now nobody in St. Petersburg offset Paléologue's influence.

The Austrian Ambassador to Belgrade rejected the Serbian reply and left the country. At 9:00 p.m., Austria mobilized eight army corps against Serbia, and none against Russia.

The First Sea Lord, Prince Louis Battenberg, reacted to the Austrian break with Serbia by canceling the British Fleet's demobilization. Churchill and Grey afterwards approved his order. Following Crowe's advice, Grey related this decision to Russia on 27 and 28 July, encouraging the Russian hawks to risk all in the expectation of Britain engaging in any resulting war.

On 26 July Nicolson suggested (Grey had gone to the countryside and later approved) the Ambassadors of France, Germany, and Italy discuss with Grey a means for finding a peaceful solution while Austria, Serbia and Russia abstained from military action as distinct from military mobilization. Sir Edward in his memoirs says:

> I believed German preparations for war to be much more advanced than those of France and Russia; the Conference would give time for the later Powers to prepare and for the situation to be altered to the disadvantage of Germany, who now had a distinct advantage.[481]

This quote shows that Grey had no misgivings about sanctioning a diplomatic gambit to boost Russia's mobilization at Germany's expense, notwithstanding the extreme risk of toying with the sparks of war. The mask of even-handedness had slipped from the Foreign Office. Grey covered up by accusing Germany of having made advanced war preparations. But there is no documentary evidence to support his accusation. Once more Sir Edward dissimulated. Although he now had taken sides, he never told his dear friend Lichnowsky that he had wound up Britain's role as honest broker.

In Grey's absence, Nicolson and Tyrrell broached the ambassadors' conference to Lichnowsky. In some straightforward

talking Tyrrell warned Lichnowsky that an Austrian attack on Serbia could spark a world war. Lichnowsky relayed the warning to Berlin:

> Every effort would have been in vain and the world war would be inevitable. The localisation of the conflict as hoped for in Berlin was wholly impossible, and must be dropped from the calculations of practical politics.[482]

Finally, the British, though not Grey himself, had given Germany a direct warning, but in the context of this ambassadors' conference, this warning only favored Russian mobilization efforts.

Crowe wrote a dissembling minute on the problems with mobilization:

> I am afraid that the real difficulty to be overcome will be found in the question of mobilisation. Austria is already mobilising. This, if the war does come, is a serious menace to Russia who cannot be expected to delay her own mobilisation, which, as it is, can only become effective in something like double the time required by Austria and by Germany.
>
> If Russia mobilises, we have been warned Germany will do the same, and as German mobilisation is directed almost entirely against France, the latter cannot possibly delay her own mobilisation for even the fraction of a day.
>
> From Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 109 (3) just come in, it seems certain that Austria is going to war because that was from the beginning her intention.
>
> If that view proves correct, it would be neither possible nor just and wise to make any move to restrain Russia from mobilising.

> This however means that within 24 hours His Majesty's Government will be faced with the question whether, in a quarrel so imposed by Austria on an unwilling France, Great Britain will stand idly aside, or take sides. The question is a momentous one, which it is not for a departmental minute to elaborate.
>
> It is difficult not to remember the position of Prussia in 1805, when she insisted on keeping out of the war which she could not prevent from breaking out between the other Powers over questions not, on their face, of direct interest to Prussia.
>
> The war was waged without Prussia in 1805. But in 1806 she fell a victim to the Power that had won in 1805, and no one was ready either to help her or to prevent her political ruin and partition. E. A. C. July 27.

Probably the most important detail in Crowe's minute is the Foreign Office consensus that Russian partial mobilization would trigger German mobilization, which in turn would trigger a European conflict.

Crowe's minute betrays fantastic reasoning that neither he nor anybody else in the Foreign Office believed. He had a command of European geography. He also had a good understanding of military history; he had married into a German naval family (two of his in-laws were admirals), and his brother-in-law was Spenser Wilkinson, Chicele Professor of Military History, and the leading military strategist in the Milner Group.[483] Crowe's allegation that Austria threatened Russia deserves ridicule: Austria posed no threat to any Great Power. But when we consider that Austria concentrated half her army in the south of the country, hundreds of miles from the Austro-Russian frontier, the absurdity of Crowe's statement becomes undisputable.

Crowe dissembled to justify Russian mobilization. He added to

his dishonesty by feigning surprise that Austria had from the start intended to go to war with Serbia. Austria never hid its intention to act against Serbia, and the failure of Crowe to advise early on the consequences of such action suggests he feared British disapproval might divert Austria from the path of war. Note that even at this late stage of the crisis, he did not advise Grey to speak firmly to Austria, even as he accused Austria of imposing her quarrel on an unwilling France, ignoring Buchanan's reports that Paléologue's behavior displayed anything but unwillingness.

On 27 July Grey complained to Lichnowsky about Austria's response to the Serbian reply. He told the Ambassador that Serbia had gone a long way to answering Austria's complaints. Grey ended his conversation with a warning:

> I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of the situation if the war could not be localised, and observed that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute, Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between Austria and Servia, and would bring other Powers in, and the war would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated that after the Servian reply it was at Vienna that some moderation must be urged.[484]

Grey had used a threat, but he had omitted that the fighting would draw Britain in on the side of France. Nonetheless, Lichnowsky reported that he was sure Britain: "Would place herself unconditionally by the side of France and Russia in order to show that she is not willing to permit a moral or perhaps, a military defeat of her group. If it comes to war under these conditions we

shall have England against us."[485] It took twenty-one days for Grey to warn Germany, but even at this late stage had he warned her forcefully, events might have taken a more peaceful path.

After reading Lichnowsky's report, Bethmann-Hollweg decided to treat British proposals with more respect. He told Vienna to consider the latest British proposal. Bethmann-Hollweg's change of attitude marked the end of German hopes to localize the Austro-Serbian dispute.

