

Alfred M. Lilienthal

There Goes the Middle East

THE AUTHOR OF *What Price Israel?*



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There Goes The Middle East

by ALFRED M. LILIENTHAL


The conflict between Israel and the Arab states, says the author, is no longer an internecine Jewish problem; the Middle East has emerged in the past year as the most important area in the economic and political struggle for power between the Communist and Western Powers. This book should be considered, therefore, in terms of American national interests.

Mr. Lilienthal's earlier book, *What Price Israel?*, shocked the nation with its story behind the story of the 1948 creation of the state of Israel in the heart of the Arab world.



In *There Goes the Middle East*, Mr. Lilienthal details the manner in which President Truman, for political purposes, helped to create the state of Israel. And he outlines the shifting policies of the Eisenhower administration, the background of the attack on Egypt by England, France, and Israel, and the reasons for their withdrawal.

By dealing frankly with the events leading up to the arming of Egypt by the Soviet Union, the collapse of Aswan Dam negotiations, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, Mr. Lilienthal casts light on the explosive questions behind Middle East tensions: Is Nasser an enslaver or a liberator? Did Egypt provoke the invasion of October 29, 1956? What caused the Arabs to flee the Israeli-held portions of Palestine, and what is the solution to their plight? What is the Soviet's game? And what

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
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

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THERE GOES THE MIDDLE EAST

BY

Alfred M. Lilienthal

AUTHOR OF *WHAT PRICE ISRAEL?*

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1960

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What has passed for American policy in the Middle East is reminiscent of a passage from one of today's foremost playwrights:

“Richard sometimes reminds me of an unhappy gentleman who comes to the shore of a January sea, heroically strips to swim and then seems powerless to advance or retire, either to take the shock of the water or to immerse himself again in his warm clothes, and so stands cursing the sea, the air, the season, anything except himself, as blue as a plucked goose.”

From *The Dark Is Light Enough* by Christopher Fry

Foreword

The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in a desperate struggle in the Middle East, the ultimate outcome of which will decide the fate of the area as well as the future of the Free World. The importance of this strategic region to the West was unhappily demonstrated when the October 1956 military action against Egypt resulted in the stoppage of traffic through the Suez Canal and Europe starved for oil. By mid-March the Suez Canal crisis had cost U.S. taxpayers \$17,410,000 via the United Nations alone.

The three-pronged invasion of Egypt confirmed in the Arab public eye the previous image of Britain as a colonial power encouraging Israel to become the spearhead for aggression against the Arab states. And France's imperialist aspirations were similarly confirmed. The United States alone of the Western Powers was left with any ability to stop the Arab world from being driven into Moscow's welcoming arms.

To protect the nations of the Middle East against communism, the United States sought Arab acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, a combination of military aid and economic

assistance. The Soviet Union countered with its own scheme calling for the liquidation of all Western bases, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and a joint program of economic development.

The chips were all down. The Arab world, for whose favor the United States and the U.S.S.R. were competing, was faced with making a choice or risking the hazards of neutralism.

Events were crowding into this stirring drama so quickly that it was barely possible for even the daily newspaper, let alone a book, to keep fully abreast of developments. The present book threatened to become an unending volume. However, while situations changed and effects altered, the basic causes of Middle East turmoil remained unchanged and unaltered—and almost untouched.

What was taking place in the Middle East involved all Americans far too personally for them not to look at all sides of the question and examine the facts closely. Here was a problem entirely new to them.

Not more than a year previously, to the average American Gamal Abdel Nasser was a relatively unknown colonel, Gaza a wholly unidentifiable spot, and the Middle East an unfamiliar area somewhere beyond Europe. But the catastrophic events which turned the Middle East into the center of international attention and transformed Nasser into the most controversial figure on the world scene had their beginnings in the 1947 United Nations act of partitioning Palestine and creating the sovereign state of Israel. At the time, the consequences of that action caused little concern and soon were all but forgotten. The smug belief prevailed that the fierce opposition to the act of pushing back the clock some two thousand years would collapse, as the Arabs folded their tents and crept away under the shadow of night.

Things turned out quite differently. And the lightning transition whereby the heretofore scarcely considered Middle East moved to the center of the world stage caught American public opinion short. Americans had not been prepared for responsibility by background briefing or interpretative news reports, prerequisites both to an understanding of the complex problems which now gripped the area and to a sound judgment which the U.S. interest in the area demanded of conscientious citizens. What little was known of the many-faceted problems had been learned through a maze of headlines, labels and oversimplifications. Direct American involvement in the area had come in the sixth or seventh inning of the game. So long as one did not go back to the beginning, to the partition of 1947, if not to the Balfour Declaration of 1917, it was quite simple to make out an iron-clad case against one or the other adversary in the Arab-Israeli conflict, depending upon just at what point one began assessing the facts.

If humanitarian consideration for the Jewish survivors of Hitler's gas chambers was to govern the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, what of consideration for the Arab refugees? In this instance the world was confronted with the most vexing human problem of all—suffering people torn from their homes to make way for other people who had been similarly afflicted. If Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was to be adjudged the primary cause of Middle East woes, what part in the havoc that followed was played by the withdrawal of the United States offer to help finance the construction of the Aswan Dam? If the harassing raids of the Egyptian *fe-dayeen* were the provocation which prompted Israel to attack, what of the Israeli provocations which had instigated this guerilla warfare? If Egypt has been guilty of violating the 1951 Security Council resolution requiring the free passage of Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal—one partial aspect

of the total problem—what of the number of crucial resolutions that Israel had declined to obey?

If cause and effect in the complicated sequence of Middle East events were linked together, the resultant total picture would differ markedly from what the American public has been led to believe is the full story.

In contrast to the near-perfect public relations of the Israelis, the Arab outlook does not comprehend the importance of this valuable technique in the world in which the Arab is being judged. Extravagant Arab statements which are adduced to prove complete Arab intransigency often reflect nothing more than repressed Arab nationalism striking out against their former colonial tormentors, the British and the French. Egyptian insistence on being treated as an equal adult power and not as a wayward child is another psychological factor in the struggle.

The sharp impact of propaganda has led to the widest acceptance of certain myths about the Middle East. Aside from the fact that "anti-Semitism" makes no sense semantically, it is absurd to talk about anti-Semitism in connection with the Middle East conflict. This word does not fit the discussion. Certainly the Arabs are anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli, but that is quite different from being anti-Semitic.

The King Saud visit to the United States raised anew widespread reports of the Saudi monarch's anti-Jewish and anti-Catholic attitude. The National Catholic Welfare Conference scotched the latter charge with a statement indicating that Catholic chaplains were "free to offer Mass at the Dhahran military base and that there were no objections over conditions for Catholics in Saudi Arabia." Prior to the invasion of Egypt by Israel, the Grand Rabbi of Egypt could have similarly attested to the harmonious living enjoyed by the Jews of Egypt. If the world at large has been reaping the effects of

the inevitable disaster caused by the abandonment of Zionism as a religious ideal and its assertion as a nationalist ideal, Egyptian Jewry has been the latest and most particular victim. Far greater than any military victory that he gained on the plains of Sinai was Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's propaganda victory provided by the liquidation of the more-than-2500-year-old Jewish Egyptian community in the wake of the Israeli invasion.

No one can minimize the depth of sentiment in the United States for Israel. Even before the President had spelled out the specifics of the pressure he was willing to apply in order to force obedience by Israel to the United Nations mandates regarding the Gaza and Aqaba areas, a powerful bipartisan political coalition responded to the presidential appeal to the nation by moving to oppose any attempt to invoke sanctions. The greatest avalanche of pressures from every segment of organized public opinion was mounted. Sympathizers of Israel contended that if the United Nations did not choose to invoke sanctions against the Soviet Union for the aggression against Hungary (and thereby run the risk of war between the West and the Soviet Union), there should be no move against the small state of Israel. This argument demanded the acceptance of a new proverb that two wrongs make a right. There could have been no stronger demonstration of the unique position enjoyed by Israel in America than this rebuff, buttressed only by such logic, to a President who enjoyed the immense popularity of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In their testimony at the hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine before the Senate Joint Committee, several witnesses, including former Ambassador Jefferson Caffery and Ambassador Henry A. Byroade, presented impressions of President Nasser quite at variance with those usually expressed publicly that the Egyptian leader is a Communist puppet or an ally of

the Kremlin because he bought arms from Czechoslovakia. (This popular line of reasoning was, incidentally, never applied to Israel after her purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia.) The views of experienced diplomats must be added to the almost unanimous opinion of varied personalities, ranging from "conservative" General James Van Fleet to "liberal" Senator Theodore Green, who, after they had interviewed the Egyptian leader, attested to his sincerity and stated their belief that he had turned to the Soviet Union for military aid because he needed arms for defensive purposes and could get them nowhere else.

Whether Nasser is an enslaver or liberator is certainly more of a moot question than has heretofore been admitted. It is very possible that the popular conception of Nasser as being in the bag for the Soviet Union can in fact force him to become a Communist tool or even destroy him. In either case, a real Communist dictator, first in Egypt and then in the rest of the Middle East, could result.

While I was flying from Beirut to Cairo in January 1957, a former Prime Minister of Lebanon told me: "What we Arabs need most from the United States is moral aid." This is what the Soviet Union has been giving the Arab world. If the Arab nations go behind the Iron Curtain, it will not be a result of external aggression. It will occur simply because the Arabs are more willing to trust their aspirations for justice and hopes for the future in Soviet than in American hands.

The abysmal failure to alleviate the plight of the Arab refugees will continue to haunt the West. This, as Vice President Richard Nixon noted upon his return from his African tour, lies at the core of all Middle East trouble.

There is a possible solution which I feel is worth exploring. I am convinced that many of the same Americans who were once absorbed in discovering "What Makes Sammie Run"

want to know what makes Nasser "tick," would like to understand this thing called Arab nationalism.

The first edition of this book was published in the late Spring of 1957 during the post-Suez War period. Then, in the wake of American troop landings in Lebanon and the emergency summer meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, the material had been brought precisely up-to-date by the addition of a new chapter carrying events through the end of August 1958. This is a revision of the new edition.

These recent happenings have sustained the validity and importance of what this book has to say. As history has moved the Middle East out of the shadows to the center of the world stage, American interest in the area and its problems has awakened. Serious minded persons of all creeds are insisting that the towering wall of ignorance and emotionalism which has surrounded the subject of Arabs, Israelis and oil be torn away.

I hope this new edition will be the answer to some of the newly aroused curiosity. In the process of considering a solution to our Middle East ills, my readers are asked to display what William Ellery Channing once defined as the free mind:

I call that mind free which jealously guards its intellectual rights and powers, which calls no man master, which does not content itself with a passive or hereditary faith, which opens itself to light whencesoever it may come, and which receives new truth as an angel from heaven.

ALFRED M. LILIENTHAL

New York, May 1, 1960

There Goes The Middle East

Israel Is Created

IN 1917, a hard pressed British government issued the Balfour Declaration as a war measure against the Central Powers. This was a conditional grant to establish a Jewish "homeland" in Palestine without disturbing either the political or economic rights of the existing Arab communities. In the years that followed, these limitations were whittled away.

The Jewish population in the Holy Land, less than 50,000 at the turn of the century, increased rapidly with the advent of Adolf Hitler and threatened the land's absorptive capacity, the yardstick for immigration laid down by Britain. The ensuing three-way conflict between the uncompromising Jewish nationalists who demanded a state, the Arab nationalists who insisted on self-determination, and the Mandatory Administration, led to illegal immigration, violence, and sabotage. The British were caught between the fire of the two conflicting nationalisms.

By the spring of 1947, the British had decided to place the

Palestine controversy before the United Nations. A special session of the General Assembly was convened and an investigating committee sent to the troubled area. Four months later a majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended partition of Palestine into separate Israeli and Arab states. The ensuing struggle at Lake Success was featured by an unprecedented U.S.-U.S.S.R. partnership favoring partition and by unparalleled pressures exerted by World Zionism.

The final vote on the partition resolution was scheduled for November 26, 1947, at a night session. But after the Zionists had ascertained that they lacked positive assurance of the two-thirds vote required for a resolution of the General Assembly, the night session was canceled and the balloting called off by a three-vote margin. November 27 was Thanksgiving Day, and the delay thus provided forty-eight additional hours in which to lobby. While Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade marched down New York's Great White Way, the United Nations quarters resembled the smoke-filled rooms of the most hectic National Party Convention. As a leading Zionist later wrote: "Every clue was meticulously checked and pursued. Not the smallest or the remotest of nations, but was contacted and wooed. Nothing was left to chance."¹

General Carlos Romulo announced that the Philippine delegation had finally received instructions and their decision was to vote against partition. In one of the most effective speeches against the partition resolution the General passionately defended the

inviolable primordial rights of a people to determine their political future and to preserve the territorial integrity of their native land. . . . We cannot believe that the United Nations would sanction a solution to the problem of Palestine that would turn us back

¹ Emanuel Neumann in *American Zionist*, Feb. 5, 1953.

on the road to the dangerous principles of racial exclusiveness and to the archaic documents of theocratic governments. . . . The problem of the displaced European Jews is susceptible of a solution other than through the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.²

To compound the consternation, Haiti's representative, Antonio Vieux, told the General Assembly: "The principle of sovereignty of states, which is a particular means of defense for small nations, was in opposition to the adoption of the special Committee's plan," and that Haiti, therefore, would vote in the negative. But Haiti, like the Philippines, proved to be not impervious to American influence.

While the American people were enjoying their turkey dinners, the Siamese Embassy in Washington received word that the credentials of the delegate who had voted against partition in the Ad Hoc Committee had been canceled. New credentials would not be forthcoming in time. Siam's negative vote was thus simply invalidated in this "but-for-the-loss-of-a-shoe" story.

The anti-partitionists could count, even after the magic disappearance of Siam, on fifteen or sixteen negative votes; and these would have necessitated the mobilization of thirty or thirty-two votes *for* partition. At this critical moment the partition forces enlisted countries that had previously abstained: Belgium, the Netherlands and New Zealand announced they would vote a reluctant yes. Luxembourg was swaying in the same direction. The ever-absent Paraguay was still in no one's corner, but her delegate was being closeted with Zionist supporters.

Bernard Baruch was prevailed upon to talk to the French—who could not afford to lose interim Marshall Plan Aid. Other important Americans "talked" to various countries, such as Haiti, Ethiopia, the Philippines, Paraguay, and Luxem-

² Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, II, 1314-1315.

bourg, all dependent economically to one degree or another on the United States. Drew Pearson, no foe of Zionists, told in his "Merry-Go-Round" column how Adolph Berle, legal adviser to the Haitian government, "talked" on the phone to Haiti's President, and how Harvey Firestone "talked" with the government of Liberia, where he owned vast rubber plantations.

In discussing the partition vote at a Cabinet luncheon on December 1, 1947, Robert Lovett said that "never in his life had he been subjected to as much pressure as he had in three days beginning Thursday morning and ending Saturday night." Herbert Bayard Swope and Robert Nathan were amongst those who had importuned him.³ The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, according to Lovett, made use of its concession in Liberia and had transmitted "a message to their representative there, directing him to bring pressure on the Liberian government to vote in favor of partition." Lovett remarked that Jewish zeal was so intense that it "almost resulted in defeating the objectives" sought.

No pressure was sadder, or more cynical, than that put on the Philippines. General Romulo sailed on the *Queen Elizabeth* within hours after delivering his fiery speech against partition. Ambassador Elizalde had spoken by telephone to President Roxas and told him of the many pressures to which Romulo and the delegation had been subjected. While the Ambassador believed that partition was not wise, he felt that it would be foolish to vote against a policy so ardently desired by the U.S. Administration at a time when seven bills important to the Islands were pending in the U.S. Congress. The Ambassador and President Roxas agreed (this was all subsequently reported in a cable from the American Ambassador in Manila to the State Department) that support could be gained easily by voting properly on Palestine.

³ *Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking Press, 1950), pp. 346-347.

Twenty-six pro-Zionist Senators joined in a telegram drafted by New York's Robert F. Wagner. That telegram, sent to the Philippine and to twelve other UN delegations, changed five votes to yes, and seven votes from no to abstention. Thus the forces favoring the establishment of a sovereign, independent State of Israel were not denied. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations voted to recommend the partition of the Holy Land into an Arab and a "Jewish" State.

Partition would never have carried the United Nations had it not been for the human factor. With the end of World War II, the plight of displaced persons was pitiable. It was simple for the outside world, for humanitarian-minded Christians and Jews alike, to embrace an apparent solution of two problems—that of finding a home for the refugees who had escaped Hitler and that of the form of government Palestine was to assume. It was equally simple for Christian nations and Christian leaders to view the creation of Israel as full expiation for past sins committed against Jewry. This picture fitted perfectly into the plans of the American politician who positively knew he had no Arab vote with which to contend but had been made very aware of a so-called Jewish vote by the articulate Zionist lobby.

In his memoirs⁴ Mr. Truman refers at great length to his detailed participation in the Palestine question. Within two weeks after he assumed office a lengthy memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew "briefed" the new President on the Palestine issues:

Although President Roosevelt at times gave expression to views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave certain assurances to the Arabs, which they regard as definite commitments on our part. On a number of occasions within the past few years, he authorized the Department to assure the heads of the different

⁴ *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1955).

Near East Governments in his behalf that "in the view of this Government there should be no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews." In his meeting with King Ibn Saud (of Saudi Arabia) early this year, moreover, Mr. Roosevelt promised the King that as regards Palestine he would make no move hostile to the Arab people and would not assist the Jews as against the Arabs.⁵

The State Department memorandum to President Truman continued with this pointed observation as to the consequences which would result from the establishment of a Jewish state:

The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism, and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country. We know that President Roosevelt understood this clearly, for as recently as March 3, after his trip to the Near East, he told an officer of the department that, in his opinion, a Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force.

In the face of the unmistakable views of his predecessor and of the clear warnings of the Department of State, President Truman nevertheless proceeded to lend his step-by-step support to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. He inched the Zionists closer to their goal by purposeful confusion of the problem of refugeeism with statehood. And as the record reveals, it was votes that above all motivated the actions of Mr. Truman and the Democratic administration. Ernest K. Lindley stated in the *Washington Post*: "Domestic politics rather than a considered analysis of the interests of the United

⁵ The personal attitude of President Roosevelt against Zionist statehood, never clearly expressed publicly, earned for him posthumously the epithet of anti-Semite at the hands of Ben Hecht in his autobiography, *Child of the Century*.

States has been the predominating factor in our policy concerning Palestine. The national platform planks of both major parties had continually attempted to out-bid each other for the so-called Jewish Vote.”

When a group of diplomats, called home in 1946 to report to the State Department, told the President of the deteriorating American position in the Middle East, he replied, “I’m sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.”⁶

The twelve-man Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry had been established by the United States and Britain in December 1945 to study the Palestine situation. Among their findings was the recommendation that 100,000 certificates be issued for immigration into Palestine and that Jerusalem be internationalized, but that Palestine should be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. Although this report was presented to the President on April 22, he chose to wait until the middle of the 1946 Congressional campaign to issue a call to the British for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. The House statement, which omitted all reference to any of the Committee of Inquiry’s other findings, including the negation of statehood, was made on October 4, 1946, which, to quote the Truman memoirs, “happened to have been the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.” Mr. Truman’s own explanation for this particular timing speaks for itself:

Presidents have often made statements on this holiday, so the timing was nothing unusual, and what I had said was simply a re-statement of my position. A few days later, Governor Dewey said that several hundred thousand should be admitted, and Bevin now told the British House of Commons that I had made my statement to forestall Dewey’s—in other words, I had taken my position for political reasons only.

⁶ William A. Eddy, *FDR Meets Ibn Saud* (New York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954), p. 37.

All the characteristic Truman venom, which was vented on the British Foreign Secretary as it once had been on a now famous Washington music critic, could not hide the fact that this bartering for votes by the leaders of both major parties had scuttled the "last chance" efforts of the Foreign Office to bring about a compromise.

The diaries of Mr. Truman's Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, shed considerable light on the motivations of officialdom in supporting the Zionist cause. Forrestal carried on a determined campaign to get both major parties to lift the Palestine question out of the domestic political scene. But he received little encouragement from Republican leaders; a warning came from Baruch that close identification with the anti-Zionist position was exposing Forrestal to the charge of anti-Semitism and the distrust of his own party.

J. Howard McGrath, then Democratic National Chairman, countered Mr. Forrestal's bi-partisan approach by pointing out that a national election for which financial support had to be gained was near. McGrath, it is reported,

insisted that, furthermore, there were two or three pivotal states which could not be carried without the support of the people who were deeply interested in the Palestine question, some of whom felt that the United States was not doing all it should "to solicit the votes in the U.N. General Assembly for partition." . . . McGrath would not understand Forrestal's reasoning that he "would rather lose those states than run the risks which he felt would ensue from that kind of handling of the Palestine question" (and that) "no group in this country should be permitted to influence our policy to the point where it could endanger our national security."⁷

Certain political facts lent credence to the unchallenged myth of the Jewish vote which blocked Forrestal's efforts. American Jews were concentrated in New York, Chicago,

⁷ *Forrestal Diaries*, pp. 344-345.

Philadelphia and Los Angeles. Though the Jews constituted but three percent of the nation, they made up twenty percent of the population in these four cities located in four pivotal industrial states believed to be vital to the election of a President. Forty-two percent lived in New York City alone, and the Empire State with its 45 electoral votes remained the prime target in every national election. The four states possessed 136 out of a total of 531 electoral votes. The Electoral College system of choosing the chief executive made possible the strong bargaining position of the Zionist minority.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., then Congressman from New York, informed the Secretary of Defense that it was impossible to get the two parties to agree not to press this issue, and the Democratic party would be bound to lose and the Republican Party gain by such an agreement. Forrestal's significant answer was, "I think it is about time that somebody should pay some consideration to whether we might not lose the United States!"⁸

Time has borne out the prophecy of the perspicacious first Secretary of Defense. Because Forrestal failed to achieve his goal, nine years later the foreign policy of his country was still being haunted by callous bartering for votes on the Arab-Israeli controversy.

During the spring of 1948 the United Nations, under American advice, hesitated to move ahead with the partition plan. Reports of the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency warned the Defense Department that the Palestine turmoil resulting from the vote of the United Nations acutely endangered the interests of the United States. An alternative scheme, trusteeship for Palestine, was announced in March, but this formula quickly withered under political pressures exerted on the President, his cabinet, and Congress.

The man from Independence is himself number one witness to the tremendous Zionist coercion.

⁸ *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 364.

The Jewish pressure on the White House did not diminish in the days following the partition vote in the U.N. Individuals and groups asked me, usually in rather quarrelsome and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this, that and the other. I think I can say that I kept my faith in the rightness of my policy in spite of some of the Jews!

As the pressure mounted, President Truman gave strict orders not "to be approached by any more spokesmen for the extreme Zionist cause," and he refused Dr. Chaim Weizmann an interview. It was only at the intervention of the President's old friend and former haberdashery partner, Eddie Jacobson, that Mr. Truman was persuaded to see the man who was to become Israel's first President. Truman told Jacobson that he would rather not talk about Palestine; that he wanted, as he put it, "to let the matter run its course in the United Nations." But Jacobson was not to be put off so easily. Playing up to the President's vanity, he overcame Mr. Truman's objections and won an appointment for Dr. Weizmann. The Zionist leader saw the President on March 18 for almost three-quarters of an hour. From that moment on, the establishment of a state of Israel was assured.

By Mr. Truman's own confession, his advisers, both military and diplomatic, were opposed to his views on Palestine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff kept reminding the Chief Executive about "the danger that the Arabs, antagonized by Western action in Palestine, would make peace with the Russians . . . who would be ready to welcome the Arabs into their camp." Mr. Truman shrugged off the advice of the military planners as being weighed solely "in the light of military considerations."

The dissenting opinions of his State Department specialists, who "were, almost without exception, unfriendly to the idea of a Jewish State," were written off by a different device: "Like

most of the British diplomats,” noted the President, “some of our diplomats thought that the Arabs should be appeased. I am sorry to say that there were some who were also inclined to be anti-Semitic.”

The over-reliance of the supine politician on the Jewish vote was matched only by Zionist under-estimation of the intensity of Arab feelings toward Palestine.

Upon her return in 1944 from Palestine, Erika Mann, Thomas Mann’s daughter, described in an article a conversation with Moshe Sharett, later Prime Minister of Israel. When Miss Mann raised the possibilities of a compromise, he said, “This is no matter for bargaining, this is a matter of life and death for our people. The absorptive capacity of this country is far from exhausted. Just how many Palestine will be able to absorb I could not say, perhaps two million, perhaps four.”

“But the Arabs,” Miss Mann ventured. “Indeed,” he said, “the Arabs keep fighting against the very nature of things. None of their rights have been injured. We have been trying not without success to teach them how to run their own business effectively and to the benefit of the whole. So what are they afraid of?”

To which Miss Mann’s answer was: “They are afraid of your nationalism.”

There were those who foresaw the consequences of building a state in the interstices of a populated land and of subordinating existing Arab communities completely to the needs of this expanding state. Jewish advocates of moderation, like Dr. Judah Magnes, President of the Hebrew University, warned against any action toward establishing a state without prior Arab consent.

In a broadcast to Zionists in Europe, Professor Albert Einstein said:

It is important to reach an understanding with the Arabs: to do this is the responsibility—not of the Arabs, not of the British, but

of the Jews. And to reach such understanding is not less important than the founding of new institutions in Palestine.

The more national-minded members of the Jewish Agency, who were certainly not unaware of the mental and psychological processes of their Arab neighbors, blatantly disregarded this advice.

The Zionists made known that they were preparing to proclaim an independent state on May 15 close upon the departure of British High Commissioner General Sir Alan Cunningham. Two days before the end of the Mandate, Dr. Weizmann wrote a personal letter to President Truman suggesting that the United States "promptly recognize the Provisional Government of the new Jewish State."

Although Mr. Truman admitted that "partition was not taking place in exactly the peaceful manner that I had hoped," he "decided to move at once and give American recognition to the new nation." The President feared, as his memoirs indicate, "that some of the State Department 'experts' would want to block recognition of a Jewish state. . . ." To circumvent any such obstruction, eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed a state, Charlie Ross, the President's press secretary, informed correspondents of the *de facto* recognition. Some moments later at Lake Success an embarrassed U.S. Deputy Representative was made aware of this precipitate action only when he read the news on a clipped off portion of a press ticker tape handed to him on the floor of the General Assembly.

The Israelis had thus succeeded on May 15, 1948, in setting up an independent state in Palestine, in territory which had not been "Jewish" for 2000 years. Events since have proven how hopelessly wrong Mr. Truman was in his opinion that the partition plan "could open the way for peaceful collaboration between the Arabs and the Jews." The Middle East struggle between the Arab states and Israel continues unabated.

And, to her regret, each day the United States is sadly learning the full import of the words of Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, when he pleaded in the 1947 United Nations debate: "Remember that you may need friends, tomorrow, that you may need allies in the Middle East. I beg of you not to ruin and blast your credit in those lands."

II

A Mecca for Communism

MIDDLE EAST FALLS TO REDS — ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL GO BEHIND IRON CURTAIN.

So may read tomorrow's headlines.

The Middle East, located at the juncture of Europe, Asia and Africa, has been the historic crossroad of invading armies of the past. Here live the forty-two million Arabs of eight young nations, all intimately related to nationalistically minded brethren in North Africa and to Islamic populations elsewhere.

No all-weather, all-year-round air route between the western and eastern worlds can be plotted without crossing the Middle East. Vital Soviet industries are within easy bombing range of air bases at Habbaniya and Shu'aiba in Iraq, at Dhahran and Bahrain on the Persian Gulf, and at Heliopolis near Cairo. The region contains the largest crude oil reserves in the world.

In testifying before a Congressional Committee, the Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, bluntly stated:

The importance of the Middle East to the free world can hardly be overestimated militarily and economically. First, its huge oil reserves now supply most of the wants of Europe, and their loss would be disastrous. Secondly, its geographic location is astride the lines of communication between West and East, and, thirdly, it is only in this area that the Soviets have no buffer states.

The Kremlin has always had its long range sights on these Middle East stakes: teeming millions, strategic approaches to three continents, and the world's largest oil bank. In the past, expansion toward the warm water ports of the Mediterranean and of the Persian Gulf was always the ambition of Peter the Great, Catherine II, and their successors.

In the 1940 agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Molotov won from von Ribbentrop the assignment to the U.S.S.R. of a sphere of influence "south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf, as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." Such early Soviet moves in the cold war as the demand for bases in the Dardanelles and the civil war in Greece, had the same objectives.

The Russians look enviously southward if only for that indispensable military resource—oil—which the West now controls and Moscow covets for military power. U.S. oil reserves are calculated at under 30 billion barrels, while the Middle East reserves are said to be more than 125 billion barrels. The McKinney Report on peaceful uses of atomic energy, issued late in 1955, adds further emphasis to the importance of oil in that area to the free world by revealing that as much as 75% of the proved reserves of the entire non-Soviet world are in the Middle East.

In the independent sheikhdom of Kuwait on the Persian Gulf, the gigantic Burgan fields contain wells with an average

1955 yield of 6200 barrels daily, compared to 13 barrels in the United States. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each have larger reserves than the States. While world oil production was increasing three and one-half times, the crude production of the Middle East was multiplying 22 times.

And while Russian and satellite daily production is estimated to be in the neighborhood of one million and a quarter barrels, better than three million barrels per day are produced in the Arab-Moslem lands. Not only can this oil help feed the Russian war machine in any military venture against Western Europe, but at the very least the neutralization of this tremendous resource inevitably becomes a Russian goal. In 1938, only 25% of the military and industrial petroleum needs of Western Europe came from the Middle East, but today the oil-laden Arab fields supply more than 90% of these wants! Without access to the Arab world, the European Defense Community, which the United States has labored so arduously to erect, would be toothless, NATO impotent.

Soviet penetration of the Middle East would give the Kremlin its long sought Mediterranean outlet, and North Africa would be opened to Communist penetration. The United States build-up of Greece and Turkey would then be outflanked and the position of the West untenable. Once again North Africa might become the jumping-off ground for an invasion into the heart of Europe.

Eruptive Morocco contains the American naval base at Port Lyautey, strategic U.S. air bases at Nouasseur, Sidi Slimane, Ben Guérir and Boulhaut, built at a cost of 372 million dollars. There are twenty million Arabs in Morocco and in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria. But the value of military bases surrounded by unfriendly, if not hostile, people becomes negligible.

The U.S. base at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia also figures heavily in the plans of the Strategic Air Command. The Soviet air challenge calls for our greater reliance on B-47's, which re-

quire overseas bases such as those at Keflavik in Iceland and at Dhahran. Baku, a major Soviet oil center on the Caspian Sea, is but 1000 flying miles from Dhahran. The loss of such bases, according to military experts, would seriously cripple the Strategic Air Command's striking power.

Soviet objectives in the Middle East have been to create a vacuum by forcing Western withdrawal from the area (and North Africa as well) and to sow discontent by encouraging unrest among the peoples of the area. The Soviet accorded speedy recognition to the independence of Syria and Lebanon in 1945 and gave support in the Security Council the following year to the withdrawal of French and British troops from the former mandated territories. And when the Egyptians brought their grievance against the British to the world organization in 1947, they too received Russian backing.

The Palestine question offered the Soviet Union the ideal opportunity. Only too gratefully the Russians joined the United States in supporting the 1947 UN partition resolution on Palestine, the first occasion on which the two countries had stood side by side to achieve an international verdict.

For the sake of creating discord, the Soviet Union was willing to risk the initial loss of prestige in the Arab world which was bound to result from her participation in the partitioning of Palestine. And in order to assure the continuance of the mischief brewed in the heart of the Arab world, the Soviet permitted the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia to supply planes and arms with which Israelis successfully defended the new state against the neighboring Arab states.

During the next several years, Israel, as much as the Arab world, became the Soviet target. The Russians straddled the Middle East fence, first encouraging one side and then the other. It seemed to be their hope that pro-Communist elements in Israel could be sufficiently exploited to capture that small state from within.

When Britain closed the doors of Palestine to further immigration, in accordance with the terms of the MacDonald White Paper in 1939, the Mandatory Power was forced to stop the smuggling of Jews into the Holy Land. Emigrés at first had come from France and Italy and then from Eastern Europe. Russia complicated affairs by encouraging Jewish refugees from satellite countries to depart for Israel from Black Sea ports. It was on these Eastern European Jews that Russia based her hopes for a quick victory in Israel.

With the creation of Israel, the legally operating Communist Party in that country stepped up its gait, and Communists were elected to the Knesset (Parliament). Party activity was assisted by the Israeli government's return of the property holdings of the Russian Orthodox Church to the Russian government.

But of even greater importance to the Soviets were the leftist Mapam laborites, at that time the third largest political party in Israel. Two members, in resigning in February (1952), had stated: "There is practically no field in which Mapam acts independently without the overt or covert partnership of the Communists."

Close contact was maintained at all times between the U.S.S.R. and Moshe Sneh, head of this Kremlin-oriented group. The combined presence of trained Iron Curtain émigrés, Communist members, Kibbutzim-minded socialists, and other extreme left-wing elements was expected to withstand any Israeli demands for orientation to the West and commit the state to the Kremlin.

But the Soviet soon came to realize that the Arab world with its lower standard of living offered easier pickings than an Israel propped up by a capitalist United States. And the Kremlin has always kept the Arab door ajar.

Even as he was casting the Soviet vote with Zionist supporters for the partition of Palestine in November of 1947, Andrei Gromyko, the Russian envoy to the United Nations,

was assuring the Arab representatives at Lake Success that the Soviet people

still entertain a feeling of sympathy for the national aspirations of the Arab East—the USSR is convinced that the Arab states will still, on more than one occasion, be looking toward Moscow expecting the USSR to help them in the struggle for their lawful interests in their effort to cast off the last vestiges of foreign dependence.

The Soviet Ambassador must have been looking into a crystal ball when he uttered these words. By 1952 the Arabs were indeed “looking toward Moscow.” The five votes of the Soviet bloc had just been instrumental in defeating the United Nations resolution, introduced by eight smaller powers and backed by the Big Three, which would have called on Israel and the Arab states to “sit down” and settle their differences. The Arab states opposed this proposal on the ground that past directives of the international organization concerning the status of Jerusalem, boundaries, and the rights of the Arab refugees must first be accepted by Israel before any further negotiations could be justified. Up to then they had all been ignored.

With this vote the assiduous diplomatic wooing of the new underdogs, the Arabs, began. At the same time, within Israel the Communist Party manifested a deeper concern for the rights of both the Arab refugees who had fled and the 160,000 Arabs who had remained behind.

The Kremlin was afforded continued opportunity by the UN forum to strengthen their position with the Arab states and the Asian-African peoples. Whenever the Moroccan and Tunisian questions came before the General Assembly, the Soviet bloc supported the North African nationalists against France and her Western supporters, including the United States. In the fall of 1955 Russian-controlled votes were a paramount factor in the narrow (28 to 27) victory which won

a place for the Algerian question on the agenda of the 10th General Assembly.

Since the Security Council was first seized with the problem at its 222nd meeting, 211 out of 755 meetings (through October 1, 1956) have been devoted to the Palestine question. On no problem has the UN proved a more singular failure. Pitiful efforts of the General Assembly resulted in barely keeping the Arab refugees alive without measurably alleviating their plight. All the international organizations had to show were nine successive years of Holy Land war and near war.

At the Security Council session on January 22 and March 29, 1954, it was the Soviet Union's vetoes, its 53rd and 58th, that defeated the U.S.-British-French resolution on the Israeli-Syrian dispute over the Jordan River hydro-electric project and prevented interference in the Egyptian-Israeli quarrel over Suez shipping. The Arab states had bitterly fought the Western solutions to these controversies and were now more deeply indebted to their neighbors to the north. In gratitude the Jordanian Parliament telegraphed a resolution of thanks to the Soviet UN representative.

When nine Jordanians were killed by an Israeli military raid on the village of Nahalin, the Security Council for the third time in three months took under consideration "Arab-Israeli tensions." The UN Mixed Armistice Commission, following an on-the-spot investigation, had condemned Israel as the aggressor. The U.S.-British-French agenda plan would have lumped the Jordanian complaint lodged five days earlier with an Israeli complaint against Jordan and would have discussed the whole question of border eruptions. Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese delegate on the Council, decried the Western approach as "a deliberate attempt to drown Nahalin." The West's alleged goal: to get at the roots of Arab-Israeli tensions. The Arab reaction to full-scale debate: "You cannot at the point of a gun force the Arabs to enter into a general debate or to sit down around the peace table." With Russian help, the

Arab position was upheld. During the four weeks of wrangling over procedure Andrei Vishinsky had adroitly used his role of presiding officer so as to lend all possible comfort to the Arabs in the face of the West's championing of Israel.

By managing at all times to keep the Middle East-North Africa cauldron boiling, the Soviet Union blocked all coordinated effort in that area. In this way the Soviet was helping to divide the non-Communist world by preventing the cooperative effort needed to overcome the economic backwardness on which communism thrives. And Arab and Israeli fears of one another continued to overshadow the real threat to the area.

The Kremlin uses any available political organism to implement its subversion, the extreme right as well as the extreme left. In Egypt, the Communists infiltrated the ultra-conservative Moslem Brotherhood, while in Iraq the Soviet had established its first diplomatic relations with the extreme right-wing World War II government of Rashid Ali al Gailani. By establishing diplomatic posts and by sending devout Moslems to work in Arab trade unions to organize intellectual committees, the U.S.S.R. enabled its representatives to mingle with Arab leaders and live with the people. Russian diplomats did not hesitate to frequent the cafés, where political movements are born, and to play *trictrac* with the Arab bourgeoisie. And as Moslem Communists made the pilgrimage to Mecca, they lauded freedom of religion in Russia and tried to show that communism was not incompatible with Islam.

Soviet agents everywhere began to stir up hatred between Arabs and Israelis, between Asians and Westerners, between Christians and Moslems. And the number of Russian subversives in the area and the means at their disposal were gradually increased.

In December 1951 it was reported that "Russian diplomats, technicians, and civilian employees have been streaming into

the Middle East.” Within a period of 40 days, a check of Rome’s Ciampino Airport, the main terminal between Europe and the Middle East, showed that more than 68 Russians, most of them carrying diplomatic passports, passed through.

The Soviet stepped up the infiltration of the Russian Orthodox Church, which owned schools, orphanages and churches both in Israel and in the Arab states. Volunteer “priests,” teachers, sextons, and gardeners—all gifted in extra-curricular activities ranging from pamphleteering to dynamiting—poured into the Middle East.