On 28 July Austria declared war on Serbia. Had Vienna understood that Britain would fight against her, they might have decided differently. However, Britain never talked to the Austrians with candor.

Meanwhile, Grey told Cambon that he had no interest in a Teuton/Slav struggle, but if Germany and France were drawn into the war and the question of the hegemony of Europe was opened, Britain would then decide. Grey also drew attention to the disposition of the British Fleet, hinting at the part Grey expected the British to take in any struggle, a hint not lost on the Ambassador.

In Berlin, the Kaiser returned from his cruise; read the Serbian reply for the first time, and judged it a basis for resolving the crisis. He recognized that Serbia had reneged on previous promises so he suggested that Austria should take Belgrade as a pledge for Serbian satisfaction. However, Bethmann-Hollweg all but ignored the Kaiser's halt in Belgrade proposal until Lichnowsky telegraphed that Austria intended to "flatten out" Serbia.

That evening the German Chancellor reconsidered the Kaiser's proposal. He wrote to the German Ambassador in Vienna,[486] venting his annoyance at the vagueness of the Austrian assurances and warning public opinion could turn against Austria. As a tactical measure he advised placing the odium for the war on Russia's shoulders, showing that he subscribed to the same cynical callousness as his counterparts in the Triple Entente. He told the Ambassador to review "the halt in Belgrade" proposal with the

Austrians and have them discuss it with the Russians. However, he diluted the message by saying "you will have to avoid very carefully giving rise to the impression that we wish to hold Austria back." Germany still supported the aim of "cutting the vital cord of the Greater Serbia propaganda, without bringing on a world war." Bethmann's qualification fatally undermined the Kaiser's proposal.

In St. Petersburg Sazanov told Buchanan that Russia would mobilize when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian border. However, after news of the Austrian declaration of war arrived, the Russian General Staff decided they could not arrange a partial mobilization without undermining their plans for general mobilization.

A few hours after learning Germany would tolerate a partial mobilization against Austria, the Russian General Staff discovered they could not partially mobilize the army—something does not ring true. On 24 July, the Russian War Minister, the Chief of Staff, and the chief of mobilization agreed to a partial mobilization: Is it credible that all three men lacked the competence to know that it was impossible? The Germans had made an extraordinarily generous concession by not mobilizing as Russia partially mobilized against Austria. Strategically, provided Germany sat still, Russia had everything to gain by mobilizing the more remote regions of her vast empire and marshaling those troops on the Austrian frontier. Why did they rush into general mobilization when they had so much to gain by partially mobilizing against Austria?

Russia's urgency to mobilize had nothing to do with Russian strategy and everything to do with French politics: Viviani would shortly return to Paris.[487] One suspects that Poincaré told the Russians that they had a narrow window where they could count on certain French support. This would explain why Paléologue pushed the Russians so strenuously while the French President and Prime Minister were at sea. Thus, on 28 July Russia had but a few days before Prime Minister Viviani and his supporters assumed control

of the French government. Having failed to provoke with partial mobilization, Russia forced Germany's hand with a general mobilization.[488]

On 29 July the Russians told the British that partial mobilization against Austria would begin on 30 July.

Grey told Lichnowsky early in the morning of 29 July that Germany must push the button for peace.[489] In this conversation, Grey only used a vague threat: "one could never tell whose house might remain unscorched in the midst of such a conflagration."[490] He suggested a version of the Kaiser's 'Halt in Belgrade' formula. In his letter to Goschen, Grey said he had told Lichnowsky that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible."[491]

Late that morning Asquith told the Cabinet that the military expected Germany to attack France by crossing through Belgium. A majority in Cabinet believed they only needed to defend Belgium's neutrality with diplomacy. In addition, Belgium would have to appeal to Britain for help. However, they believed British interests were engaged if Germany occupied most of Belgium and took positions on the coast. The Cabinet directed Grey to tell the French that they could not count on Britain joining the war and to tell the Germans that they could not count on Britain staying out.[492]

In the afternoon of 29 July, Grey told Lichnowsky that Britain would not stand aside. He made it clear to Lichnowsky that he did not want the friendly tone of their discussions to mislead him on this score. Lichnowsky reported to Berlin that Britain wanted Germany's friendship and would be able to:

> Stand aside as long as the conflict remained confined to Austria and Russia. But if [Germany] and France should be involved, then the situation would immediately be altered, and the British Government would, under the circumstances, find itself forced to make up its mind quickly. In that event it would not

> be practicable to stand aside and wait for any length of time.[493]

Albertini believes the last chance of British intervention saving the peace occurred on 27 July, so Grey issued his warning two days late.[494] Albertini comments on Grey's failures during the crisis:

> So Grey was anxious not to incur the reproach of having misled the German government into believing that England would stand aside and that, but for his misleading them thus, the course of things might have been different. But this is the very reproach which must forever remain attached to his memory, despite the fact that he is one of the most upright, disinterested and deserving of esteem of the men in English political life.[495]
>
> This is a terrible responsibility from which Grey cannot be exonerated ...The reproach made against Grey to-day and which will be made against him by posterity is not that he failed to warn Germany, but that he did not warn her until too late. If he judged it right and proper to speak to Lichnowsky on the 29th, why did he not do so earlier? By speaking as he did to Berlin, he did not commit himself to anything, he did not tie the hands of the Government or of the Parliament; he simply worked for peace.[496]
>
> Hence if the whole mass of the *British Documents* and the history of British policy in the previous crises had not established beyond dispute the high moral integrity which characterized Grey's whole personality and policy, one might almost be led to suspect, as did Wilhelm, that England only threw off

> the mask when she thought that Germany had gone too far to retreat.[497]

Stunning! Albertini grudgingly concedes the evidence is consistent with Grey deliberately luring Germany and Austria into making irretrievable decisions. He is forced to defend Grey's behavior with a character defense, a defense for which he can offer no evidence. Having a pro-British and Anti-German authority of Albertan's stature, make this finding about the evidence reinforces the credibility of the conspiracy thesis, and must challenge the skeptics.

Austria ignored Germany's 'halt in Belgrade' proposal, and inflamed tensions by shelling Belgrade. Berchtold told Berlin Austria was determined to check Serbia and would mobilize the entire army if the Russian mobilization continued. The Austrians still had not understood that Britain would fight against them.

Lichnowsky reported his second interview and the German Chancellor realized that Russian intervention was certain and British neutrality was lost. He sent urgent messages to Vienna to start talking about the 'Halt in Belgrade' proposal. He told Pourtalès, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg, to tell the Russians that Berlin had decided to pressure Vienna and gave a brief outline of the halt in Belgrade proposal. He sent another message to Vienna to talk with the Russians. Bethmann had reversed Germany's position. He wrote: "Austria's political prestige, the honor of her arms, as well as her claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relations to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia."[498] Ponting comments:

> There is a clear air of panic about Bethmann-Hollweg's actions late in the night of 29 July and in the early hours of the next day. Time was now needed to put pressure on a highly recalcitrant Vienna –

> perhaps Berlin might even have to make the threat to abandon its ally if it did not change tack.[499]

Bethmann's panic of 29 July has convinced scholars that he would have drawn back had he received Grey's warning earlier. Albertini believes that Bethmann-Hollweg was ready to pull back and that he would have forced Vienna to accept some form of 'halt in Belgrade' solution. However, once Russia ordered general mobilization, the time for talking had ended.[500]

In St. Petersburg, Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, told Sazanov that Germany had applied pressure on Vienna to talk directly with Russia. Sazanov said that Austrian partial mobilization meant that Russia must partially mobilize as well, but he promised not to cross the border. Pourtalès warned that Russian mobilization might provoke German mobilization. Having decided to roll the iron dice of war, Sazanov ignored this and all following German warnings that mobilization meant war.[501] The clarity of Germany's warning contrasts with the vagueness of Grey's.

News on 30 July that the British Fleet had sailed to battle stations in the North Sea convinced the Russian militarists that Britain would stand by France. The Belgian Chargé d'Affaires wrote the Russians were certain:

> That Britain would stand by France. This support carries quite extraordinary weight and has contributed not a little to the success of the war party.[502]

Sazanov persuaded the Czar to sign the papers for general mobilization on 30 July to become effective on 31 July. The British and French governments lied about Russia's mobilization to their citizens and blamed Austria for bringing about general mobilization. Albertini says:

> Let it be clearly established that the responsibility of

> the fatal step of mobilizing against Austria on the evening of the 29th and against Austria and Germany at 4 p.m. on the 30th rests beyond all doubt with Russia ... general mobilization, to which the Tsar was only induced to assent by false reasons.[503]

Albertini remarks on Paléologue's influence at this critical stage:

> Not only does it show Paléologue as partly, if not entirely, responsible for Sazanov's mistakes and imprudence, but it throws a shaft of light on the part played by Poincaré at St. Petersburg. One can hardly suppose that Paléologue acted as he did solely on his own initiative and after the departure of Poincaré[504]

From the beginning, the July Crisis participants played a dramatic game of high stakes diplomacy. The game broke down lethally when Russia mobilized against Germany. Anglo-American scholars have struggled with this inconvenient fact. First, they argued that Austria had mobilized against Russia. When that ruse collapsed they resorted to the absurdity that mobilization did not mean war, that this was solely Germany's interpretation and not Russia's nor France's nor Britain's. They chose to ignore the clear German warnings to Russia about mobilization, clarity which contrasts with Sir Edward's opaqueness. These scholars would have us believe the Kaiser should have sat in Berlin while Russia marshaled two to three million men on the Prussian frontier. No contemporary thought this outcome even remotely possible and no scholar should credit this suggestion with the slightest seriousness. The truth is as simple as it is inconvenient: Britain and France had solved the problem of Russian infidelity by persuading Russia to commit first—Russian general mobilization sparked the Great War.

460 Ponting, Clive. Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. London, Charto& Windus. 2002. Print. 116

461 Albertini, Luigi. *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Oxford, Oxford university Press. 1953. Volume II. Print. 334

462 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 337

463 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, Vol. XI Edited by G.P. Gooch, D.Litt. and Harold Temperley, 1928, Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. July 24, 1914.

464 It is more than a little suspicious that in February Kokovtvov, the chairman and finance minister had been dismissed. He had opposed Russia adopting adventurous polices and supported conciliatory policies in the Balkans. His arguments had been decisive against mobilizing in 1912.

465 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 125

466 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 127

467 Ferguson, Niall. *The Pity Of War.* London, Basic Books, 1999. Print. 61

468 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. XI, Communication by the German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

469 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. XI, Communication by the German Ambassador, July 24, 1914.

470 R. J. Crampton, in Hinsley, F. H. *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey:* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977. Print. 258-259

471 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. Vol. XI .Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. July 24, 1914.

472 See Crowe's January 1907 *Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany.* British Documents on the Origin of the War, Vol 3, Appendix A,

473 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 130

474 Lutz, Hermann. *Lord Grey and The World War.* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1928 Print. 236

475 *Lord Grey and The World War.* 236

476 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 336

477 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 336

478 Montgelas, Count Max, *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*. New York, Alfred Knopf, 1928. Print. 74

479 *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*. 75
480 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 332
481 See Grey's comments in *Twenty Five Years* Vol I. 315.
482 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 150
483 Wilkinson inspired Crowe's famous 1907 memorandum against Germany. - reference 13 above
484 British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. XI, Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen. July 27, 1914.
485 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 157
486 Tschirschky
487 On the morning of July 30, at 7:10 a.m., Viviani rushed off a telegram to Paléologue:

As I have indicated to you in my telegram of the 27th, the Government of the Republic has decided to neglect no effort with a view to the solution of the conflict and to second the action of the Imperial Government in the interest of the general peace. On the other hand France is resolved to fulfill all the obligations of her alliance. But in the very interests of the general peace, I believe it would be opportune that, in the precautionary and defensive measures to which Russia believing herself obliged to resort, she should not immediately proceed to any measure which might offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces,

(Viviani to Paléologue, July 30, 1914, in France, France: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1871-1914. Troisième Série. Vol. XI. Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1931-1942. Print 261-262.)