In an attempt to wrest control of the Jerusalem Patriarchate from the Greeks, Archimandrite Ignatius Polykarp, a trained graduate of the Soviet-controlled theological academy, was dispatched to Jerusalem with five able assistants. The efforts of the Russian Palestine Society in helping pilgrims and establishing hostels for them were also heightened.

The seething Arab political scene facilitated Kremlin strategy. Resurgent nationalism and communism became inseparable handmaidens, and their adherents became scarcely distinguishable from one another. A devoted core of doctrinaire Communists hung on to the coat tails of the nationalists.

Nationalism, a Western product of the 17th century, is a new phenomenon in Asia and Africa. Only within the last decade over 650 million people of these continents, one quarter of the world’s population, have gained their independence. Only in comparatively recent times have Egyptians referred to themselves as Egyptians rather than Moslems. The nationalist germ has spread westward from Egypt into Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

Other Arab states took up the cry for complete freedom. Syria and Lebanon, newly liberated from French mandatory rule, and Iraq and Jordan, restless under their British treaties, responded bitterly to the Palestinian defeat and to the presence in their midst of the million Arab refugees. Their pent-up frustrations and deep humiliation at defeat found a ready

outlet in support of heightened rebellion on the French North African front. Successive Paris governments were finding that their efforts to compromise were "too little and too late."

On the May morning in 1953 when Secretary Dulles arrived in Beirut, the Lebanese people awoke to find walls and buildings smeared with crimson-painted admonitions: "Go home, dog of Wall Street," and "Down with the United States." At the time the Secretary was preparing to leave Damascus in neighboring Syria, a mass protest meeting was held in Beirut's main square. Foreigners, like this writer, were warned by hotel concierges to deposit their valuables for safekeeping, to stay in the hotel, and if they had to go out, to speak only French on the streets. Mr. Dulles was not permitted to visit the campus of the American University of Beirut, one of the leading American educational institutions abroad, for fear that his presence might touch off a demonstration by students.

Communists and nationalists together had succeeded in stirring up this Middle East center of academic intellectualism. As happens so often the extreme left and the extreme right had buried their ideological differences in a common hatred and in joint action. "Spite" communism was an accommodating outlet for frustrated nationalism. It was, for example, impossible to ascertain whether the eggs thrown at the Secretary's car in Cairo were directed by "down with the West" Communists or "Egypt for Egyptians" nationalists.

One needed to be only momentarily in the Arab states to encounter the widespread conviction that the people's enemy was not Russian communism, but Western imperialism. As Professor Nabih Faris, a student of this area, pointed out: "The Arabs hate foreigners, not because foreigners are foreigners or because they are Moslems, but because of their bitter experiences with those foreigners and because of their fear of them."

What Carlos Romulo has described in his book *Crusade*

in Asia as the Asian attitude toward the United States, holds true for the Arab:

He has been taught by communist propaganda to bracket the Americans with all the white overlords he has hated so bitterly and so long. Now he is no longer helpless; he thinks this is his chance to affiliate with a great and growing power, the Soviet Union, which has pledged itself to drive colonial imperialism out of Asia. He blinds himself to the communist danger in order that he may have his revenge against the hated European Imperialism.

People will fight for freedom when they have a stake in that freedom . . . to get closer to the heart of Asia, America must use its own heart more. The people of Asia will respond with understanding and sympathy to the freedom-loving, the generous hearted, the deeply humane America. . . . On the other hand, nothing will more surely repel them than an America that carelessly allows its escutcheon to be blemished by the sins of its European allies.

The Soviet Union has had no territorial holdings in the Middle East, has no record of "oil imperialism" and has astutely avoided public interference in the area. As a Syrian delegate to the UN, Ahmed Shukairy, told the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee in December 1955: "The Soviet Union has not a single military base in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has not affronted one single citizen of the Middle East." With clean hands, therefore, Russians could and did lead the cry: "Out with the colonialists and imperialists."

While Russia was emerging as the champion of the Middle East, the United States began to be viewed as the ally of the established empire builders, Britain and France. Antipathy toward the United States increased with the continuous American support given to the Zionist cause. And Israel came to be regarded as the imperialist arm of the United States in the Middle East.

Prominent Arabs have had the dangers of world communism vividly described to them by Americans in their con-

fidence. Their reply invariably has been: "The only Communist danger lies in the minds of the British and the Americans."

In 1942 Winston Churchill stated that Britain would ally herself with the Devil to survive. In their struggle to survive, the Arabs have indicated that they too are prepared to ally themselves with the same Churchillian Devil, the U.S.S.R. This same attitude receives encouragement from an old Arabic aphorism: "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Bitter hatred of the Western Powers has been whipped to such a frenzy that the Arabs are leaving the back door wide open to Communist penetration. Skillful agents have had no difficulty in making fellow travelers out of many of the hungry and the discontented in the Middle East.

The actual strength of the Communist Party in the Middle East is unknown, for the Party has been outlawed in the Arab countries and the various cells are operating underground. From time to time they have come to the surface under high-sounding titles such as "Committee of National Liberation." Russia used Lebanon as its center for activity in the Arab East, while from Egypt she worked on North Africa. However, under the Egyptian revolution things became too hot, and the Egyptian center had to be moved to Ethiopia, where the Party can now work without undue trouble.

A United States government study made public in May 1954 estimated that there were 50,000 members of the Communist Party in the Middle East countries. Their activity was increasing and might pose long-run dangers, admitted the U.S. Information Service. Communist representatives from Arab countries and from Israel attended various international party conferences abroad, receiving free trips to the Soviet Union and satellite nations. The Communists hold six seats in the Israeli Knesset as this is written.

In Nazareth, Israel's Arab town of 20,000 where Jesus grew up, the Party won 34% of the vote in 1951, although a majority of the population here is Christian. The Greek Orthodox

Church then launched a vigorous campaign among its members against communism. But in the municipal elections held three years later, the Communists won more than 38% of the vote and captured six out of fifteen Council seats, even though the town was under the control of a military governor.

A detailed plan for Communist infiltration in French Morocco, endangering the new French-American air bases, was exposed in 1953. And the Communists almost succeeded in pulling off a coup in Syria behind Populist Premier Marouf Dawalibi, but Colonel Adib Shishakly moved swiftly into the picture and arrested the pro-Russian leader with his cabinet.

Communist inroads are facilitated by the small cost of agents and the speed with which they take advantage of any opening. For example, a Lebanese school was looking for a basketball coach, but could pay only a part-time salary. The Russian government at once offered to supply a coach. The salary offered was of course supplemented by the Party.

The Soviet Union operates an effective full-time radio station in the Arabic language. This station is continuously beamed to the area and is heard by tens of thousands of Arabs, many of whom have no movies, no television, and no reading matter. For these simple people, the sole amusement may be to listen to the radio. In the hands of the Communists this has become a tremendous weapon in the Middle East. I remember driving at night from Beirut to Damascus and listening to the car radio. The only station that came in strong and clear was the Communist one, which drowned out the weak tones of the Voice of America's moving ship transmitter in the Mediterranean.

Communist strategy seizes upon every kernel of dissension, whether it be Kurd irredentism or Armenian nationalism. The infinite number of small religious and ethnic groupings, which under Turkish suzerainty were individually protected, has afforded an ideal background for trained agents in this region.

The hand of communism usually manifests itself subtly,

often starting with the simplest street demonstration directed against either a foreign country or the government in power. The Cairo uprising of January 26, 1952, which ousted the Wafd Party and paved the way for General Mohammed Naguib and the Revolutionary Council, gave clear indications that Communists were moving among, if not directing, the demonstrators as they pillaged the city. Later the new army leadership had continually to keep their eyes on the underground Communist cells, even as they expunged corruption and checked the more rabid nationalists. A week after the public eruption of the dispute between Naguib and Nasser in the winter of 1954, Egyptian security authorities claimed they had smashed the biggest Red organization in the country, seizing "seven printing presses together with enough subversive literature to fill four storerooms."

The death of Ibn Saud, Saudi Arabia's strong old King, in November 1953 at first brought an element of uncertainty to the land laden with American-leased oil. Labor difficulties, fomented during the last lengthy illness of the King, bore the familiar red imprint.

General Adib Shishakly, the strong man in Syria, who had most impressed Secretary Dulles on his Middle East tour, himself became the victim of an army uprising. The two-year rule of Shishakly was brought to an end in February 1954, and former President Hashem Atassi, 89 years old, was restored temporarily as chief of state. As control of Syria changed hands, the Communists were very much in evidence.

During the November 1952 anti-American riots in Iraq, in which the United States Information Service building was burned, demonstrators came out from the side streets at a given signal and joined the student parade. Most of those apprehended by the Iraqi government proved to come from next-door Iran, where the strong Tudeh Communist movement operated.

In Iran the Communist puppet government in the frontier

province of Azerbaijan had offered the Soviet Union an unusual opportunity in 1946, but the Shah's strong initiative checked the Russians. He threw out the Communist clique and jailed the leaders of the extreme left-wing Tudeh Party. The 1950 Russian-Iranian reconciliation, the escape from prison of the Tudeh leaders, the rise of extreme nationalists demanding oil nationalization, the obstructions to Prime Minister Ali Razmara's social reforms, and the assassinations of this pro-West Prime Minister and the Minister of Education—all led straight to the Mossadegh regime. The British were gradually squeezed out, as instability and chaos became rampant. The Tudeh Party, under Communist tutelage, was gradually given increased responsibility.

Mossadegh's course between defying the West and embracing the Russians was becoming perilous as Iran inched toward Soviet control. An August day in 1953 saw the Shah fleeing for safety to Rome. The next day he was back, disaster narrowly averted only because the Tudeh Party once again was not strong enough to assume power. But the government of General Fazollah Zahedi, even with an immediate economic grant from the United States, was by no means out of the woods, either politically or economically. The road to rapprochement with Britain proved to be a bumpy one. The grim, fanatical leader, Ayatullah Kashani, former speaker of the Majlis (lower chamber of the Parliament), wielded great influence, and the Teheran headquarters of the Moslem Brotherhood became infested with communism.

Students have long been a disruptive factor in Middle East politics, and the clever Communist agent has made a specialty of playing up to the volatile youngsters. Even high school boys have been known to start disturbances leading to the overthrow of governments and to the creation of new ones. When the Naguib government replaced the corrupt Farouk regime, well-written pamphlets appeared in the secondary schools bluntly querying: "Why don't we become Communists?" Stu-

dents were arrested in Alexandria distributing leaflets of obvious origin calling for a coup d'état.

Leftist students at the University of Teheran staged anti-British demonstrations during the Anglo-Iranian struggle. Persons entering the University were forced to don black neckties and to wear black armbands as a sign of mourning for the resumption of Iranian diplomatic relations with Britain. The pre-Christmas 1955 disturbances which rocked Jordan and forced three successive cabinet turnovers were started by students encouraged by Communists. Throughout the area Communist contacts have successfully spread their venom among young people—intellectuals and workers as well as youth societies, trade unions and faculties.

The key to Communist success in the Middle East consists in their secretive tactics and their ability to operate with small forces. Since they sow their revolutionary seed in the minds of the hungry and discontented, nowhere have they more fertile soil than among the nearly one million displaced and impoverished Arab refugees.

Many of these homeless Arabs have passed their ninth winter crowded together in tents and huts of refugee camps. Mass camp life is the ideal climate for Communist indoctrination. The idle Arab with no incentive and little hope is conveniently exposed to the "happy talk" of the small core of Communists. Nine years of so little to do but bitterly and morbidly brood about their plight has destroyed morale. A debilitating despair, strongest amongst the youngest, has been driving even the most devout of Islam's children to overlook the precepts of their religion. Though affirmative Communist ideology was rare, reiterated references to "western imperialism" and "big power colonialism" served the same purpose. Along with a deep resentment against United Nations charity and weak Arab leadership, an intense hatred of the West has been bred.

These displaced Palestinians are providing the Kremlin with the "open sesame" to the Middle East.

The Displaced Arabs

THE plight of the Arab refugees lies at the flaming core of Middle East turmoil. For every Jewish immigrant that has gone into Israel, there has been one displaced Arab. Should hot war come to the area again, the failure to find a solution, after nine years, for the problem of these one million displaced Arabs from Palestine will have been responsible for the conflict.

These Arabs left their homes for a variety of reasons before and after the state of Israel came into being on May 15, 1948. Some left at the bidding of their leaders. The Arab Higher Committee in broadcasts suggested that a temporary departure would ease the operations of the Arab Army of Liberation, and then they could return triumphantly as the vanguard of the victorious forces.¹

¹ According to the Israeli government, the Palestinian Arabs were asked to leave by Arab leaders to "clear the villages and the adjacent roads for the advance of Arab armies . . . to bring home to the Arab peoples of the neighboring countries the reality of war in Palestine and to enlist their support in its prosecution." *The Arab Refugees* (Jerusalem: Israeli government 1953), pp. 9-12.

Other Palestinians were besieged in such cities as Jaffa and Haifa and were forced to flee under the intensive mortar bombardment of the advancing Israelis. There were still others who fled in stark terror inspired by the Deir Yassin massacre of 250 Arab men, women and children on April 9 at the hands of the Irgun Zvei Leumi. In his book, *The Revolt*, Menachem Begin, who commanded this irregular terrorist Israeli army, boasted that the subsequent wild tales of Irgun butchering, spread from Arab to Arab, had resulted in the "maddened uncontrollable stampede of 635,000 Arabs . . . the political and economic significance of this development can hardly be over-estimated."² Wholesale destruction of Arab villages by the official Israeli army had taken place early in the 1948 fighting. The Arab flight began on a small scale, 30,000 of the well-to-do leaving in the early phases. Deir Yassin further speeded Arab flight—so that by mid-May, when the partition plan came into effect, there were already 200,000 refugees. "The enemy propaganda was designed to besmirch our name," wrote Begin. "In the result, it helped us. Panic overwhelmed the Arabs of Eretz Israel."

Begin, who is at present the leader of Herut, the second most powerful political party in Israel's Parliament, continued:

Kolonia Village, which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated overnight and fell without further fighting. Beit-Iksa was also evacuated. These two places overlooked the main road; and their fall, together with the capture of Kastel by the Haganah, made it possible to keep open the road to Jerusalem. In the rest of the country, too, the Arabs began to flee in terror, even before they clashed with Jewish forces. All the Jewish forces proceeded to advance through Haifa like a knife through butter. The Arabs began fleeing in panic, shouting "Deir Yassin." Not one person of 14,000 people was left in Safad in northern

² *The Revolt: Story of the Irgun* (New York: Henry Schumann, 1951).

Palestine, for example, six hours after the exodus commenced.

Channing B. Richardson, former administrator of the UN refugee camps at Gaza, commented:

Confusion become compounded as rumors filled the villages. It was said that one must leave home and go to welcome the invading Arab armies. . . . It was stated that the British would give no protection. It was said that one should remain calmly at home. To the average Palestinian Arab all this fear and confusion was too much. He fled. . . .³

Pro-Zionist sources corroborated the impact of the Deir Yassin massacre. Hal Lehrman wrote in *Commentary* magazine:

Native fear of more Deir Yassins must be added to all the other reasons for the mad flight of the Arab people. I am shaken by the expressions of grief and shame that I have privately received from non-political but prominent Israelis, whose personal integrity is beyond question. The Israeli soldier has looted, burned and slaughtered, I have been told, and it is no comfort for us that soldiers of every other army do likewise. It is even hinted that certain officers actually ordered their troops to let themselves go. . . .⁴

An American missionary, Mrs. Bertha Spofford Vester, who has spent her entire life in Jerusalem, reported in her book⁵ that jeeps with loudspeakers poured out this warning in Jerusalem and in Arab villages: "Unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate."

Jon Kimche, like Lehrman a staunch sympathizer with the Israeli position, refers to Deir Yassin as "the darkest stain on the Jewish record," a deed which demoralized the Arabs and wiped out the last hopes of "moderates under Rashid Haj Ibrahim."

³ *Proceedings*, American Academy of Political Science, January 1952, p. 483.

⁴ Hal Lehrman, "The Arabs of Israel," *Commentary*, December 19, 1949.

⁵ *Our Jerusalem; An American Family in the Holy City* (1881-1949) (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1950).

James G. McDonald, first U. S. Ambassador to Israel, relates in his book, *My Mission to Israel*, a conversation with Chaim Weizmann in which the President of Israel talked of this "miraculous simplification of Israel's tasks" through the departure of the Arab citizens.⁶

Lt. Gen. John B. Glubb, better known as Glubb Pasha, in charge of the Arab Legion until his abrupt dismissal by King Hussein in March 1956, has written at length on the refugees' flight:

Both before and after the end of the Mandate, the Israelis seized every possible opportunity to get rid of the Arabs still living in the area allotted to them. . . . In the course of the fighting the Jews occupied a number of Arab towns and villages, some of which were in the area allotted to the Arabs under the United Nations partition plan. In many such instances, the civil inhabitants were driven out immediately by Israeli troops or were given half an hour to leave. In some cases, all the means of transport were seized by the Israeli army, so that the inhabitants were obliged to abandon all their possessions and their homes.⁷

When the general fighting in Palestine came to an end in July 1948 with the United Nations truce, the Egyptian army was still in occupation of the Negev, including the Beersheba area and Wadi Araba, the depression which runs from the Dead Sea down to the Red Sea. In October 1948, the United Nations truce agreement was broken by the renewal of fighting, and the Israelis drove the Egyptians out of the Beersheba area. UN observers had two weeks previously been refused permission to visit the area in which alleged troop concentrations were taking place.

In what the Arabs alleged to be a surprise attack, the Israelis

⁶ *My Mission in Israel* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 176.

⁷ "Violence on the Jordan-Israel Border," *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, July 1954.

moved into the Wadi Araba area, routing the Jordanian forces there. A number of additional Arabs now fled into Jordan from the Negev. Certain Bedouin farmers in the Beersheba area remained behind, but the Bedouin tribes, little by little, have since been evicted by the Israeli government. These people did not hold title deeds to their land, although the boundaries of tribal areas had been carefully demarked under the Mandate. Israeli authorities refused to acknowledge Bedouin ownership and kept moving these tribes from place to place, sometimes into less fertile areas. Arab sources allege that certain tribes were allowed to plow and sow their land, but when the crop was above ground, they were moved to another area and the harvest taken by the Israelis. Under such conditions, tribal chieftains were only too happy to sign an "option" agreement calling for their migration into Jordan, the wording of which indicated that they were moving voluntarily.

On arrival in Jordan these Beersheba tribes were not added to the relief rolls by UNRWA (The United Nations Relief and Works Agency) because they had migrated after the war. They were regarded as ordinary immigrants into Jordan, and only after a year of virtual starvation were they granted relief.

In his report⁸ to the United Nations in 1951 General William Riley, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, declared:

In addition to the expulsion of the Bedouins, since March 1950 more than 1,000 Arabs have been expelled by the Israelis across the demarcation lines into the Gaza Strip, with marked increase in numbers during the last month; between the 21st of July and the 11th of September, 756 Arabs have been reported expelled from the vicinity of El Majdal across the demarcation lines into Egyptian territory.

The Chief of Staff also referred to expulsion from Beit Ha-

⁸ UN Document S/1797, p 3

nun of 144 Arabs who were required to sign a statement agreeing to go to Gaza and never to return to Israel. During the spring of 1951, 785 Arabs along the Syrian-Israeli border in the vicinity of Lake Huleh were forcibly expelled from their homes, and their homes and villages were destroyed, even though they were living in a demilitarized zone. The hatred harbored by the refugees and political leaders of the Arab countries deepened as continued acts of the Israelis indicated that they welcomed the departure of Arabs so that more room would be available for the Jews who were being "in-gathered" into Israel.

Whatever the reasons for the mass exodus, the rights of the Arab refugees to their land and property left behind remained inviolate. Starting with the General Assembly in 1948, the United Nations has passed successive resolutions upholding the rights of the refugees to return to their homes, or if they choose otherwise, to be compensated.

As their painful story has become known, the Arab refugees have become the chink in the Zionist armor. The causes which impelled Arab flight would be of little more than academic concern were it not for the vigorous defense raised by apologists for Israel to the mounting criticism. Speakers who lecture on the Middle East invariably encounter in question periods a defensive reaction to any mention of these refugees. The repetitive queries, often read from a printed form, betray a guilt complex as well as an attempt to shroud the facts: "What do the Arabs do to help the refugees?" or "How can Israel carry out the UN resolutions now that Jewish immigration has swamped that little country?" One short letter in the New York *World-Telegram* asking that justice be done for the Arab refugees brought the simultaneous publication of nine indignant letters in reply the following week.

To the Zionist the Arab refugee subject means "Danger—Avoid at All Cost." He recalls vividly how the Jewish refugee

problem, handled so cleverly and dramatically, brought victory in 1947 at the United Nations. If Arab leaders are now making political capital of the plight of their displaced persons, they are only taking a page out of the history books. Speaking at a meeting in 1946, the publisher of *The New York Times*, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, said: "I cannot rid myself of the feeling that the unfortunates of Europe's displaced-persons camps are helpless hostages for whom statehood has been made the only ransom."⁹

There has been a great Zionist fear lest the Arabs learn from these lessons of the past. Pro-Israeli forces bitterly fight any assumption of responsibility for the Arab refugees. They refuse to accept the cogent advice of Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade:

A breath of fresh air would be given the world if all concerned would simply admit the fundamental facts that these people are homeless, are in desperate want and are uncompensated for their property and other losses that they have suffered. Can anyone benefit by the continued compression of these people in tiny areas and in other circumstances that make for moral degeneration and the making of a new generation fed on bitterness and hate?¹⁰

With the passage of time American editors find it impossible to continue their avoidance of this "sticky" humanitarian problem, which has such embarrassing political connotations. The story of the Arab refugee problem began to touch a deeply sensitive chord in open-minded Jews as well as Christians. The Secretary of State, after seeing the refugees in their camps during the summer of 1953, reported to the nation: "Within these camps, the inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no solution, for as

⁹ *New York Times*, October 27, 1946.

¹⁰ Speech in Philadelphia before the American Council for Judaism, April 20, 1954.

the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate."

From inside Israel itself, one small voice sounded to kindle the Jewish conscience. The followers of the late Judah Magnes, who had been President of the Hebrew University, were keeping alive the *Ihud* (brotherhood), a movement dedicated to Arab-Jewish friendship. In their publication, *Ner*, Moshe Smilanski wrote: "Where are you, Jews? Why do we not at least pay compensation with a generous hand, to these miserable people? Where to find the money? But we build palaces, buy cars, waste petrol like water, let our ministers and hundreds of delegates live a luxurious life, instead of paying a debt that crieth unto us from earth and heaven."¹¹

The magnitude of this Israeli debt and of Arab displacement can best be realized in terms of the 1951 report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission of the United Nations on the extent of Arab property holdings. It estimated that more than 80% of Israel's total area and more than two thirds of Israel's cultivatable land was abandoned by Arab refugees during the war. One third of Israel's Jewish population was living on absentee property, and nearly one third of the new immigrants were settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs. The amount of Israel's cultivatable abandoned Arab property was nearly two and a half times the total area of Jewish-owned property at the end of the Mandate.¹²

Of the 370 agricultural settlements established between 1948 and 1953, 350 were on Arab property, according to a statement by the Custodian of Absentee Property. Nearly all olive groves, half the citrus groves, and 10,000 shops, businesses and stores belong to Arabs who are now refugees. Without the expropriation of Arab property, as the *Christian*

¹¹ *Ner* (Israeli monthly), September-October 1953.

¹² A. Granolt, *Land System in Palestine* (London, 1952), p. 278.

Century pointed out,¹³ Israel could not have taken in 700,000 new immigrants after 1948, half of them penniless Jews from Iraq and other Arab countries. Nearly half of these immigrants live in homes and property which belong to absentee owners. In 1954 it was estimated that a quarter of the buildings then in use in Israel were Arab property.¹⁴ The 30,000 acres of citrus groves belonging to absentee Arabs produced one million and a quarter boxes of fruit, accounting for 10% of the country's foreign earnings from exports in 1951.¹⁵

Under the original Partition Plan, 54% of Palestine was assigned to one third of its population, who owned less than one tenth of the land in the state prescribed for them. In the UN-decreed state of Israel, 24% was owned by Arabs, 9.38% by Jews, and 66.04% by the government. In this state there were to be 18 towns and 455 villages; and of these, 272 villages were Arab-owned as against only 183 Jewish-owned. Of the towns, 14 were Jewish, 3 were mixed and one was Arab. The internationalized City of Jerusalem was to include 3 Arab towns, 17 Arab villages and 2 Jewish villages.

The Israeli conquests in the Palestine war extended the area of Israel to include 77% of the mandated territory. Jaffa, all of western Galilee, fringes in western Judea, a large bulge of the coastal plain including the towns of Ramleh and Lydda, the plains to the south of Tel Aviv including Majdal and Isud, part of the coastal strip in the southwest and all of modern Jerusalem with its Arab population of 40,000 and its university, shops, stores, government buildings, and homes became part of the new state.

Most refugees were small landowners who cultivated their own holdings. In 1944 they earned \$78,000,000 of the total

¹³ December 30, 1953; see also Israeli government *Year Book* (English ed.), 5712 (1951/1952), p. 315; *Facts and Figures*, 1952, p. 1.

¹⁴ Study by Don Peretz, *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*, October 1954.

¹⁵ Israeli government *Year Book* (English ed.), 5712 (1951/1952), pp. 418-419.

\$112,000,000 Palestinian income from agriculture. They owned 1,000,000 head of cattle, on which, according to the last Mandate figure for the year 1945-46, they paid taxes of some \$744,000.

Everywhere, the presence of the Arab refugee caused new problems. In the narrow Gaza Strip (biblical Philistia) of 120 square miles, 214,000 were crammed. The 499,000 in the hills of Judea and Samaria and the highlands of Ammon and Gilead in Jordan are half the total number of the displaced and nearly one-half of the population of the enlarged kingdom. It is not entirely strange that in a great deal of the area, turmoil and bloodshed has centered on these two small areas.

In Gaza, the human tragedy stands out in sharpest focus. The narrow Gaza Strip, 25 miles long and from three to five miles wide, is the sole surviving remnant of divided Palestine. The Egyptians, whose occupation of the Gaza area was confirmed by the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949, have placed control in the hands of an Egyptian Military Governor, but still regard the territory as Palestinian. The other two sections of Palestine have been incorporated into the new state of Israel or the enlarged kingdom of Jordan.

On a hot July morning in 1953 I arrived in Gaza on a United Nations plane for a thirty-six-hour stay. The pilot of the plane, an American captain, returned a half hour ahead of his schedule and took off without me. I was destined to earn the dubious honor of becoming *the* expert on the Gaza Strip. I had four days in which to become acquainted with the details of misery in full bloom.

Into Gaza, completely cut off from its hinterland by the partition, and into the narrow strip of surrounding territory, had poured 214,000 refugees. They joined an indigenous population of some 85,000 whose means of livelihood depended on the hinterland, now part of Israel. The latter, called "economic" refugees because they had not been displaced

from their homes, were hungrier than the refugees who found themselves in United Nations camps.

Gaza is mostly coastal dunes and desert with limited grain fields and citrus groves and no industries. As part of the mandate of Palestine, Gaza was economically integrated into Palestine until 1948. It served as a port for the desert between Egypt and Palestine and as an important frontier station with warehouses storing the wheat and barley of Beersheba. Gaza was a center of administration and marketing for the people going out to work in other parts of Palestine. Gone now were the markets for such products as they could still produce, and lost were the lands they either owned or worked.

Gaza had once been one of the six administrative districts of Palestine, divided into sub-districts of Gaza and Beersheba. All but 14,900 acres of the Gaza sub-district of 274,500 acres were owned by Arabs, and together with Beersheba, there were almost 3½ million acres (3,418,750) of which all but 77,390 were Arab owned. Now the ownership relation is exactly reversed, the Arabs possessing only some 75,000 acres. The Gaza people found it impossible to sustain themselves on less than 3% of the land they originally worked. Not having been displaced, they were not entitled to UN succor. So they lived off the proceeds of their worldly possessions, which they had to barter with the refugees for UN rations.

The majority of the refugees were huddled together in eight UN camps spread over this strip. In the largest camp, Rafah, with 30,000 refugees, was Ibrahim Hassan, aged 45, who with his parents, his wife, and three children occupied a tent left over from World War II. He used to be a thrifty shopkeeper in Beersheba. Ibrahim, like his camp companions, has been subjected to much Communist propaganda in his crowded abode. "I do not have to believe everything I have read or been told," he said to me, "to know that whatever change will take place for us will be for the better. I am willing to listen to anything which offers some hope."

Another Gaza refugee, a 35-year-old farmer who had lost his wife and child, told me with bitterness in his voice: "You have caused our enslavement, but some day someone will help us go home." And as he spoke that last word, he pointed to the open fields but a few hundred yards away. The sole boundary demarcation was then a six-inch furrow. Continued infiltrations and reprisals under such conditions were inevitable.

Near the reputed tomb of Samson a sad-faced, emaciated Arab boy of 12 came up to me and cried out pitifully: "Help us refugees and God will not forget you." The aged caretaker of the tomb told me there were hundreds of such lads wandering among the camps in the strip.

Of the total number of Arab refugees, 120,000 are Christians of various denominations: Protestant, Greek Orthodox and Roman Catholic. In fact, three out of every five of the total Christian population of Palestine have been displaced. Quite naturally in this moment of trouble many of these turned to Bethlehem, the birthplace of Christ, the oldest Christian community in the world. As in the California gold rush days, a small town mushroomed into a city overnight. Where there had been under 15,000, there were now 50,000.

Very soon the native civic populace had so pauperized themselves caring for their stricken brethren that it was almost impossible to discern the difference between a displaced person and a resident. Housing as well as food became scarce in Bethlehem. It is ironic indeed that the name of the town should derive from the Hebrew, meaning "house of bread."

Communist agents made capital of these conditions, saying to the people of Bethlehem: "Well, a fine Christian community you belong to. Here you are living in the birthplace of your Savior, and the great Christian world does not do a thing for you. We are supposed to be atheists, but where are your Christian brethren?"

What luxuriant ground for the Kremlin! It was never necessary for Communists to foment class struggle or preach eco-

conomic reforms in the Middle East. All they had to do was trade on the existing hunger, destitution and sub-standard living which had been accentuated in the case of the refugees. In this region of despair the Communist was making great capital of the key to the trouble—the continued failure of the West to alleviate the misery of the displaced peoples.

When Adlai Stevenson reached Lebanon on his round-the-world-tour, he visited Dibyah, a refugee camp outside Beirut. Through a United Nations interpreter, he talked to the Arabs, including the *mukhtar* (chief) of an old Palestinian village who retained his position even in exile. The chief poured out resentment for fifteen minutes against the United States for turning its back on victims of war and injustice: “Why don’t you do something to return us to our homes?” he impatiently asked. “The United States is our enemy, and we must find other friends elsewhere who will assure us justice and freedom.”

The Democratic presidential candidate was hard pressed to answer the argument advanced. With characteristic levity, Mr. Stevenson replied, “I will remember what you have said. But don’t forget, no matter what has happened, you yourself are pretty lucky—you are still chief. Look what my people did to me when I tried to become chief.”

When roving Ambassador Edwin Locke Jr. visited a Jordan Valley camp, he met with a delegation of the refugees to discuss their problems, needs and ultimate hopes. An intelligent-looking, blue-eyed refugee shook hands with the American, touched his heart and then spoke in Arabic: “I thank God,” he said, “that the United States and Great Britain have scattered us widely throughout this area. When World War III comes, we can show you how we can hurt your interests everywhere and help your enemies.”

Then he coldly informed Ambassador Locke that although he spoke English perfectly—he had learned it in a British

school—he would never speak the language again until the Americans had done something for the refugees.

In little Lebanon there are 15 refugee camps divided among five principal areas. In the rainy winter the refugees suffer from the intense cold. Many refugees have become implicated from time to time in smuggling tobacco, hasheesh and vegetables into Israel in exchange for khaki, clothing, or money.

When I visited Lebanon in October 1954, the small Shetila camp of 2000 persons in the Beirut area was in the process of being liquidated because the landlord wanted his property back. Being close to the city, the camp had both “official” refugees, who were receiving shelter and services, and “unofficial” refugees, who were using the other facilities—supplementary feeding, water, and the schools. Some refugees had set up “squatter” huts near the camp because they refused to live in the camps themselves. They had come from rural areas and preferred to live in seclusion.

The 343 families at Shetila lived for the most part in tents of various kinds. When the rains of winter came and the snow from the mountains melted, these refugees were sitting, standing and sleeping in water. The few families who had constructed huts lived a bit more elegantly than those in tents, but the materials for these huts were very difficult to obtain and very costly. Dwellers averaged from 2 to 7 in a tent.

The psychology of those living in tents was expressed by Mohammed Arad, who said: “We will remain in tents until we go back home.” These people, while resentful of conditions under which they were living, were fearful of improvements lest they be considered resettled in Lebanon and their right to return home become impaired.

Mahmoud Naif Muksin, 9 years old, came from the Alma Village near Safad in Palestine. He was one of 10 children living in one tent measuring 14 by 15. “No matter even if I were given the best clothing, I would prefer to go home,” the youngster said. His father, who was very old and could not

work, sold potatoes wherever he could find a market in and around the camp.

Many refugees peddled vegetables, became porters or filled other unskilled jobs. The Lebanese government frowned upon giving refugees work. "Why employ Palestinians when we have our own unemployed?" was their attitude. These refugees in Lebanon constituted about 9% of the population.

Neither the tents nor the huts of Shetila had floors and the ground was sticky with mud. Few tents were patchless. Here and there was a water-soaked rug. In the corner there might be a damp blanket thrown over some straw. This provided warmth for sleeping. There were few oil stoves; only one or two of the more fortunate had a tiny wood stove. The out-houses were without roofs.

The leader of this camp, Abed Hussein Ali, had been the *mukhtar* of Alma. Now he worked for UNRWA. He told me that a long hard winter was approaching: "You Americans are responsible for this plight. These people—my people—will join with anyone who will get them back to their homes, and any hope that is offered we will take. Life here," he added, "is no better than death itself."

In a row of barracks lived families of 6 to 8 persons from Ramseh Village, near Acre. The women were preparing their bread on the floor, mixing the flour given by UNRWA with water and yeast. One Issa Elias, who had been a butcher employed by the chain store Spinney's in Palestine, now could find no work except an occasional laboring job. This man admitted he had no desire to return if he could not get his property back. But others like Ahmad Rash, who came from Bassa in the Acre District, wanted to go back even if they could not recover their family property. He had learned English in Palestine at the government school and time was heavy on his hands.

Many refugees were too proud to stay in camps. They sought work and held out for some time. But some of these more in-

work refugees were too proud to stay in camps. They sought dependent people were soon falling into the ration line, as they became no longer able to pay even the smallest rent. "Many Americans believe we are nomads," said one, "but we own property in a land which is ours and a civilization that is older than America's."

I was curious to see what the Arab reaction would be to the often-advanced charge that the refugees were better off than they had ever been. Young Mihail Issa Ayoub responded sharply: "You cannot make a statement like that because 1% of us are better off and not the 99%." A crowd gathered around him as he talked loudly and gesticulated wildly, making me the object of his deep-seated animosity against the U.S.A.

A woman pushed her way to where we were talking. She was Marie J. Azzany from Sheifa Amer, near Haifa. "Even," said she, "if we were kings here, it is not like being a simple citizen at home . . . America is encouraging us to adopt communism." I inquired if there were any Communist agents in the camp, but before an answer could be given, the UNRWA camp leader shouted: "No Communists are allowed here!" trying to drown out any answer that might have been given to the question.

Telling the refugees that there were some few Americans concerned with their plight offered little consolation to people facing such conditions. I tried through an interpreter, but my words sounded hollow even to me. The Arabs, polite as always, were profuse in their "*shukrans*" (thank you) and "*Maa salaamis*" as I left this refugee camp.

Three to four thousand Palestinian families in Lebanon had managed to bring out some possessions and money from their homeland after the catastrophe. Most, for example the enterprising Tamaris, worked exceedingly hard and have succeeded in building a new life for themselves in Beirut, although ever mindful of what still belongs to them in Israel.

In Jordan, refugees are huddled into camps or scattered in caves among the rocky hills of Judea and Samaria from where it is possible to see their homes, their farms, their cottages and their gardens. Certain of them fled with only the clothes on their backs, leaving behind all their possessions. In the panic, families became divided. Some of the old people remained behind in Palestine. In other instances, wives fled with their children while the husbands were still away at work.

During the first year following the establishment of the Armistice Line, in the spring of 1949, a number of "infiltrators," refugees who walked across the line into Israel, headed for their homes. Most of them were unarmed, their intentions merely to collect their possessions, search for relatives, or just to go home. A number of them were shot dead without so much as a question or answer by the first Israeli patrol. Others were maltreated.

In occupying the Beersheba area down to the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel severed the land passage joining Asia to Africa and cut off the Gaza Strip from Arab Palestine and Jordan. There was now no way of going from Jordan, Syria or Lebanon to Gaza and Egypt, except by air. Many of the people who crossed the Israeli frontier near the Beersheba area in darkness were crossing for legitimate reasons. Some were in search of work; others had animals loaded with rice, sugar or consumer goods from the Gaza area and were going toward Jordan where their former trade lay.

The wounding or killing of these infiltrators deeply embittered the Arabs who remained behind. An "eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" refrain was taken up by many who had once maintained the closest personal ties with their Jewish neighbors and had placed primary blame for their plight on the British, the U.S. and the UN in that order. By the adoption of this ruthless policy toward the infiltrators, the Israelis only increased the Arabs' hatred. "Infiltrator" became a term

applied alike to pilferers, smugglers, armed robbers, and the occasional Arab who deliberately murdered an Israeli as a personal act of revenge for his dispossessed nation. It was also applied to herdsmen who strayed across the line for pasturage, farmers who persisted in tilling their former land, and women, men and children who crossed the line to visit relatives or attend funerals or weddings.

The armistice line, drawn hurriedly to cover an emergency period, worked tremendous hardships. In some instances, the line divided a man's house from his orchard. If he went out to pick an apple in his own garden, he was shot as an infiltrator. To the west of the little town of Qalqilya, lying in the hills of Samaria, the coastal plain is covered with the town's luxuriant orange groves. The armistice line divided the town from its orange groves. Though the population had been swollen by refugee influx, the area of Qalqilya had been cut from 50,000 to 7000 dunums.¹⁶ At the time of the first orange picking season, many people from Qalqilya went over the line, each man to pick oranges from his own trees. The Israelis concealed patrols in the orange groves and killed the pickers. The resulting incidents were described by the Israelis as "armed incursions of bandits."