This was the only recorded French attempt to restrain Russia. It certainly suggests that Viviani would have taken a strong hand if he had time but this message to to Paléologue was sent just before war broke out. A further piece of evidence to support this conclusion comes from the diary of the German Ambassador to Paris in (Schoen, Freiherr von. *The Memoirs Of An Ambassador.* Translated by Constance Vesey. New York: Brentano's, 1923. Print. 311-312). The German government ordered Schoen to negotiate with the French government, but Viviani appears not to have been aware of the order for Russian mobilisation:

In the conversation I had with M. Viviani, on the vening of July 31, he professed, to my surprise, to have no information of a Russian general

mobilization against us, and said he only knew of partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary and general precautionary measures. He would not abandon hope that the worst might yet be avoided. On my pointing out that not only the whole Russ ian army, but the fleet had also been mobilized, a clear proof that the measure was directed against us, M. Viviani could make no reply. He promised to give an answer to the question of neutrality the next afternoon, after the Cabinet Council. His ignorance of the Russian general mobilization seems very remarkable, in view of the fact that it had been publicly proclaimed in the early morning of that day in St. Petersburg, had been ordered the evening before, and undoubtedly decided on even earlier; further, in view of the close relationship of alliance, and finally of the circumstance that the Premier had just returned from St. Petersburg, and therefore ought not to have been in ignorance of what was intended there. It must either be assumed that he knew all about it or that the Russian Government had misled him in the same way as it had tried to mislead our representatives in St. Petersburg. On the other hand, it is certain that the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg had been specially informed by the Russian government of the decision to order general mobilization...

It is now only a matter of conjecture what Viviani and his allies would have done had they been given another week.

488 It was much easier to persuade the Tsar to authorize a partial mobilisation against Austria. When it came to authorizing general mobilisation, Sazanov had to deceive the Tsar by telling him that Austria had mobilised against Russia and that German mobilisation was complete.

489 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II.511

490 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 196

491 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 197

492 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 197-8

493 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 200

494 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 514

495 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 514

496 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 515-516

497 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 517-518

498 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 206
499 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 206
500 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 526-527
501 *Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War*. 208
502 *Lord Grey and The World War*. 1928..276
503 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 574-576
504 *The Origins Of The War Of 1914*. Vol. II. 588

14
Lord Milner's Second War

With the Great Powers of Europe mobilizing or about to, Lord Milner and Sir Edward Grey contrived to bring Britain into the war. The crisis had split the British Cabinet on 31 August. A core of ministers in the middle believed that the British public would not support Russia or France, but a violation of Belgian neutrality might tilt sentiment in favor of war. Thus, the majority in Cabinet believed intervention in a European war hinged on an invasion of Belgium. Grey received instructions to ask Germany and France about their attitude to Belgium.

After the Cabinet, Grey refused to give Cambon, the French Ambassador, a guarantee that Britain would join the war, but he told Cambon "The preservation of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude ..."[505] Cambon rejoined that the Foreign Office had pledged to support France and asked the British Government to immediately guarantee support for France.[506] What pledge? Cambon had nothing in writing, yet he confidently demanded that Britain honor the verbal pledges he received from the Foreign Office. Poincaré backed Russia's escalation based on this verbal pledge from Britain so it must have been credible. The Foreign Secretary claimed he had a free hand as he had not promised France anything, yet we now discover he had made gravely important verbal promises of British military support to France—so much for Sir Edward Grey's

integrity.

Despite Grey's diplomatic legalese, Ponting says Cambon knew that Grey supported immediate intervention.[507] Cambon reported his conversation with Grey:

> The German Ambassador having this morning asked Sir E. Grey if England would observe neutrality in the conflict which seemed imminent, Sir E. Grey replied 'that England could not remain neutral in a general conflict and that if France was involved, England would also be drawn into it.[508]

Grey's actions that day supported this conclusion. He directed his representative in Brussels to advise the Belgian Government:

> In view of existing treaties you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and say I assume that Belgium will to the utmost of her power maintain neutrality and desire and expect other powers to observe and uphold it.[509]

Grey needed the Belgians to resist for his intervention policy to have traction at Cabinet.

On Saturday 1 August, France promised to respect Belgian neutrality while Germany sidestepped, saying it "could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing to a certain extent part of their plan of campaign."[510] The Foreign Office, aware of Germany's Schlieffen plan, immediately derided Germany's reply.

Asquith, Grey and Haldane concerted their strategies for tackling the Cabinet. After the meeting of 1 August, Grey proposed to Lichnowsky that Germany should pledge not to attack if France remained neutral. Lichnowsky agreed immediately and Grey told him that he would use his assurance at the Cabinet that morning.[511]

Grey sent his secretary, Tyrrell, to the German embassy to prepare for their discussion that afternoon. Lichnowsky reported to Berlin:

> Sir E. Grey will this afternoon make proposals to me regarding English neutrality, even for the eventuality of our being at war with Russia and France.[512]

While the British Cabinet met, Lichnowsky sent this happy news to Berlin.

At the Cabinet, Churchill wanted to go to war immediately; Grey and Asquith favored intervening when the Germans attacked France while Lloyd George and his faction made Belgium the *casus belli.* Morley and Burns opposed intervention. To appease the doubters, Asquith and Grey agreed not to make any immediate decision to send the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France. Grey never mentioned his proposed offer of British neutrality to Germany, showing he wanted to deceive the German Ambassador with his proposal.

In the afternoon Grey proposed to Lichnowsky that France and Germany should arm but not fight. Lichnowsky agreed. Grey warned also of the danger of violating Belgian neutrality. Lichnowsky related:

> To the question whether, on condition we respected Belgian neutrality, he could give me a definite statement about the neutrality of Great Britain the Minister replied that this was not possible, although this question would be of great importance with English public opinion. [513]

Grey recounted Lichnowsky's bid for British neutrality to his ambassador in Berlin:

> I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still

> free, and we were considering what our attitude would be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I replied that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.[514]

Finally, the gullible Lichnowsky had pierced Sir Edward Grey's mask. For more than twenty days the Foreign Secretary had baited Germany with hints of British neutrality; however, when pressed, he refused to stipulate his terms. His refusal revealed the lie in his claim to having a free hand. If British neutrality were ever a possibility, nothing prevented Grey from specifying his terms. He could not meet this simple challenge because he had repeatedly made moral and verbal commitments to France— these verbal commitments fettered the Foreign Secretary. Throughout the July Crisis, Grey had duped his good friend Lichnowsky by suppressing his commitments to France and by hinting at British neutrality. Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy demanded a European war.

At Cabinet, Grey belittled Lichnowsky's offer,[515] stressing the Ambassador had made a personal and not an official proposal. In truth, Grey suppressed Lichnowsky's bid for British neutrality at the Cabinet because he had decided for war, a suppression that violated the Cabinet's collective responsibility, and a decision that cost close to a million British lives.

The exact date of Grey's decision for war is paramount. The evidence suggests that Grey made up his mind for war at the

beginning or even before the July Crisis. To recap: the Foreign Secretary and his staff suspended their anti-German animus at the start of the crisis, enabling him to speak kind, instead of firm, words to the German and Austrian Ambassadors; He minimized the gravity of the crisis to his Cabinet colleagues, preempting any possible Cabinet challenge to his approach; Even after Austria's trial balloon he steadfastly refused to speak frankly to the Austrians, either in London or in Vienna; When speaking to Lichnowsky, he persistently suppressed his commitments to France, lying about having free hands and hinting at the possibility of British neutrality. The telling point is that Grey did not evolve these behaviors and attitudes during the July Crisis—he started the Crisis with these attitudes and behaviors predetermined consistent with him anticipating these discussions. He anticipated the Crisis because he had foreknowledge of the assassination.

After the Cabinet, Grey told Cambon the details of the Franco-Russian alliance did not concern Britain, and the present crisis did not arise out of the Anglo-French agreement as did the 1906 and 1911 crises. Grey claims he told Cambon that:

> Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral in the event of war between Russia and Germany. If France could not take advantage of this position, it was because she was bound by an alliance to which we were not parties ... This did not mean that under no circumstances would we assist France, but it did mean that France must take her own decision at this moment without reckoning on an assistance that we were not now in a position to promise.[516]

Ponting researched the Foreign Secretary's claim and concluded Grey had intentionally deceived the Cabinet:

> Copies of these telegrams were circulated among a number of Grey's colleagues in Whitehall and there must be a strong suspicion that the wording was designed to reassure them that the Foreign Secretary was following the lines of their discussion at that morning's meeting. Cambon's record of the meeting provides a very different version of their talk. It says that Grey told him that the expeditionary force might not operate on the French left flank (as the plans devised in 1905-6 and updated regularly since required) but that it might go elsewhere. The operation Grey had in mind was a direct intervention in Belgium, which had been considered by the cabinet in 1911, and which might appeal to public opinion as being a more obvious defense of Belgian neutrality.[517]

In Grey's account one understands that Britain reserved the right whether to intervene in the war while in Cambon's account one understands that Britain reserved the right where to intervene in the war. The two accounts conflict irreconcilably so one must infer the Foreign Secretary had once more deceived the Cabinet. Note however, that Grey must have thought through his deception and it did not occur spontaneously: He spent time working out the details, and getting copies of the telegram with which he deceived his colleagues.

The Germans reacted strongly to the British proposals. The Kaiser sent a telegram to King George about the proposed neutrality of Britain. Later that evening the palace summoned Grey to explain his neutrality proposal. According to Ponting:

> Grey simply denied that any such exchange had taken place with Lichnowsky and drafted a misleading reply for the King to send to the Kaiser.[518]

Grey brazenly lied to his King, which supports the inference that Asquith had done the same on 26 July.[519] Even Albertini cannot explain away Grey's behavior:

> There is no need to press the matter further. Grey's blunder of the forenoon is inexplicable.[520]

The bogus neutrality proposal is only inexplicable to those who, like Albertini, insist the Foreign Secretary had not committed to France. Grey had made the final play in the strategy he had followed throughout the crisis. War on 1 August was all but certain unless the Kaiser lost his nerve and pulled back at the eleventh hour. As Russia mobilized, he teased the Germans with the prospect of British neutrality to gain time for the French mobilization. King George ruined his plans by asking for an explanation.

Grey told Churchill he had promised Cambon the British would not allow the German Fleet to steam into the Channel. Churchill gave the order.

France mobilized at 4 p.m., one hour before Germany. Poincaré told Izvolsky that he wanted Germany to declare war on France, rather than the other way around. Poincaré noted in his diary that:

> I do not despair; the Foreign Office is very well disposed toward us; Asquith also; the English are slow to decide, methodical, reflective, but they know where they are going.[521]

Note how confident Poincaré felt about British participation. This most detailed of men would only have expressed this confidence if he had already received credible assurances about British participation.

On Sunday, 2 August, Germany occupied Luxembourg, but this occupation did not engage essential British interests. Asquith and

Grey faced a divided Cabinet. They, favored siding with France irrespective of Belgium, a stance backed by Churchill. On the other hand, the Cabinet majority insisted that a violation of Belgian neutrality was the precondition for British intervention. Morley opposed any form of intervention.