When the Israeli government found that dealing with infiltrators did not end infiltration, they resorted to military reprisals, at first on a small scale by means of a party of 8 or 10 Israeli soldiers. These soldiers would cross into Jordan, approach a small village, kill one or two of the first persons encountered and return. Sometimes they might throw hand grenades into the windows of houses, killing women and children in their beds. When reprisals by military patrols were not effective, it was decided by the government that platoon or regimental attacks might be more effective. In these attacks by infantry companies, mortars and torpedoes were used to

¹⁶ A dunum is a quarter acre.

remove the barbed wire entanglements placed by the Jordanian government to protect the frontier villages.

The great difference between infiltrations by the refugees on the one hand and the reprisals by Israel on the other was that the latter were carried out by the army of a sovereign nation on the orders of that government, and the former carried out in most instances by destitute refugees whom Jordan was doing its best to control.

The Arab infiltrators were blamed by Israel as the reason for Israeli raids on the Jordanian villages of Falameh, Kibya, Nahalin, Kirbetillin and the el Breig Refugee Camp, as well as the attack on the Egyptian army cantonment in the Gaza area. The Israeli police, by admission of the English language newspaper, the *Jerusalem Post*, have a tendency to attribute unsolved crimes to Arab infiltrators. The Jordanian government made the claim that not one single incursion between 1949 and 1954 was made by the Arab Legion or by any other armed force controlled by Jordan. The absence of any Security Council condemnation of Jordan bore out the correctness of this claim.

Two days before the first Israeli attack in force upon Gaza, February 26, 1955, *New York Times* correspondent Kennett Love, writing from Tulkarm, Jordan, described in detail the attempts of the Jordanian government to check the Arab infiltrators.

The Arab Legion's efforts to control infiltration were supplemented by members of the National Guard who were placed in and about the frontier villages. These volunteer guardsmen strove to prevent their villages from suffering reprisals for acts of irresponsible individuals. Between 1954 and 1955 the Jordanian courts actually sentenced 997 infiltrators to jail terms and gave suspended sentences to many others accused of border crossings. Included among those punished were boys under 16 years of age and *mukhtars* of villages, who were

dismissed and even punished for failing to cooperate in apprehending the suspected infiltrators. Anti-infiltration patrols were set up, working chiefly at night along the suspected infiltration routes.

Salem Haj Shennar, 18 years old, with a record of two previous infiltration convictions, had a personal history that deeply interested *Times* reporter Love. His last sentence had been for three months. The family had a 15½-acre farm separated from their home by the armistice line. Salem was then responsible for supporting his mother, four sisters, and one younger brother. Economic refugees, like the Shennar family, even though they had lost their livelihood, were not entitled to UN rations.

Salem admitted returning to his family's farm undetected three or four times, stealing clothes, food and sheep. Asked by Love if he would now stop infiltrating after his second term of imprisonment, he said: "I don't know. The Yehudi (Jews) have taken our farm. We get no rations. I can make only a few shillings a week because there is not enough work for all of us. We're often very hungry. I ask you—shall I steal from my own people or those who have robbed us?"

Israeli supporters allege that the Arab leaders have done nothing toward resettling the refugees. This charge is predicated on the assumption that Arab leaders outside of Palestine have had the power to resettle these people. But, in fact, the power rests solely in the hands of the refugees, who insist upon their right to return home to Palestine.

The farming Palestinians are homesick for their lands. The refugees are so determined to return that even those who worked on Musa Alami's well-ordered project near Jericho would only rent, not purchase, their share of the land. How refugees would feel had they received compensation for their property instead of nurturing an unfulfilled longing to return home is quite another story.

Even were the Palestinian refugees and Arab leadership in

accord on a resettlement program, the question arises whether these Arab states, wrestling as they have been against poverty, under-development and other economic handicaps of their own, possess the ability to absorb the one million displaced persons. The refugee influx in the Middle East would be comparable to an additional 3 million persons to France, 3½ million persons to the United Kingdom and 10 million persons to the United States.

Egypt is already vastly overpopulated and the fertile portions of Jordan and Lebanon are fully occupied. Syria, it is said, could absorb the refugees because, with only 6,000,000 acres under the plow, there are 8,000,000 acres uncultivated. But Syria's own political instability since the ousting of Colonel Shishakly makes any refugee settlement impossible, even if agreeable to the refugees. Syria and Iraq would need vast billion-dollar projects on which to settle the refugees, and current political factors do not favor embarking on such a program even if the financial obstacles could be met.

The impact of half a million refugees, almost a third of them in camps, create in Jordan a social and public security problem. The refugees, dissatisfied with the efforts of the government in their behalf, can threaten strikes and are eager to join in demonstrations. It is impossible for the authorities even to take a new registration of refugees and to lop the dead from the relief rolls.

Within the framework of the United Nations, the Arab host states carry a share of responsibility for refugee relief. In Jordan, the refugees have been given full citizenship, and land has been given to many of them. In Iraq the comparatively small number of refugees have been the entire responsibility of the government, and in Syria they are permitted to work when they can find jobs. The Egyptian government has been forced not only to contribute heavily to the relief of 214,000 refugees, but in the Gaza Strip the impoverished indigenous population have required extra help. With the exception of oil-rich Saudi

Arabia and perhaps Iraq, concern for their own citizens more than takes up the limited budgets of the countries concerned. These two wealthier Arab countries have made substantial contributions to the care of refugees.

It is undoubtedly true that the Arabs do not possess the same "togetherness" that Jews throughout the world do. Their centuries under foreign domination have developed heightened individualism rather than a clannish consciousness of having to help other Arabs. As Henry Labouisse, Director of the UNRWA, pointed out in his 1954 annual report to the United Nations, it has not been sufficiently understood that a Palestinian Arab refugee in an Arab state is in exactly the same position as any other refugee from one country living in another.

The seven cents a day received from the United Nations for rations and care has kept the refugees alive without lessening one whit their tragic frustration and bitterness. Deserted by all, they are easy prey for anyone who takes the trouble to woo them.

As these refugees go, so will go the Middle East.

IV

Truman Partiality

IN the face of a growing Russian offensive in the Middle East, the Truman administration continued to bumble, fumble and stumble. Failure to formulate a definite U.S. policy in the Far East had resulted in the loss of China as well as portions of Korea and Indo-China, and the same error was being made with this area to the west. What the Truman administration referred to as “policy” was being shaped by weighing Zionist aggressiveness against Arab reaction instead of subordinating U.S. action to the total objective of meeting the world Communist challenge.

The Democratic administration was not unaware of the deteriorating U.S. position in the area. It was a question of not “doing,” more than a problem of not “knowing.” Washington had been alerted as far back as the winter of 1947-48 by reports submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council. It was these warnings that spurred Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal to push for a trusteeship of Palestine even after the United Nations voted for partition on November 29, 1947.

Competent military authorities echoed the warning of Secretary Forrestal against the latent dangers. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that “destitute hordes from Palestine” were poorly prepared to resist Communist plans.

While the Cominform was making hay on luxuriant meadows, the attention of the West was occupied elsewhere in Europe and the Far East. Beyond enacting an appropriation in 1949 to cover the U.S. share in a United Nations agency caring for Arab refugees, nothing was done. Foreign Service reports of the alarming growth of communism and the corresponding decline of Western Power influence finally gave impetus to the issuance of the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950. The avowed purpose of the declaration was “to permit the Middle East countries to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole.” To achieve this end, the United States, France and the United Kingdom recognized the need of the Arab states and Israel to maintain armed forces to assure “their internal security and their legitimate self defense.” At the same time, the Big Three pledged action, inside and outside the United Nations, to prevent any violation by force of the frontiers or armistice lines.

The main goal of this declaration was never achieved. Neither Israel nor the Arab states were brought into an area defense system against communism. What the tripartite declaration accomplished was to permit a limited sale of arms on the basis of parity between Israel and the seven Arab states. However often invoked by the Western Powers, the reference in the declaration to the maintenance of the *status quo* has never been taken seriously by any of the parties concerned: the Arabs, the Israelis or the Russians.

The United States continued to take no effective action to alleviate refugee misery, although the experience of Ambassador Locke, together with other recitals, were reported to the White House and reprinted in the Congressional Record. Pres-

ident Truman knew the facts and took cognizance of the growing tragedy in his 1951 State of the Union address: "Until this large body of uprooted and homeless people find new homes and economic opportunities, they will constitute a potentially destructive force in this vitally important area of the world."

On May 24, 1951, President Truman, in recommending the Mutual Security Program to Congress, referred to the Near East¹ as an area "important to the security of the United States and of the free world," which was under "steady and relentless pressure" from the Soviet Union and whose security was "endangered by political and economic instability." The President went on to say:

There are increasing evidences of Soviet inspired subversion in the Arab states. An ideal target are the nearly one million Arab refugees from Palestine who are scattered throughout adjoining Arab states and who, though they are being assisted by the United Nations, represent a dissatisfied and homeless group. Moreover, the Arab states have been deeply disturbed by the conflict in Palestine, and, despite the traditional cultural bonds between the Arabs and the West, breaches in mutual understanding and much bitter feeling have come about as a result of the Palestine issue. This bitterness, together with the growing feeling in the States that the West has no interest in their welfare, has extenuated a tendency towards neutralism.

This was a most precise analysis of the malady and ought to have evoked a suitable prescription. But in trying to cure this grave ailment, the "tendency toward neutralism," the Truman administration assiduously avoided political rectification. Economic uplifting of the area was substituted as a far less controversial end to be sought. Yet, even in this direction, substantial progress toward raising the standards of living in

¹The State Department refers to the area as the "Near" rather than "Middle" East.

the area could hardly have been expected with the pitiable amount of money available under the Mutual Security Program. If the Soviet tactics alluded to in the Presidential message were to be checked, a different psychological approach toward the Arabs was imperative.

Four months later, in October 1951, the U.S., Britain, France, and Turkey invited the Egyptian government to join them as an equal partner in a proposed Middle East Defense Command. Turkey had just been admitted into NATO, thus moving the European defense grouping eastward. The four power proposal called for the loosest type of military cooperation in which the Suez Canal Zone was to be an allied base under Egyptian control.

Egypt summarily rejected the plan, viewing it with little more attention than it had viewed the British offer the previous April of a new treaty arrangement and joint Anglo-Egyptian control of Suez. In addition to spurning membership in this proposed adjunct to NATO, the Wafd government of Nahas Pasha announced the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and of the 1899 Agreement establishing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium over the Sudan. This denunciation actually took place five days before the West's plan was formally presented to the Egyptians on October 13.

The new Egyptian policy of self-assertion was aimed both at concealing the corruption of the Wafd administration under Prime Minister Nahas and Minister of Interior Serag al Din, and at covering up failures to fulfil promises. These questionable motivations for the Egyptian action in no way diminished the sting of the rebuke to Western tactics. The United States, Britain, and France had not bothered to consult Egypt or any other Arab nation prior to the announced Middle East Defense Command.

The inclusion of Turkey, the Arabs' cruel and harsh overseer of many centuries, as one of the sponsoring powers increased the suspicions of the Arabs, many of whom vividly re-

membered Ottoman oppression. Had the Soviet appeared as a threat to these Arab nations—which she did not—the Russian specter could never have frightened them as much as the sanctuary offered by England, France, Turkey—three perennially imperialist lords of the Middle East—and the United States, the creator of Israel. The new defense plan was presented to the Egyptians as the only substitute for British occupation. Egypt regarded the military planning body provided under the projected Defense Command as a British scheme to remain in possession of the Suez Canal Zone. With British imperialism in their front yard and U.S.-supported Israel in their back, the Egyptians could pay scant attention to what *The New York Times*, in an effusion of editorial praise for the defense scheme, called “the real imperialism of Russian communism.”

Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s rejection of the Egyptian repudiation of the treaties with Britain as not being in accord with “proper respect for international obligations” may have been valid, but the United States had found that its efforts to rally the Arab states had only widened the breach in the defense of the Middle East and further opened the doors to communism. With a statement made on November 10 by the four sponsoring powers calling the defense of the area “vital to the free world,” the abortive Middle East Command was dropped.

Months before final Egyptian action to abrogate the treaties with Britain, the policymakers in the State Department were aware of the impending crisis and still permitted themselves to be paralyzed by inaction. Continual interference from the White House and Capitol Hill impeded constructive action to meet the Soviet challenge. Every U.S. move calculated to win back the friendship of the Arab-Moslem world had first to pass the test: “Will this do any harm to Israel?” An occasional public utterance of a nice word for the Arabs was more than offset by the Barkley-Chapman-Douglas-Ewing chorus of

praise for "democratic Israel in its struggle against the feudal Arab world."

Congressional energies, save those of the Celler-Javits Zionist bloc, were riveted on Korea, exactly as the Kremlin had planned it, with scarcely a passing thought for the Middle East. The Great Debate of 1951 revealed a preference by the elected representatives of the American people for holding post mortems on the loss of China to finding the meaning of the increasingly inscrutable smile on the Sphinx.

At stake in the Middle East was more than a century of uphill struggle by enlightened Americans to win a foothold of respect in the Arab world.

The first printing press in the Middle East had been established in 1834 by the American Presbyterian Mission in Beirut. The Syrian Protestant College received its charter in 1863, and in 1920 became the American University of Beirut. From the classrooms of this school, from the American University in Cairo, and from Robert College in Istanbul graduated a great portion of the Arab leaders who had become acquainted with American culture. To them, America represented a disinterested and liberal influence in contrast to Ottoman self-interest and backwardness.

The 1921 report of the King-Crane Commission, which had been sent by President Wilson to make a survey of conditions in the provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, indicated that the newly liberated Arabs preferred the United States as the Mandatory Power for the area. In the ensuing years American universities, hospitals, YMCA's, missionary endeavors and other social agencies all contributed toward building up a reservoir of good will and a friendly disposition toward the United States.

Other Western Powers fell into disrepute because of their colonial, imperialist policies. Arab nationalism, rampant after World War II, would have taken a moderate course,

save for continued U.S. partisanship on the Palestine question. As the Truman administration vacated Washington, the man who was returning to Independence boasted at a testimonial dinner: "Six-twelve P.M. on Friday, May 14th, when I recognized Israel was the proudest moment of my life."² No mention was made on this occasion of the other side of the coin.

In seven years of occupancy of the White House, the Truman administration, aided by certain elements in the Republican Party, had succeeded in dissipating American prestige in the Middle East dangerously close to the vanishing point.

² When Mr. Truman was visited in Independence, Missouri, in the spring of 1955 by a group of Arab-Asians touring the United States, the former Chief Executive frankly told his visitors that he never regretted his activity in behalf of Israel.

The Eisenhower New Look

THE incoming Eisenhower administration was faced with the stern necessity of halting the loss of friends in the Middle East. Mr. Eisenhower, speaking as a general, had indicated an awareness of the unique position of the area when he made the statement before his election: "As for sheer value of territory there is no more strategically important area in the world than the Middle East." And as President, he was well acquainted with the declining American position there. His overwhelming political victory had placed him in a unique position to take action necessary for safeguarding the national interest even in the face of the strongest pressures.

The inaugural ceremonies of January 20, 1953, brought to the nation's Capitol representatives of all facets of opinion. While Zionist Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver delivered a moving prayer which brought a tear from President Eisenhower, non-Zionist Dr. William Rosenblum and anti-Zionist Lessing Rosenwald were listening attentively in the huge audience.

In his speech that day the President did not touch upon the

Middle East. Nor was that sensitive area touched upon in his first State-of-the-Union address. In his own first report to the American people on foreign policy, Secretary of State Dulles gave no mention of the Arab-Israeli quarrel nor any indication whether the favored position that Israel had enjoyed was to be continued. For some time it was undecided whether, as in the case of other areas of division in the State Department, a new Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs would be chosen to replace Henry A. Byroade. The difficulty of finding a successor, both competent and at the same time politically acceptable to Zionist interests, helped the incumbent survive the change in administrations.

On March 2, 1953, Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister, Prince Faisal, called on the President at the White House. Mr. Eisenhower expressed to the second eldest son of King Ibn Saud "his concern over some evidence that there had lately occurred a deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States." The President added that "it would be his firm purpose to seek to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations, and he hoped the Arab leaders would be inspired by the same purpose." Alluding to "the many strong educational and cultural ties" between the Arab world and the United States, Mr. Eisenhower expressed confidence that these links were "a foundation of goodwill on which to build during the coming years to mutual advantage."

The following day the press carried the presidential statement together with a picture of the white-robed Saudi Arabian Prince gripping a snowball on the White House lawn. This visit can be said to have marked the beginning of the Eisenhower administration's endeavor to cut loose from past Middle East policy and to conform more closely to the admonition of George Washington, who in his farewell address as first President had cautioned against "a passionate attachment of one nation to another which produces a variety of evils."

Later in March Secretary Dulles announced that the President had asked him to visit the Middle East in order "to show our friendship for the governments and the peoples of the area." In unofficial Washington circles the Dulles trip was linked to rumors that the United States was preparing to supply arms to Arab countries as a defense against Communist encroachment. American Ambassadors to the Arab states had been urging this course of action. The Truman administration, on protest from Israel, had withheld approval.

The Israelis themselves had been seeking a military grant-in-aid from Washington ever since February 1952. The Department of State had been holding up action on this application even though Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, on a visit to Washington strongly urged his country's right to United States military aid.

This trip of Secretary Dulles to the Middle East was an open avowal that America's interest in the area was now deemed vital and that policy contradictions were going to be resolved. In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee four days prior to his departure, the Secretary referred to the "steadily deteriorating Western and even American prestige in this area," and pointed to "urgent and decisive remedial measures." Mr. Dulles did not neglect to refer to Soviet gains in the Middle East as he asked the Congressional committees for authority to undertake limited military aid programs for the area. With this objective in mind, Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen accompanied Secretary Dulles on the trip. The former Minnesota Governor, in presenting President Eisenhower's foreign aid recommendations to Congress, had previously urged special help for Egypt.

In Egypt, first stop on the Dulles-Stassen junket, history was racing. The Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the status of the Suez Canal bases, previously postponed several times, opened on April 27 in Cairo. The Canal Zone included the mightiest

military bases in the Middle East: 37 big military installations, including two fully equipped airfields, docks, dumps, hospitals, radar stations, and the world's largest ordnance depots. Building them had taken 38 years and more than one and a half billion dollars. The policy of the Conservative government was soon clearly enunciated. Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill had stated:

We do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 men at a cost of perhaps over 50 million pounds, or \$140,000,000 a year, discharging a duty which has largely fallen on us, and us alone, safeguarding the interests of free nations in the Middle East and preserving the International Water Way—the Suez Canal. . . . We remain convinced that it is in our interest, military and financial, to secure the re-deployment of our forces in North Africa and the Middle East.

The Prime Minister pointed out, however, that the solution to the Canal controversy will “not be dictated either by the violence of our foreign enemies or the pressure of some of our best friends.”

That the Palestine question should have contributed to the pressure forcing the British from Suez was more than a little ironic. It had been its interest in the Suez Canal which had partially motivated the British government to make the Balfour Declaration in 1917. The presence in a nearby territory of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, friendly to the British, was regarded by the war cabinet of Lloyd George as a security measure for Suez.¹ This step led to the formation of the state of Israel thirty years later. And now the vicious circle was closing.

The Churchill government had consented to evacuation only if the base were to be maintained in such a condition that

¹ J. W. V. Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, IV, 170; Alfred M. Lilienthal, *What Price Israel?* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 21-22.

it could be made immediately available to Britain and her allies in case of war. An understanding on the prerequisites to British evacuation had been reached with the Truman administration. These conditions had to be reconciled with the extremely sovereignty-conscious Egyptian revolutionary regime of General Naguib and Colonel Nasser. The Egyptians recognized the need of retaining British technicians but absolutely precluded any association with a Western-sponsored Middle East Defense Organization. General Naguib and his advisers, while insistent on freeing Egypt from all evidence of foreign control, indicated an appreciation of the necessity of reconciling British withdrawal with an effective use of existing installations for the general defense of the Middle East. It was a personal message delivered by Ambassador Caffery from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Naguib that had helped considerably to create a proper atmosphere for the new April negotiations.

In announcing the 12-country, 21-day itinerary of the first American Secretary of State to visit the Middle East, the State Department noted that the trip was "primarily to develop understanding, gain first-hand impressions and listen to views of leaders." "The Secretary," the statement added, "was not to make or ask any commitments."

Despite this announced limitation to "fact-finding and listening" which precluded any immediate policy changes, the arrival of Mr. Dulles was awaited in Cairo with the greatest anticipation and hope. Satisfaction was gained from the Dulles plan to spend less than two days in Israel and more than eleven days in Arab countries.

The Egyptians and the British had become deadlocked in their Suez talks. This interruption tended to place even greater emphasis in the Arab mind on the Dulles visit. There was every indication that the government of Mohammed Naguib would seek some reaction from the Secretary of State to the Egyptian demand for immediate and unqualified evacuation.

The Arab Foreign Ministers, at a three-day conference in Cairo, drew up a coordinated Arab policy to present individually to the distinguished American visitor. And on Sunday, the day before the anticipated arrival of the Secretary and his party, Egypt buried its unknown soldier of the Palestinian War. An impressive three-and-a-half-hour funeral, in which Egypt's Armed Forces participated, started from Bab el Hadid Station and proceeded through Cairo's main streets to Liberation Square. Marching behind the beflagged catafalque were General Naguib and members of the Revolutionary Council. Behind the Chief of State walked Sheikh Kidr Hassanein, Rector of Al Azhar, with the Coptic Patriarch on his right and Haym Nahoum, the Grand Rabbi, on his left. The funeral oration of the Prime Minister indicated clearly that Mr. Dulles would be reminded in Cairo and in the six other Arab capitals that the reasons for past differences with the United States were not forgotten and that it would take more than words to restore American prestige in the Arab world.

On Monday morning, May 11, five minutes ahead of schedule, a military air transport plane bearing Secretary Dulles and his party alighted at Cairo International Airport. The Secretary, followed by Mrs. Dulles, Mutual Security Director Stassen and Mrs. Stassen, Counselor of the Department of State Douglas MacArthur, II, and Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade, alighted from the plane to be greeted by Ambassador Jefferson Caffery. While Mrs. Dulles and Mrs. Caffery chatted amiably, the Ambassador presented Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein and Under-secretary of State Sami Abou Fetouh to his chief. After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Secretary Dulles walked to the microphone and delivered a brief statement in which the Secretary explained his "listening-learning" mission and expressed admiration for the courage with which the Naguib government had approached the many problems besetting Egypt.

Late that afternoon Secretary Dulles conferred for two and

a half hours with General Naguib at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Dulles handed the Prime Minister a sealed letter from President Eisenhower and a silver-handled revolver on which was inscribed "To General Mohammed Naguib from his friend Eisenhower." As the conferees emerged from the Presidency and were met by the press, General Naguib proudly extracted the revolver gift from his pocket, saying, "This is for self-defense or security—however you may wish to phrase it."

Fifteen minutes before the long meeting had ended, newspapermen had sent in to General Naguib news-agency excerpts from a statement on Egypt made in the House of Commons by Sir Winston Churchill. Sir Winston had exploded in characteristic Churchillian fashion. Denying that anything in the nature of a British ultimatum had been served on Egypt, Sir Winston expressed a willingness to renew discussions on the Suez Canal issue, with or without the United States, and emphasized the position of Britain in the Suez Canal Zone as vital to the defense of the free world in the Middle East. The British Prime Minister declared that the troops in the Canal Zone were prepared to defend themselves.

This was expected. It was his uncalled-for remarks in reference to Israel, however, that gave Sir Winston's speech an inflammatory character in the eyes of the Arab world. He recalled that since the Balfour Declaration he had been "a supporter of the Zionist cause"² and gave renewed assurance of British support for Israel, saying: "It is very unfortunate that there is no peace between Israel and the Arab states." The Prime Minister added this further fuel: "Fortunately for Israel, they have the best army in the Levant. And nothing we shall do in the supply of aircraft to the Arab states will be allowed to place Israel at a disadvantage." Sir Winston earnestly

² Sir Winston apparently chose to forget the role he had played as Colonial Secretary in assuring a deputation of Arabs that they would never be placed under Jewish hegemony. (See *What Price Israel?*, p. 25.)

prayed that the "great Zionist conception would eventually be fulfilled."

The press in Egypt and throughout the Arab world took up the Churchill challenge and fired back. *Al Misr* in Cairo editorialized, "Kill us—but you shall clear out." In the early hours of the morning an irked General Naguib released a sharp response to the British Prime Minister: "The defense of the Middle East can only be undertaken by its own people in possession of their entire sovereignty and liberties. I will not stand any tampering with the independence of my country even at the cost of my life."

Pressed for comment on the Churchill declaration, Secretary Dulles briefly referred to the full agreement reached by the Truman administration with the British government on policy regarding the Canal and the defense of the Middle East. A solution reconciling Egyptian sovereignty with the need of maintaining the base for future eventualities was defined by Mr. Dulles as "an Anglo-American aim."

With this seemingly innocuous statement, one main objective of the Secretary's trip was made hopeless. Learn and listen Mr. Dulles could and did, but all chances of building American goodwill had now been inadvertently destroyed. Latent suspicions of the true aims of the United States burst to the surface. The press compared the Churchill and Dulles statements. They could find no difference. Both policy enunciations were viewed as giving lip service to full Egyptian sovereignty but as "opposed to putting this idea into immediate effect." And to make matters worse the United States became associated in the Arab mind with Churchill's references to Israel.

The Eisenhower policy, on which so much hope had been placed, was viewed as only a continuation of the Truman policy. The concern of the British Prime Minister for Israel was not surprising, said Cairo's leading newspaper, *Al Ahram*. "What is surprising is that it should triumph in America at the

hands of a great soldier in whom democracy had pinned its faith."

Mr. Dulles was accused of coming not to listen but to inform the Arabs of solutions previously reached. After two full days in the Egyptian capital, the American Secretary of State proceeded to Tel Aviv, arriving on the same day that Israel celebrated the 5th anniversary of the establishment of the state. In their frame of mind distrustful Arab editors refused to accept this as a mere coincidence. The *Daily Star* in Beirut and other Arab papers had featured two days previously the latest report of the United Jewish Appeal in headlines: "U.S. Grants to Israel in Billions."

During his 36-hour stay in Israel the legally recognized Communist Party staged a large demonstration against Mr. Dulles. The Secretary's brief visit was otherwise without incident. From the new city of Jerusalem he crossed into the old city in Jordan, proceeding in turn to the capitals of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. He was content in the Arab capitals, after Cairo, merely to look and listen. But everywhere the Arabs' blistering answers to Churchill continued to cast ugly shadows on the goodwill mission.

Secretary Dulles arrived back in Washington on May 30, having journeyed eastward to Pakistan and India and returned by way of Turkey, Greece and Libya. The American press hailed his trip as an unqualified success. The *New York Herald Tribune* expressed this commonly accepted opinion in an editorial entitled "Foundation for Friendship." The Secretary's statement, issued on his return, was regarded by *The New York Times* as "most hopeful."

In his broadcast report to the nation, Secretary Dulles declared it "high time the United States government paid more attention to the Near East and South Asia." The Secretary, noting the deep concern of the people of the area "about political independence for themselves and others," declared that the

U. S. policy had become unnecessarily ambiguous regarding our NATO obligation to support "the old colonial interests of our allies."

Speaking even more frankly on the Arab-Israeli controversy, Mr. Dulles admitted "the deep resentment against the United States that has resulted from the creation of Israel" which we "should seek to allay." The Arab peoples were depicted as being "afraid that the United States will back the new State of Israel in aggressive expansion and were more fearful of Zionism than of Communism." And Israel on her part, the Secretary added, was apprehensive lest the Arabs attempt to push her into the sea.

This tense situation, according to Secretary Dulles, called for an American policy of strict impartiality toward Israel and the Arab states. In defense of this policy departure, the Secretary declared that the leaders in Israel themselves "agreed with us that the U. S. policies should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israelis, but also of the Arab people." (In the light of subsequent events, there had apparently been no agreement with Israeli leaders on the meaning of the word "impartial.")

While stating that the United States would not "hesitate by every appropriate means to use its influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of tensions and the conclusion of ultimate peace," Mr. Dulles at the same time was forced to abandon publicly any immediate possibility of a Middle East Defense Organization. Previously on his trip he had admitted to a Karachi audience having no firm view as to the precise defense organization which might develop in the Middle East. "Collective security organizations," the Secretary had told the Pakistanis, "are more solid as they reflect not only strategic factors, but unity of culture and faith." To his American listeners Secretary Dulles now admitted:

The establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization is

a future rather than an immediate possibility inasmuch as many of the Arab countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel, or with Great Britain, or France, that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet Communism. Where the Soviet Union is near, there is much more concern and in general the northern tier of nations demonstrate an awareness of the danger. . . . Here there is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed to grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger. The United States could, in awaiting the formal creation of a security association, usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength—not as against each other, or the West, but to resist the common threat to all free peoples.

Adlai Stevenson, who reached the Middle East on his world tour in the wake of Mr. Dulles' visit, arrived at the same conclusions as the Secretary. In his *Look* magazine article, "No Peace for Israel," the 1952 Democratic standard-bearer pointed to the "psychological—indeed I might say pathological" fear that the Arabs and Israelis bore toward one another, which precluded all hopes of building a common defense against communism. "They (the Arab leaders) are quick," wrote Mr. Stevenson, "to blame the U. S. and Zionists for their woes, and American popularity, once so high, has fallen to a low estate." Mr. Stevenson's conclusion: "The Arab states must be made to feel that America's friendship for Israel does not mean we are anti-Arab or esteem them the less. But this will take far more than words."

While appreciative of the "fine words of the Dulles statement," the Arabs were unmistakably disappointed in the reluctance of the United States to compel Israel to carry out United Nations resolutions. Unalterably opposed in 1947 and 1948 to these resolutions, the Arabs were now demanding implementation of the resolutions regarding the boundaries, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the refugees. They con-

tended that such action by Israel was a prerequisite to any discussion of peace terms and, by implication, to Arab recognition of the State of Israel.

Arab reaction to the promised American impartiality was expressed to me in Beirut by a prominent editor: "Neutrality in this case after the bias of Truman is hardly enough. The admission by Mr. Dulles of agreement on the part of leaders in Israel that U. S. policy should be neutral was most unfortunate."

The U. S. attitude ought to be "the restoration of rights," Egypt's Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salem, later stated. Cairo nevertheless received with interest the offer of Secretary Dulles to give assistance "in any desired way" toward finding a solution to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over Suez. The revolutionary government of General Naguib was then much more concerned with this Egyptian problem than with the Palestine question, which was regarded as a distasteful inheritance from the Farouk regime.

Based on the findings of his trip, the strategy of Mr. Dulles gradually began to take form: Settle the Suez problem, while preventing any exacerbation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and contribute to the stability of the area by limited expenditures for military and economic aid. And because he had also learned that defensive measures could not be imposed on the Middle East states from the outside, the Secretary turned his efforts toward building a different type of defense wall around the area.

His recently acquired first-hand knowledge convinced the Secretary not only that bringing Israel and the Arab states together into any kind of defense pact was completely impossible, but that, in the light of the high pitched anti-American feeling, leading the Arab states into any Western arrangement would pose an overwhelming problem. To supplement his diplomatic sources, the Secretary had engaged in confidential talks with other competent Americans whose familiarity with

the area was unquestioned. In Beirut and in Cairo he had learned of the alarming growth in the Arab feeling toward neutralism similar to that of Mr. Nehru. An alternative approach called for the arming of Middle East states separately by the United States under bilateral agreements and the linking together of the countries thus armed by mutual defense pacts. This new plan emerged as the so-called Northern Tier Alliance and culminated in the Baghdad Pact.

The United States came to know the facts of life the hard way. Football strategists realize that, while the forward pass offers greater chances for a spectacular gain than a plunge through the center of the line, there is always the risk of interception. The United States was leaving the settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem in the hands of time, while proceeding with the new defense plan. In doing so, it forgot all about a possible Red interception.

VI

The Arab Reawakening

As a first step toward the defense of the Middle East, an arms agreement with the United States provided Pakistan with war material under the Mutual Defense Agreements Program to be used “exclusively for the maintenance of her own internal security and legitimate self-defense.” Pakistan pledged herself not to engage in any act of aggression nor to devote the arms, without prior arrangement, to purposes other than those for which they had been furnished. Turkey and Pakistan then began to consult on a common defense, the first link in the so-called Northern Tier Alliance.

The decision to arm Pakistan drew tremendous opposition in certain quarters in Washington. Paul Hoffman, former head of the E. C. A., and Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India, opposed sending arms to Pakistan. They claimed this step would only heighten the already existing Indian-Pakistani tension over the suzerainty of Kashmir and might drive India out of the Western camp into the hands of the Communists. However, the administration, during the last weeks of 1953,

went ahead with plans to arm Pakistan as the first move in closing the northern gap of 1200 miles between that country and Turkey.

Pakistani leadership had favored closer ties with the West in the face of her need for a strong Western ally as a protection in the event that Red China should move against East Pakistan, 1000 miles removed from the other half of Pakistan. Three days after the signing of the U. S.-Pakistani agreement, Fazhil Hug, Chief Minister of East Pakistan, announced that the province wished to become independent of West Pakistan. In the course of ensuing negotiations with Turkey, Communist agitation within East Pakistan increased to such a point that Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed was forced to remove Fazhil Hug from his position and supplant him with someone from West Pakistan.

With U. S. encouragement, a full military alliance was reached between Turkey and Pakistan. Pakistan, long a proponent of Moslem unity, soon became the object of pressures from the Arab states to force her new ally, Turkey, into an anti-Israeli position.

When Turkey and Pakistan, as recipients of arms grants from the United States, agreed upon a full military alliance, Iraq was put next in line for a mutual defense agreement as another "northern tier" country bordering the Soviet Union.

Iraq, with deeply rooted British ties, was regarded by the West as a key country for many reasons. It was located just west of the strategic Zagros Mountains, a natural barrier in any military plans for the area. Again from a military standpoint, the Iraqi bases of Habbaniya and Shu'aiba were important forward installations capable of accommodating interceptors, light bombers and tactical aircraft supporting ground troops. And Basra was the best equipped port in the Persian Gulf.

With her oil revenues, Iraq was in no need of economic assistance. It was hoped by the West that as an Arab country Iraq might be able to induce her sister Arab countries to fol-

low her example by coming into the Pact. Furthermore, Iraq, having no common border with Israel, was more acceptable in Western eyes as a recipient of weapons than were other Arab countries who might conceivably have aggressive designs against Israel. Western Powers friendly to Israel viewed Iraq as potentially less of a threat toward the common Arab enemy, despite the fact that Iraq blustered as much against Israel as the other Arab states, if not more, and had never signed a truce agreement.

Iraq, nevertheless, moved slowly and cautiously into the scheme of Secretary Dulles. Iraq's adherence to a Turkish-Pakistani pact could be bartered for termination of her treaty with Britain. For some time the regime of Nuri-as Said (who had been continually in and out of the Iraqi government, having served no less than 14 times as Prime Minister) had been threatening the British government with the abrogation of the long standing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.

Iraq's decision to accept United States arms and join the Turkish-Pakistani pact was met with a storm of protest from the rest of the Arab world. Iraqi assurances that these new ties were in no way contrary to the obligations of Iraq under the Arab League Security Pact did not stop the opposition.

Every Arab country had one or more reasons for viewing the Iraqi-Turkish alignment with the greatest suspicion. Syrians could be stirred to bitter anti-Turkish sentiment. Still rankling over the seizure of the port of Alexandretta (renamed Hatay and Iskenderon), the Syrians were fearful of Iraqi designs to bring about a "Fertile Crescent" union under Hashemite hegemony. Lebanon, whose cultural orientation toward the West was strongest, was torn by nationalist and sectionalist movements, many of whose leaders viewed with alarm any increase in Iraqi strength.

Saudi Arabia had had her own military arrangements since 1951 with the United States, under which the strategic Dhahran base was being utilized by the U. S. Air Force. She had

no fear of communism but regarded Israel as a threat. Her rulers, first Ibn Saud and then his successor, Saud, had vowed the return of Palestine to Arab hands. No further military ties with the West were deemed possible or necessary by Saudi Arabia. And despite the interchange of visits between Iraqi and Saudi sovereigns, the wounds of the ancient, bitter Hashemite-Wahhabite rivalry were scarcely healed. King Saud did not relish the possible ascendancy of Iraq.

Egypt led with increasing vigor Arab opposition to the plans of Iraq. The United States was to be sadly disappointed in the fanciful notion that Colonel Nasser could be persuaded to look to the lands south of Egypt as a sphere of interest while the northern tier was being cemented.

Whereas vulnerable Iraq felt a great need for some Western protective arrangement, Egypt, further to the south, did not feel the same urgency. First, she was fighting to oust the British from the Canal Zone. Then, bitter memories of former Turkish occupation and the subsequent imposition of the Albanian ancestors of Farouk still rankled. The Revolutionary Junta were accustomed to assessing a portion of the blame for the Egyptian defeat in the Sinai-Gaza campaign by Israel to the complete inactivity of the other Arab armies, particularly that of Iraq, where Nuri-as Said had just come to power. And it was the same Nuri, always considered by Egyptians to be a tool of the British, who had masterminded his country's alignment with the West.

Major Salah Salem, the Minister of National Guidance, who had been touring Arab capitals to build up Arab sentiment against what was to become known as the Baghdad Pact, was dispatched in August 1954 to Iraq by Prime Minister Nasser. Major Salem's report on his return indicated that major points of difference had been resolved. The over-optimism of the exuberant major then almost cost him his job. He had to resign for twenty-four hours—because of bitter protests from the Saudi Arabians who believed that he had compromised the

Egyptian-Saudi position. Nuri had apparently almost persuaded Nasser through Major Salem that dependence and alliance on the West might be beneficial to Egypt. A trial balloon by way of a Nasser statement in this direction had to be retracted by the Revolutionary Council. Public opinion could not be prepared for a new "treaty" arrangement linking Egypt with still another foreign power at the very moment that she was struggling to be liberated from "Western imperialism" in the form of the British occupation of the Suez.