Cambon claimed the 1912 Anglo-French naval agreement[522] included an undertaking from Britain to guard the French northern coasts and the channel. Grey supported Cambon's interpretation at Cabinet, and was backed up by Asquith and Churchill. However, the written agreements carefully stipulated that each country made their naval dispositions according to their individual national needs and not as part of an overall agreement. Keith Wilson says of Grey's dishonesty "In what he saw as an honorable cause, Grey proceeded to do a very dishonorable thing,"[523]inferring that Grey had intentionally deceived the Cabinet about the naval agreement. Grey's deception arose from his secret commitments to France. At the Foreign Office, Arthur Nicolson said to Grey during the crisis: "But this is impossible, you have over and over promised M. Cambon that if Germany was the aggressor, you would stand by France." To which the Foreign Secretary replied "Yes, but he has nothing in writing."[524] The British Foreign Secretary admitted he had verbally pledged to fight alongside France, proving that he systematically misled Austria and Germany on British neutrality and that he systematically deceived the Cabinet about British commitments.

Any pledge to defend the coasts of France was an obligation, yet Grey and Asquith had repeatedly declared to the House and the Cabinet that Britain had 'free hands'. It is undeniable that Cambon and the French government understood that Britain had committed to fight alongside France. These commitments were given to the French military attaché, to the French General Staff by General Wilson, to Cambon by Grey and Nicolson, and to Clemenceau by his friend, Lord Milner. These verbal pledges lay at the core of the Anglo-French relationship, but they contradicted the free hand

declarations of Asquith and Grey.[525]Secret commitments condemned Britain to join in the Great War: the Cabinet never knew what British foreign policy entailed and what commitments the Foreign Secretary had made—they, the Parliament and the country were victims of conspiracy.

At the 2 August Cabinet Asquith stopped his pretenses and supported Grey's hard-line.[526] The two men made such a powerful combination that Morley later recalled their strength and force with some awe. In a touch of high drama, halfway through the Cabinet a note arrived from Bonar Law, leader of the Tories:

> It would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.[527]

With the opposition Tories at his back, Grey issued his colleagues an ultimatum—either they enter the war or he would resign.

Two historians, Wilson and Ferguson, believe the Bonar Law note broke the back of the dissenters in the Cabinet. According to Wilson:

> Faced with desertion by Grey and Asquith, their two most prestigious colleagues, and with the readiness of the opposition to pursue a war policy, the neutralists reneged on their pacifism. Considerations of unity and of the future prospects of the Liberals as the party of Government constrained all but two ministers to accept the conditions Grey made.[528]

Bonar Law's note ensured the victory for the war party in Cabinet, convincing each minister the country would go to war irrespective

of his individual choice. Law's note was Milner's ace, and it explains the importance of not breaking up the Cabinet before the crisis had peaked.

According to Austen Chamberlain,[529] the Bonar Law note arose from a meeting of the Conservative leaders at Lansdowne House on the evening of 1 August. Lord Lansdowne, the Duke of Devonshire, Austen Chamberlain, Arthur Balfour, Lord Talbot, Henry Wilson, and Bonar Law were among those who attended. Other people attended the meeting but Chamberlain withheld their names.

On 2 August, Chamberlain and Lansdowne pressured Bonar Law to support the war faction in Cabinet, indicating, inadvertently, the meeting of the previous evening had received precise intelligence about the Cabinet divisions. (One speculates that Lord Milner received the report on the Cabinet divisions from either Grey or Haldane) At first, Bonar Law refused to write to Asquith unless he was first asked. Chamberlain had to leave the room and he hints that Bonar Law received a telephone call. When Chamberlain returned, Bonar Law had become compliant and wrote the letter to Asquith. Bonar Law's note so complemented Asquith's hard-line at the Cabinet that one suspects Asquith anticipated it.

Although she is a historian loyally committed to justifying the Triple Entente, Zara Steiner recognizes the role played by the Milnerites:

> It was due to pressure from Wilson and men like Amery and Milner that the Conservative chiefs offered their unconditional support in a letter which Asquith read to the Cabinet on the morning of the 2nd. There was now a concrete possibility that if the Cabinet split there would be a Coalition or Unionist party leading the country into war.[530]

Never before nor since, can one point to such an open, concerted effort by the Milner Group to force the hand of politicians. In the final days of the crisis, many members of the group openly concerted their efforts to bring Britain into the war. Milner had Haldane and Grey in the Cabinet, and Crowe and Nicolson in the Foreign Office so he knew exactly when to throw his weight behind intervention, and did so at that critical moment. Bonar Law's note to Asquith did not refer to Belgium—the pledge to France came without conditions on Belgium or on responsibility for the crisis.

On 3 August, Sir Edward Grey's finest hour arrived. After eight-and-a-half years of painstakingly preparing Britain for a continental war, he presented his case to the House. He never mentioned Russia nor responsibility for the assassination. He concentrated on British interests, British honor and British obligations. Although he had approved General Wilson's plan to place the British army in the path of the advancing German army, Grey suggested to the House that the cost to Britain would be small, a misleading reassurance that British intervention would be chiefly naval.

Perhaps Sir Edward Grey suffered a compulsion to deceive. He forever tarnished his finest hour in the House of Commons by deliberately omitting the last sentence in the Grey-Cambon letter of 1912: "If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them." In suppressing this sentence the great English angler admitted to all posterity that even he could not square the circle. After he repeatedly assured the house over the years that he had kept Britain's hand free, he balked at revealing that he had created a secret military partnership with France, a partnership that included more detailed war plans than those of the Austro-German and Franco-Russian public military alliances. Sir Edward Grey knew that his radical colleagues might not recognize the subtle distinction he had made between secret Anglo-French military arrangements

and secret British military commitments so he suppressed the information.