British and Egyptian signatures were affixed to the final draft of the Suez Canal evacuation agreement in mid-October. United States prestige revived temporarily because of the role played by Ambassador Caffery in these successful negotiations restoring full freedom to Egypt. This was the climax to the Ambassador's career of 44 years in the diplomatic service, 29 of which had been served as head of an American mission abroad. With the best wishes of a grateful Egypt and of her Prime Minister, Jefferson Caffery returned home to a Georgetown retirement and to special praise at a Presidential press conference.

But Ambassador Caffery's successor, Henry Byroade, soon found himself in an unenviable diplomatic position. It was alleged that as Assistant Secretary of State for the area, he had been the architect of the controversial Baghdad Pact. Egypt's unrelenting war against what she viewed as the "splintering of the Arab League" resulted in the youthful diplomat becoming the target of much criticism.

The Nasser regime was confronted at home with other compelling reasons for viewing the participation of Iraq in a Western alliance as a danger to Arab unity and as a challenge to Egypt's leadership within the Arab world. Extremists led by the Moslem Brotherhood were attacking the Egyptian government for having reached an amicable arrangement with the British which would permit reoccupation of the Suez Canal under certain specified conditions. From the safe distance of

Damascus, leaders of the Brotherhood even accused Prime Minister Nasser of negotiating a secret agreement with Israel at Aqaba.

Even had he not been personally convinced that neutrality provided the Arabs with the best bargaining position vis-à-vis Palestine, North Africa and other outstanding problems, Prime Minister Nasser felt forced to hew to a policy of independence from the West in order to meet internal dangers and retain his place at the head of the Arab world. From the standpoint of Egyptian tactics it made much more sense to champion the Arab cause against Israel, whose mentor was the West, than to become U.S. "number 2 boy" behind Iraq. Any other course, it was believed, exposed the government to grave dangers at home.

During the fall of 1954 and the following winter, the peregrinations of Arab, Turkish and Pakistani leaders around the Middle East were as difficult to chart as the travels of John Foster Dulles. While Major Salem was trying to persuade Arab governments to strengthen the Arab Collective Security Pact and not to join any outside pacts, Prime Minister Nuri Said was making a tour of the same countries, talking an entirely different language. Some Arab statesmen tried to heal the rift, while others endeavored to form new economic and military ties.

In this period there was much talk, more rumor and no agreement—bitterness, recriminations and no restraint. As political battle lines formed and re-formed, it became clear that the Iraqis, despite the violence of the propaganda war with Egypt, would not be turned from the path set forth in the communiqué issued at the end of Nuri Said's visit to the Turkish capital in October. The Iraqi Premier at the December meeting of the Arab League's Foreign Ministers reserved the right of his country to sign an agreement covering special arrangements for defense with its immediate neighbors, Iran and Turkey. This, Nuri contended, was a regional arrangement

consistent with the United Nations charter. The strengthening of Iraq, he insisted, would in turn strengthen the Arab League Security Pact.

Iraq's former Prime Minister Fadhil el Jamali argued: "Those who cannot move should not chain the feet of those who can. If Nasser feels that the Egyptians are not ready for pacts, our own internal situation is good."

The adherence of Iraq to a pact with Turkey, linked to Pakistan, occurred only after a bitter eleven-month struggle and amidst the wildest of threats and rumors. Following Iraq's signing on February 24, 1955, Britain announced that she too was joining the Pakistani-Turkish-Iraqi Pact. The substance of this Pact was to provide for joint measures "against any aggression that may be committed against them from within or without this region whatever its origin." Israel, according to the Iraqi interpretation, was precluded from joining by the specific limitations to "states which can strengthen regional security by virtue of geographical position." (This reasoning at the same time conveniently provided Turkey with an answer to Israeli protestations against being left out of the area agreement.)

The new regional arrangements provided a special British-Iraqi defense agreement replacing the bilateral treaty. The Iraqi-British Treaty, due to terminate in 1957, was erased and Britain handed over full control of the air bases of Shu'aiba and Habbaniya to Iraq. English-appointed civilian firms, as under the Suez Agreement, were to maintain the bases.

Egypt, frustrated in efforts to block the Iraqi-Turkish alliance, pushed counter defense arrangements with the other Arab states. Former Syrian President Shukri Kuwatly, who had been groomed in Cairo, returned to Damascus from exile to become President again. The new chief of state solidified his country's ties with Egypt and led the opposition to the Baghdad Pact. The murder in April of Syria's Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Adnan Malki, and the subsequent trial of mem-

bers of the Syrian Popular Party (PPS) accused of plotting his death, aroused more Syrian bitterness against Iraq and the U. S., both of whom were accused of political machinations. Syria, increasingly unstable politically since the ousting of Colonel Shishakly, began to reflect increasing Soviet influence under the leadership of Khalid Baghdash, the first Communist to sit as a member in an Arab Parliament. Although the Party was banned, he gained election as an Independent.

Yemen leaned in the direction of Cairo while Lebanon labored to remain neutral. Jordan was being twisted between the two opposing camps. She faced the loss of an annual British subsidy of 22.4 million dollars if she joined the Egyptian sponsored defense group. Turkey presented three military planes to Jordan in an attempt to woo her from siding with Egypt.

A new factor then entered into the Arab internecine struggle. The activities of a mutual foe prevented the widening chasm between Egypt and Iraq from leading to an irreparable break in relations. Four days after the conclusion of the Iraqi-Turkish pact came the attack of Israeli armed forces against Gaza, the first of a series which was to turn the Gaza-Israeli frontier into an inferno.

While the Israeli-Jordanian front was enjoying a relative calm during the winter of 1954-1955, reports were current by February that Israel was building up her armed strength to meet impending Arab re-armament. Former Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who had been in nominal retirement at Sde Boker, the experimental settlement in the Negev Desert, announced his return to public life as the Defense Minister in the Sharett government. From his retreat he had maintained at all times the closest contact with Major-General Moshe Dayan, Chief of the Israeli army and others who belonged to the activist school. In contrast to the more diplomatically minded Moshe Sharett, Mr. Ben-Gurion advocated the tough rather than the soft approach toward his Arab neighbors. Not

ten days after Defense Minister Ben-Gurion had assumed office, Gaza was added to the black record alongside Kibya and Nahalin, the ill-fated Jordanian villages. On the night of February 28, 1955, a heavily armed Israeli force opened up a new front by attacking an Egyptian military post in the Gaza border area in answer to Arab infiltration.

The threat of physical danger sent the more than 200,000 miserable Gaza refugees into near pandemonium. Tensions mounted on both sides.

The Israeli reprisal raids provided Egypt with an opportunity to assume the top command against Israel. A Turkish-Pakistani plan to assuage Cairo and place Egypt at the head of a new nine-nation Moslem defense group was forgotten. Mr. Ben-Gurion and his cohorts gave new life to the tottering Arab League and lent vitality to an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian military alliance. The Gaza attack was a more telling blow to the Baghdad Pact than any action that the Egyptians could have undertaken. The southern tier counter-alliance commenced to gain ascendancy.

The mild, conciliatory attitude toward Israel shown earlier by the Revolutionary Junta in Egypt evaporated under internal steam and external bombardment. This was not the result of the change in leadership from General Naguib to Colonel Nasser but of events which gradually moved Egypt from the least to the most bitterly anti-Israel Arab country. As *New York Times* correspondent Kennett Love reported, the average Egyptian had rarely expressed hatred for the Israelis and was not concerned with the Palestine question. The Gaza Strip and its refugees were very remote indeed to the Egyptian shopkeeper in Cairo or the farmer in Tanta—until Gaza shook with successive explosions and Egypt began to count her dead.

Convinced as he was of his inability to join the West, Nasser never closed the door to future cooperation compatible with full Egyptian sovereignty. Even as Egypt carried on her campaign to win Arab countries to her neutralist position, Major

Salah Salem hinted to Israel that the surrender of the Negev to unspecified Arab hands might be viewed as a reconciliatory move. The Israeli Foreign Ministry had previously indicated a willingness to give the Arabs transit rights in this desert area; General Naguib had indicated that the physical presence of Israel there, separating Egypt from the other Arab states, made any peace impossible. While it was not clear whether the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance was referring to an outright cession of this Israeli-held area or a land link connecting Egypt and Jordan, the Israeli Foreign Office condemned the Salem suggestion, the British called it impractical, and the U.S. State Department declined comment.

It is not surprising that to strengthen his bargaining position with the United States, to gain more support in the Palestine struggle and to win increased prestige, Nasser should look eastward, toward an evolving, growing force there.

The collaboration of Asian-African nations as a bloc had gone beyond the confines of the United Nations, where the cooperative efforts of these people had started. Pan-Asianism, intermixed with a little Pan-Africanism, was being stirred by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan—known as the Colombo Powers because of their association in an economic development plan framed in Ceylon's capital.

At that time the four Big Powers and Red China were settling the issues of Indo-China at the first Geneva meeting (April to July, 1954) in the wake of the West's military disaster of Dien Bien Phu. The Asian "Big Five" Prime Ministers issued a joint communiqué reiterating their "unshakable determination" to resist interference by communism and anti-communism alike. These Asian powers then called for the independence of Arab North Africa and expressed "deep sympathy" for the Arabs of Palestine, urging the United Nations to "expedite the rehabilitation of these refugees in their original homes."

While the West paid little heed to these leaders who represented almost six hundred million people, Russia's Molotov and Red China's Chou En-lai skillfully directed their remarks as much to the conferees in South Asia as to the delegates whom they faced in Switzerland. Indications were that they were not unheard, as the note of anti-colonialism reverberated and the African-Asian-Arab nations closed ranks.

The following December the Colombo Premiers invited Red China, North Vietnam and twenty-three non-Red nations of Asia-Africa to meet in Indonesia. All states on the Asian continent and the adjacent islands were asked to be present, with the exception of North and South Korea, the Chinese Nationalists and Israel. The deepseated desire of those issuing the conference call was to re-emphasize Asianism and independence from the West.

By the potency of her delegation, Egypt indicated the importance attached to this Indonesian conference. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of National Guidance headed a group of 30. Enroute to the conference Prime Minister Nasser stopped to confer with Jawaharlal Nehru and to address a joint session of the New Delhi Parliament.

In the colorful plateau city of Bandung, famed for its handsome mosques, colleges and government buildings, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers and outstanding diplomats representing one billion, 400 million people and 29 nations gathered. Only the Central African Federation had declined the invitation.

Here, in his first major international conference, Nasser shared the spotlight with Chou En-lai, Nehru and U Nu and pushed his cause. The American press featured the resistance of the pro-West nations to the enticements of Chou En-lai, but the unresolved differences on communism amongst the conferees were far less impressive than the expressions of solidarity on colonialism and on Palestine. While the Bandung nations

represented heterogeneous political philosophies, ranging from outright communism, through varying degrees of neutralism to pro-West anti-communism, these delegates of 56% of the world's population found agreement in their outright support of Arab claims in the Palestine dispute.

In the course of a three-and-a-half-hour discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem only Nehru of India and U Nu of Burma defended the idea of a negotiated settlement long advocated by Israel and opposed by the Arabs. Chou En-lai more than offset this position by placing Communist China squarely in favor of the resolution calling for territorial revisions and recognition of the rights of Arab refugees. These were adopted by the Conference.¹

This resolution on Palestine was not at all surprising. Of the nations at Bandung, the Philippines and Liberia alone had voted in favor of the United Nations partition of Palestine and then only in a reluctant last-minute shift of position. Representatives of 480 million people had opposed partition, and eleven delegations with 620 million people had abstained on the final vote. Eight hundred million people represented at Bandung had no representation at the United Nations when the fate of the Holy Land was being decided.

Bandung opened new vistas for Egypt. The Asian-African talks provided tangible, as well as all manner of intangible, gains, not the least of which was enhanced Nasser prestige. Despite the fact that Egypt declined to grant recognition to the Peiping government, a step strongly advocated to the Prime Minister by Nehru, new Cairo-Peiping ties brought for Egypt an important increase in the sale of cotton in addition

¹ The final Bandung resolution adopted on the Palestine question was as follows: "In view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Asian-African conference declares its support of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and calls for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on Palestine and of the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question."

to the 50 million pounds purchased by Red China the previous year. U. S. subsidization of cotton exports as a surplus commodity for aid purposes under the Mutual Security Act was precipitating a near economic crisis in Egypt. Egyptian cotton could not compete with the sale abroad of American cotton for local currencies. Thus, in still another sphere Egypt was being forced to look to Russia and her satellites. Barter deals were already providing crude oil from Russia, kerosene from Rumania, machinery from Poland and Czechoslovakia. New barter agreements with East Germany were already looming on the horizon.

Meanwhile Secretary Dulles and the Department of State could not fail to see in the Bandung Conference a greater urgency to present a friendlier face toward the Arabs. Of the Arab states, only Iraq was lined up with the West. In the face of the overwhelming sentiment for the Arab position and direct Communist overtures to the Arabs through Red China, the Secretary now could convincingly argue with Zionist protagonists that a display of greater American concern for the Arabs would help Israel "lest a situation be created which would suddenly ring Israel with a solidly hung iron curtain."

The Israeli question no longer involved merely the Arab states; it involved a group of Asian states, uncommitted to East or West, but committed to the Arabs. "Look what the West is doing to your Arab brothers" was an effective Communist argument which could be exploited not only to win the favor of the neutralists, but to shake the confidence of pro-West adherents Iraq and Pakistan, securely tied by Moslem fraternity to the Arab cause. In the event of a real crisis over Israel there was the grave danger of a revolt against the pro-West government of Iraq, a country long known for violent swings of the political pendulum.

The challenge of the Kremlin was growing more imposing as the Soviet continued to tantalize the Asian-African peoples. More and more was basic Soviet policy manifesting itself: to

build friendship and alliances with these newly established nations. The visit of V. P. Krishna Menon to Chou En-lai in Peiping and of Jawaharlal Nehru to Moscow, which was later reciprocated by the trip of the Russian leaders Khrushchev and Bulganin to New Delhi, was a successful pattern to be applied elsewhere in the neutral world. The grave danger in the Middle East as in Asia was not of Communist aggression but of internal explosions against Western imperialism.

After Bandung, Israel clearly saw the pro-Arab pronouncements as a threat of complete political isolation should the West rise to the Russian challenge and compete for Arab as well as Asian neutralist support. On the diplomatic front, the Foreign Office in Jerusalem replied to the resolutions adopted at the Asiatic conference by demanding Arab recognition of Israel. On the military front, added impetus was given to the Ben-Gurion reprisal policies along the Gaza frontier. And on the propaganda front, American Zionists stepped up their attacks on the U.S. Middle East policy as endangering the security of Israel.

The support of the Arab states by Chou En-lai and other Communist delegates was adduced by Zionist adherents as proof of the futility of "appeasing the Arab states at Israel's expense," an argument steadfastly advanced despite the fact it was the Communists who were supporting the Arabs more than the Arabs who were supporting the Communists. The time for more vigorous public action in behalf of Israel had arrived, cried the leaders, as "appeals to the President and State Department have failed."

VII

Impartial but Pro-Israeli

THE United States found it as difficult to embark upon a policy of impartiality in the Middle East struggle as to build a defense system in the area against communism. The catch: one was inexorably linked with the other.

From the outset, the Eisenhower administration had been viewed with hostility by the Zionist lobby and pro-Israeli leaders. They had been confident that Adlai Stevenson as a Democrat would continue the path blazed by Harry S. Truman, and they had thrown most of their influence behind his candidacy. In Egypt the election of General Eisenhower was hailed with general satisfaction by the press and General Mohammed Naguib. Minister of State Fathy Radwan echoed the man in the street's "hopes for better things."

While the Arabs were hoping for the best, the Zionists were preparing themselves for the worst. Their gravest apprehension was the imminent possibility of an altered U. S. Middle East policy. Gone was the Zionist pipeline into the White

House maintained through David Niles, Judge Samuel Rosenman and Eddie Jacobson. It was soon discovered that President Eisenhower was not giving away keys to the House on Pennsylvania Avenue, although Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, influential Republican and close political associate of Senator Taft, was striving to pry one loose. Greater difficulty began to be encountered in winning from officialdom a continuation of the spasms of praise for Israel.

Events behind the Iron Curtain gave proponents of Israel a new propaganda weapon with which to resist change in United States foreign policy. The Czech trials in December (1952) and the subsequent Russian indictment of Jewish doctors were widely exploited as evidence of a new wave of anti-Semitism. Members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee openly expressed doubt that there could be any considerable change in United States Middle East policy in the light of these actions in Europe. One extremely well informed Washington correspondent noted that "to espouse at this time United States action which will be less pro-Israel will immediately draw the charge of being pro-Communist."

The action of the Senate in revising the resolution on Soviet "anti-Semitism" adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee was deemed indicative of the administration's unfriendliness. As the Jewish press complained, "the resolution in the form in which it was adopted lost almost all significance for Jews in that it condemns Soviet Russia for persecuting all religions—Christian, Mohammedan and Jewish. . . . It would have been better if the resolution had not been brought up at all. . . ." ¹

The Eisenhowers had scarcely finished unpacking their belongings in 1953 when the assault against the rumored arming of the Arabs commenced. The Zionist press charged that arms

¹ *Jewish Forward*, March 19, 1953.

were not sought for the defense of the West, but for a "second round" against Israel.

An alleged U.S. boycott of the opening ceremony of an important government exhibition in Jerusalem created additional acrimony. At this stage the U. S. was refraining from according recognition to the Israeli *fait accompli* making Jerusalem their capital.

A final piece of evidence of what Zionists regarded as increasing hostility toward Israel was adduced: America had refused Israel a long-term loan to meet its short-term obligations.

The schism widened as the State Department indicated its determination to remain impartial in the Arab-Israeli controversy and to arm Arab states in the face of Communist gains in the Middle East. The American Zionist Council, following an emergency meeting of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, allocated special funds to renew its political work in Washington and elsewhere in the United States. The Zionist Council announced a plan to mobilize new forces for a campaign . . . whose activities would be carried out in consultation with the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The goal of the new campaign was two-fold: to prevent arms from going to the Arabs and to get arms for Israel.

Adherents of Israel asserted that U.S. impartiality endangered Israel, and any action which did not subordinate the area defense needs to the security needs of Israel was assailed by these partisans as anti-Israeli, if not anti-Semitic. The Israeli goal was to prevent any arms from being shipped anywhere in the Arab world before these states agreed to a peace settlement. And, as in the past, the Arab-Israeli controversy became more and more a political football.

On September 23 General Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, requested Israel to order stoppage of the B'not Ya'akov hydro-electric project in the Israeli portion of the demilitarized zone

between Israel and Syria. The canal which the Israelis were erecting there was diverting the waters of the Jordan River into Israel.

In the Middle East the big economic battle is more the search for water than for oil. While a few grow rich on oil, the survival of the masses depends on water. For Israel more hydro-electric power meant less reliance on the importation of oil and coal. But the Syrians claimed the water diversion was affecting their mills on the east banks of the Jordan.

The U.S., Britain and France informed Israel of their support of General Bennike's request. On September 25 Foreign Minister Sharett announced that Israel would proceed with the work. A week later the American Chargé d'Affaires in Tel Aviv, Francis Russell, called upon Mr. Sharett to inquire why Israel had not complied with the desires of the U.S. The Israeli Foreign Minister replied that although General Bennike had ordered the stoppage, he had not stated the date on which work should stop and hence Israel was proceeding as planned. In the face of the Israeli refusal to suspend operations on the construction of this Huleh Canal, the payment of 26 million dollars from Foreign Operations Administration funds was withheld by Washington. It was subsequently divulged that this decision of the Israeli Cabinet to defy the United Nations had been reached despite the knowledge that this act would undoubtedly mean a suspension of American economic aid.

The New York mayoralty campaign, already in progress, henceforth developed into a contest as to which of the three candidates was able to attack the State Department the hardest for what Democratic candidate, Robert F. Wagner, Jr., declared to be a "cruel and intemperate" action in withholding grants in aid from the state of Israel. His rivals, Liberal Party Candidate Rudolph Halley and Republican Harold Riegelman, took up the cry. Soon the three candidates were conducting themselves more like candidates for mayor of Tel Aviv than of New York. Mr. Riegelman flew to Washington to meet with

Secretary Dulles and triumphantly returned with a promise of renewal of aid. Israel had in fact finally agreed to comply with the UN order and eliminated the "impediment" which in the words of the Secretary had held up the funds for a month.

The Zionists openly boasted that the restoration of aid had been accomplished through their political activity: "One can say that the security of the Jewish State depends almost as much on enlightened public opinion as upon its own armed might. If there ever were a doubt as to the political function of the Zionist movement in America, it has disappeared completely following this recent controversy between the United States and Israel."²

During this same period a more serious onslaught upon the new American goal of impartiality evidenced itself. Israeli armed forces, on the night of October 14-15, attacked the border village of Kibya and killed 66 Jordanians, injured 16 and blew up scores of buildings. The United States, Britain and France introduced a resolution in the Security Council calling for the censure of Israel. Telegrams flooded the State Department, Zionist speeches filled the press, pressures jammed the Congress—all in a hysterical wave endeavoring to prove that Israel had been provoked into the cold-blooded murder in Kibya. Mr. Dulles was depicted as a second Bevin or one step from a cross between Haman and Hitler. Had this been other than an off-election year with no national posts at stake, the Zionist attempt to reverse the U.S. position at the United Nations might have carried the day.

At this juncture, the White House began to display a healthy respect for the Zionists. President Eisenhower, wherever possible, avoided public reference to the Middle East, following a course of "the less said, the better." While the 7000 words of his 1954 State of the Union message detailed most problems that confronted the country at home and abroad, exactly

² *The Day* (N. Y.), November 7, 1953.

17 words were devoted to the Middle East, as follows: "In the Middle East where tensions and serious problems exist we will show sympathetic and impartial friendship."

Secretary Dulles could find no inconsistency between this goal and the decision to build future Western hopes in the Arab World around Iraq by making her army a "stabilizing force" in the Middle East. Zionists vehemently objected, pointed to Iraqi pro-Axis sentiment in World War II and contended that the "interests of the United States and Israel were coincidental," to use the words of Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban. The record showed quite a different picture.

From the very inception of the state, Israel has been anything but anti-Russian. Strong interests favoring the Soviet Union vied with pro-Western forces for control of the country's foreign policy. In these early days, a strict policy of neutrality prevailed.

While American Jewry and the American government were being urged to give a political blank check in support of Israel, the Israeli government was refusing to become involved in the war between East and West. Israel was not among the 15 nations which sent volunteers to fight against communism in the Korean war nor would Israel permit any Western military or air base on its soil the way Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Libya had.

When the Kremlin pressured both the Arabs and the Israelis to reject the Middle East Command offer of the West, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion in a note of November 21, 1951, assured the Soviet Union that Israel would never be a "member of any kind of union or agreement which pursues aggressive aims against the Soviet Union."

The very real threat of a second Arab round plus the pronounced Russian diplomatic bid for Arab support in 1952 accounted for a shift in Israeli tactics and a move toward the West. On February 9, 1953, a bomb exploded on the territory of the U.S.S.R. legation in Israel, wounding several Russians

and leading to the severance of diplomatic relations between Russia and Israel.

But less than four months later, the Israeli government proposed to the Soviets a resumption of diplomatic relations. In a subsequent exchange of notes, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett reiterated the non-aggression pledge contained in the previous note of 1951.

The Israeli papers, including those supporting the Ben-Gurion government, went out of their way to point out that it was Israel, not the Kremlin, which had made the first approach. Even moderates exulted in the event as the end of Israel's diplomatic isolation.

The resumption of diplomatic relations was heralded by the parties of the left with festive mass meetings and celebrations. The legally operating Communist Party, the Mapam Party, and other pro-Russian elements had been pressing for an independent foreign policy, for a "clean break with Israel's American overlords," to quote the paper *Tol Haam*.

On a visit to Great Britain in September (1953) Meyer Argov, Chairman of Israel's parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, announced a shift in Israeli foreign policy from a pronounced pro-Western position to that of "neutrality." This came in the wake of the Dulles trip to the area and enunciation of the new U. S. policy of impartiality. The Israeli parliamentarian stated that Israel must now rely on its own strength for protection in view of the impending Arab rearming and must cultivate a better understanding with the Soviet which "would make possible the emigration of Jews from the countries behind the Iron Curtain."

In returning to Moscow in December 1953 as Israeli Minister, Dr. Samuel Eliashev, upon presenting his credentials to the Soviet President Marshal Voroshilov, declared

the resumption of diplomatic relations (with the Soviet Union) had been received with great joy by the people of Israel. The State

of Israel had always been interested in friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The people of Israel remembered Russia's support at the time of the establishment of the Jewish State and the fact that the Soviet Government had given *de jure* recognition to Israel immediately after the proclamation of its independence.

In the celebration of the Jewish feast of Purim, parades in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem displayed Israel's impartiality very graphically—they were headed by huge puppets representing President Eisenhower and Premier Malenkov.

It was quite natural for Foreign Minister Sharett to state that Israel would not cooperate with U. S. foreign policy where that policy, as in the Huleh affair, ran athwart Israel's interests. But any suggestions that the U.S. too must be guided by her own national interests invariably ran into anguished howls, and all in the same vein: "How can America desert the defenseless little state of Israel?"

One direction that the Russian-Israeli friendship pledged by Ambassador Eliashev took was toward increased trade and barter between the two countries. Months later, even as the U.S. was weighing appropriate action to meet the crisis caused by the announcement of the Egyptian purchase of Czech arms, an important barter arrangement for 350,000 tons of Russian oil for Israeli citrus was completed in Tel Aviv.

The interests of the United States and Israel, therefore, were far from being coincidental. In fact, a disparity became increasingly evident as the Israeli Foreign Office and the Zionist machine fought successively the Iraq military aid agreement, the Suez Canal Evacuation Agreement, the arming of Egypt, the Turkish-Iraqi Pact and voluntary curbs on the Israeli right of unlimited immigration—all measures advanced by the United States.

In laying down the cornerstone of the new American policy for the Middle East in his June (1953) report to the nation, Secretary Dulles had said: "Israel should become a part of

the Near East community.” Assistant Secretary of State Henry A. Byroade in speeches in the spring of 1954 expanded upon this Secretarial injunction, only to discover how divergent were American goals and Zionist dogma. In the first of his speeches, Mr. Byroade said to the Dayton World Affairs Council:

To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves as a Middle Eastern State . . . and see your own future in that context rather than as a headquarters . . . or nucleus, so to speak . . . of worldwide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli State.

To the Arabs I say, you should accept this State of Israel as an accomplished fact.

In Philadelphia, before the American Council of Judaism, he defended this Dayton speech, which had met with an avalanche of protests from all quarters in Israel. The young Assistant Secretary, who had served during World War II as a top aide to General Marshall in Germany, stated that his proffer of advice to Israel had been misinterpreted as an improper intrusion into religious matters. This suggestion, Mr. Byroade pointed out, had been advanced solely to meet one of the principal causes of Arab-Israeli tension: Arab fear of Zionist expansion through immigration.

The second Byroade plea that Israel voluntarily curb immigration met with redoubled opposition because it was voiced under the aegis of the bitterly hated American Council for Judaism. In Israel, Independence Day speakers obstinately retorted by urging mass immigration into the small state. Mrs. Golda Myerson,³ Minister of Labor, told a Jerusalem audience that the most difficult fact in the life of Israel was not “its economic situation but the fact that it was short of more than one million to three million Jewish inhabitants.” The Minister

³ Later, she Hebraized her name to Meir.

of Development, Dr. Dov Joseph, said no one could “dictate an immigration policy to Israel” and, if Russia permitted the Jewish people to go to Israel, they would be “received with open arms.” “What right has the United States to interfere in our internal affairs?” was the cry that echoed throughout the land of Israel.

The organ of the right wing Herut Party in Israel declared:

Mr. Byroade is walking briskly in the footsteps of his mentor and teacher Bevin in that he has made it his mission to destroy the basis of Israel’s existence . . . to follow the friendly advice of Mr. Byroade would amount to transforming the State of Israel into another Levantine country in the Middle East that would be forever left at the mercy of strangers with regard to her security and economy.

The storm directed against Mr. Byroade gathered force from this comparison with Bevin’s attempts in 1946 and 1947 to hold down immigration into Palestine.

In May, Mr. Byroade, at hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, took occasion to say that he had not been dictating Israeli policy. Rather he had been analyzing the Arab fear of immigration and advising Israel to find means through wise statesmanship to meet this fear.

Mr. Byroade continued in his Congressional testimony:

It seems to us that one of the real impediments standing in the way of peace is that the Arab world does not know really the size of the State that they are dealing with. They know that the only limitation on immigration to Israel is the total of all people of the Jewish faith anywhere in the world. They are not sure that if they had a peace treaty today, that it would mean anything because some time in the future, these calls for greatly increased immigration might be heeded.

I point out there are only two places in the world where there are millions of Jews. One of these is the United States; and I don’t

foresee many from American Jewry emigrating to Israel to take on a new citizenship.

The other is the Soviet Union. We know that the plight of these people, as well as those of many other races in Russia, is a sad one. But we don't see the Kremlin opening its gates to let them out and risking the disadvantage of breaking the Iron Curtain, unless the time comes when they feel a Middle East aflame would be more important to them than the disadvantage of this break in the Curtain. I said in my speech that if that happened it would be a problem for the whole world and not just for Israel. I ended by saying that they should find some way to assure their neighbors upon such matters.⁴

But Russia possessed a special weapon. During the alleged Russian anti-Semitism of 1952-1953 the Israeli government had launched a new propaganda campaign, both at home and at the United Nations. Israeli leaders called upon the Soviet Union to let the more than two-and-a-half million satellite and Russian Jews come to Israel. This cry did not abate, even after the trial of the doctors had proved to be merely a facet of the Malenkov-Beria struggle for leadership control. Should the Communists as a gesture of renewed friendship for Israel ever become willing to permit even 250,000 Jews (10%) to pass the Iron Curtain, Israeli expansion, which Zionism has preached and which the Arabs have feared, would of necessity become a reality. A new Middle East War and World War III would be on its way. But the Russians believe they have devised a safer and surer method of penetrating the area. The as-yet-not-ingathered Jews are always held in reserve as a trump card for a tour de force via Israel should the Arab route fail.

Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, Republican Congresswoman from Ohio, interjected into the same hearing of the House Committee this thought (*italics mine*):

⁴ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on the Mutual Security Act of 1954, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session.

It seems to me that one of the important values of a closed session like this, is that this Committee be made aware of the actual situation in the various areas. *It cannot be talked about outside. These issues are too inflammable, but it seems to me that, as a Committee, we should know, for instance, that Russia is moving with great force into the Near East.* Some of us know this but the Committee, as a whole, really does not. . . .”

In responding to a suggestion of Congressman John M. Vorys, of Ohio, that cutting off Point Four appropriations to both sides might be better than spending more money, Mr. Byroade said:

I think, Sir, that the first job is to try to see that these people see the same dangers we do. This is not the case today. Part of our concern about the Middle East is that they will judge these moves of Russia as being friendly moves—I am talking about the people—they have not seen as much, or thought as much about Russian intentions as we have because their troubles seem to be more local. States around Israel fear Israel. Israel, itself, feels insecure, surrounded as she is. I don't believe with all the troubles there we would be doing the United States any service by saying, “Well, you have so many troubles you don't see things as we do and we are not going to try to help.” I think our policy of impartiality between Israel and the Arab states is our only policy that we can conscientiously have and the only one that will get through this period. But I predict two or three pretty rough years.

The Assistant Secretary of State maintained that at the time of the Kibya incident the United States was making a great deal of progress in the Arab world. He said:

I think that when anything like that happens, the net loser is the United States as well as Israel. The Arabs' first hatred and renewed passions are against Israel. But, on second thought, they say, “Well, there would not be an Israel but for the United States.” And they find a United States cartridge shell and they say, “Well, look, who

is really our enemy? Who has done this? The United States has done it."

Zionism's adamant answer to the State Department was to assail the Byroade proposals as "Byroadeism." Jewish nationalists were determined to preserve as an intra-Jewish issue the question of what kind of state Israel was to become, and to prevent it from being considered as part of American foreign policy bearing directly upon the fate of the Middle East.

Zionist jubilation over the open breach wrought by the Baghdad Pact between Iraq and Egypt was more than offset by the fear that Turkey might be brought into an anti-Israeli alignment by Iraq and Pakistan. This was a far more likely possibility than that Nuri Said, because of his Western ties, might become less intransigent toward Israel.

Even after the U.S. and Iraq had reached an arms agreement, Zionists sought to place obstacles in the way of the arms shipment. As Israel protested the aid on grounds that "assurances regarding defensive use of such aid" were a vain gesture, Louis Lipsky, Chairman of the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs, denied that the move would contribute to the peace of the Middle East or strengthen the defenses of the free world. Major General Yigael Yadin, former Israeli army Chief of Staff, on a visit to the United States to aid the United Jewish Appeal, joined the rising clamor in a statement issued from the United Nations. The Israeli soldier warned against any reliance on an Iraqi army which lacked the "will to fight."

Politicians were only too willing to join in the chorus against sending arms at the expense of "Israel, the strongest bastion of freedom on our side in that part of the world today." These words from Tennessee's ambitious Senator Estes Kefauver reverberated from platform, radio and TV.

The policy of arming the Arabs resulted in a deluge of complaints. In a letter replying to Congressman Emanuel

Celler, Brooklyn Democrat and a vehement proponent of Israel, Thruston P. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, explained:

The threat posed by Soviet imperialism is of such character that we feel obligated to take immediate measures to foster indigenous defensive strength, and not to delay such steps pending a definite settlement of intra-area problems. . . .

We fail to find evidence that any Arab state is desirous or capable of sustaining an aggressive move against Israel. . . . The Israeli request for military assistance remains under consideration by this Government but Israel's present military posture is not one of weakness. . . .

A decision to give United States arms to Egypt would fulfill President Eisenhower's pledge to Cairo on July 15, 1953, that Washington would help strengthen the Egyptian armed forces as soon as a Suez agreement was reached. The decision also would be in line with the United States view that the Arab states can be strengthened militarily without tipping the balance against Israel. . . .

The State Department supported with military statistics the judgment that the Arab states needed arms to defend themselves against Communist aggression and that Israel required no bolstering of her security position. Israel with its reserve system could place more soldiers under arms within 48 hours than all the Arab states put together. Defense Minister Ben-Gurion, addressing the first graduates of the Israeli military staff college, could honestly boast: "We have the best army in the Middle East."⁵

As the 1954 elections approached, it became apparent that Zionist strategy called for pressuring the Republican Party

⁵ This statement of April 1955 was echoed in the *Jewish Forward* on April 27: "At the present, however, at the threshold of her eighth year of independence, Israel faces the world without fear and with complete reliance upon its own power. The Arab enemies of Israel know full well how to value the power of the Israeli State; they have great respect for it. . . ."

from Middle East impartiality by threatening to support the Democrats, making them appear as the defenders of Israel. The White House was being warned of a probable defeat in six Senatorial contests if it persisted in disciplining Israel and working with the Arabs.

This new campaign actually began in August when the Zionists attempted to block the Suez Canal evacuation agreement. The Eisenhower administration was attacked bitterly for helping to reconcile Britain and Egypt. Democratic denunciations of the Arab countries were intermixed with denunciations of Republicans. And these Republicans, feeling it necessary to bid for the "Jewish vote," tried to out-denounce the Democratic denunciations of "Arab aggressors."

Zionists and pro-Israeli groups reminded the Republican Party that the new administration had departed from the constructive statesmanship of Governor Dewey and the late Senator Taft, thus "leaving Israel at the mercy of the terrorist acts of the Arabs . . ." said the *Jewish Forward*. "Jewish citizens will not be able to forget all this on Election Day. They will not be able to ignore it even if they wanted to."

Leaders called for mass action to tell the American public that "American weapons delivered to the Arabs are a knife plunged into the State of Israel; the hand which delivers the weapons is that of the State Department and of the Republican Administration in Washington." The battle cry was "No arms for the Arabs—if there must be, then weapons for Israel, too." A memorandum sent out by the American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs to all Congressional candidates sought to force a stand against the Arab arms grant. Jewish leaders were instructed to submit the memorandum personally to Congressional candidates in their own districts.

The Zionist pledge which the candidates were called upon to support read:

I am opposed to the grant of arms to any of the Arab states unless

(1) they declare their readiness to join in the defense of the Free World against Communist aggression and (2) agree to negotiate a peace with Israel and (3) in advance of such negotiations, abandon their boycott and blockade of Israel and, in the case of Egypt, the restrictions on the free movement of shipping to and from Israel, through the Suez Canal. Too, I believe the Administration should make a new and vigorous effort to bring the Arab States and Israel to the peace table.

By Election Day this pledge had been signed by 249 candidates plus an additional 76 who issued their own statement expressing general agreement with the joint declaration. This was better than 40% of the candidates seeking office in the new Congress!

A writer for the Jewish Labor Board had this comment to make on the Zionist hysteria over Iraqi arms and Egyptian economic aid: "All Jewish communities showed themselves during the campaign to be satellites of Israel whose duty is solely to supply the mainland with money, manpower and political influence."

Collaterally a rally was held at New York's Hotel Commodore to "raise the voice of American Jewry against the horrible wrong the Washington Administration is about to commit against the Jewish state and the Jewish citizens of America. . . . Don't wait till bombs are raining over the streets of Tel Aviv. Raise your voices now!" The New York press was inundated with advertisements and stories in an attempt to bring out a crowd. Outside the hotel, leaflets calling for votes against the Republicans were being distributed.

Thirty Chicago rabbis announced they were launching a counter-offensive against "anti-Israeli propaganda undermining the traditional friendship of the American people for the Jewish State." At this time *The New York Times* carried a full-page advertisement in the form of an open letter to Secretary Dulles over the signature of the well known and popular American entertainer, Eddie Cantor. While employing highly spe-

cious humility, the professional comedian assumed the role of spokesman for Jews in the United States. He took to task the Secretary of State with Zionist argumentation exactly like that which had been flooding the press.

Israeli Ambassador Abba S. Eban began making a constant pilgrimage to the State Department, interrupted only by a trip to Tel Aviv to report to his government. He called on Mr. Dulles, August 4, 1954; on General Walter Bedell Smith, who was then Under-Secretary of State, on August 5; and again on Mr. Dulles August 7. He met with Secretary Dulles September 15; with John D. Jernegan, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, September 24; with Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, October 1; and again with Mr. Dulles, October 8.

President Eisenhower was scheduled to speak at the Jewish Tercentenary Dinner in New York on October 25. It was the hope of many Zionists that under the force of political pressure in the middle of the Congressional campaign the President would be obligated to announce some favorable change in the administration's policy toward Israel. Every conceivable kind of pressure was brought to bear upon the Chief Executive and his advisers, ranging in impertinence from what the President should say to how long he should speak on the radio. In an open letter to the President, supporters of Israel stated that the reversal of the present policy "would be the greatest present that you could bring to American Jews when they celebrate their 300th anniversary in America."