On August 4, 1914, Lord Milner saw his imperial strategy fulfilled when Britain declared war on Germany. Persistence had finally produced results. Grey had voiced the Milner Group's ambition of aligning with Russia against Germany as early as 1895. The Milner group ensured Grey's appointment as Foreign Secretary and Haldane's appointment as War Secretary in December 1905. Almost immediately these two allies and friends started the secret military talks with the French, and covertly prepared the British Army for a Continental engagement. They experienced difficulties finding cooperative generals until they appointed General Wilson Director of Military Operations, a man happy to make military plans without the sanction of the Liberal Cabinet. In August 1911, Asquith arranged for the CID to approve Wilson's plans with the French, after which he replaced McKenna with Churchill at the Admiralty. Ready for war, Britain waited for France and Russia. However, fear of Russian infidelity had forced Britain and France to encourage a Russian clash with Austria in the Balkans to ensure Russia committed to the war first.

Russia had dealt Austria a serious blow in the Balkan wars, leaving Austria demoralized and anxious for her future. Tensions between Austria and Serbia reached a breaking point. Russia threw gasoline onto this tinderbox by sanctioning the assassination, and Colonel Apis lit the fire by leaving a trail of evidence linking Sarajevo to Belgrade, evidence that enraged and provoked the Austrians. However, Russia would only have provoked Austria and her ally, Germany, if they had secured in advance a firm French commitment to go to war. But France would only have guaranteed Russia if Britain had guaranteed France. These linked commitments formed the core of the conspiracy: Britain, France and Russia had agreed to foster a European war with Serbia's provocation of Austria. The July Crisis saw these commitments play out with France pushing Russia forward, and Britain baiting Germany and

Austria with hints of British neutrality. As outlined in the previous four chapters, the strategy succeeded.

However, Milner's brilliant success slowly turned into a nightmare. The 'home by Christmas' war degenerated into a war of attrition, a grinding relentless bloodbath. At least nine-million men died in battle, over twenty-million received terrible wounds and European civilization collapsed and never regained its predominance. Germany had far more staying power than Milner had expected, and Russia had far less. Although the slaughter on the European battlefields left Milner unmoved, the possibility of a British collapse alarmed him and galvanized him to action. As the course of the war worsened, Milner formed his 'Ginger Group' to oust Prime Minister Asquith. However, he still preferred having a Liberal leading the country in war so they chose Lloyd George. Milner joined Lloyd George's war council. But Russia collapsed, and Great Britain teetered on the edge of bankruptcy. Germany was about to win the war.

Milner appealed to his banking colleagues in America. Although the American branch of Milner's organization had already played an important role in supplying Britain with credit and war materials, Milner asked them to intervene militarily. J. P. Morgan and Co. led the drive by the American bankers to bring the USA into the war. They persuaded the American people that Britain followed legitimate means of war with their blockades and minefields but Germany followed barbarous means of war with their submarines. The bankers insisted the presence of American citizens on board conferred protection from submarines—but not mines—on any munitions ship entering the European war zone.

American intervention overwhelmed Germany, and saved the world for Lord Milner and the Anglo-American bankers. I stress the bankers. The war started with international bankers and imperialists equal, but at its conclusion the bankers dominated the partnership and have since expanded their power and influence enormously.

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509 Montgelas, Count Max, British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey. New York, Alfred Knopf, 1928. Print. 105

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511 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 254

512 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 254. Ponting says: The lunchtime proposal for British neutrality – which the British had rejected when Bethmann-Holweg suggested it – is very difficult to understand.

513 The Origins Of The War Of 1914. Vol. III, 388-389

514 The Origins Of The War Of 1914. Vol. III, 389

515 The Origins Of The War Of 1914. Vol. III, 517

516 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 261

517 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 262

518 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 264

519 King George told Prince Henry of Prussia that Britain would do all it could to stay out of the war. Asquith was the source for this disinformation. Constitutional issues are beyond the competence of this work, but Asquith appears to have gone close to the wire when eh deceived the King while keeping the Cabinet and the Parliament in the dark about his policy for war.

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521 Thirteen Days: The Road To The First World War. 253.

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Epilogue: The New World Order

Our journey has come to an end. Yes, this is an account of the Great War's origins, but to a far greater extent it is a case study in conspiracy theory that I hope gives skeptics pause for thought. My position is straightforward: An honest account of the Great War's origins would force a rewrite of Twentieth Century history in the West. The unseen hand directing our affairs is not anonymous. We even have a good idea who is directing events at present.

Much work remains to be done. We need to rewrite the history books by including the influence of the Milner Group in world affairs. The Great War destroyed European civilization and issued in the era of finance, led by the Milner Group and their Anglo-American banker allies, an alliance that gradually became the Anglo-American Establishment. During the great depression these bankers concentrated enormous wealth into their hands, while the people of the world fell into poverty. The Anglo-American Establishment became the most powerful private entity in the world.

However, the Anglo-American utopia still had a serious blemish because Russia and Japan lay beyond their influence and control. In a ghastly parody of the Great War, the Milner Group obsessed over Stalin's Russia so they permitted Hitler's rise to power, and later sanctioned the march on the Rhineland. They wanted Hitler's

Germany to destroy Stalin's Russia, instead Frankenstein turned on his master, and the bloodbath of the Second World War followed, leaving fifty-seven million dead.

The Establishment survived the blunders and bloodshed of WWII just as they did those of WWI, and their blunders have neither humbled the organization nor diverted it from setting up an 'enlightened' New World Order. The organization that presently plays the role of the "unseen hand" is best described with the label the "New World Order." Their fervor for this New World Order ideal has a quasi religious feel to it and they seem willing to sacrifice people and wealth to attain their goal. If the New World Order movement is religious, it is unique in its antipathy toward the family so it is radically different from any other religion. The New World Order is uniquely earthbound for a religion—their paradise is on earth. They believe that they can achieve huge increases in longevity through stem cell medicine and human cloning. They may even believe that science can provide some form of earth-bound immortality. Whether the science can add "hugely" to the human life span remains to be seen but stem cell clinics in Germany and Switzerland have already extended the average life expectancy of some "important" people. I mention this because of all the moral and ethical problems associated with this new technology (especially when we openly speak of rationing medicine for ordinary people), moral and ethical problems that an unscrupulous few can easily turn to their advantage.

The New World Order lacks all national and territorial loyalties. They demanded huge sacrifices of the British people, but once the British Empire had served its purpose, they dispensed with it just as one throws away old, worn-out shoes. British citizens, especially the better educated ones, deluded themselves when they thought the international bankers were a friendly and benign force. Post Suez Crisis, the organization has operated out of the USA, and they have made the same extraordinary demands of the American people as they made of the British. As a result, the average American family's

standard of living has plummeted since the 1960s. The cause for this decline rests with American foreign policy. The strategic interests of America as defined by American policymakers in the State, Defense and Treasury Departments concern the interests of the American Empire, and have nothing in common with the interests of the American people. The British people went through a similar experience and were, ironically, emancipated when the Establishment abandoned the British Empire.

Outsiders do not know the grand design for the New World Order. We must confess our ignorance. In general, few people, including conspiracy theorists, know the secret decisions of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Group, the Bilderberg Group, the Federal Reserve, Chatham House and a host of other organs of the New World Order. However, the New World Order will continue orchestrating political, military and economic crises to expand their power and to convince the people they need a savior.

Although the New World Order has amassed awesome power, we are not powerless. For example, American citizens could focus on removing the Federal Reserve System of America. The Federal Reserve operates as the American central bank, but it is a unique institution. The same bankers who started the Great War established the Federal Reserve, and it has the strangest rules of governance of any supposedly public entity. The Federal Reserve consists of a Federal Board of Governors appointed by the federal government. Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve has no obligation to account for its balance sheet to Congress, which challenges the federal nature of the institution and raises doubts about its constitutionality. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve also consists of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks that are essentially private institutions. The Reserve Banks supply the members of the Federal Advisory Council. Even more bizarre, the identities of the private owners of America's central bank are not disclosed on a yearly or even on a timely basis. Thus, we have a federally appointed Board

of Governors being advised by private bankers, with the Governors responsible for public policy and the Advisory Council responsible for the undisclosed interests of private banks. This arrangement cannot benefit the typical American citizen. Because the Federal Reserve controls the world's reserve currency, it is the most powerful financial institution in the world, and the anonymous private interests that control it have enormous influence on everybody's well-being.

The Federal Reserve created bubbles in the western economies over the past twenty years. At present, the global economy is unwinding this huge bubble of debt and leverage, yet it is far from certain the economy will withstand the deleveraging shock. One fears the New World Order Establishment will engineer another economic crisis so they can provide humanity with a solution—at a suitable price. One can only hope and pray American readers will tame this extraordinary institution before it does more harm.

For the ordinary American, the CFR and the Federal Reserve make a mockery of America's Homeland Security system—the enemy is not in Afghanistan or Iran, the enemy is within. An unprecedented threat to our privacy has begun. Almost imperceptibly, smart phones and smart chips have been insinuated into everybody's life. The phones have excellent camera capabilities and before long iris scanning will become the mandatory method of identification. We are also rushing toward a cashless society. When cash is gone, "big brother" will have the means to monitor the typical citizen's every movement. We have trackers in our cars and in our phones. Once cash is removed big brother will issue a personal communication device to each citizen, a device that will identify the owner with an iris scan, access their bank accounts and pay for all purchases, and report on the owner's location. In a cashless society the individual will need this device just to survive. Unless we resist strongly, the cashless society will arrive shortly. George Orwell erred about Big Brother in one small detail: Big Brother will have far more control over our lives than

even Orwell could have imagined.

Given that western societies have allowed the Milner Group, alias the Anglo-American Establishment, alias the New World Order do as they please for the past ninety years, who or what will limit and restrain the organization's growing power over individual lives? In the next ten years, individuals stand to lose their civil liberties and their personal freedom. The war on drugs and the war on terror has already eaten away much of our freedom—the rest will disappear shortly. What is most frightening of all is that individuals are voluntarily surrendering their freedom in a Faustian bargain of short-term gain for long-term pain.

As I sign off, I hope my case study inspires some people to work in the conspiracy field, and many more to exercise political vigilance. After all, the New World Order is awfully powerful, but they have made terrible mistakes in the past, and they will make more mistakes so while the threat of enslavement looms, not all hope has been lost. Perhaps the people will resist. Farewell dear reader.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John Cafferky holds three degrees from Trinity College, Dublin. He spent ten years as chief geologist at the Agnico Eagle Mines, Joutel site, in northwestern Quebec where he helped discover, and bring into production, the Telbel mine. Currently he lives in Toronto and teaches mathematics. He has a passion for science, philosophy, history and writing. This is his third book. In his first book, *Evolution's Hand,* he examined the problems of evolution in the light of his Achaean rock experience in northern Canada. In his second book, *Scandal and Betrayal,* he investigated the mysterious disappearance of the Irish Crown Jewels in 1906, which was featured in a documentary on the subject. In his third book, *Lord Milner's Second War,* he argues that the First World War was fostered by an agreement between Russia, France and the Rhodes-Milner secret society of Great Britain. The secret society was a partnership of British imperialists and international financiers. It is this group that has given rise to the New World Order movement that has been highlighted by conspiracy theorists studying the Federal Reserve, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderberg Group. *Lord Milner's Second War* is a case study in conspiracy in which the question is posed: "is there really an organized shadowy group directing major events?" John Cafferky answers yes and reviews the evidence that led him to this conclusion.