The dinner, timed as it was at the height of the political campaign, was not unlike the dinner tendered to John Foster Dulles during his 1949 bid for the United States Senate, to finish out the term to which he had been appointed on the death of Senator Wagner. On that occasion supporters of his opponent, Governor Herbert H. Lehman, had indulged in a great whispering campaign against Mr. Dulles. Republican supporters were advised to take measures to scotch charges of

anti-Semitism against Mr. Dulles. Jewish leaders in New York arranged a luncheon where it was hoped Mr. Dulles would take a strong stand against the internationalization of Jerusalem, a burning issue at the time. However, Mr. Dulles greatly upset the plans of the stunned luncheon sponsors by upholding United States approval of Jerusalem's internationalization.

In his Jewish Tercentenary Dinner address President Eisenhower did not retreat from the arms-for-the-Arabs program, although he stressed friendship for Israel. The President told his New York listeners:

In the Near East we are all regretfully aware that the major differences between Israel and the Arab states remain unresolved. Our goal there, as elsewhere, is a just peace. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other nations in that area, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world. For, I assure you that in helping to strengthen the security of the entire Near East, we shall make sure that any arms we provide are devoted to that purpose—not to creating local imbalances which could be used for intimidation of or aggression against any neighboring nations. In every arrangement we make with any nation, there is ample assurance⁶ that this distortion of our purposes cannot occur.

A delegation of twelve Jewish leaders, representing sixteen organizations, including avowedly non-Zionist B'nai B'rith and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, called upon Secretary Dulles just before Election Day. Their purpose was to register a protest against arming Arab states and to get assurances that the arms sent to the Arab states would not be used against Israel. Mr. Dulles refused to discuss foreign policy issues under political pressure, but promised a post-election statement.

⁶ This reference was to Section 202B of the Mutual Security Act of 1953, which required that any country receiving arms aid must formally undertake that it will not engage in any active aggression against any other nation. This was written into all the arms contracts.

In the Democratic Congress which was elected that November, 157 seats were won by signers of the Zionist-extracted pledge to vote against grants of military aid to the Arab states. This was a number insufficient to block Mutual Security appropriations, even had all these pledgees wished to adhere to their election campaign promise.

This setback did not daunt the Zionists' enterprise. They continued to press for a reappraisal of American policy. As the first shipment of American military material for Iraq arrived at the port city of Basra aboard the freighter *Steel Artisan*, pressures were mounted on the new Congress and on Secretary Dulles. But the State Department hewed to impartiality, while hastening to assure Israeli proponents that they were not being deserted.

Leading Republican Simon E. Sobeloff, Solicitor-General of the United States, brought a message to the annual dinner of the American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science expressing Secretary Dulles' "understanding of the sense of apprehension and isolation which has arisen in Israel and belief that measures can be taken to allay these feelings." And in presenting his credentials to Israeli President Izhak Ben-Zvi, U. S. Ambassador Edward B. Lawson expressed President Eisenhower's hope that friendship between the two countries would be strengthened.

Later a Tel Aviv audience was told by the Ambassador that part of his mission was to assure the Israeli people of the American government's urgent desires "to see Israel develop continuously as a partner of the free world. There is no justification for fears. . . . Israel is not an isolated state, but a member of the free world community and is destined to play an important role in the world." These verbal gestures to Israel, naturally enough, did not go unnoticed in the Arab world.

However much of a Zionist defeat the agreement to aid Iraq may have been, the arms shipment was slow, and the real

objective of the “no arms for the Arabs” campaign was to prevent arms from going to Egypt. The 40-million-dollar grant to Egypt for highway, railway and water projects, given as part of the Suez Agreement bargain, came in for some attack in the Knesset by Prime Minister Sharett; but the major portion of Israeli attention was riveted on arms aid to Arabs “who breathe hatred and revenge against Israel.”

The State Department’s new look was thus drawing fire from both sides. It became more and more apparent that nothing short of partisanship would satisfy the Zionists-Israelis and that only a stringent impartiality would please the Arabs. The Arabs maintained that deeds had not kept pace with the spate of friendly words, that the Eisenhower-Dulles goal was in effect being vitiated by the continual acts of other branches of the government as well as by private Americans. The twenty-page State Department pamphlet,⁷ “Israel,” although emphasizing that the U.S. considered Israel a “political reality,” fell considerably short of a Zionist hoped-for major policy change. Disgruntled Zionists pointed to the absence of any fresh security guarantee for Israel, while the Arabs found new cause for dissatisfaction.

In discussing economic problems the document stated: “Israel has been able to maintain herself financially only because millions of dollars in foreign capital have come into the country.” Then followed the list of principal sources: Israeli Bonds, Private Contributions, U.S. Government Aid to Israel, United Nations Technical Assistance, and Reparations from Germany. However much the White House and the State Department may have been striving for impartiality, it was difficult to alter the very favored position which the American people had so long accorded Israel. And it was equally difficult to persuade the Arabs that anyone harbored a sincere intent to be

⁷ Background Pamphlet, “Israel,” released December 1954 by Public Services Division, Department of State Publication 5674, Near and Middle Eastern Series.

impartial. Even as our diplomatic representatives abroad endeavored to give appearances of "impartiality," the Jerusalem (Israel) *Post*, read carefully in the Arab countries, kept the Arabs au courant with American private aid and governmental encouragement.

Israel between 1949 and 1955 had received 135 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank as a loan, 250 million dollars in economic aid and 6 million dollars in technical assistance. This was a total of governmental assistance of 391 million dollars for a population which by 1955 had reached 1.7 million, covering 7800 square miles.

The seven Arab countries (not including Libya) for the same period received 104 million in technical assistance and economic aid, 3 million for exchange of persons, 36 million for loans or credits and 137 million dollars for the Palestine refugees. This was a total governmental assistance of 280 millions for 42 million people covering 2,400,000 square miles! And half of this sum was spent not in developing the Arab countries, but in keeping Arabs, displaced from Palestine as a result of partition, alive.

According to the figures released on July 4, 1955, by Ted Kollek, Director General of the Prime Minister's office, Israel had received \$396,150,000 since 1950 in U.S. governmental assistance.⁸ United States help for Israel had been extended without any conditions or strings. This July 4 tribute to the United States was widely publicized in the Arab world.

During the February 1957 United Nations discussion of economic sanctions against Israel, the New York press pointed

⁸ Economic Aid	\$226,228,000
Technical Assistance	6,322,000
Export-Import Bank Loan	135,000,000
Food Relief Shipments	20,000,000
Agricultural Surpluses	3,600,000
Books and Publications	5,000,000
Total	<u>\$396,150,000</u>

out, in its headlines, that Israel's economic life hung on U.S. funds and that sanctions would stop a flow of dollars equal to three fifths of the Israeli budget.

Certain members of Congress, "conservatives" for the most part, have insisted that the amount of assistance which the U.S. provides to a country should not be determined primarily by the needs of the country, measured in terms of such things as health, poverty or undeveloped resources, but on the basis of how much it is to our advantage to help these people. "Liberals," on the other hand, contend that the United States has an obligation—even a responsibility—to provide assistance to a country merely because living standards are lower there than is the case elsewhere. This cleavage between the liberal and the conservative approach is wide. Under the Mutual Security Act, however, aid to foreign nations rests solely on what the assistance will contribute to the attainment of the prime objective of United States foreign policy, namely, the containment of communism.

Whichever yardstick is applied, U.S. aid to Israel has been grossly out of proportion. For the fiscal year 1952 Europe was getting \$7.22 per capita, the Middle East \$1.03, Southeast Asia 59 cents, and the Orient 16 cents. But Israel was getting \$48 per capita, or more than 64 million dollars for its 1,300,000 inhabitants! Total American aid through 1954, including aid from private sources, provided \$854 per capita. While the United Nations was spending \$25 per year on each Arab refugee, Israel was requiring \$250 to care for each immigrant.

Under the Mutual Security program for the fiscal year 1954, \$208 million dollars was available for a development assistance fund. Israel received 25% of the funds allocated for all of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa; 20% of Israel's imports were financed by U. S. government grants.

Private contributions to the United Jewish Appeal and the sale of Israeli bonds in this country have brought the new state an additional half billion dollars since 1948. These tax-deduc-

tible contributions to Israel represented more per year than all the money given to the seven Arab states by the United States for economic aid, including "Point Four," between 1948 and 1954. To Israeli income must be added the annual German reparations payments which will total 715⁹ million dollars when completed. A U.S. waiver of two billion dollars of German reparations plus a loan to West Germany was part of the deal making these reparations to Israel possible.

Congress did not authorize funds for the economic development of the Arab states until the fiscal year 1954, two years after such projects began in Israel. When even the vast sums of gift capital were not sufficient to bring the Israeli budget into line, the United Jewish Appeal raised 62 million dollars for a consolidation loan to help pay Israel's pressing short-term debts. Subsequently the Bank of America was "prevailed upon" to grant a 30-million-dollar loan to Israel.

The U. S. governmental appropriations for the fiscal year 1955 to the seven Arab states were for the first time as large as the sum appropriated for Israel. This was because of the special Egyptian aid program promised for signing the Suez agreement. Arabs did not fail to call attention to the disproportionate allotment in terms of the respective populations involved.

The arms allotment aimed at keeping a military balance in the Middle East has been similarly disproportionate. This treatment reminded Colonel William Eddy, former American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and business consultant in the area for many years, of the story of the restaurant keeper who, when asked to explain the proportions of horse and rabbit in his hasenpfeffer, remarked: "Fifty-fifty, of course. One horse and one rabbit."

However many the individual expressions of goodwill toward the Arab world, and however fierce the resistance of the

⁹ An additional 105 millions goes to private Jewish organizations outside Israel.

State Department to continued coddling of Israel, the Arabs could sense little change under Eisenhower beyond a shadowy intent to be fair. The inadequate Point Four program providing technical assistance was something about which the average Arab knew little and thought less. Had the financial aid been in the amount and of the kind Israel was receiving, covering, for example, light industrial development and irrigation projects, so desperately needed in the Arab world, the impact would have been far different.

The violence at Gaza in February 1955 failed to make the slightest impression on the myopic American public or their political leaders. The Egyptian demand for a UN censure for the attack was offset by the widespread coverage given to Ambassador Eban's request that Egypt "join Israel in a code for peace." The "liberal" press, notably the *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune*, *Washington Post* and *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, while mildly admonishing Israel, placed the prime responsibility for Gaza at the door of Arab intransigency in refusing to make peace.

The call by the American press for immediate Middle East peace negotiations, which grew louder as a Security Council censure of Israel appeared more certain, was the precise reaction that the attack on Gaza was calculated to have. An article in *Harper's Magazine*, published almost simultaneously with the incident, frankly discussed the Israeli policy of ordered reprisals by the Israeli armed forces. According to the author, Moshe Brilliant, the *New York Times* man in Tel Aviv, the attacks were an answer to individual Arab infiltrations and were intended to force the Arab nations to the peace table. "These bloody border accidents," Brilliant noted, "are seldom accidental." The Israelis, continued the *New York Times* correspondent, had found that "model deportment had brought compliments and ultimate disaster," while "gunpowder and

dynamite earned them ultimately the coveted prize (a state in Palestine).”

New friends picked up the Israeli peace offensive. Acting like a prospective Democratic presidential nominee, Governor Averell Harriman placed the responsibility for border tension on Arab hostility. In a speech before the United Jewish Appeal at New York's Plaza Hotel on March 25, 1955, Secretary Dulles was assailed for not making clear to the Arabs that Israel “will be defended if necessary with overwhelming help.”

A Washington political conference of twenty leading Jewish American organizations, heralded as “the most important confab since the 1943 Biltmore Conference,” once again demanded that Israel be joined to the Western defense plans. But more than three hundred and fifty delegates were frankly told by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan that American amity with the Arabs was placed ahead of any such security pact with Israel. The U. S. was sticking to the *status quo*, wishfully believing that, if she did not take any further pro-Israeli steps, past partiality would be corrected.

Step by step reductions of tensions through “impartial friendship” remained the unswerving goal of the administration. And the President believed that progress was being achieved in this direction. But whoever was advising President Eisenhower was not telling him the whole truth about the Middle East. In his message to Congress on Foreign Aid on April 20, 1955, which was delivered while the Bandung Conference was in session, the President referred to the serious situation, but in an optimistic mood all too reminiscent of his Secretary of State, Mr. Eisenhower added: “Our cooperation is beginning to bring results, particularly in the development of water resources. Such developments in the Palestine area can go far to remove present causes of tension.” Five months later, when roving Ambassador Eric Johnston had returned from his fourth trip to the area, the project for the international development of the

Jordan River was as far from acceptance as in October 1952 when he had first gone there.

Both Israel and the Arabs were adamant in their own formulas for the division and storage of the Jordan waters, and the Arabs charged that Israel was going to divert the waters of the Jordan to the parched Negev.

After each trip by Mr. Johnston to the Middle East, the newspapers featured the same tale: "Arabs Inclining to Johnston Plan."¹⁰ If only the motion picture mogul had as much success with the Arabs in the area as he invariably had with the American press on his return, Presidential optimism might have been well founded. Inevitably, Mr. Johnston mistook proverbial Arab hospitality for acquiescence in his plan.

The time when words could satisfy had long since passed. Since the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the American government and the American people had lavished every possible favor, first on the Jewish Palestine community, and then on the sovereign state of Israel. The Arab feeling was that when the chips were down, America would inevitably be supporting Israel governmentally and even more so privately. According to Lebanese philosopher-Ambassador Dr. Charles A. Malik, "the outlook and attitude" of the United States was just as important as the material response. During a recess in the Security Council meeting in May 1954, this Lebanese graduate of Harvard disclosed his great fear of Communist inroads in the area. A leading Egyptian newspaper, which he displayed, carried some account of his recent speech in the Council attacking communism. But featured more prominently on the front pages was the story of the strong support that Russia, in the person of Andrei Vishinsky, was lending to the Arab states at the United Nations.

The Russian threat seemed far removed, while aggressive Zionism was very near and very real. It was obvious to ob-

¹⁰ *New York Times*, June 19, 1955.

servers on the scene that the Middle East could be awakened to the deceptiveness of Communist promises only by a sincere display of friendship through genuine neutrality.

But the American press remained partisan; American Christians continued to lavish their sympathy; American Jews continued to rally with their political and financial support in every Israeli crisis. The United States had refused to assume the role of a benevolent, disinterested third party.

VIII

Egypt Arms

MIDDLE EAST violence increased on the heels of the Gaza onslaught, and the final Egyptian death toll reached 40. A statement by Lt. Col. Salah Gohar, director of Palestine Affairs for the Egyptian army, which controlled the area, declared that this was "the most serious incident since the signing of the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel on February 24, 1949." A complaint was filed immediately with the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. The Israeli Foreign Office replied that the attack had been launched by Egyptian forces in Israeli territory and that the fighting was carried into Egyptian territory by the Israeli counter attack. But the Mixed Armistice Commission refuted the Israeli version in a communiqué stating that Israel had carried out "a violent attack" against Egyptian troops.

As the Commission continued to gather material for its final report, indignation swept the two hundred thousand Arab refugees crowded into the small wilderness area. Refugee students stoned the headquarters of the United Nations' Truce

Supervision Organization in Gaza. And later, mobs of refugees braved army and police gunfire in protest against Israeli attacks. Seven demonstrators were wounded in clashes with security forces, and the crowd stoned trucks carrying Egyptian forces to trouble points. For more than an hour and a half, 500 rioters besieged Egyptian officers and foreign correspondents in a hospital. The besieged group had to be rescued by an armored car.

On March 6, 1955, it was announced that families of the United Nations Relief Works Agency staffs, and wives and children of truce observers were to be taken through Israeli territory to Arab Jerusalem for safety. The refugees continued to demonstrate and demand arms. Meanwhile, along other border sectors there were charges and countercharges of breaches of the Armistice Agreement. War panic spread as one of the leading Cairo papers, *Akhbar el-Yom*, reported that Defense Minister Ben-Gurion had set up temporary headquarters at Majdal near the border.

Major General E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who inspected the scene of the attack, flew to New York to report in person to the Security Council, a procedure similar to that used in the Kibya incident by General Bennike.

The final report of the Mixed Armistice Commission and that of the special appeals committee, to which Israeli contentions for overriding the Commission's findings had been referred, affirmed the decision against Israel. The report, based on the investigation conducted by Major Sven Rosenius of the Swedish army, found that on the night of February 28 a force of the Israeli army estimated at two-platoon strength crossed the Armistice demarcation line east of Gaza, advanced more than two miles inside Egyptian-controlled territory, and, using rifles, machine guns, two-inch mortars, anti-tank projectiles, hand grenades, Bangalore torpedoes, Molotov cocktails (bottles of flaming gasoline) and 250 lbs. of heavy ex-

plosive charges, attacked an Egyptian military camp, the Gaza stationmaster's house and a concrete waterpump house supplying part of the Gaza area. The waterpump house, a stone military building, and four Nissen huts were completely destroyed. Another group of the Israeli army crossed the demarcation line three and a half miles southeast of Gaza and ambushed a military truck carrying a lieutenant and 34 men moving from the south to reinforce the Egyptian garrison. The highway was two miles within Egyptian-controlled territory.

Though the Security Council then censured Israel and called on General Burns to strengthen the UN truce machinery, there was still no peace. Between the Gaza attack on February 28 and June 10 there were 13 censures of Israel by the United Nations' Mixed Armistice Commission. As border violence continued, the Council rejected on April 19 a demand by Israel to hold Egypt responsible for these subsequent frontier clashes and then requested both parties to cooperate in carrying out practical measures for avoiding future hostilities in line with the suggestions of General Burns.

During April, May and June, even as General Burns endeavored to carry out the United Nations mandate, incident after incident occurred in and around the Gaza area. Colonel Nasser then declared: "We will meet force with force. If Israel takes the Gaza Strip, which she is capable of doing, it will automatically mean war."

Mr. Sharett responded: "Israel is quite prepared to leave the Gaza Strip as it is, provided that it is not used as a springboard for continued attacks against and incursions into Israeli territory."

Israeli soldiers were killed at Kisufim; Israel announced a reprisal attack and the blowing up of Egyptian installations. An exchange of mortar fire led to fighting in the demilitarized El Auja zone.

On the sidelines the battle of words continued without abatement. On a visit to Israel, Mrs. Roosevelt declared that

the repatriation of 100,000 refugees to Israel would be a "fair compromise" if the Arabs would take the remainder. The former First Lady lauded the economic gains of Israel, "the only nation with the spirit that founded the United States." But in a quite different vein, the Archbishop of York declared the Jordanian-Israeli truce line "absurd." The English prelate referred to the "terrible retaliation" by Israel for isolated raids by individual Arabs which led to "the widespread feeling that Israelis are provoking incidents." And, as General Burns publicly acknowledged, infiltration would not end so long as the refugees were not permanently settled.

The summer-long Gaza talks carried on by Egyptian representative Colonel Salah Gohar, Israeli spokesman Joseph Teikoah and the UN's General Burns sputtered along in the galvanized iron hut at Kilometer 95, without any substantial contribution to the lessening of friction. Talks or no talks, the shooting continued to crackle around the Gaza Strip. Patrol clashes led to retaliations, and retaliations bred other retaliations. Brutality and force increased hatred and bitterness, ushering in new acts of brutality and force.

The humid summer did not silence the Middle East political front. Prime Minister Nasser reemphasized Egypt's determination to join no camp nor be bound by any new military obligations. On a visit to Cairo, India's Nehru joined with Nasser in denouncing military pacts, a blow aimed at Pakistan and Iraq.

Two days after the Egyptian withdrawal from UN talks at Gaza, Secretary Dulles made his long-heralded Middle East pronouncement. Before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on August 26, 1955, the Secretary offered international guarantees to an Arab-Israeli agreement on the borders and an international loan for Arab refugee compensation with substantial U.S. participation. President Eisenhower, the Secretary added, would also recommend that the U.S. "contribute to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would directly or indirectly facilitate the resettlement

of the refugees." In this connection Mr. Dulles with characteristic optimism referred to the "encouraging willingness to accept the principle of coordinated arrangements for the use of the Jordan waters" and the "small margins of differences" which existed over the Johnston Plan. The United States, the Secretary noted in passing, would support a review by the United Nations of the status of Jerusalem.

The American press gave the widest coverage to the Dulles proposals. Editorials at home and in Western Europe sang his praises.

The reaction from the parties most concerned, however, was quite different. Israel announced that she considered the Dulles proposals for guaranteeing Arab-Israeli frontiers "constructive," but wanted to know what the United States meant by the proposed "frontier adjustments."

Ambassador Eban and Zionist leaders expressed open opposition to the yielding of any territory. They sensed that the Secretary may have had the Negev desert to the south in mind when he alluded to the "difficulty in drawing permanent boundaries . . . increased by the fact that even territory which is barren has acquired sentimental significance." Under the partition plan the Negev had been awarded to Israel, but under the revised settlement proposed by UN Mediator Count Folke Bernadotte the area would have been given to the Arabs in order to link Egypt and Libya with the Arab East.

The Arab press lashed out at the Dulles plan. One Arab refugee leader described it as a Republican Party political move aimed at strengthening Israel "by offering Arabs 30 pieces of silver." While there was no official Arab response, Colonel Sadat, a member of the Revolutionary Council, writing in *Al-Tahrir*, Cairo semi-official weekly, strongly criticized Mr. Dulles for failing "to note Israel's rejection of UN resolutions on Palestine," which for "Egypt and the Arab world could be the only basis for stability."

What was without question most significant about the Dulles

proposals was the fact that such a speech was made. This marked the first major American foreign policy speech devoted entirely to the Middle East. The emergence of the area from obscurity to the center of the foreign policy stage had begun. The proposals themselves hardly went beyond the *status quo*. The international guarantee of the borders envisioned by the U.S. Secretary of State was predicated upon prior Israeli and Arab understanding. If the two belligerents could ever reach agreement on permanent and final boundaries, an international guarantee would add very little. The mutual fear which Mr. Dulles hoped to eliminate would dissolve only when mutual confidence was established.

At that very moment Israeli and Arab alike were demonstrating just how remote they were from any meeting of minds. For twelve days starting August 22, when an Israeli patrol stormed an Egyptian post on the Gaza border in the wake of an exchange of fire, the Gaza border saw the most bitter fighting since 1949. Erez, Beeri, Kisufim, and Mefalsim were the scenes of attacks and counter attacks. An Egyptian *fedayeen* raid deep into Israel was followed by a heavy Israeli reprisal attack against the alleged headquarters of the Arab raiders. The concrete police barracks of the Khan Yunis garrison, one of the old British-built "Taggart forts," was blown up, and 39 were killed, including 15 Egyptian policemen, 12 Palestinian soldiers, 8 villagers and 4 Egyptian soldiers.

Israel admitted responsibility, boasting of the incident as a reprisal for an Arab terrorist raid. The attack came after Egyptians had accepted a UN cease-fire order. As reinforcements streamed toward Gaza, the Egyptian army under Commander-in-Chief General Amer was ready to move in full force. Other Arab states, even including Iraq, offered Egypt their support. Glubb Pasha flew to England from Amman. Only the restraining hand of the Egyptian Prime Minister prevented full-scale war. After two Israeli Meteors had destroyed two Egyptian Vampire Jets in a running battle over Israeli settlements north

of Gaza, Israel herself accepted the UN cease-fire order, relinquishing the condition that Egypt acknowledge responsibility for previous clashes. Armed truce with intermittent frontier conflicts ensued. Egypt and Israel were given time to bury their more than three score dead.

The moral force of the United Nations, never strong in this volatile area, had all but vanished. As Egypt disregarded the Security Council resolution calling on her to permit the passage of Israeli ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal, Israel defied the dictates of the UN Truce Supervision Organization. She believed her reprisal raids were far more effective in curtailing border infiltrations. The reluctance of the Sharett government to permit joint Israeli-Egyptian border patrols under UN command to operate within Israeli territory did not spring as much from considerations of a "violation of sovereignty" as from a deep cynicism toward the United Nations, which she believed was protecting the Arabs against Israel's superior military arsenal without affording Israel any redress against the Suez and Aqaba blockades.

Even General Burns' plan for an effective physical barrier between the opposing forces and a one-kilometer demilitarized zone along the entire Gaza frontier did not bring a cessation of violence. Israel moved into the truce zone of El Auja, southeast of the Gaza Strip. In occupying the demilitarized 195-square-mile desert triangle, Israeli armed forces arrested UN observers and seized their headquarters. Israel announced that she would withdraw her troops "as soon as Egypt withdrew her forces illegally stationed in the demilitarized zone."

Four days after members of the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations had heard Secretary Dulles call on them to make the "spirit of Geneva" permanent, Prime Minister Nasser in Cairo announced the Egyptian decision to accept the offer of the Czechoslovakian government to trade arms for cotton. A "stunned and dismayed" world, in the words of the press, received the news of this barter arrangement which

“bared Egypt and the Middle East to Communist penetration.”

Whoever else might have been surprised by this move, the Department of State had been more than adequately forewarned. Almost from the outset of the Revolutionary Regime, General Naguib had made known to the United States that military aid was essential to bolster the new government. Marguerite Higgins, New York *Herald Tribune* columnist, had featured this need in a story from Cairo in November 1952. U. S. arms aid to Egypt had been first promised July 15, 1953, by President Eisenhower in a message to General Naguib as an incentive to the lagging Suez Canal negotiations.

In early September 1954 the Department of State indicated a readiness to approve Egyptian purchases of arms. Assistant Secretary Byroade had warned a few months previously: “The more Russia’s aggressive moves are stalemated in Europe and the Far East, the more danger grows for the Middle East. . . . I believe this [Soviet] façade of friendship [to the Arabs] to be only a by-product of their real intentions . . . their primary objective is to stymie United Nations action in order to maintain and increase the dangerous tensions that exist within the area.” With these Russian objectives in mind, the United States had discussed with Egypt ways and means to satisfy both donor and recipient of an arms agreement. The contention that Israel needed arms and the Arabs did not had been rejected. And, according to form letters being sent to the public by the State Department’s Public Service Division, “no evidence could be found that any Arab state was capable or desirous of sustaining any aggressive move against Israel.”

At the time the U.S. commenced the arms shipment to Iraq, Egypt’s need for arms was daily increasing, but was in no way being satisfied. Cognizant of Egyptian military weakness, Colonel Nasser had anxiously sought to lessen tensions. Ansel Talbert, military editor of the *Herald Tribune*, noted (on April 7, 1955) that news of clashes with Israel had been consistently played down in the Egyptian press. The attack on Gaza and

the humiliating defeat at Khan Yunis only too clearly demonstrated the Israeli military preponderance. In the face of these national tragedies Nasser, only one voice in the Revolutionary Junta, was now finding it difficult to urge a course of continuous restraint upon his fellow officers. Having at least for the moment overcome the opposition of the Moslem Brotherhood and the Communists, Nasser had to fulfill his own promises that arms would shortly be forthcoming. The army had hoped for action to help erase memories of the inglorious 1948 Palestinian defeat, associated in their minds with faulty arms and dummy bullets.

As the U. S. was being approached for arms, Major Salah Salem declared that Egypt would seek Russian aid if the West turned down her request. When the U. S. agreed "in principle" to furnish arms to Egypt, air chief Major General Mohammed Sidki was rushed to the United States in the hope of contracting for 27 million dollars' worth of propeller-driven fighters, small artillery pieces and automatic weapons. The United States, as it had done on previous occasions, was willing to grant arms only under conditions similar to those imposed upon Iraq. Egypt would not accept a grant of arms conditional upon her joining a mutual defense agreement. And the U. S., by publicizing the conditions under which Nasser was to accept arms, made his chancing such an arrangement impossible even had he personally wished to go ahead. The United States, furthermore, insisted on payment in dollars, not in sterling. And at that moment Egypt's total dollar balance was exactly one million dollars in excess of the 27 million dollars' worth of arms they were seeking. In the face of increased cotton production and a dwindling market, Egypt's favorable balance of trade had vanished during the first six months of 1955. Egypt was able to make payment in sterling, but, as Colonel Nasser explained, her limited hard currency was available only for building schools and roads and other things to bolster the

economy. The arms mission of General Sidki failed. In Washington, arms for Egypt were all but forgotten.

At a press conference on August 30 Secretary Dulles disclosed that he had received indications that the Soviet Union might be intervening in the Arab-Israeli conflict by supplying arms to the Arab states. The indications were unofficial, the Secretary noted, but bore the marks of reliability. According to diplomatic informants, Egypt had been offered arms by the Soviet Union in exchange for cotton.

Notified in early July that Egypt was considering the possibility of securing arms from the Eastern bloc, Ambassador Byroade had cautioned Washington that, if the U.S. did not supply Egypt with arms, the U.S.S.R. would. And when Russia did exactly that, Congressman Celler, who had led the clique actively opposing any arms for the Arabs, demanded Byroade's resignation. Charges: Byroade was an appeaser and Egyptophile.

These reports of a Soviet-Egyptian projected arms deal won more credence in the light of the acceptance by Prime Minister Nasser of an invitation to visit Moscow in the spring and the build-up of trade relations between the Soviet Union and other Arab states. Saudi Arabia, closely associated with Egypt in opposition to the northern tier defense system, threatened steps to exchange diplomatic representatives with the U.S.S.R., and Syria was moving toward closer economic ties.

Only the day before the announcement of the Czech arms deal, Lincoln White, State Department press officer, admitted that the U.S. had agreed in principle on June 30 to sell Egypt arms but that "no arrangements have been effected to finance the purchase." This offer to Egypt, White added, had been in response to an Egyptian inquiry, and Ambassador Byroade was reported to have been in almost daily personal contact with the Egyptian Prime Minister. But the threat that Egypt might turn to Russia apparently was taken lightly by both the Eisenhower and the Eden administrations despite parallel

warnings from their ambassadors in Cairo. The long extant Egyptian request for arms with no strings had finally found a bidder. Under the prodding of Daniel Solod, Soviet Ambassador in Cairo, Czechoslovakia stepped forward, and a deal was swiftly arranged. It was believed that the barter agreement carried an open-end arrangement whereby Egypt might continue to make arms purchases according to her needs.

The day after the deal was consummated, the Egyptian Prime Minister told about it to the thunderous applause of thousands of Cairenes massed to attend the opening of an armed forces exhibit in Gezirah. He told of a France who attempted to bargain arms against the cessation of Egyptian criticism of French policy in North Africa; of a United States who insisted on anti-Russian pacts; and of a Britain who was only willing to supply equipment on a very small scale. And the French, to boot, had announced that they were sending tanks and jets to Israel. "This," the Prime Minister noted, "was their attitude toward us, while Israel was supplied with military equipment from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Canada and other countries."

Khrushchev and Bulganin had succeeded where Peter the Great and Stalin had failed: The Russians had a big foot in the Middle East door. Nasser had been driven into the dangerous position of accepting the wooing of the Kremlin. Few becoming thus enmeshed had been able to escape the inevitable end.

If we can accept the view that Nasser was not being driven by hate of Israel to seek arms and would have preferred, as he continually reiterated, to devote himself to internal reforms, we must conclude that the Egyptian leader was impelled by desperation to his position. The U. S. stumbled in pursuit of "impartiality"—and achieved it in words only. The Department of State had failed miserably in persuading Israel to transform itself from a world movement with its center in the Middle East into a normal national state.

The deeprooted Arab fear was never of Israel herself but of a state whose development and economy, supported by outside sources, inevitably would require more *lebensraum*, which those same outside sources would assure to her. Like the Roman emperor who said that his son was the strongest force in the world because he dominated his mother who in turn ruled the emperor, Arabs have noted that Israel could control the United States which in turn dominated decisions in the United Nations. Hence, Israel could do as it pleased and was bigger than any big state.

Only three months before the Czech arms deal President Eisenhower had sent a message to the Zionist Organization of America in which he attached great value to firm friendship with Israel. The Arab world heard this greeting and the Zionist response to the message: "If Israel prospers, we in America will share in that good; but if Israel should falter, the step of every American Jew would surely falter also." And Prime Minister Nasser could not catch even a muted rebuttal to this declaration of unity between Americans and Israelis. Under these circumstances, it was simple for the Arabs to enlarge their already exaggerated picture of the extent of Zionist influence in America. The Arab world commonly believed, for example, that the U. S. Secret Service, as well as Israeli intelligence, knew who the assassins of Count Folke Bernadotte were, but that they had never been brought to justice.

During the deepening October conflict along the Gaza frontier, Prime Minister Nasser alluded to "the Jewish influence in the United States as an obstacle between the Arabs and the Americans." "All Arabs," the Egyptian chieftain told *New York Post* Executive Editor Paul Sann, "feel that America is under the guidance and domination of strong Zionist organizations to help Israel against us."

This Arab declaration that Egypt was fighting not Israel alone but international Jewry was assailed by the *New York Post* editorially "as reminiscent of Dr. Goebbels." Three days

later on October 17 Premier Moshe Sharett in an open appeal called on Jews in the U.S. and throughout the world to unite in buying arms for Israel, even as the U.S. government was taking a negative position on the merits of the Israeli plea for arms. This appeal to American Jews constituted no departure from the long-standing Israeli view as expressed by Mr. Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem: "Zionists in other countries ought to have the courage to stand up for Israel even if their governments are against it." This had been echoed time and again in the words and actions of Jewish groups in the United States.

The capitulation of non-Zionist forces to the Zionist demand for unity contributed to the Arab belief that they were being opposed by "the Jewish people," united behind World Zionism. This deep-seated conviction, added to the vicious reprisals of the Israeli armed forces, inspired the fear that led Prime Minister Nasser to risk all—his Revolution, his dreams and even his life—by accepting arms from behind the Iron Curtain.

IX

No War, No Peace

THE Czech-Egyptian arms deal unleashed new American emotionalism. Articulate U. S. public opinion rallied around the Israeli banner. The big city press and syndicated columns attacked Russia and the disintegration of "the Geneva Spirit" alike. The notable exception was the editorial pages of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, which cautioned: "Look before leaping."

As in 1952 and 1953, anti-Communists came to the support of Israel. The Arabs were given the pro-Communist label because they were receiving arms from Czechoslovakia, and Israel was viewed as being in the anti-Communist camp.

The fact that Israel had received arms from Czechoslovakia in '47, '48 and '49 was given mention nowhere. There was a complete reluctance in any of the information media to discuss why the West had been out-manuevered by the U.S.S.R. The press refused to relate cause to effect.

Seventeen major Jewish organizations, including the ostensibly purely religious, fraternal and non-political groups, joined

with Zionist organizations in assailing the Cairo arms pact. A committee of four, including the President of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, led by the Chairman of the American section of the Jewish Agency, launched a campaign "for the protection of the interests of the Jewish state." They called on Secretary Dulles and presented their views.

These supporters of Israel, and representatives of the State of Israel, renewed the plea for a security pact guaranteeing the boundaries of Israel, and requested arms. Ambassador Abba Eban presented the Department of State with a list of "defensive" weapons which Israel wished to purchase. It was the contention of the Ambassador that the new Egyptian weapons violated the 1950 tripartite agreement assuring a military *status quo*.

In the issue of *The New York Times* that carried the story of the Czech arms deal, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had been quoted as saying that Israel was capable of beating all the Arabs together. Military experts generally considered that Israel did possess a stronger military organization and striking power than the Arab states combined. Only in population did the Arabs possess superiority. Israel's armed forces, based on an adaptation of the Swiss military system, consist of a small, permanent cadre of regulars, and all men between 18 and 20 are drafted for 2½ years. All single women between the same ages are called for 2 years. After military service all except the professional cadre enter the reserve, undergo a month of refresher training annually and remain liable for active service. This is the requirement for Israeli men up to the age of 49 and women up to 34. Reserve units are mobilized regionally. Weapons and equipment are kept in central depots and the country's military strength can be put into action within a very few days.

As Hanson Baldwin, *New York Times* military expert, pointed out, this system meant that Israel had between 50,000 and 75,000 men in uniform, but in a few days could mobilize

better than 200,000. Against this well equipped army the Arab League could muster approximately 185,000 troops, many with archaic weapons and limited training. The Israeli ground forces were amply equipped with small arms, machine guns and mortars. Their artillery was superior to that of the Arab states, according to military observers, and they had even re-gunned some Sherman tanks. Israel, with a decided superiority in bombers and fighters of all types, had also contracted to purchase French Mystère jet fighters.

At the UN General Assembly the Big Three Foreign Ministers met to discuss the crisis. The Arabs and the Israelis had interjected their quarrel into their opening speeches on the floor of the General Assembly. Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Dulles repeated expressions of concern, but did nothing toward solving things. Mr. Dulles informed Foreign Minister Molotov that delivery of arms to Egypt had not relaxed world tensions. In England Sir Anthony Eden, speaking at a mass meeting of the Conservative Party at Bournemouth, repeated the Dulles warning to the Russians. When France walked out from the General Assembly because of the Algerian question being placed on the agenda, the political picture for the West was further complicated.

Another blow to long-standing Western plans was the latest rejection of the Johnston plan by the Arab governments and the proposal of their own national plan for harnessing Jordan water. There was every indication that this rejection freed Israel to push ahead early in '56 with plans to divert waters for the irrigation of the vital Negev waste lands. Such action was announced by Israeli Minister Levi Eshkol in a talk to a United Jewish Appeal mission from the United States. He linked the need for more water with the expected mass immigration of Moroccan Jews.

In the Arab world, officials of Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia enthusiastically backed the arms deal of the Nasser government. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Egypt even

advanced the "ominous" suggestion that all other Arab nations should follow Egypt's lead.

The West and the Arab states now strove to mobilize their respective forces. While Egypt failed to woo Iraq from her western moorings, she built closer ties with other Arab neighbors. Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia replaced the ineffectual joint Arab defense pact with bilateral defense agreements as the adherence of Iran to the Baghdad Pact was announced triumphantly by the West. Yemen was to join the Egyptian axis later.

In the big gap between Turkey and Pakistan, Iran shares a 900-mile frontier with the Soviet Union. The strong government under General Fazollah Zahedi, who came to power in the August 1953 counter-revolt against Mossadegh, reached agreement with a Western consortium for the resumption of the flow of oil and seemed to be moving closer toward the West. Iran was invited in March 1955 to join the Baghdad Treaty, but the country that had been laid waste by Mossadegh was far from stable. Unable to deal with increasing corruption, General Zahedi gave way to Hossein Ala, pro-Western Iranian Ambassador to the United States and close friend of the Shah. There followed a six-month campaign to win the support of powerful neutralist elements before Iran was able to announce her adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani-Iraqi-British Treaty.

The entrance of Iran into the Baghdad Pact was followed by a conference of the five signatory powers at the Palace of Flowers on the Tigris River. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran mapped military plans for a defense of the area built around a strategic line formed by the Zagros Mountains of Eastern Iraq and Western Iran. The Middle East Treaty Organization, METO, linked up NATO and SEATO and provided a chain of U.S.-sponsored defense groupings stretching from Norway to the Philippines. Walde-mar Gallman, American Ambassador to Iraq, and Admiral John H. Cassady, serving as their country's observers at the

meetings, made clear to the conferees that the U.S. could not join the Pact. Such adherence, the U. S. reasoned, would result in an increased estrangement of Egypt and her Arab allies as well as provide Israel with a new leverage for her demands both for a mutual defense treaty and arms assistance. These arguments were permitted to prevail over contentions advanced by Western allies in METO that without the participation of the U.S. the Baghdad Pact was little more than a paper tiger.

While the Pact nations expressed, in the words of Turkish Premier Menderes, "a desire to work for an equitable solution" of the Palestine question, the non-participating Arab nations viewed with heightened suspicions and new apprehension the absence of any concrete METO action in support of the Arab cause. "At this first opportunity," said the Beirut press, "the Baghdad powers have failed to dispel doubts."

The door having been opened, Russia was expanding her Middle East activities. Cairo announced that the Soviet was interested in helping finance the projected High Aswan dam, the long-delayed Egyptian irrigation project, and indicated that Moscow was willing to lend financial assistance over a 25-year period in exchange for cotton, rice and other Egyptian commodities.

In the wake of the arms deal came increasing incursions in the form of economic and cultural ties between Egypt and the Soviet bloc. The Arabs had been subjected to Western cultural dissemination and had no knowledge of the literature, art or history of the Soviet Union. Soviet and Rumanian ballet dancers appeared at the Cairo opera house. New Soviet bookshops in Cairo began to do business in English, French and Arabic translations of Soviet history, literature and technical information. A Soviet art exhibit was well attended and a Soviet soccer team beat Egypt before 30,000 people.

The Soviet weekly on international affairs, the *New Times*,

appearing in ten languages, commenced to devote considerable space to Egypt and other Arab countries. Three weeks before the announcement of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal a long article, "Egypt on to a New Phase," written by L. Vatolina, heaped a paean of praise alike on Egypt's ancient civilization and her present revolution, which was "pursuing a policy of peace and a strengthening of its bonds with the Soviet bloc." The article quoted Chou En-lai's Bandung statement that "if every Chinese were to get himself an extra centimeter of cloth a year, China could buy up Egypt's cotton crop," adding that "the Soviet Union could supply most of Egypt's requirements of wheat, flour, oil, coal, farm machinery and other industrial products."

Moscow's diplomatic offensive extended throughout the Arab world and neutral Asia as an aftermath of the Bandung Conference. The Russians were now exerting their influence everywhere toward unfettering the Asiatic giant and manipulating its potentiality on the world scene. Diplomacy, economic assistance, trade offers and military aid were meshed together in an offensive directed toward clearly defined objectives.

Russia was perfectly willing to open up the cold war in a new area and more than agreeable to dispelling what the West, the United States in particular, had chosen to build up as "the spirit of Geneva." The Russians stepped up their diplomatic and propaganda activity by sending Sergei Petrovich Kiktev, who had been head of the Near and Middle East Department in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, as Minister to Lebanon.

Egypt's leading newspaper, *Al Ahram*, disclosed that Premier Bulganin had made an arms offer to King Saud, as the entire Arab world exulted in the "new dawn."

The northern defense tier had clearly been "leapfrogged" by the Soviet Union. The West woke abruptly from its reverie. In another too-little, too-late gesture, Assistant Secretary of State George Allen rushed to Cairo for a talk with Prime Min-

ister Nasser. The American Embassy denied that Allen's purpose was anything but to warn the Egyptian leader against the dangers into which he had plunged his country.

But there was no turning the clock back. If trouble-shooter Allen had any illusions about dissuading the Egyptians, he was doomed to complete disappointment. A press onslaught against the U.S. put the American diplomat immediately on the defensive. Arab vehemence stemmed from the fear that Allen might use cessation of American economic aid as a club. Arab leaders assailed the West for questioning the sovereign right of Egypt to purchase arms wherever she pleased. "The question of the defense of the Arab world and the Middle East," said Ahmed El-Shukeiri, head of the Syrian delegation to the United Nations, "is the concern primarily of the Arab world itself."

In the wake of Mr. Allen's visit, an Egyptian-American dispute raged over assessing the blame for the Czech arms deal. The Assistant Secretary of State was alleged to have remarked that Cairo had turned to the Reds while still negotiating with Washington. Egypt's Prime Minister, out of an apparent desire not to slam the door in the face of the West, retorted that Washington's continued "postponement and promises" had forced the Egyptians to shop behind the Iron Curtain. Colonel Nasser noted that, while Egypt was receiving scanty arms consignments from the West and "not a single piece of military equipment from the United States," Israel was being armed by the Western Powers. According to the British *Daily Herald*, when Colonel Nasser informed Henry Byroade that he might buy arms from the Soviet Union, the American Ambassador, in Nasser's words, "accused me of bluffing and said my bluff was meant to blackmail America into selling arms to Egypt."

The American version indicated that the State Department had not considered the information about the Soviet bloc's willingness to sell arms to Egypt sufficiently authentic to take up with Soviet leaders at the summer Geneva Conference.

Paradoxically, while Ambassador Byroade was being indicted for not putting the State Department on proper notice of Egyptian intentions, Congressman Emanuel Celler, as has been noted, was calling for the resignation of Byroade on the ground that the Ambassador had urged the sale of tanks and jets to Egypt and "his policy of appeasement had failed."

Anglo-American apprehensiveness grew when intelligence reports uncovered the secret details of the barter deal. Egypt was to receive, within six months to a year, some 200 to 300 Mig-15 jet fighters, 25 medium bombers, 100 to 200 Stalin tanks, six submarines and a quantity of small arms. Some of these arms were reported already enroute from Odessa, and Egypt was paying for them in cotton and rice at a cut-rate price of one-fifth to one-tenth what the West would have charged.

"Nothing in recent years," said the *Times* of London, "has given so sharp a jolt to western thinking as the Russian offer of arms and economic help to Egypt." *The New York Times* naïvely noted, "It seems only too possible now that Russia is embarking on a new policy of intervention in the Middle East." Arab moderates, while giving approval to the deal, were willing to admit the risks involved. The pro-West *Daily Star* in Lebanon lectured: "It is never too late. Even Egypt would prefer a fair deal with the West to a generous Russian offer."

In answer to alarmed cries of "arms race," Nasser called attention to Israeli military superiority, noting the amount of arms shipped by France, England and other European countries. The Egyptian leader belittled the possibilities of Red penetration through the presence of military technicians. "If necessary," the Egyptian Chief of State said, "we can send military missions to Czechoslovakia."

The United States and Britain sought vainly to find new means of meeting the open Soviet challenge. When Mr. Dulles asked for a discussion in New York, Mr. Molotov bluntly re-

buffed him. At a press conference prior to his departure for Europe, Mr. Dulles admitted that the terms of the Tripartite Declaration demanded action to avoid either any "serious imbalance" of power or an armament race. The difficulty, he pointed out, in appraising the exact amount of arms, particularly second-hand arms, going from Czechoslovakia to Egypt prevented a fair estimate as to whether such a serious imbalance was shortly to take place.

Mr. Dulles flew to Paris for a meeting with the British and French Foreign Ministers prior to the Geneva meeting of the Big Four. There the Secretary indicated that, although the Soviet Foreign Minister had not raised the question of Russia's becoming a party to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, this was a possible Red maneuver.

The Big Three talks in Paris and the Big Four meeting in Geneva got no nearer to a solution of the problem. Any Western hope for gaining the cooperation of the Soviet Union in lessening Middle East tensions proved as much of a pipe dream as the "spirit of Geneva." In Washington the Egyptian Ambassador, Ahmed Hussein, said the Soviet had offered to advance Egypt three hundred million dollars toward building the Aswan Dam. The West accepted this challenge by renewing pressure on the World Bank which had been considering a loan to Egypt. If the Bank agreed to the loan, Anglo-American financing could handle the outside help required for this vast water project.

In answer to a much-discussed possibility, both Prime Minister Sharett and Prime-Minister-designate Ben-Gurion denied that Israel intended to wage a preventive war. Regarding arms purchase behind the Iron Curtain, the Prime Minister admitted that "faced with an alarming increased arm power in Egypt, Israel would not hesitate to obtain arms from any possible source." Sharett visited the French, American, and British Foreign Ministers in turn and then followed them to Geneva.

The dramatic antics of the Israeli Prime Minister completely

overshadowed the meeting of the Big Four. Unsuccessful though he was in winning immediate arms support for Israel, Mr. Sharett captured the world's headlines and built up sympathy for the plight of the "little democracy" battling against the "mighty Arab states." Even as Mr. Sharett pleaded the insecure position of the Israeli armed forces, the army of Israel struck again, carrying out a raid into Syria, killing three and taking five prisoners.

Even before Geneva had been written off as a complete failure, the United Kingdom, mindful of her prestige and her interest in Suez, had perceptibly increased her diplomatic activity. Israel asserted that she had been informed by a Soviet satellite government that in the event of war, Egypt "would not honor her obligation to re-admit Britain in the Suez Canal in accordance with Article 4 of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of October 1954." Although the Egyptian Embassy and Prime Minister Nasser categorically denied this report as being completely without foundation, the British were concerned with other possible undisclosed strings attached to the Czech arms deal.

Britain, like the United States, approached Russia about limiting arms deliveries to the Middle East. But her move was also rebuffed. She entered into consultation with the French and compared notes on the amount of arms supplied to the Middle East adversaries.

While the British were critical of the re-exportation of old Sherman tanks by the French to Israel as scrap, the French, as a signatory to the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, had become increasingly piqued at being left out of the British negotiations with Turkey, Iran and the other Arab states regarding the Baghdad Pact. The British countered by accusing the French of using their influence to support Syrian and Lebanese resistance against joining the Pact. The old Anglo-French Middle Eastern rivalry thus had flared up again. And Britain and America seemed to continue pulling in opposite directions.

While the United States took steps to relieve the alarm of the Israelis by agreeing to consider an arms request, the British moved correspondingly toward assuaging ruffled Arab feelings. The United Kingdom made it known it would resume the sale of arms to Egypt after the four-year embargo. Such a resumption was calculated to halt Communist gains. The Eden government indicated that previous arms commitments to the Arab states, including 1949 orders from Egypt, would be fulfilled.

Sir Anthony decided to take a bolder Middle East course as Prime Minister than he had as Churchill's Foreign Minister. Early in April in his last House of Commons speech before he succeeded Sir Winston, Eden expressed Britain's readiness to help guarantee a Middle East settlement which would of necessity have to include an Arab-Israeli understanding regarding refugees, the frontier and the waters of the Jordan.¹

In a speech in the Guild Hall at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9, Prime Minister Eden brought his April House of Commons peace formula up to date by spelling out the controversial specifics. Neither in the April speech nor in the August plan of Mr. Dulles had there been any attempt to specify the particular territorial compromises that might bring peace. And at subsequent press conferences Secretary Dulles had astutely avoided elaboration.

For the first time a major speech by a Western leader referred to the 1947 resolutions as a basis for a Palestine settlement. Admitting that the hostility between Israel and her Arab neighbors was as yet unreconciled, Sir Anthony called for a compromise between the Arab demand for implementation of the 1947 United Nations boundary formula and the 1949 armistice agreements. The address alluded to the "new element of danger" injected by the Soviet government and

¹ By implication, this policy statement marked a still further Western abandonment of the internationalization of Jerusalem.

boasted of the West's one lone accomplishment: "Despite frontier incidents from time to time—some more serious than others—there has been no war since 1948."

When Prime Minister Eden spelled out which territorial concessions Israel and the Arabs would have to make, the State Department refused to be drawn into any discussion of the English plan. The press was permitted meanwhile to indulge in speculation over the Anglo-American disagreement. The momentary benefits from Eden's frankness were wiped out by unanswered protests from opposition quarters. The American Secretary of State had not been consulted before Sir Anthony's speech and wished to avoid endorsement of details which might bring down new pressures upon his head.

Even as the *New York Times* stories continued to embroider upon the tactical differences between Britain and the United States, Mr. Dulles was not in the least reluctant about specifics in his pro-Portuguese commitment on Goa. At a time when the disparity between the approaches of the United States and Britain was being magnified, he was making perhaps the most unnecessary "boner" ever made by a Secretary of State. Apparently the formula needed in the Arab-Israeli quarrel could in no way resemble the Indian-Portuguese one. There was no Indian vote to frighten the Secretary away from being specific in that dispute.

The semi-official government newspaper in Egypt hailed the offer of the British Prime Minister to mediate on the basis of reference to the 1947 resolutions "as the first Western look at the Palestine problem independently." This was the first and only Western peace effort which met with Arab approval. But the Eden suggestion of compromise between the 1947 partition boundaries and the 1949 armistice frontiers brought down a storm on the Minister's head from elsewhere. The Prime Minister was attacked by the British Board of Deputies (the most important Jewish body in England), by pro-Zionist

sympathizers in and out of Commons, and by Labour Party leaders. And added to this was the indifference, amounting almost to antagonism, of the United States.

In a subsequent debate on November 24, Sir Anthony was forced to retreat. While still insisting that both sides would have to make compromises, the Prime Minister admitted that he was not bound to the specific territorial formula laid down in the Guild Hall address, which he had reached by balancing Arab recognition of Israel and concessions regarding the Bay of Aqaba as against Israeli refugee resettlement and boundary concessions.

A flash of rare boldness now gave way to wishy-washy procrastination and wishful thinking. Sir Anthony deserted his specific formula, indicating that he had really intended details to be left to the adversaries themselves. The State Department, by emphasizing American-British agreement on "the imperative necessity" of an early settlement in the Middle East but stopping short of endorsing the specific Eden proposal of a boundary compromise, encouraged the interpretation that they disapproved the Eden formula for territorial concessions. And *The New York Times* was permitted to state: "Privately, State Department officials acknowledged the United States was disturbed about the territorial implications."

Simultaneously with the Eden Guild Hall speech, President Eisenhower in Denver had appealed to other nations of the world to avert a Middle East war. In supporting the *status quo* and reemphasizing the Tripartite Declaration, he said: "While we continue willing to consider requests for arms needed for legitimate self-defense, we do not intend to contribute to an arms competition in the Near East because we do not think such a race would be in the true interest of any of the participants."

In Israel the dangers of a preventive war were being weighed against certain hard facts. The Mapai Party, in political control of the state since its establishment in 1948, had suffered

a defeat in the July elections. The Ben-Gurion party had lost ground to the Herut, which emerged as the second strongest Parliamentary group, and to the other activist party, the Ahduth Haavod. The victorious parties outspokenly favored a preventive war. To meet this challenge and maintain their leadership in the country, the Mapai was being pushed by extremist forces from within its own ranks.

This threat of preventive war was heightened by the clash on October 28, the biggest clash since the Reds had agreed to arm the Arabs. The border fortress of El Kuntilla was attacked, 10 Egyptian soldiers were killed, 20 captured and 17 vehicles destroyed. The fort was reoccupied by Egyptian forces in a counter-attack. The attack had been preceded by a pre-dawn clash between an Egyptian patrol and an Israeli police post at Derotayim. It was becoming increasingly obvious that at some juncture one of these retaliatory raids might be met by a real show of force and a mere skirmish would be turned into the full scale war which both sides claimed they wished to avoid.

The El Kuntilla incident took place even as Sharett was making his dramatic appeal at Geneva for arms to meet the new Arab challenge. As one military observer pointed out, these Israeli raids could provoke a large Arab attack which, from the manner in which it was likely to be reported, might seem an initial aggression. While generally contemptuous of world opinion and particularly of United Nations resolutions, there is no doubt that Israel still preferred to give a semblance of being aggressed against rather than aggressing.

The United States continued to flounder in every possible direction. Secretary Dulles had spent week-ends away from the frustrating Geneva conference to visit Franco in Spain and Tito in Yugoslavia. With them, he had not hesitated to bring up the Middle East question. But Franco would not be dissuaded from sending arms in small amounts to the Arab

states. Tito would not agree, in his prospective Cairo visit, to urge Nasser to stop the importation of Red arms.

In Geneva Mr. Dulles, supported by Foreign Minister Macmillan, decided to deny Sharett's demand for arms. Bolstering each other's courage, they took a firm joint stand and were able to argue that Israel was still stronger than all the Arab states put together. Back in Washington and London, the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister went their separate ways. Secretary Dulles hastened to assure the Zionist-Israelis that their security would be guaranteed. The British made overtures to the Arabs.

The cold war, meanwhile, was sporadically erupting into a hot war all along the Israeli-Gaza and the Israeli-Jordanian frontiers. Egypt and Israel continued attempts to oust the opponent's forces from the demilitarized zone of El Auja. Difficulties in reaching an agreement on a coalition government and the illness of Prime Minister-designate David Ben-Gurion had delayed the formation of the new Israeli government. When the new government finally took office, the maiden address of the Prime Minister contained a fresh appeal for peace. Mr. Ben-Gurion called for face-to-face talks with Prime Minister Nasser.

As these dramatic proposals were being headlined in every paper throughout the United States, the Israeli army stormed at night in full battalion strength with armored cars and field guns across the Sinai Desert, into El Auja at El Sabha, killing 50 Egyptians, taking an almost equal number of prisoners and capturing many pieces of heavy armor, including military automobiles, armored trucks, howitzers and ammunition.

According to a statement by the Israeli Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, the assault was intended to expel Egyptian armed forces entrenched in the Nitzana (El Auja) area. Egypt accused Israel of using army troops instead of police in the zone, while Israel countered with the accusation that Egypt had moved forces into Israeli territory. The United Nations press

officer in Jerusalem indicated that UN truce observers were prevented by Israeli authorities from moving west or south out of El Auja. This was the heaviest fighting since the Palestine war ended in 1948 and led to strong rebukes from Western Powers.

Meanwhile, the Eden proposal "to redraw Israel's borders, bringing them closer to the limits set by the United Nations in 1947," continued to be the object of vigorous attack from Israelis and American Jews alike. Ambassador Eban, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and Foreign Minister Sharett made clear that Israel was not prepared to yield one inch of the more than two thousand square miles admittedly occupied in excess of United Nations 1947 boundaries. Israel, they said, would never negotiate for "the truncation of Israel."

In the December House of Commons debate on the Middle East, Labourites Hugh Dalton and Herbert Morrison characterized the Eden-Macmillan policy as a complete failure. The Foreign Minister's observation in the debate "that one could not altogether blame the government of Egypt for being tempted to accept arms from Communist Czechoslovakia" drew heavy fire. Although Sir Anthony now abandoned reference to the 1947 resolutions, the Labourites appealed to the Prime Minister not to go to Washington in January with a project for a "second Munich" at the expense of Israel.

In the United States Israeli protestations for peace continued to receive press headlines. Israeli supporters launched a national series of meetings in New York's Madison Square Garden with the theme "*Arms for Israel—No Territorial Concessions to the Arabs.*" Foreign Minister Sharett's presence in the United States on a combined speaking-fund-raising-lobbying tour sparked these propaganda efforts. The visit of Mr. Sharett was the occasion for the establishment of an additional 25 million dollar fund to assist North African Jews migrating to Israel.

The State Department kept postponing a decision on the

Israeli request submitted in mid-November for more than 40 million dollars' worth of "defensive weapons," including 50 late-model jet aircraft, anti-submarine vessels, heavy tanks, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft weapons—some of the items being in drastically short supply. Military experts were quick to point out that a division of military weapons into "offensive" and "defensive" had little meaning.

In the shattering aftermath of Geneva, the West's precarious position in the Middle East had assumed grave proportions. The Russians had timed their open intrusion into the area with heightened anti-West feeling throughout the vital Mediterranean area. The Greco-Turkish-British quarrel over Cyprus and the still-unsettled conditions in French North Africa were adding to the woes of the Western Powers.

Cyprus, in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean, was a British Crown colony occupied in 1878 and formally annexed in 1914. The Turks had long laid claim to the island. Four-fifths of the islanders were Greek Christians, and under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios favored union with Greece. The Cypriots were receiving full support from the Greek government in Athens. This conflict spread to Turkey, where crowds rioted against the Greeks, who had made the Turks one of the objects of their dissatisfaction. These strained relations between Greece and Turkey damaged NATO's Balkan flank. When British Governor-General Sir John Harding exiled Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean, rioting, terror and violence spread throughout Cyprus. Britain was determined to hold on to the strategic island—now more important as the British were being pushed out or retreating elsewhere. U.S. criticism of Britain's behavior was viewed by the Eden government as "untimely and unjustified."

The Arabs poured oil on the fire by going to the support of Greece. They explained: "The Greeks have always supported

us in the United Nations even when some of our so-called friends went against us, and there is no reason why we should not offer them our services where they are needed.”

Western championing of Israel was complicating the troubles of the anti-Communist world elsewhere. In North Africa, the bitter struggle between the French and Arab nationalists in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria saw Egypt pouring propaganda and money into the nationalist battle against Paris. Radio Cairo beamed continuous attacks against the French. To protect Europeans from further massacre, the French reinforced the two divisions which they had previously detached from Europe's NATO forces.

The U.S. Consulate was sacked in Tunis. As the French yielded in Morocco and Tunisia, Algerian nationalists demanded independence. The Algerians, having no identification with a nationalist past, were on less solid ground than their freed Arab brothers. The American Ambassador in Paris affirmed that Algeria was part of France and thus brought a new hate wave against the West. What might have been accepted as reasonable concessions were rejected by the nationalists in the face of prodding from Cairo. All the pent-up Arab resentment over Israel found an outlet in North Africa.

As the western end of the northern tier was shaken by this internecine struggle, the quarrels between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between India and Pakistan flared anew on the eastern end. Ever since the northern tier had begun to take shape, the Soviet Union had been exerting increased pressure on the Afghans. Military strategists familiar with the region had noted the importance to any Pakistani-Iranian defense line of the Hindu Kush mountain range, just south of the Afghan-Soviet border. Afghanistan's ruler Zahir Shah, lukewarm anti-Communist, had indicated a determination to steer a realistic middle road for his country, exposed as it was to the Soviet Union on the north and to Iran and Pakistan on two other sides.

The Kremlin moved into the picture by encouraging the demand for self-determination of the five million Pushtoons occupying the northwest frontier province of Pakistan. The Pushtoons had been receiving support from the Afghans, who insisted on a plebiscite. The pro-Soviet Prime Minister Sardar Mohammed Daud, fanatically ambitious cousin of the king, welcomed Russia's support in the dispute with Pakistan during the spring of 1955. Pakistan retaliated by closing the Khyber Pass, Afghanistan's vital lifeline.

On their return home from India, Soviet Premier Bulganin and Communist Party Secretary Khrushchev made a successful stop in Kabul, adding more poison to the brew. Here the Russians announced their support of the Pushtoon cause and reached an agreement with the Afghans for a 10-year extension of the neutrality non-aggression pact. To seal the pledge of continued Afghan neutrality, the Russian leaders agreed to a 100-million-dollar loan. These funds were to be used to finance a Soviet Technical Aid Program covering the development of agriculture, a power station, irrigation works, motor repair shops and the Kabul airfield. In every direction Afghanistan moved closer to the Soviet.

Deep as the Afghan desire was for a Pushtoonistan, far more obsessed with Kashmir was Pakistan. As one correspondent noted upon his return from the region: "What Alsace-Lorraine was to France and Trieste to Yugoslavia, Kashmir is a hundred-fold to Pakistan." After the war between India and Pakistan, India had taken over two-thirds of Kashmir. The United Nations favored a plebiscite to decide the sovereignty of this province. After American arms had reached Pakistan as part of the Baghdad Pact arrangement, Nehru became a determined opponent to any vote on the fate of Kashmir. Arms to Pakistan had set off a chain reaction of distrust and resentment against the West in both India and Afghanistan.

The only encouraging ray on the threatening horizon was the return of Sultan Sheikh Mohammed Ben Youssef to the

throne of Morocco. This event, however, led to a round of internecine battling for a position of ascendancy in the new Moroccan picture. Additional French troops drawn from NATO forces were needed to quell the rioting.

In the long view, it became increasingly questionable whether the price the United States had paid for a northern tier was worth the loss in prestige and friendship in the surrounding countries. Mr. Dulles and his associates were well aware that the Truman Middle East Policy had been costly to the United States. They had the right words for a new song, but indecision and political pressures were preventing them from finding the tune to go with the words.

Eighteen Tanks and a British Pasha

As November 1955 passed into December, the Gaza proposals set forth by General Burns remained unacceptable to both Israelis and Egyptians. Cease fire orders continued to be violated by one side or the other, and sporadic fighting continued. The activities of the *fedayeen* added to Israeli grievances.

Then a new region erupted on December 11, when Israeli forces wiped out the Syrian outposts at Butaiha on the north-east shore of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). The attack, carried out by two infantry companies under protection of armored cars, planes, heavy artillery and launches, killed 56 Syrians, including three women. Six Israeli soldiers lost their lives in the conflict.

Israel announced the raid as a reprisal for continued interference with her fishing rights on the Sea of Galilee. In a letter addressed to Secretary-General Hammarskjold, Prime Minister Nasser then stated that Egypt was prepared to use her armed forces to repel aggression and warned that, under the Syrian-

Egyptian defense pact, the Israeli attack was considered to be an aggression against Egypt itself. The Egyptian Prime Minister listed six acts of aggression committed in 1955 by the Israeli government against Egypt and her allies: Gaza in February, Khan Yunis on August 31 after the cease fire, El Auja on September 21 when Israel seized the occupied zone, Kuntilla on October 28, El Sabha in November and the attack at the Sea of Galilee.

Before the Security Council, Syrian representative Ahmed Shukairy demanded sanctions against Israel and charged that financial support from abroad was responsible for the continued Israeli aggressions. In reply Ambassador Eban laid responsibility to the persistent Arab harassment of Israeli fishermen. As the debate unfolded, it became obvious that Syria would receive unanimous support in her quest for a censure of Israel; the only question was whether the Council would go beyond previous measures and impose some type of sanctions. The Soviet Union supported the Syrian demand in a resolution far stronger than that submitted by the Western Powers.

This marked the first U.S.S.R.-sponsored resolution on Palestine since 1947, when the Soviet had joined with the United States in advancing the partition resolution. When the Soviet proposal for economic sanctions failed, a substitute proposal that Syria be compensated was advanced. Russia could muster the support only of Iran, China, Peru and Yugoslavia, the Western Powers calling the move impractical. A temporizing influence weighing against compensation was a captured Syrian military document providing proof that the Syrian army had orders to interfere with Israeli activities on the sea. The Sea of Galilee and an eleven-yard strip of the shore belonged to Israel under the truce agreements.

Ambassador Lodge summed up Security Council sentiment in these words: "No government has the right to take the law in its own hands. . . . It is greatly to be regretted that Butaiha should now be added to the list of military actions which Israel

initiated at Gaza, at Kibya and at El Hamma." The Council thus unanimously rejected the Israeli claim that Syrian harassment of fishing boats had justified the attack. While not as strong as suggested by the Soviet resolution, the censure of January 19 was the most serious to date. It warned that a repetition would bring punitive action. This marked the fourth Security Council rebuff to Israel within three years.

Undoubtedly Israel's resentment against the new joint Syrian-Egyptian command under General Amer had led Ben-Gurion to test this new defense pact of his Arab neighbors. But the rashness of the Galilee attack scuttled the Sharett bid for arms and tainted the propaganda claim of "inferior military position." Israel lost some ground momentarily with American public opinion, as her Galilee move was decried by friends as a "blunder."

While she had failed to gain indemnity for Syria, Russia had again capitalized on the UN forum for propaganda purposes. And the Russians were otherwise demonstrating their increasing friendship for the Arab states. In a two-hour review of foreign affairs before the Supreme Soviet (Parliament), Khrushchev punctuated his address with bristling assaults on "Western colonialism" and with expressions of sympathy for the yearnings of the Arab nations to win "full liberation from foreign dependence." He accused the Western Powers of violating the Geneva spirit by promulgating the Baghdad Pact. The Soviet boss pointedly declared: "From the first day of its existence, the State of Israel has been taking a hostile, threatening position toward its neighbors. Imperialists are behind Israel trying to exploit it against the Arabs for their own benefit." The Arab press (save in Iraq) applauded this evidence of support. The Beirut *Daily Star* was quick to note that the Kremlin "dared call Israel an aggressor," whereas the Western countries, despite their diversified cultural, financial and military interests in the area, "swallow their tongues when they come to Israel."

The center of the conflagration now moved to Jordan. The visits of British Foreign Minister Macmillan and General Sir Gerald Templar preceded demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact. The British chief of staff was believed to be exerting pressure on King Hussein to join the Pact and using General Glubb, the head of the Arab Legion, for the same purpose. Britain was enticing Jordan with economic advantages into substituting the Baghdad arrangement for the existing treaty with England. But the Arabs feared that the accession of Jordan to the Western alliance would result in the side-tracking of the Israeli issue.

The upshot was Jordan's refusal to stand for an alliance with the mistrusted powers, who were believed to be supporting Israel against Egypt and denying the rights of the refugees granted by the UN.

Four Jordanian ministers resigned, and the Said Mufti cabinet fell on December 14. Although the government indicated that its terms for joining the pact required implementation of the United Nations resolutions, the unrest increased, and what started as quiet demonstrations broke out into five days of violent anti-West riots on December 18. Rioters in the old city of Jerusalem attacked the U.S. Consulate and ripped down the American flag. The French and Turkish Consul Generals were forced to take refuge in Israel. The government of Hazza Majali resigned after five days in office.

It had been made plain that no Arab authority could consider participation in any pact against Russia, the sole power supplying arms to Arabs on a large scale and demonstrating to them what seemed to be a Simon-pure friendship. At this moment of agitation Radio Moscow heaped praise on the Jordanian rioters as "courageous partisans" in the "struggle against imperialism," and their agents helped to inspire the demonstrations.

Under the caretaker regime of Ibrahim Hashim, the riots continued. On January 7 the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem was

stoned, the Point Four building in Amman burned. When Jordan's Supreme Court declared new elections to be unconstitutional the caretaker government resigned and a new government was constituted under Samir Rafai, a strong opponent of the Baghdad Pact. Riots, which ensued sporadically, were now under the sole leadership of the Communists.

The Jordanian government began to feel increasing pressure from the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian-Syrian bloc to break her treaty with Britain and accept a substitute subsidization of the Arab Legion from Saudi Arabia. Britain's Middle East envoys were called home to London for consultation as the entire British position in the Middle East faced further deterioration. Unrest in Cyprus had intensified. Saudi Arabia was trying to oust British-supported Sheikhs from the Buraimi Oasis,¹ and Yemen was emphasizing her claim to Aden. The unpopular Eden government, pinning many hopes on the conference planned with President Eisenhower, took steps to strengthen the British position and devised careful strategy for the Washington meeting.

The crack Red Devil regiment of 2000 paratroopers was flown to Cyprus; the evacuation of the last of the British soldiers from Suez in advance of the final treaty date of June 18 was slowed down; a propaganda war against Saudi bribery of Jordanian ministers and newspaper editors was launched. The nettled British Prime Minister was prepared to demand that the United States persuade the Arabian-American Oil Company to tighten the reins over the Saudis. Under Secretary of State and Middle East expert Evelyn Shuckburgh was dis-

¹ The Buraimi dispute over the 15-square-mile oasis in the southeast corner of Arabia involved a conflict of interest which pitted the British Iraq Petroleum Company against an American company, the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), a full partner of the Saudi Arabian government. The United States was duty bound to protect the interests of Aramco. Paradoxically, Socony Vacuum and Standard of New Jersey, 40% owners of Aramco, had little to lose. They also owned 23¾% of Iraq Petroleum.

patched ahead to Washington to pave the way for Anglo-American agreement on a plan of action.

The United States moved up to the important conference between Mr. Eisenhower and Sir Anthony under a new barrage from the Zionists. Israel herself was still fearful of the Eden territorial proposals. Arms-for-Israel meetings flooded the country, and the politicians were made very well aware that the 1956 election year had arrived.

The front pages of the Sunday *New York Times* and other newspapers carried a joint appeal for arms for Israel bearing the signatures of Harry Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt and Walter Reuther. When Mr. Truman arrived in New York the following day, he told the press that he did not think that any arms should be shipped to any land in the Middle East. Later, after telephonic consultation, the crossed-up signals were straightened out, and the former President issued a prepared statement that he "stood by" what Mrs. Roosevelt said he said.

A conference of 19 Jewish groups demanded that the Secretary of State give arms to Israel. Secretary Dulles, under continuous fire, had agreed to have another look at the arms request once final disposition had been made of the Galilee case. Now he countered with the suggestion that the issues of the Middle East be removed from demagogic, political debate both in and out of the Congress. As he put it: "Lacerating partisan debate only increases the risk of war."

The White House was not exempt from these new pressures. When the President offered Israel "even-handed friendship," Ambassador Eban again called for arms. The Secretary reiterated, "Not now."

The conference of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Eden resulted in the Washington Declaration condemning Kremlin aggressions, but failed to evolve any kind of formula for halting the trend toward war in the Middle East. Too wide a range of subjects was covered, and the Middle East was buried in the communiqué featuring the cold war.

If the British Prime Minister had hoped for the acceptance of his Guild Hall compromise and U.S. membership in the Baghdad Pact, he was doomed to full disappointment. The United States would take no steps likely to offend Israel or Egypt. The United States could do little to help the British in their Arabian Peninsula troubles.

Post-conference talk about UN policing of the demilitarized zone, an idea not too dissimilar from one voiced earlier by Adlai Stevenson at the University of Virginia, soon came under heavy fire. The possibility raised in Montreal by Eden of sending British troops back into Palestine was viewed with grave alarm by the Beaverbrook paper, the *Daily Express*.

The prospect of armed intervention, reflected in the strengthening of the U.S. Sixth Fleet with 1800 additional marines, brought angry comments from the Middle East. *Akbar al Yom*, the Amin brothers' Cairo publication, editorially noted:

When Israel was more powerful than the combined strength of all Arab countries, the West considered the situation normal, but since Egypt has armed herself and put herself in a position to repel aggressions, it is said that the situation has changed and the Middle East area is now regarded as in danger, and foreign armed forces should be prepared to maintain peace there.

Middle East resentment was not allayed by the Defense Department's explanation of the presence of marines in the area: "in line with the regular program of intermittently assigning battalion size marine units in the Mediterranean area for training and maneuvers." Subsequent hints at Western armed intervention aroused further Arab antagonism.

Prime Minister Nasser had interjected into the Eden-Eisenhower meeting a plan which clearly indicated that he too wished to buy time and at the moment wanted no war with Israel. The Egyptian Premier had proposed through the British Ambassador in Cairo a withdrawal by Israel and Egypt of

one kilometer ($5/8$ of a mile) from the present border position and an increase in the number of officials supervising the Arab-Israeli borders, a kind of remedy always opposed by Israel.

The innumerable ensuing conferences on different levels by the Big Three could not conceal the wide disagreement. Although the United States and Britain realized that United Nations intervention in a Middle East outbreak could be blocked by the Soviet Union vote, alternate plans ran afoul of individual predilections. France, still piqued because she had not been invited to the Washington Conference, was exceedingly critical of Britain. She had frequently warned that the Baghdad Pact would push Egypt into a position of neutralism. The approaching elections affected the American point of view, and again nothing could prevent the Middle East issue from becoming ensnared in politics.

Britain, at first opposed to the idea of intervention outside the UN, became more and more a proponent of drastic action in the light of the dire consequences facing her. At stake in the Middle East were her 12,000 troops on Cyprus, oil for her industrial machine, the commonwealth life line running through Malta, Cyprus, and Suez, and inestimable sterling balances accruing from oil. Without the oil of the Middle East, economic chaos threatened the financial structure of what was left of the Empire.

Rumored plans of Anglo-American military intervention in the Middle East gained credence with President Eisenhower's declaration that he would do everything he could constitutionally to prevent an outbreak of hostilities there. Although at a subsequent press conference the President denied any intention of using American troops, the Russians had been given the opening they needed. The Soviet Union took a clear and unmistakable stand against any Western military intervention as a "rude violation of the United Nations Charter." The official Soviet statement warned that "action by certain foreign

circles whose interests are alien to the national aspirations of the peoples of the countries of the Near and Middle East' threatened peace. This typical anti-imperialist jargon found sympathetic ears in the Arab world and the uncommitted areas to the east. Further American bungling soon added to the damage.

On February 15, the attention of the United Press was called to 18 tanks, bunched on two barges due to sail aboard the steamship *James Monroe* from a Brooklyn pier to a Saudi Arabian port. Certain affluent Zionists had "leaked" the story. An immediate howl of protest arose, particularly from Democratic Congressmen and Senators.

The President was in Georgia, the Secretary of State was vacationing in the Bahamas. In their absence the State Department panicked under Zionist pressure. At the direction of White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, in Georgia, a hasty midnight order was imposed placing a temporary embargo on shipment of tanks and other arms both to Arab nations and to Israel.

The ban had lasted less than 36 hours when a thousand-word statement drafted by Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., clarified the U. S. position and announced that the shipment could now go forward. The tanks were delivered under the reimbursable assistance agreement signed in June 1951 when the United States took over possession of the strategic air base at Dhahran, less than 1000 miles from the Soviet's southern flank.

The sale of training tanks was not inconsistent with announced tripartite policy to supply Middle East states with armaments "for purposes of answering their internal security and their legitimate self-defense." The decision to ship the tanks² had been reached on August 25, a month before the

² Light Walker M41 tanks known as Bulldogs, which, according to military experts, never could be used as offensive weapons against Israel.

Czech arms deal; the Saudi Arabian government had paid for the purchase on November 26. These negotiations had foolishly been carried out in secret, and the State Department now acted as if the tank shipment had come as a complete surprise.

The affair of the tanks had all the makings of a great *opéra comique* which might have been entitled "The Reversible Embargo." Had Gilbert and Sullivan been alive, they would have had a libretto which could have brought more laughs than the *Mikado*: agitated and confused statements from official and unofficial sources, protests from Arabs and Israelis, the abrupt application of an embargo on all Middle East arms shipments, the premature dock celebration of young Zionists in a rendition of the Israeli native dance (the Hora), and finally the sudden lifting of the ban.

While the Saudi Arabian Ambassador was doing everything to lift the embargo and force the United States to live up to her agreement, the Arab position would have been better served had the tanks not moved. And, similarly, while the Zionists were pressuring to keep the ban, the dramatic release of the tanks provided the best propaganda impetus to the outstanding Israeli request that they be armed. To revert to a Savoyard expression: "Things indeed are seldom what they seem."

The widespread publicity given to this buffoonery was calculated to embarrass the State Department and help the Israelis gain the arms they had been seeking since November 16. While expressing dismay at the shipment, Ambassador Eban announced that Israel's request for arms would now be pushed with greater urgency.

The Arab states pointed to the episode as another example of Zionist pressures. They maintained that the embargo had been lifted only by the Saudi Arabian threat not to renew the treaty covering American use of the Dhahran air base, which was due for renegotiation in June. And the Soviet willingness to supply Arab states with arms unconditionally, the Arabs

added, had made it possible for the Saudis to stand firmly on their rights.

This was no happy homecoming for Mr. Dulles. A full scale Senate investigation of the administration's foreign policy awaited him. The House Foreign Affairs group, neglected in consultations by the State Department officials, was piqued, and its chairman complained that the House was apparently being considered "a weak-minded illegitimate son." A new demand for arms to Israel, voiced by 18 Democratic Congressmen, added further to the confusion in the State Department.

The Senate hearings added little to anyone's comfort. Shouldering the entire blame for the tank fiasco, Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr., made the astonishing confession that he had ordered the temporary suspension because of "charges in the press that the shipment did not conform with U.S. policy and with pertinent laws and regulations." There was no allusion in his testimony to pressures, but Mr. Hoover had been in close touch with the White House executive assistant, pro-Zionist Jack Martin, and with Press Secretary Jim Hagerty in Georgia. Martin was the devoted protégé of Rabbi Silver, and Hagerty was under continuous fire from interested organizations which had access to him through his former chief, Thomas E. Dewey.

In his own testimony, Secretary Dulles again bluntly argued that injecting the Arab-Israeli dispute into U. S. politics would endanger Middle East peace as well as the future of Israel itself. This statement received the late afternoon headlines, but accounts in the morning papers were unfortunately concerned with what Mr. Dulles later said about the cold war. His over-optimistic statement that Russia was on the run, and the partisan reaction thereto by Democratic Senators completely overshadowed the constructive suggestions made earlier.

The Saudi Arabian tank fiasco had brought pro-Israeli sentiment to the surface again after the ebb following the United Nations Galilee censure. Former Air Secretary Thomas K.

Finletter, manager of the Stevenson-for-President Committee, urged jets for Israel. All Zionist organizations continued to protest the tank sale. Full page ads in *The New York Times* and elsewhere—invariably strategically located near the editorial page—called on the President to avoid war in the Middle East by sending arms to Israel.

Despite the appeal over his head to the President, the Secretary's answer remained the same as set forth in his reply earlier that month to the separate demands of 86 Democrats and 40 Republicans that he arm Israel and guarantee her security: "Security in the Middle East cannot rest upon arms alone, but rather upon the international rule of law and upon the establishment of friendly relations among neighbors." But Mr. Dulles did not rule out the possibility of an eventual grant of arms.

Even as the State Department was resisting these pressures, American Jews were being asked to contribute tax-free dollars to circumvent the decision of their government. The United Jewish Appeal called upon American Jews: "Give much more in 1956. . . . Give to UJA's special survival fund for 25 million dollars." On a visit to the United States, Israeli Labor Minister Golda Myerson demanded that the extra quota be raised to 100 million dollars.

Despite Ambassador Eban's eleventh request for arms, this time with the insistence that the United States give a "yes or no" answer, the administration stood pat. The President rested on his determination to take "immediate action" to prevent war. But no specifics were being spelled out. The United States was continuing to buy time.

From Lebanon, United Nations Relief Works Agency Director Henry Labouisse declared that a tour of the camps had only strengthened his conviction that all refugees were determined to return to Palestine, and even preferred to remain in their present state to being settled in any country not regarded as their homeland. Labouisse asked that these refugees be

given an opportunity to express through a plebiscite their choice of going home or being resettled.

A constructive suggestion such as this, contained ticklish domestic political aspects which in a presidential election year had to be avoided at all costs. The administration, while resolutely resisting pressures to become more pro-Israeli, was equally determined not to become involved in redressing the wrongs done to the Palestinian refugees. It would not assume the risk of a bold dramatic proposal for a solution, even in the face of the worsening situation.

No event, not even the Czech arms deal, stirred the Western World as much as King Hussein's precipitate dismissal on March 2 of Lt. General John Bagot Glubb, leader of the strong Arab Legion and once his close adviser. The fabled Glubb Pasha, who headed the strongest single Arab fighting force, was escorted out of Amman under guard. The twenty-year-old monarch had also terminated the services of Intelligence Chief Colonel Coghill and Chief Staff Officer Brigadier William Hutton, as well as three senior Jordanian officers.

In London Prime Minister Eden immediately called his Cabinet and the heads of the British Armed Services into emergency session.

King Hussein was enthusiastically cheered as he drove through the streets of his capital and told demonstrators that "this was a Holy Day on which we have succeeded in our movement by God's will." The public hysteria continued for three days, the streets of Amman resounding with continual triumphant firing from automatic weapons. The riotous dancing of youngsters reminded one correspondent of "the generation of dead end kids almost comparable to the wolf packs of post-revolutionary Russia."

Details of Glubb's dismissal were veiled by false rumors and wild stories. Glubb himself, on arrival in Cyprus en route to London, would make no comment.

The Evening Star Co., photo by Rosemary




King Saud greeting the author at Washington reception during the Saudi Arabian monarch's visit to the United States.

left: Prime Minister General Abdel Kerim Kassem; *right:* King Hussein of Jordan.

Studio Haik, Amman


United Press International



President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt with the author in Cairo.



David Ben-Gurion.



Israel Office of Information

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Israel (*center*) with Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett (*left*) and UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

United Nations



Arab Information Center



above: Dr. Charles Malik, former Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the 13th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. *below:* President of the Republic of Lebanon, General Fuad Chehab.

United Nations





above: Sheikh Abdullah al Sabah, the Ruler of Kuwait. *below:* Imam Ahmed of Yemen.





Arab refugee children.

Palestinian Arabs in refugee camp.





Refugee Bedouin women gathering fagots.



Anglo-French destruction in Port Said.



Egyptian women search for their dead after Anglo-French-Israeli invasion.



Indonesian soldiers of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) assembled for the raising of Indonesian and UN flags at camp north of the city of Suez.

United Nations





United Nations

above: UN troops quelling Arab riot before UNEF headquarters in Gaza, March 10, 1957. *below:* Swedish unit of UNEF entering Port Said.

United Nations





United Nations

above: Canadian helicopter landing with UNEF commander, Major General E. L. M. Burns, outside El Arish in Sinai Peninsula. *below:* El Ferdan bridge destroyed by Egyptians to obstruct Suez Canal traffic.

United Nations



Back in England Glubb discussed the Jordanian situation with Sir Anthony Eden. In statements to the press the dismissed leader of the Legion cautioned against any undue criticism of the Arabs for their action and in a letter to the London *Times* advised the British government that "it would be a serious political error to get tough with Jordan at this stage.

Jordan was quick to announce that she would respect her '48 British pact and by radio revealed that Glubb was ousted for defying orders to build defenses against Israel. The King charged that Glubb "remained deaf to my repeated orders."

The differing explanation of General Glubb appeared in a series of terse, well-written *New York Times* articles. These indicated Glubb's complete surprise. At two o'clock in the afternoon Glubb was called to the Prime Minister's office and the news calmly broken to him: "His Majesty the King orders that you take a rest from your duties." According to Glubb, the Prime Minister could give no reasons but told the General to be ready to leave by four o'clock. Glubb's answer was: "No, Sir, I have lived here for 26 years and I cannot leave at two hours' notice." The departure was delayed until seven the next morning when the General, accompanied by his wife, eight-year-old son and his adopted Arab son, flew away.

The Glubb account told of the bitter campaign by anti-Western elements which culminated in the removal of the British officers, and of tremendous Communist influence within Jordan during the December and January riots. The denunciation of the Baghdad Pact as a Zionist plot had fed the uprisings. Communists and extreme nationalists, who had converted many school teachers, cooperated in the riots against the Jordanian government. "When a riot was proposed, the school children were let loose from their classes and turned into the streets. They blocked traffic and threw stones, compelling the shops to close." Then refugees, other Communists and disorderly, motley Jordanians joined in the trouble.

Six weeks previously, Glubb wrote, the Communists had

openly boasted that he would be dismissed within three months. His dismissal was necessary, Glubb surmised, to the severance of connections between Jordan and Britain and to the overthrow of the King, both goals of the extremists.

While the Jordanian government indicated that it wished to maintain British ties, there was no question that the Egyptian-led anti-British group had won a big victory. The dismissal of Glubb had been a major concession by Hussein to the anti-West neutralist southern periphery alliance, and fell just short of Jordan's joining the Egypt-led group and thereby completely splitting with the pro-West Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family. According to some sources, the youthful King was advised by Queen Zein, his mother, that he was in danger of being toppled from his throne. It was a case of either Glubb goes or the King falls. So the English General became the sacrificial lamb to the strong anti-West feeling of the predominant Palestinian Jordanian element.

Whatever sympathy the British still possessed for the Arab position vanished with Glubb's dismissal. Desperate Britain was finding her old game of "divide and rule" failing in the growing tide of anti-colonialism. She was still dividing, but the Russians were doing the conquering. The British lion, choked with anger, turned on its chief tormentor, Colonel Nasser. Much of the British woe in the Middle East was placed at his door. Despite Nasser's assurance that there was "no room for hate between us," the Arab radio poured out anti-British vitriol. Potent, inflammatory propaganda was being continuously beamed by the Voice of the Arabs to the Mau Maus in Kenya, the Cypriots in their island stronghold and to all parts of the Arab world. The British soon were placing the blame for the revived Iranian claim to Bahrein on their *bête noire*.

At home the Conservatives had been under heavy attack from the Labourites. As the Democrats had played politics with the Saudi Arabian tanks, the party of Gaitskell and Bevan did the same with the 192 World War II British tanks which

had wound up in Cairo. These reconditioned Valentines of questionable military value, trans-shipped from Belgium to Egypt, made good speech copy for the opposition in Commons.

In London the Zionists were progressing in their campaign to undermine confidence in the Eden government. Israeli Ambassador Elath threatened that if arms were not given, Israeli activist leaders would force Israel into a preventive war against Egypt. From the moment Egypt had unloaded the first Migs, Begin, leader of Herut, had been demanding a defensive war against the Arabs.

The antagonism of important Jewish-Christian Zionist circles was reflected in the widely publicized dissatisfaction with the Conservative government under Eden, which represented nothing more than an oblique attack on Eden's Middle East course. Zionists did not feel that they could undo the damage already done by the proposal in England itself but stimulated an anti-Eden campaign in the United States.

The British now had had it. The United States had poured cold water on the Guild Hall plan. The French were demanding of their allies a more pro-Israeli policy to get back at Cairo for becoming the GHQ for North African, particularly Algerian, ultra-nationalists. Nasser's role of bad boy provided the British with an excuse for ending what had been assailed as Arab appeasement. With the U.S. seemingly bent on not giving arms to Israel, the door was open for Britain to move into a strong pro-Israeli position.

Nasser's star ascended as quickly as Great Britain's fell. To the Arab masses, Nasser had become a hero who was defying the Western Powers, "the exploiters of the people." The Prime Minister's reference to the Baghdad Pact "as a prison for the Arab peoples" had delighted those who were anti-West. The Jordanian uprising and the removal of Glubb had added to Egyptian prestige. The well publicized visit of Tito to Cairo had increased Egypt's international stature and moved Nasser

more firmly into the neutralist camp. The two leaders assailed the Baghdad Pact as "an aggressive military grouping, splitting the Arab countries."

Prime Minister Nasser now felt strong enough at home to announce the end of Egypt's three-year transition period from the Farouk regime and to release a new Constitution. The plebiscite on this Constitution and election of a new president was scheduled for June 23. In delivering the document to his people, Nasser referred bellicosely to Israel: "After World War II part of the Arab heart was snatched from the Arab body. Today Arabs from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf will cooperate in restoring that part."

The Russians continued to make use of Arab nationalism. Communists in Syria were creeping into high places; the Saudis were offered Russian support on the Buraimi issue. Western threats of armed intervention had given the Russians a greater chance to become heroes to the Middle East. The Soviet Union built up its campaign to strike at Arab intellectualism in Beirut. Economic aid and support were offered everywhere in accordance with the new Krushchev-Bulganin line. The Lebanese were wooed with bids for long range technical aid as well as material aid through increased trade. When the U.S. approached Lebanon with an offer of a loan, the Lebanese froze up. Little Lebanon flatly turned down the World Bank's five-million-dollar offer for road construction as being niggardly compared to four hundred million dollars for Israel.

To Russian satisfaction, the chasm between Iraq and Egypt had not narrowed, despite efforts of neutral Lebanon to push both sides together, and even though Iraq offered arms to her fellow-Arab states (presumably from her Baghdad Pact supply) in the event of an attack from Israel.

The Arab "Big Three" meeting in Cairo directed careful attention to Jordan. Prime Minister Nasser, King Saud and Syria's President Shukri Kuwatly sent a messenger to King Hussein offering to meet the yearly ten million sterling subsidy

Jordan was receiving from the British for the Arab Legion. This would of course bring Jordan into the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Syria Pact. While keeping the door open, King Hussein neatly ducked the invitation with a counter suggestion that all Arab Chiefs of State meet in his capital and seek a basis for unity. The eight-day Cairo Conference resulted in further coordination of military and diplomatic policy, but did not prevent the cousin kings, Hussein and Faisal, from subsequently meeting privately to take stock of the situation.

Western vacillation and indecisiveness still prevailed. Britain, harassed in Cyprus, squeezed in Buraimi, and threatened in the Persian Gulf, could do naught. While she talked about a hard-fisted approach, her withered arm no longer had power to command. In Algeria, nationalist rebels had stepped up their attacks on the French and were causing up to 50 casualties a day. The pot was boiling, and the Cairo anti-West broadcasts were spicing the stew.

Egypt held air raid drills in major cities, while Israel announced a call for 150,000 volunteers to strengthen frontier fortifications. Egyptian leadership devoted less and less attention to land reclamation, while the Israelis were spending greater portions of U.S. money—including an undisclosed part of a 37-million-dollar “extraordinary budget”—on their security budget.

One war crisis had been narrowly averted by Mr. Ben-Gurion's announcement that the Israeli plan to build the hydro-electric plant and a canal on the Jordan south of Lake Huleh was being held up pending Eric Johnston's fifth visit. But both sides went on preparing for war.

In accusing the Egyptians of new Gaza attacks, Mr. Ben-Gurion forecast an Arab attack against Israel within the next few months. “If war should come,” the Israeli Prime Minister stated, “the moral responsibility rests with the Soviet Union and the U.S. government.”

His cry was picked up in Zionist rallies throughout the

country. The attacks on Dulles became bolder and sharper. When President Eisenhower upheld his Secretary, noting that there were 42 million Arabs as against 1,700,000 Israelis and that Israel could find no security in arms, he became the chief villain of the piece. Ambassador Eban bitterly retorted: "The ratio of the population is not a relevant criterion. Israel is seeking American arms aid for legitimate self-defense."

Behind the President's argument had been the thought that, as Colonel Nasser had noted, the Arabs would be able to get more arms from the Soviet bloc than Israel could receive from the West. Thousands of Russian obsolescent and surplus tanks, planes and guns were available to Arabs as they had been to Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and brother of the Secretary of State, had warned of this possibility.

The Presidential statement in mid-March that "he was working long hours lately going far into the evening" on the Middle East, "where our interests are gravely jeopardized," and that he had "never foreclosed" on furnishing arms to Israel, was favorably received in Israel, but was not satisfying enough to halt Zionist political onslaughts. Seemingly dilatory were the White House declaration that the United States was "exploring every avenue" to achieve a peaceful solution and a letter from Mr. Eisenhower to Izhak Ben Zvi, President of Israel, which appealed for "patience, mutual confidence and good will."

Senator Kefauver, Governor Harriman and Adlai Stevenson bartered for primary votes and delegates with competing accusations against the administration. Adlai Stevenson had long held out against Zionist enticements. During the 1952 campaign, the Democratic candidate had run on a platform which had been patently less pro-Israeli than that of his opponent. The Republicans had then followed much more closely the "bloc vote" pattern set by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and emulated by Governor Dewey. In the intervening

years Stevenson had singularly and adroitly avoided competitive bartering for the "Jewish vote." His article in *Look* magazine, "No Peace for Israel," which followed his trip to the area in the late spring of 1953, failed to please Israelophiles, and the usual "anti-Semitic" whispering charge made the rounds in certain circles.

After Senator Kefauver had won the race in Minnesota and was pressing Stevenson in the important Florida and California primaries, Chicago boss Jack Arvey broke down Stevenson's resistance. Every prominent Democrat was committed to a pro-Israeli position, and it was argued that any Stevenson aloofness toward a similar position would strengthen Harriman and Kefauver. In a message to the opening of a 75-million-dollar Israeli bond drive at Miami Beach, Stevenson demanded assistance for Israel so as to counter recent Soviet military help and restore the area's "equitable balance of armed strength."

By indirection, the Eisenhower administration moved to relieve itself of some of the crushing pressures at home, and also to answer the cry of its allies for action. Brought to an end was the eight months' tug-of-war between those who opposed sending any arms to Israel except under very stringent conditions and those who believed that the United States had no choice but to restore the balance of power upset by the Soviet arms supplied to Egypt. The solution: France and Britain, traditionally the suppliers of arms for the Middle East, were both only too delighted to help Israel arm, if only as a check on their mutual tormentor, Egypt. As Israeli deals were being cooked up with Canada and Britain, France announced that the U.S. had agreed to her selling 12 Mystère IV jet planes to Israel.

It was thus the renewed threat of an Arab-Israeli war that brought an end to Western drifting. The West gave up on the now-outmoded Anglo-French-American 1950 declaration—which had pledged Big Power maintenance of a military bal-

ance—and placed the Palestine issue back in the lap of the United Nations. After all, as Mr. Dulles noted, Israel was the ward of the UN, who had created the state.

Other courses of action had proven futile. Blusterings of intent by the West to intervene militarily had achieved nothing save further loss of face. The French delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Hervé Alphand, disturbed by the worsening of the North African situation, was arguing in private talks with members of other delegations that Israel should be given some more military help and then a total arms embargo—by both the West and Russia—should be imposed. If this were to be done, the international organization was the logical body to impose such a ban.

On April 4 the Security Council empowered Secretary-General Hammarskjöld “to undertake a survey of the various aspects of enforcement and compliance with armistice agreements.” This U.S. resolution had initially aroused Arab suspicions that the proposed mission would be used not to prevent war, but to impose a peace on Western-supported Israeli terms.

In their now familiar role, the Russians moved to amend the U.S. proposal. U.S.S.R. delegate Ambassador Sobolev made the charge that the Big Three were plotting action to void Arab rights. After a lengthy debate, the resolution as adopted made clear that Hammarskjöld was limited to implementing and strengthening truce arrangements rather than exploring a full Palestine settlement.

Secretary-General Hammarskjöld had returned only five weeks previously from a fruitless visit to all Middle East countries. But this second trip was perfectly timed. The United Nations chief arrived in the Middle East on his limited mission amidst the most furious Gaza fighting since the previous November. The Israelis alleged that the Egyptians had opened fire on an Israeli patrol. They also, it was charged, had three times the number of troops permitted under the Armistice rules. The Egyptians accused Israel of launching a premedi-

tated attack on civilian and refugee areas. In the ensuing artillery duel a hospital and other civilian centers had been destroyed, 67 Egyptian civilians and refugees killed, 93 civilians and 9 soldiers wounded. Egyptian forces had to restrain Arab refugees in the Strip from venting their spleen on United Nations Truce Observers. This, to many observers, could have been the start of Israel's preventive war. Only the efforts of Dag Hammarskjold staved off a full scale conflict and brought an end to this outbreak.

Israel at first demanded that Egypt lift the Suez blockade against Israeli shipping, but then agreed unconditionally to the cease-fire, effective April 18. Hammarskjold, apparently still worried about the Jordan River area, personally cautioned Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that renewal of work on the diversionary canal in the militarized zone along the Syrian frontier was not compatible with past Security Council resolutions.

Hammarskjold thus won a breathing spell for the area, settling nothing beyond extending the state of "no war, no peace." The renewed Israeli and Arab pledges to respect an armistice had brought the Middle East conflict back exactly to the spot where it had been. And the causes of Middle East tensions remained unaffected.

The cold war continued. The Zionists and their friends in the United States made evident their dissatisfaction with the Hammarskjold mission. While Hammarskjold was flying home with his report, it was announced that Egypt and Jordan would link their armies, thus bringing Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Jordan into a single military bloc. Lebanon, while not becoming a member of the neutralist axis, reached an agreement aligning her defenses with Jordan.

On April 16 the Soviet Union made a surprise move with an offer to support a United Nations settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The statement from the Foreign Ministry, calling on Israel and the Arab countries to refrain from fur-

ther incidents and rejecting all "external intervention" in the area, was timed to coincide with the departure of Bulganin and Khrushchev for their London talks.

The Soviet peace dove was welcomed by Secretary Dulles. The attitude of the Soviet Union strengthened the United States determination to keep the Palestine question within the United Nations. Britain, who feared the immense power wielded in the international organization by the anti-colonial Arab-Asian bloc as well as the Soviet veto, had most reluctantly agreed to this tactic.

But in London, the Russians soon turned a deaf ear to the Eden suggestion that Soviet arms shipments to the Middle East be curbed. The Russians, equally as adept as the West in mouthing peace platitudes on the Palestine question, obstinately refused to spell out specifics.

The Arabs, who had become alarmed at the prospect that their Soviet champions might indulge in some Middle East intervention of their own, had been reassured by the London stand. While the Russian chieftains may have derived little benefit from their visit to the British capital, the Eden government certainly gained less. The Russians at least won from Britain recognition as a Middle East power.

Prior to the May meeting of NATO in Paris, Secretary Dulles worked out final details with Foreign Ministers Lloyd and Pineau for supplying Israel with "defensive" weapons, including the transfer by France of some supersonic jets originally destined for NATO. The "Big Three" Foreign Ministers intended a discussion of a military blueprint drafted by Britain for emergency Middle East intervention. Previous rumors of this had forced Secretary of State Dulles to make clear that the President was not disposed to send U.S. troops into action without obtaining a prior Congressional authorization.

Upon his return from Europe, the Secretary, before a B'nai B'rith audience, defended the refusal of the Eisenhower administration itself to sell arms to Israel: "It seemed particularly

important to avoid a situation where great military powers confronted each other by proxy under conditions which would engage their respective prestiges in a manner ominous for peace, not only within the area, but possibly throughout the world." How the arming of Israel by proxy avoided any less the "situation" which he considered "ominous for peace" was never explained by Mr. Dulles. The Secretary contented himself with happy talk based on the new Soviet pledge. His words on this occasion—"The Soviet Union seems increasingly aware of the dangerous consequences of reckless action"—were all too reminiscent of Geneva.

In a final report on his Middle East mission, Secretary-General Hammarskjold coupled a call for patience with the hope that the Arabs and Israelis, if left to themselves, might expand their area of agreement. On May 28, at the first Security Council meeting since the Hammarskjold mission began, the impatient British introduced a new resolution. This proposal called on the UN chieftain to continue his good offices toward reducing tensions and assuring "full compliance with the Armistice Agreements."

The preamble to the resolution, referring to a "mutually acceptable settlement," stirred a hornet's nest. The Arabs violently opposed the phrase "mutually acceptable" as being a means of bypassing earlier General Assembly resolutions on Palestine and arriving at new solutions based on the Israeli *fait accompli*. Proponents of Israel contended that this was but another manifestation of Arab intransigency toward acceptance of Israel as a neighbor. A prolonged debate in which the Russians advanced the Arab point of view resulted in the adoption of the resolution minus the objectionable words. In token effect, Hammarskjold once again had been requested to guard the peace, but not to bring about a settlement. The Secretary-General was entrusted with the task of holding the dikes until after the election.

While overt acts of Arab-Israeli strife had considerably

lessened, the Arabs were growing closer to one another and to the Russians. Jordan and Lebanon were being pulled into the Cairo orbit. Syria's rudderless government was receiving Russian jets and under the prodding of Moscow-trained Khaled Bagdash was becoming more pronouncedly anti-West. The Yemen Crown Prince Saif el Islam el Badr Mohammed was making final preparations for his pending visit to Moscow—the first Arab leader to visit Soviet Russia. And Egypt had recognized Red China!

While the West ought to have had no qualms about an action which Britain herself had taken long before, this Nasser move tended to dissipate some of the Dulles optimism created by the Russian attitude following the Hammarskjöld Middle East mission. Red China's recognition had followed in the wake of growing economic ties, including a barter of 45,000 tons of Egyptian cotton for 60,000 tons of Chinese steel. Nasser announced his intention of visiting Moscow and Peiping. It was apparent that the Egyptian Prime Minister was insuring a continuous flow of arms. Should a United Nations arms embargo be imposed, Krushchev would be bound by this mandate, but not Chou En-lai, whose government had never been admitted into the world organization.

The extent to which the West was losing the propaganda war was dramatized by the Cairo celebration that marked the evacuation of the last British troops from Egyptian soil after 74 years of occupation. The highlight was a gigantic military parade in which Egypt's acquired Communist arms were displayed. Stalin tanks rumbled through crowded Revolutionary Square. Mig-15's and twin Illyushin bombers screamed overhead. And thousands of well-trained soldiers with arms swinging high in British cadence marched past the reviewing stand, where sat the Prime Minister flanked by guests of honor, the most important being Dmitri T. Shepilov.

The Russians as usual had proved to be the masters of timing. Shepilov had been earlier invited as editor of *Pravda* to

the Suez-Third Anniversary of the Republic celebration, along with other international journalists and political leaders from the Arab world. In the meantime he was appointed to take the place of Vyacheslav M. Molotov as the new Soviet Foreign Minister. Shepilov seized the dramatic opportunity to attend the celebration of the final ouster of the British and to further Soviet wooing of the uncommitted Arab world. The new Soviet Foreign Minister was also to visit Beirut and Damascus. It was this same Shepilov who had helped engineer the Czech arms deal, and it was not beyond the realm of possibility that he had been given his new post because of his connections in the Arab world rather than his commonly alleged friendly relationship with Tito.

The Middle East spotlight, focussed on the doings of Comrade Shepilov in Cairo, soon was shared by the dramatic story of the ouster in Israel of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett by Premier Ben-Gurion. In this cabinet shuffle, activist Mrs. Golda Meir replaced the temporizing, diplomatically minded Sharett, who had held his post since the creation of Israel.

The almost ominous quiet which had surrounded the Middle East battlefield for some weeks now gave way to speculation and rumor. Was Israel planning a more audacious line of conduct which might even include preventive war? Was Egypt asking Moscow for further military aid? Had Shepilov given Nasser a blank check for economic aid and offered a more-than-billion-dollar loan to cover the entire cost of the Aswan project? Was the Egyptian Prime Minister leaving the door ajar to the West's competitive offer to assist in building this high dam?

While these questions were receiving different answers, it was perfectly clear that Ben-Gurion had been given a much freer hand to take bold action. Equally obvious was the desire of the Russians to enlarge their reservoir of goodwill without repudiating their United Nations avowals. It was most difficult to ascertain what was going through the mind of Colonel

Nasser as he received the wild, enthusiastic plaudits of Suez and Cairo mobs with his benefactor, Dimitri Shepilov, at his side.

Was the Egyptian leader as happy as on the afternoon of October 19, 1954, when he had brought foreign military domination to an end by signing the evacuation pact with Britain and before the Russians had begun to cast their shadow? Was Nasser enough of a realist to know when to stop—and could he stop—accepting Russian gifts? Could he, like Nehru and Tito, manage to avoid becoming a Soviet bride after assiduous wooing?

In his first speech on June 26 after the adoption of the new Egyptian Constitution and his election as President, Colonel Nasser declared Egypt wanted friendly relations with the United States and “for my part I will do all I can.”³ There was every indication that Egypt’s Chief of State wished to be rescued from the predicament into which events had forced him. What would be the answer of the United States and of the West to this profession of friendship?

³ *New York Times*, June 27, 1956.

XI

From Aswan to Suez

NASSER's tender of friendship to the United States soon received a reply. The United States announced the withdrawal of its offer to share in the financing of the Aswan Dam.

The plan for building the High Dam across the Nile at Aswan was one of the main projects in the Nasser reform program. The dam would have increased Egypt's irrigable land from six to eight million acres and multiplied electric energy tenfold. The kilowatt capacity of the proposed dam would have exceeded the Hoover Dam and been outstripped only by the Grand Coulee and Russia's Bratsk Dam.

On this gigantic scheme rested the Revolutionary Junta's main hope for the social democracy which Nasser had promised his country and a means of wrestling with the gigantic problem created by the ever increasing Egyptian population. The offer in December by the United States and the United Kingdom of grants-in-aid had been agreed upon as a counter-offensive to the Soviet economic, cultural and political pene-

tration heightened by the September arms deal. The International Bank had announced its readiness to lend Egypt up to 200 million dollars, which with the grants made up one-quarter of the total sum sought by Egypt.

Egypt's delay in accepting this offer of the West was alleged by American newspapers to be part of Nasser's game of playing the East off against the West in order to win the best bargain. The Russians themselves, abetted by the pro-Israeli American press, had helped implant this notion. E. D. Kisselev, Soviet Ambassador to Cairo, declared Russia was willing to finance the dam. When Shepilov was quoted from Moscow as saying that industrialization of Egypt was more important than financing the dam itself, the Soviet Foreign Minister charged Western distortion of his statement. Later, he reversed himself by announcing that Moscow did not plan Aswan Dam aid at the moment and pointedly referred to Colonel Nasser's impending trip to Moscow in August. The Russians apparently were planning to force Nasser to make certain important concessions for the aid.

The Egyptian sources claimed their hesitancy in accepting the West's proposals came from a desire to receive a guarantee of continued financial support so that the construction of the dam would not be halted in the middle of the 15-to-20-years required. But no American administration was in a position to guarantee funds beyond its own term in office. The failure to complete negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan over Nile water distribution and compensation for any flooding of lands within the Sudan was also holding up any agreement with the West.

Early in July Egypt abandoned hopes for long term financing and decided to accept the West's offer. The World Bank had tempered its original demands for controls over the Egyptian economy, and other snags were overcome with the visit to Cairo of Bank President Eugene Black. Nasser, scheduled to go to Moscow, apparently preferred to make his visit

not with hat in hand. Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein, who had been in Cairo for consultations, left for Washington on July 14 with his government's acceptance of U.S.-British-World Bank financing.

On Monday, July 16, the Senate Appropriations Committee in a rider to the 1956 Foreign Aid Bill barred use of funds for the Egyptian Aswan Dam without specific authorization. (Funds available for the dam under the previous year's bill had lapsed.) A strange combination of political bed-fellows concocted this Senatorial edict: Southerners who feared increased competition from Egyptian cotton, election year economically minded conservatives, anti-Communists resentful of Egypt's Czech arms deal and recognition of Red China, and pro-Israeli Senators succumbing to the demands of the Zionist lobby.

In his testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Secretary Dulles had stated that "he did not see any likelihood of an early utilization" of U.S. funds for the Aswan Dam project. "It is possible," the Secretary added, "that the Soviet Union may move in. We will probably know more about that within the next few days." But in a letter to the Chairman of the Committee the Secretary stated that he and President Eisenhower would not be bound by the restrictions on "his powers of maneuvering in the delicate negotiations." Dulles had agreed to consult with the Committee before acting, but he did not hesitate to state that he regarded the language of the report as an invasion of Mr. Eisenhower's executive powers. The tone of Mr. Dulles certainly indicated chagrin at this Senatorial action.

Events moved quickly. Upon his arrival in New York, Ambassador Hussein indicated acceptance by his government of the West's offer and proceeded to Washington. When Ambassador Hussein called on Mr. Dulles on Thursday, July 19, he had every reason to believe that Mr. Dulles would certainly, at the very least, leave the way open for further negotiations.

Instead, the American Secretary of State withdrew the offer of a grant-in-aid and unequivocally slammed the door on United States participation in this project.

The following day Britain announced that she too was withdrawing her offer of a grant-in-aid. The British and U.S. withdrawal of funds voided the two hundred million dollar loan of the World Bank, premised upon the grants of the two Western Powers.

Members of the Senate applauded the Dulles action, expressing themselves through Senator Edward J. Thye (Republican from Minnesota), who said: "There is too much uncertainty about where Egypt stands. Premier Nasser has been flirting too much with the Russians." The American press praised the move and noted that certain elements of Arab leadership would be glad to see Nasser pegged down a few notches.

The reaction of the Arab world, held up momentarily by a religious holiday, was violently explosive. From North Africa to Iraq, a stream of abuse was directed against the United States and the alleged reasons for the withdrawal of Western support (i.e., to halt the Nasser game of playing East off against West; the failure of Egypt to reach an agreement with the other users of the Nile; and the changed economic position of Egypt resulting from the mortgaging of her cotton crop by the purchase of Red arms).

It did not take the Arab press long to point out that the arms deal had taken place in September and the United States offer of assistance had followed in December. The Egyptians pointed out that as late as July 9 World Bank President Eugene Black, in a letter to Egyptian Finance Minister Abdel Moneim Kaissuny, had reiterated the assurance that "the World Bank will finance the High Dam scheme" and had urged Nasser to speed up an acceptance of the bank's offer of a loan. Did not this, the irate Egyptians argued, indicate

that, from the standpoint of the very practical-minded bank, Egypt was a good financial risk as of the moment?

Other Arab newspapers and Arab leaders were quick to inquire: "If the purchase of arms had mortgaged Egypt's cotton output, what about Israel's economy? Is it sounder than Egypt's? . . . And why doesn't Egypt deserve to get four hundred million dollars—even as a donation (which it was not) against the nine hundred million dollars she pledges herself to pay in order to build the world's greatest dam, which will combat poverty and protect the poor Egyptians against the spread of communism? Aren't these the aims of the United States herself?"

Egypt could only view the U.S. action as further evidence of Zionist influence and of Anglo-French pressure. In Arab eyes the argument of the need for economy in an election year did not stand up. They knew only too well that the 56 million dollars promised for this project was but a minute portion of the 4½ billion dollar American foreign aid program. To play uncle for more than 10 years to the entire world and then to become economically minded toward the Middle East appeared to them as unfriendly discrimination.

The Egyptians argued that the Black letter to the Egyptian Finance Minister, dated only ten days before the U.S. withdrawal, invalidated the American government's argument that during the past months unfavorable economic developments had taken place in Egypt prompting Washington to withdraw its offer.

It was not disclosed why on July 9 Egypt was a good financial risk to Eugene Black of the World Bank but ten days later was not a good risk to the United States. If the Soviet refusal to help on the dam was sincere, this was all the more reason for the United States not to back away. Communist interests were served equally well if the dam was not built.

Exactly what had changed the attitude of Secretary Dulles toward the project was never made clear. Fear of possibly

becoming involved in underwriting Egypt's economy for years to come was alleged to be a factor, as could also have been the Secretary's resentment against being put on the spot by the Egyptian public acceptance of the offer at a time when the Congress had openly indicated definite opposition to the dam. But could any explanation account for the precipitate manner in which the offer had been withdrawn?

In testifying seven months later before the Senate Joint Committee Hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine, former Ambassador to Egypt Byroade admitted under the questioning of Senator J. W. Fulbright that he had first learned about the cancellation not from the State Department in Washington but from the Cairo press.¹ Byroade, who was now Ambassador to South Africa, stated that "there may have been many reasons unknown to me why we could or should not go ahead on the Aswan dam," but said that the withdrawal was "a mistake."² He added: "A project such as this could be the difference as to whether there can be stability in Egypt no matter who is running the country 20 years from now."

In this light, Western action on the Aswan Dam could only be regarded by Cairo and by the other Arab capitals as a step calculated to overthrow Nasser, who had reaffirmed his neutralist allegiance at meetings with Nehru and Tito on Brioni Island, the summer residence of the Yugoslav President. Anglo-American doubts of Egypt's capacity to finance its share of the dam impugned the financial position of the Nasser government. The President of Egypt acted accordingly, struck back in defense.

In inaugurating a new refinery near Cairo, Nasser, in a bitter attack, accused the United States of lying about the Egyptian economy and, as translated in *The New York Times*,

¹ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 85th Congress, First Session, On S.C. Res. 19 and H.C. Res. 117—Part II, p. 717.

² *Ibid.*, p. 708.

said: "I look at Americans and say, 'May you choke to death on your fury.'"³

Two days later, on July 26, before a wildly cheering crowd of 100,000 in Alexandria, President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and the use of the Canal revenues to help build the Aswan Dam. The premises of the Suez Canal Company in Cairo were taken over by Egyptian officials of the Company with the aid of a squad of policemen.

The Suez Canal Company was, at the time, an Egyptian company, with headquarters in Paris, and 44% of its stock owned by the British government. The 99-year concession would have expired in 1968 and would have reverted to Egypt without payment. The shareholders were to be compensated in the amount of 210 million dollars.

En route to his capital from Alexandria, Nasser was hailed by hysterically happy mobs.

Announcement of the nationalization was received in stunned silence in London and Paris, followed by emergency Cabinet sessions. In Washington many Congressional and diplomatic observers, admitting that the action might not be illegal under international law, pointed out that it had created an extremely dangerous situation.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company evoked an even louder reaction than the hysteria which had greeted the Czech arms deal. American newspapers refused once again to link cause with effect. With the exception of the Scripps-Howard papers and a few stalwart journalists like Marguerite Higgins of the *Herald Tribune*, the newspapers confused the

³ The translation of this quotation appeared in three different versions in various American papers. The original was an Arabic proverb which has many ways of being translated. Another N. Y. newspaper translated the Nasser July 24 attack: "May your hate choke you to death, but you will never dominate us."

Company nationalization with the Canal seizure and joined together in labeling Nasser the "Hitler of the Nile."

The storm over Suez broke as the Democratic Party convened in Chicago to adopt a platform and nominate a candidate for president. The platform makers at this convention and at the ensuing Republican conclave in San Francisco were very mindful of the Middle East. There was little to choose between the Democratic bid for the "Jewish vote" by demanding arms for Israel and the bid of the Republican Party by seeking a security guarantee for Israel. Had Khrushchev and Bulganin written the Middle East planks of the two parties, they could not have done a better job for the cause of world communism. The 1956 platforms added to the Arab conviction that United States domestic votes were more important than the friendship of the Arab world.

The British and the French reaction became violent. Declaring that the Suez Canal would never be ruled by any single power, Eden halted shipment of arms to Egypt and then froze all Egyptian accounts. The French followed suit. Prime Minister Guy Mollet accused Nasser, the "apprentice dictator," of imitating Hitler by addressing the democracies in "insulting terms" and compared the Egyptian leader's writings with *Mein Kampf*. Secretary Dulles flew to London to confer with Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd and with Foreign Minister Pineau of France, for the first of several meetings.

The State Department, recognizing the distinction between seizure of the Canal company and of the Canal itself, admitted that Nasser's statements had given no indication of challenging the freedom of the Canal as an international waterway. "There is no doubt," as one administration source declared, "that Egypt has the right, if it wishes, to nationalize the Suez Canal Company, assuming that adequate payments are made. If Nasser does not go further and does not disrupt the operation of the canal, then everything will be all right."

Although the Egyptian government continued to reiterate

its adherence to the 1888 Constantinople Convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation, statements from London and Paris continued "to assume that international liberties will suffer from Nasser's action." In contrast to American moderation, Britain and France seethed with anger and aired long accumulated grievances. The Bandung nations, who strongly supported Nasser, viewed the British and French agitation as an attempted resurgence of colonial power. In the eyes of the Asian-African world, the British were attacking Nasser for his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, his wooing of Britain's subsidized Jordan and his encouragement to Cypriots. The French were attacking him for his stand on Algeria.

In both Britain and France, the influential stockholders of the old Suez Canal Company were exerting tremendous pressures to hold on to their handsome dividends. According to the *Wall Street Journal* of August 6, 1956, the Suez Canal Company had long term non-Egyptian investments with a book value of more than 46 million dollars. Ambassador Byroade in his testimony indicated that Nasser's act of nationalization was motivated in part by a desire to "get some of the capital profits that were going outside of Egypt," instead of into improvements in the Canal.⁴ In the United States overzealous anti-Communists, infuriated at Egypt for having accepted Communist arms assistance and recognized Red China, joined in the cry. Pro-Israeli sympathizers everywhere lent full support to the anti-Nasser agitation. On every front Dulles was subjected to crushing pressures.

The two European powers began building up military forces in the Mediterranean, with Cyprus as the base, and made no secret of their resolve to resort to force should the peaceful road be closed to them. Britain and France pushed for a plan under which the Suez Canal would be ruled by a world agency,

⁴ Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, p. 706.

with Cairo receiving a special role. Nasser indicated a willingness to adhere to a new agreement bolstering freedom of navigation and to consider an international advisory board.

Britain's position was expressed by Eden in this way: "Our quarrel is with Nasser who is not a man to be trusted. We all know that this is how fascist governments behave." The United States, vacillating between one position and another, always adhered to a determination for a peaceful settlement barring the use of force. The "peace" slogan in the Republican campaign served as a most effective deterrent to Anglo-French use of force.

Successive attempts to negotiate the differences between the Anglo-French demands for complete international control of the Canal and Egypt's insistence on national control failed. With Greece and Egypt alone declining to attend, 22 nations met for the first London Suez Conference. (Nasser's political adviser, Wing Commander Aly Sabri, arrived in the course of the hearings as an observer.)

As the deliberations began, a general strike of the whole Arab-Moslem world took place to protest the London meeting. In pro-West Beirut all stores were closed. In nearby Libya pro-Nasser demonstrations had to be restrained by the police, and even in pro-West Pakistan's capital of Karachi, Suez Canal Day was held.

The Indian plan, calling for an international advisory board for consultative purposes, but with the actual operation remaining in Egyptian hands, was strongly championed by the Soviet Union, Ceylon and Indonesia. The Dulles plan providing for operation by an international board won the concurrence of the other conferees after the acceptance of amendments to win hesitant Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia and Spain. (The latter had pressed for a compromise between the majority and minority approaches, which would have provided international representation on the Egyptian company's board.) Krishna Menon, the Indian representative who had just conferred with

Mr. Nasser, warned the conference that nothing but an Egyptian rejection could possibly result from the advocacy of the majority plan.

A five-man committee, headed by Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies and including American,⁵ Iranian, Swedish and Ethiopian members, was dispatched to discuss the proposed plan with President Nasser in Cairo.

Nasser, while insisting on Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal, indicated that he was willing to negotiate, and the talks with the Menzies mission opened in a spirit of goodwill. But after a week, the talks broke up with nothing accomplished. Nasser rejected the plan for international control and suggested that a special negotiating body be established to include all interested countries. Chairman Menzies, upon departing, declared the situation "very, very grave."

Anglo-French agreement on stern economic measures against Egypt followed in the wake of the rejection of the London Conference's proposals. The first move was to call upon non-Egyptian pilots to quit. At the outset of the nationalization crisis, Mr. Georges Picot, director of the Company, had sent a message to 59 pilots offering them two years' salary for not returning to work. Twenty-seven of these pilots, mostly British and French, then quit, forcing Egypt to recruit new pilots.

The attempt to form a Users' Association, which would control pilots and collect tolls, revealed further American vacillation. Prime Minister Eden broke the first news of this new approach in a House of Commons speech. When queried about the London announcement, Washington first denied any knowledge of or responsibility for the Association, although the idea had been hatched in long and arduous sessions held in the State Department. State Department spokesmen denied

⁵ The American delegate was Ambassador Loy Henderson, known to be a friend of the Arabs.

and then re-affirmed an intention to finance oil shipments to Europe to the extent of five hundred million dollars if the Suez transit became "impractical."

The user nations, now reduced to 18, met in London for the second London Conference in an atmosphere of increased tension. Nasser had reacted to the Users' Association with the declaration, "This means war." The Soviet Union charged that the West planned to seize the Canal by aggression. Bulganin demanded a six-nation parley. Dulles bristled: "Restraint by the powers over Suez cannot last indefinitely." And Israel had ended a long silence by airing an eight-year-old grievance against Egypt for barring her shipping from the Canal.

At this second London conclave a diversity of views was aired. Some nations, such as Britain and France, maintained that the Users' Association proposal did not go far enough. It did not require, as Dulles had apparently originally indicated to his allies, that it be mandatory that tolls be paid to the Association and not to Nasser's authority. On the other hand Pakistan rejected the idea entirely, while Iran, Ethiopia, Japan and Sweden accepted even the moderate plan with reservations. Prime Minister Mollet of France was exceedingly bitter at the failure to bind the members to drastic action, and deferred approval. Egyptian willingness, reported by India's envoy Menon, to establish Canal tolls under international agreement had reduced the need for an Association.

Mr. Dulles revealed the gravity of the U.S. and Anglo-French split when he announced on October 2 that there were differences of a fundamental nature between the United States and its European allies over the Suez Canal question, which, he declared, stemmed "from the independent position" of the United States on the colonial issue. Two hours after his news conference, Mr. Dulles did the singular in amending the official transcript to remove part of his statement, his method of noting that the first version of the differences was not the true United States view.

Britain and France, who had previously hesitated because of the Russian veto and of the preponderant strength of pro-Nasser Asian-African countries, announced that they were taking the Suez "situation"⁶ to the Security Council, a step upon which hesitant members of the new Suez Canal Users' Association had conditioned their participation. Where there were 26 user nations invited to the first London Conference, there were now only 15 members of an Association whose duties remained singularly obscure.

What added to the Anglo-French frustration was the abysmal failure of their attempt to sabotage functioning of the Canal. Although some 400 foreign employees, including 93 pilots, responded to their call to quit, leaving Egypt with only 65 pilots, of whom but 33 were Suez-seasoned, navigation through the Canal proceeded with scarcely a hitch. Traffic continued to move as the experienced pilots carried on an around-the-clock duty. Additional Soviet, Yugoslav and American trainees were arriving.

During the period July 26 to October 23, according to Hanson W. Baldwin in *The New York Times*, 3693 ships transited the Canal as compared to 3585 in the comparable 1955 period. Minor accidents in the last two weeks of September numbered three, and seven for the same period in 1955. The Big Power charge that Egypt could not run the Canal, as well as the expansive slanted stories in the American press as to the difficulties in Suez piloting, had been exploded. Cargo and insurance rates, which had skyrocketed to unprecedented figures, worked their way back to normal.

The Security Council in both open and closed hearings heatedly debated the Suez question, but failed to reconcile the users' interests with Egyptian sovereignty. Britain and France, who had scarcely raised the question of Israel's rights to free

⁶ Under the United Nations Charter, parties to a "dispute" are themselves barred from voting. When the question is brought to the Security Council as a "situation" endangering the peace, the parties involved can vote.

navigation under the old Company, now made a big issue of Egypt's blockade.

The Security Council failed to arrive at any decision save an agreement upon six principles to serve as a basis for further negotiation. The proviso that the operation of the Canal was to be insulated from the politics of any country was considered a Western victory. But the proposal backed by the U.S., Britain and France that the international control plan be approved in accordance with these six principles was vetoed by the Russians, who once more demonstrated their friendship for the Arabs. The Eden statement on October 13 that the "use of force as the last recourse in Suez cannot be excluded" was the key to the disappointment with which Britain and France viewed the Security Council results. Mr. Dulles, in contrast, exuded optimism, three days later stating that great progress had been made. (This was on October 16, the very day on which Eden, Lloyd, Mollet, and Pineau met in a five-hour super-secret conference at which war on Egypt was presumably decided.)

The mounting Middle East heat was having its repercussions in the United States, where the Eisenhower-Stevenson battle was raging. The politicians refused to refrain from injecting the issue into domestic politics. Former President Truman charged Eisenhower with allowing the Soviet Union to gain a foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. Adlai Stevenson charged his Republican opponent with misleading the American public on the Suez crisis by means of a "there is good news about Suez" statement. Attorney-General Javits and Mayor Wagner each tried to outbid the other as to who would do more for Israel; they conducted their campaign more as if they were candidates for the Israeli Knesset than for the United States Senate.

The U.S. pledge of aid to any victim of aggression was reiterated by Secretary Dulles. Border tensions between Jordan and Israel, which had been mounting the previous three weeks,

were climaxed with the wiping out of the Jordanian post at Qalqilya, resulting in 60 deaths. Secretary General Hammarskjöld warned that Israel was jeopardizing the Palestine Armistice by deciding that she could deal with border violations without United Nations supervision. Israel was boycotting the UN truce machinery.

However, even as London was putting finishing touches on the plans for the attack on Egypt, Britain sent jet reinforcements to the harassed border of Jordan and reminded Israel that in the event of an Israeli war against Jordan she intended to live up to her defense obligation pursuant to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. The Israelis had threatened to move against Jordan if she admitted Iraqi troops to assist her Arab brothers. However, Britain's attitude changed markedly after the October 21 elections, in which anti-West elements in Jordan won an overwhelming victory. Those elected to the Jordanian Parliament were in favor of closer ties with Nasser and of ending the defense pact with Britain.

As late as October 26, Washington sources were speculating as to a Geneva meeting between Egypt, Britain and France to discuss a new basis for Suez negotiations, and the Users' Association was completing plans for the establishment of offices and a bank account.

On Sunday, October 28, from Walter Reed Hospital where he was taking his final pre-election physical check-up, President Eisenhower sent the second of two personal messages to Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion urging the Israeli leader to exercise every possible precaution to avoid an outbreak of war. The President had been apprized by the American Embassy in Tel Aviv and by intelligence reports that partial mobilization of Israeli reserve military forces had been started. At the same time the United States officially warned its nationals not in essential positions to get out of the Middle East and moved to assist them in leaving the tense area.

On Monday, October 29, a two-pronged war on Nasser was

launched. Israeli armor and paratroops thrust deep into Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, moving in the direction of Suez as the British Mediterranean fleet steamed east from Malta toward Cyprus. Tel Aviv announced that their objective was to crush nests of *fedayeen* commandos harassing Israeli frontier posts. The Israeli offensive against Egypt came with great surprise because for weeks there had been comparative quiet on this front. It was obvious from the size of the Israeli invasion that this was not another reprisal raid, but the preventive war which had been in the offing ever since moderate-minded Moshe Sharett had been dropped as Foreign Minister in favor of Mrs. Golda Meir.

The President announced that the United States would bring the new crisis to the United Nations Security Council. The White House made clear that it stood by the repeated pledges to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East. The following day the United Kingdom and France issued an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt demanding withdrawal of troops from within 10 miles of the Canal area and acceptance of Anglo-French occupation of key Canal points. The European powers gave Egypt twelve hours to accept, indicating that Anglo-French forces intended to move in to safeguard navigation of the waterway. The joint Anglo-French demand was rejected by President Nasser.

President Eisenhower first learned of the ultimatum of his European allies from a news ticker. (This was reminiscent of the manner in which UN Ambassador Warren Austin learned of United States recognition of the new state of Israel in 1948.) The American Ambassadors in London, Paris and Tel Aviv were instructed to reiterate the President's confirmed belief that force was not to be used as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes. And in the Security Council, Ambassador Lodge moved a resolution calling for a cease fire and withdrawal by Israel, urging all members to refrain

from the use or threat of force and from rendering any kind of aid to Israel.

The United Kingdom, joined by France, applied its first Security Council veto to the resolution and took the same action on a variation of this resolution put forward by the Soviet Union.

The United Nations was called into extraordinary session at the motion of the Yugoslav Representative over British-French objection. A UN sponsored resolution calling for an immediate cease fire, vigorously supported by the Asian-African countries and the Soviet bloc, passed the General Assembly by a vote of 64 to 5. (Australia and New Zealand alone sided with the three aggressor nations.)

The Eden-Mollet answer to the United Nations decree was to send jet bombers over Cairo to pave the way for the invasion. President Eisenhower in a television campaign broadcast beamed from Philadelphia Convention Hall said that the United States would not become involved in the present hostilities and exhorted against the use of force. In an obvious rap at the U.K. and France, the President declared there can be no law if we are to invoke "one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for those allied with us."

This new Middle East crisis furnished the Russians an ideal opportunity. Soviet troops, on the verge of leaving Hungary, returned, drove Prime Minister Nagy from office and began a new blood bath.

Spurred by the Hammarskjold offer to resign rather than "stand idly by when UN nations refuse to honor their pledge to observe the Charter which makes maintenance of peace mandatory," the United Nations Assembly voted to organize a "UN Emergency Force" from small nations to police the peace in the Middle East. The joint Anglo-French armada of more than 100 warships and troop transports was sailing from Cyprus for Suez.

British action faced not only the stinging rebuke of world

opinion but the strongest opposition at home. In introducing a resolution of censure in Commons, Labourite Leader Hugh Gaitskell stated, "The use of force is in clear violation of the United Nations Charter affronting the conviction of a large section of the British people, dividing the Commonwealth, straining the Atlantic Alliance and gravely damaging the foundations of international order." Crowds massed around 10 Downing Street and in Trafalgar Square protested against what was becoming known as "Eden's war." Anthony Nutting, Minister of State and near shadow of Eden, resigned his post.

From Britain the *Time-Life* London Bureau Chief, Max Ways, cabled this assessment of the situation:

London is a city of doubt, expressed in two painful questions. First, was Prime Minister Eden's action morally right? Second, did it make political sense? Many fear that what Eden did may not work, partially because it is morally dubious, and they consider it morally dubious, partially because it may not work. . . .

The Russians continued to exploit this strangest of wars to their own advantage. Under cover of the Anglo-French aggression, they proceeded to stamp out with unparalleled ruthlessness the Hungarian rebellion. They assured Syrian President Kuwatly, who had pointedly stuck to his scheduled visit to Moscow despite the crisis at home, that they would support the Arab world. When Britain and France ignored the injunctions of the United Nations to cease fire, Premier Bulganin dispatched identical notes to Prime Ministers Eden, Mollet and Ben-Gurion, warning them to stop hostilities or face the possibility of Russian intervention, which by implication included devastation by bombing: "We are fully determined to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the Middle East through the use of force." At the same time the Russians proposed joint Russian-U.S. intervention to President Eisenhower to halt the invasion of Egypt which was proceeding by air and by sea.

The White House termed the Moscow proposal for joint Soviet-American action as "unthinkable" and accused the Soviet Union of trying to divert attention from the brutal repression of human rights of the Hungarian people. In the face of the Anglo-French action, the U.S. was finding it impossible to mobilize the full weight of world moral force against the Soviet Union's actions in Eastern Europe and was seeking to move in the Middle East crisis without strengthening the Kremlin's impact there.

The war against Egypt came to a halt with the acceptance of a cease fire after Anglo-French occupancy of two of the key posts on the Suez Canal, seizure of the Gaza Strip, which was promptly proclaimed by Ben-Gurion as part of Israel, and the conquest of the Sinai Peninsula. Fear of Russian intervention and the inflexible attitude of the United States had forced the Eden government to accept the United Nations' demands.

At this very moment the United States in a landslide election returned Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Presidency and New York State elected Javits to the U.S. Senate. The failure of Stevenson to carry New York City by more than 65,000 votes and of Wagner to roll up a big enough majority to overcome the upstate Javits plurality was a crushing defeat for the forces of Zionism. The entire weight of the Zionist machine had been thrown into an effort to defeat Eisenhower and Javits (who, although a strong friend of Israel, had refused to repudiate the Eisenhower policy to halt the Israeli invasion of Egypt). During the last days of the campaign tens of thousands of pamphlets blanketed New York City, calling for support of those who "Cherish Israel and its dream . . . here is the shocking record of Nasser, Nixon and Dulles . . . what they have done to Israel only Stevenson and the Democrats can repair." The rebuke to Stevenson and Wagner laid bare the myth of the Jewish vote.

Armed with United Nations directives, Secretary General

Hammaraskjold proceeded to maneuver the gradual withdrawal of the invading forces from the Canal area. As the step by step evacuation of Anglo-French forces proceeded, the volunteer troops of the United Nations Emergency Force under the command of General Burns moved in, giving way in their turn to Egyptian civil and military authorities. The narrow waterfront perimeters in Port Said and neighboring Port Fuad were the final areas to be surrendered. Seven weeks after the launching of the invasion, the last of the British and French troops departed on December 22 from Egyptian soil.

Hysterical citizens of Port Said greeted newspaper correspondents, who had been patiently waiting for two weeks to enter the beleaguered, bombed-out city. Few journalists remained unmoved at the evidence of the horror and terror, which had been visited upon civilians in this so-called "police action." The entire Arab quarter was subjected to incendiary bombing and resembled the worst of the ruined cities of Germany just after the war.

While an Anglo-French salvage fleet had been working in and around the Port Said harbor to open up a narrow passage for ships, UN salvage operations awaited complete military withdrawal before commencing the clearance of the fifty ships and the two bridges obstructing the Canal's navigation. Lt. General Raymond A. Wheeler, in charge of clearing operations, meanwhile completed his survey. British ships with crews in civilian garb won a concession to participate in some of the work. The biggest obstacles toward resumption of Canal navigation were to be found in that part of the waterway which Britain had not time to take. Removal of the 7100 ton LST *Akka* from a channel in Lake Timsah south of Ismailia proved to be the greatest trouble.

The Secretary General made clear that the function of the UN forces was to monitor the withdrawals of invading forces and not to induce the Nasser government to enter into negotiations for a final settlement of the Suez Canal or the Pales-

tine question. The bulk of the UNEF troops was accordingly moved to the Sinai desert to await the full compliance of Israel with UN directives.

From the beginning, Israel resisted all UN mandates to quit Egypt. Ben-Gurion in a fiery address to the Knesset declared he “would never relinquish the newly gained territory and never consent that a foreign force, no matter how called, take up positions in any area held by Israel.” The Israelis began building permanent fortifications in the Sinai desert. President Eisenhower sent a stiff note reminding the Israeli leader of “the various elements of our policy of support in so many ways and of the fruitful relations” which he earnestly hoped “will not be impaired.” Then Ben-Gurion reversed himself and accepted the UN cease fire, but stalled on withdrawing troops. The Israelis, while agreeing to yield Sinai after the arrival of UN police troops, refused to make any commitment as to the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s stubbornness found considerable support in American public opinion. The Zionist excuse of Egyptian provocation had received broader acceptance in the light of the simultaneous attack by Britain and France. *The New York Times* asked its readers, in effect, to justify the doctrine of preventive war. No American organization, much less any individual, even had it possessed the information, dared point out that the Israeli attack was merely implementation of avowed Zionist expansionism. When questioned in the summer of 1956 in Tel Aviv by an American representative of the State Department in the presence of 30 government training officers, Mr. Ben-Gurion said that Israel could absorb up to 8,000,000 Jews and he expected up to 4,000,000 in Israel in the near future. It was obvious that no such population could ever be absorbed within the present boundaries of this small nation, three-quarters the size of the State of Vermont.

Meanwhile, the outline of what had been a carefully planned U.K.-French-Israeli conspiracy clearly emerged. Even

as they were simulating further negotiations over the Suez Canal, the Colonial Big Two had been planning to break Nasser by invading Egypt. Israel, yearning for a preventive war, was persuaded to turn away from the Jordanian territory she coveted and to move against the Egyptian "dictator." Both France and Britain had been supplying Israel with NATO arms, Mollet also managing to ship some extra Mystère Jet fighters.

The Israeli Prime Minister had timed the action well, moving at a time when the United States, on the verge of a Presidential election, was least likely to move decisively to halt Israel, and Russia's hands seemed tied by the Hungarian rebellion.

America's European allies kept their activities so secret that Washington's suspicions were not aroused by the coincidental absence from their posts of the British, French and Israeli Ambassadors. When the United States moved to stop the Israeli invasion in the United Nations, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd advised U.S. Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich to omit any reference in the draft resolution to aggression, but revealed nothing of his intention to deliver an ultimatum to Egypt later that day. Either U.S. Intelligence sources had slipped up miserably in failing to alert their chiefs in Washington, or they had information and were not believed.

In the aftermath of this perplexing war cut short by the force of world moral opinion, certain inescapable facts emerged: Britain and France had failed abysmally to achieve their objective. They had not rid themselves of Nasser, and the Egyptian President, however militarily crippled he had become, was emerging politically strengthened in the eyes of his own people, his Arab allies and African-Asian friends. Conversely, Britain and France had written their death warrants in Asia and Africa as the under-privileged masses of these continents closed ranks with the cry, "See, colonialism is not yet dead."

The greater tragedy of the Anglo-French error was the failure to realize that Nasser was only a symbol of a rising Arab nationalism which could never be checked by force. There were other Nassers, perhaps less able, but ready to step forward. The British government's failure to understand the relation of Nasser's position to Arab nationalism and the false illusion that the Egyptian leader's regime would collapse as soon as Anglo-French troops landed were costly. Anthony Eden paid with his diplomatic career for his gross miscalculations. The dispirited and ill Tory Prime Minister was obliged to resign after a respite in Jamaica.

This resort to force by America's European allies, in open defiance of President Eisenhower, was a more staggering blow to the cause of the West than any the Kremlin had been able to strike. The Canal was to be unserviceable for many months, and oil shipments from Arab states to Western Europe were halted. In 1955, 76% of the northbound Suez Canal traffic had been in oil of which 97% was from the Middle East and 31% went to Britain. As Western Europe rationed gasoline to keep the industrial wheels moving and faced the worst winter since 1948, Britain's economy was strained to the roots. (The World Bank temporarily eased the pressure by a loan of 561 million dollars, with the authority to draw up to a billion.) NATO . . . the U.S.-British-French alliance . . . Commonwealth ties . . . the UN . . . all had been placed in grievous jeopardy by action which was providing the greatest opportunity to the Soviet Union.

The Arab world, seething with anti-British and anti-French sentiment, felt the economic pinch, too. The revenues of oil producing countries shrank in degrees varying from the 75% decrease of Iraq to the 33% of Saudi Arabia. Syria's sabotage of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe line to the Mediterranean cost both Iraq and Syria precious income. The Egyptian economy was seriously impaired by the three-pronged invasion. The subsequent exodus of British, French and some

Jewish business interests did not augur a brighter future.

Political unrest, much to Russian liking, continued. Syria received arms at cut rate from the Soviet Union and continued to issue anti-West denunciations as the influence of the Army Intelligence Chief, 31-year-old Colonel Abdel Hamid Serraj, mounted. Jordan, further cutting away her ties with Britain after abrogating the Jordanian-British Treaty, moved closer to the Nasser camp by signing an agreement whereby Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria promised to replace the 33 million dollar yearly subsidy received from Britain. The cold war waged by Egypt against Iraq's Nuri Said and the Baghdad Pact persisted. In more stable Saudi Arabia continuing nationalist outcries were tempered by King Saud's moderation.

The Russians were in a perfect position to reap profit from the economic-political unrest. They had once again appeared in the role of champions of Arab nationalism. Together with the United States, the Soviets had assumed the leadership in seeking UN action to halt the invasion. When this was not sufficient to move Britain and France from their course, the Bulganin notes led to the needed cease fire. And then the Kremlin's threat to pour in "volunteers" (Egypt had asked the world for volunteers) propelled the United Nations police to speed on to the task. The Arab world had been placed under such heavy obligation indeed to the Soviet Union that the Egyptian diplomatic victory could well dissolve into a tragic defeat of Arab serfdom under communism.

Greatly alarmed by Communist gains, President Eisenhower moved dramatically to keep this area, so strategic to Europe and the Western world, out of Russian hands. Before a joint Special Session of the Congress on January 5, the President explained the Eisenhower Doctrine, the plan heralded to fill the Middle East "vacuum" and place the U.S. squarely in this area. The President sought from Congress the authority both to use U.S. troops "to protect the territorial integrity and political independence" of any Middle East nation

that called for help and to spend without restriction 200 million dollars in already appropriated foreign aid funds for special economic projects in the area.

The Eisenhower Doctrine had been leaked to the press prior to the official unfolding before Congress, with these serious adverse effects: Democratic leaders balked at receiving "our news from Scotty Reston's (*New York Times*) column," as Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson expressed it; and Arab opposition to the plan was built up on inaccurate, incomplete reports of the provisions. The "wait and see" philosophy of Lebanon's Dr. Charles Malik and of Saudi Arabia's King Saud, who came to Washington for an official visit in late January as Congress debated the merits of the Plan, was at variance with the censure of Egypt and Syria. Iraq, along with the other Baghdad Pact nations, gave unreserved support to this second Eisenhower "new look."

Unchallenged as a deterrent to overt Communist aggression, the American doctrine had little to say on the subject either of aggression from other than Communist sources or of subversion. Nor did the Eisenhower Plan attempt to deal in any manner with the two major causes of area tension: the Arab-Israeli and the Suez Canal controversies. It was apparently the intent of the administration to freeze the *status quo* and once again win more time in which to find a solution to these two vexatious problems.

There were still problems from the Suez war which had to be settled. After United Nations insistence had forced a reluctant Israel to withdraw back of El Arish in northern Sinai, the Ben-Gurion government refused to yield either the Gaza Strip or Sharm el Sheikh at the southeast tip of Sinai and the two tiny islands in the Straits of Tiran, until the receipt of guarantees that Egypt would cease threatening Israel's national security. Israel rejected a U.S. offer to use its influence in the General Assembly to keep UN troops in Gaza and to establish

by means of American ships the principle of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.

President Eisenhower followed with his February 20 address to the nation in which the Chief Executive declared that the UN "had no choice but to exert pressure" and resolutely called for unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces in these words:

Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agree, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.

At stake was the goodwill created by King Saud's U.S. visit which had started out so badly as a result of the bald play for politics by New York's mayor, but which had been fortuitously salvaged thanks to the sad, appealing face of little Prince Mashur. The President realized that any success the Saudi Arabian monarch might have in winning an open mind toward the Eisenhower Doctrine from the Arab Big Four Cairo meeting (to which King Saud was reporting on his American visit) would depend directly on a show of American impartiality and fairness in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

While strong, outspoken opposition by all segments of American political life was being expressed to the President's position of being stern to Israel, the Arab-Asian block introduced a resolution calling for economic sanctions against Israel. Close U.S.-Israeli, UN-Egyptian and UN-Israeli consultations followed. Dulles and Eban were closeted for hours in private talks. And then the 125-day Israeli occupation ended when Israel ordered the last of her forces to leave Egyptian territory and Gaza on March 4. This occurred after six United Nations resolutions demanding unconditional withdrawal, the first of which dated back to November 2.

In declaring her country's action to the General Assembly,

Israeli Foreign Minister Mrs. Golda Meir outlined the assumptions and expectations upon which the withdrawal was being made: the UN was to take over Gaza exclusively from Israeli control, was to have sole responsibility for the civilian administration, and was to maintain military control until a peace settlement was reached. There were parallel assumptions regarding the Bay of Aqaba. When he took the rostrum, Ambassador Lodge asserted that this Israeli statement was not an "unreasonable" declaration of "hopes and aspirations." United Nations officials seconded this hope, but in the concluding General Assembly discussion on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the unconditional nature of the withdrawal was re-emphasized.

The duration of UNEF's occupation in Gaza and the Aqaba area had never been spelled out beyond the vague February 2 resolution endorsing the Hammarskjold suggestion that the UN force be stationed at these points, provided both Egypt and Israel agreed. The State Department, in answer to reports that Secretary Dulles had assured Ambassador Eban that the United States would oppose an Egyptian return to the Gaza Strip, made this emphatic denial: "There are no, repeat NO, private understandings or undertakings on the part of this government in any way, shape or form."

The United States and the United Nations could not long avoid being forced to deal with the overshadowing dilemma: how to restore Egypt to Gaza and Aqaba in accordance with the 1949 Armistice Agreement and how to make Israel secure from *fedayeen* raids and blockades. A week after the Israeli withdrawal, in a reassertion of the Egyptian right to Gaza, President Nasser appointed General Hassan Latif as civilian governor; Saudi Arabia declared that Aqaba was part of its "territorial waters and would not allow the establishment of any right for Israel in the gulf." Another new serious crisis threatened.

Events were proving that the ultimate success or failure of

any American plan for the Middle East would depend on the ability of the policy makers to accomplish these ends: first, to settle Arab-Israeli differences; secondly, to reconcile the need for maintaining our NATO defenses in Europe with the necessity of freeing ourselves in the Middle East of the encumbrances of an alliance with Britain and France which was threatening to lose for us the entire uncommitted free world. Should such a reconciliation be impossible, then the United States might well be forced to desert her colonial-minded allies so as not to be swept out to sea in a mighty undertow. For she alone was in a position to meet the Russian challenge for the world's most valuable real estate, the Middle East.

XII

Smears and Fears

THE phenomenon of a United States so intimately oriented to Israel is explainable only in terms of an almost pathological state of mind. Consider the following:

. . . there is no country in which people live under more overpowering compulsions. . . . What is exacted cuts deeper [than what is prohibited]; it creates habits which overlay nature; and every faculty is atrophied that does not conform with them. Even what is best in American life is compulsory, the idealism, the zeal, the beautiful unison of the great movements. You must wave, you must shout, you must push with the irresistible crowd: otherwise you will feel like a traitor, a soulless outcast, a deserted ship high and dry upon the shore . . . in a country where all men are free, every man finds that what most matters have been settled for him beforehand.

This penetrating comment by the philosopher George Santayana explains the inexorable hold that certain *idées fixes* exercise over American public opinion. In the post World

War II era, fear has more deeply rooted this American passion to conform.

When the first bomb was dropped upon Hiroshima, people shrugged their shoulders and sublimated a corroding fear deep in the recesses of the subconscious. With the subsequent development of the new weapon and the eruption of warfare in Korea, this fright increased. The shock of just eluding Hitler, only to run into Stalin, and then the bomb, was too much for man's nervous system. It required no Sigmund Freud to analyze the subsequent flight from reality and the escape from thinking. The "brave new world" soothed itself beneath the rays of television. Rich and poor alike took to the new plaything, even in homes which still used outhouses. The machine offered an ideal substitute for thought. Entertainment became the end goal, murder mysteries the very quintessence of a new culture. The same people who had grumbled during the war at standing in line momentarily to meet a rationing shortage queued up for hours to see a program telecast. In trying to keep up with their new competition, the radio and the press doled out the same kind of escape medicine as a shield against the deepening feeling of insecurity.

Repugnance toward thinking was matched by a suspicion toward originality and a resentment of challenge. A judicious regard for what "they say" was relied upon to solve most of Mr. Average Man's problems. And "they" included any person who worked "his" or "her" way into the "brand name" category.

Thus, the pretty wife of a business man who had been held captive behind the Iron Curtain became a regular on television as she discoursed on what United States policy should be toward Russia. An amateur golfer won a championship and was elected to Congress. Marilyn Monroe and Mickey Mantle could have named the public offices they wanted.

A disc jockey could boast of building up a phenomenal listening audience for his midnight-to-three-a.m. discourses,

ranging from civil liberties to foreign policy. The advice proffered by husband-and-wife radio teams was given more respect than the Sermon on the Mount. A coast-to-coast televised crime investigation yielded no tangible results save a New York mayoralty candidate and a near presidential nominee.

Following his naval reserve officer's tour of duty, the top radio-TV entertainer in a page one, nationally syndicated tabloid series discoursed on why the Air Force was in a "weak condition."

Throughout history, important civilizations have fallen for reasons ranging from external over-expansion to internal corruption. Should the Western way of life, of which the United States is now the chief progenitor, fall victim to the ravages of time, future historians might well ascribe the downfall to a scarcely-known disease—"labelitis." A gadget called a "label" has contributed to the paralysis of individual thinking and led to the concomitant mass conformity. Slap the word "liberal," "Fascist," "reactionary," or "Communist," as the case may dictate, on any argument you do not like, and a sure, quick victory can be yours. Call a nation a "democracy" or, better still, a "bastion of democracy," and the relative merits or demerits of that nation's policies become almost the sole concern of pedantic academicians.

In his great novel, *1984*, George Orwell has Big Brother in the Ministry of Truth, bringing about Thought Control. In the world of 1957, the princes of advertising manipulate the media of information, newspapers, radio and TV to the same result.

When Edward Corsi was dismissed from his post in charge of the Department of State's refugee program, the action was attacked as "anti-liberal." The label affixed, every "liberal" organization rallied to Corsi's side. Without exception each of these same groups had, but a year or two before, attacked Corsi, a Republican candidate for the United States Senate, as a "reactionary."

This disease of "labelitis" has proved to be Zionism's strongest ally. By wrapping the labels "humanitarian," "liberal" and "religious" around its political program, Zionism has carried the day. And, conversely, people who have supported but one plank of a many-faceted Zionist program, usually the "humanitarian," have wound up by being counted in the fold and have been exploited by Zionist nationalism.

Where the compassion to conform has not been sufficiently compelling and the label has not stuck, a most powerful propaganda machine has stood ready to serve. By means of equating criticism of the foreign state of Israel with criticism of Jews, for example, Zionists placed the policies of the Middle East republic beyond judgment. The "anti-Semite" smear silenced would-be Christian critics, and the fear of being tagged a traitor throttled latent Jewish opposition, smothering debate in the United States and leading to no less than the opening of the Middle East to communism.

The American press has often been deaf to a restrained approach to public questions. Everything must be black or white. The American public found itself herded into two opposing camps, the anti-Communist and the anti-anti-Communist, both of which behaved with equal indifference toward civil liberties as the McCarthy issue rent the air. The resultant by-product of the struggle between anti-Communists and anti-anti-Communists has been increasing hatred and fear.

Controversy, once the magnet for public discussion, became the mark of a pariah. Criticism of current affairs was reduced to a set of partisan slogans. Books were judged by their author's history rather than by their contents. Guilt by association and guilt by juxtaposition served as new extra-legal norms to bring Blackstone up to date.

Attacks provided the best open sesame to newspaper columns. The city desk doted on the negative and the destructive. The more clarion-like the assault, the more prominent the next day's press display. But the state of Israel . . .

Zionism . . . Jewish leaders . . . Jewish organizations . . . still remained inviolate: immunity for their activities and statements was guaranteed by the 11th commandment: "Thou shalt not be anti-Semitic." As Dr. Ralph Bunche, Under Secretary of the United Nations, remarked at a gathering in the headquarters of the international organization: "Even humor regarding Palestine is controversial." He might have added: "hence verboten." Even when headlines whetted the public appetite for more information and more facts on the Middle East, press-radio-television dared not fill the void.

The eloquent warning of Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren at Columbia University's Bicentennial, that the "right to dissent and free inquiry must be safeguarded if America is not to store up the seeds of its own destruction," was falling on deaf ears.

According to Elmer Davis' popular book, *But We Were Born Free*,¹ Senator McCarthy was the sole fount of the American fear psychosis. But the intimidations, interferences, and restrictions which Mr. Davis so ably documents have been dished out by "liberals" quite as well as "reactionaries." It was difficult to assay whether the "liberals" in their "liberalism" or the "conservatives" in their "conservatism" were more narrow and more dogmatic. Liberals hurl the words "Fascist" and "anti-Semite" around as loosely as their *bêtes noires* fill the air with "pinko" and "Commy." The advantage, of course, lies with the former, since there is no opposite label to "anti-Semite." One can hardly retort, "Semite." Mr. Davis has forgotten Justice Learned Hand's reminder that civil liberties and human rights can be safe only in a society that has learned to tolerate dissent.

Every excess attributed to McCarthyism has been laid by liberals at the doors of those who have tried to scale the walls of liberalism's citadel, the inviolability of Israel. The plight of

¹ Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1954.

those who have crossed the path of the Wisconsin terror is mild compared to the storm that has descended on those who dared to deny that "Israel is all right and the Arabs are all wrong." It requires far less effort to lay the ground for a successful charge of "anti-Semite" than it does to make the "Communist" smear stick. The economic power of pro-Israelis to crush any attempt at freedom of speech by anti-Zionists far surpasses any massive power that the pro-McCarthy forces in the United States could ever have mustered. But this 229-page documentation by Mr. Davis of interferences with freedom touches on no subject save the tribulations of the "liberals." Much of the very subjectivity that the author decries penetrates his own writings.

In short, the freedom of mind for which Mr. Davis pleads apparently belongs only to those who agree with him. One certainly cannot quarrel with the quoted statement of former President Truman at a 1955 dinner of the Four Freedoms Foundation: "A good life is not possible without freedom." But one must ask: "Freedom for what? Freedom for whom?" Certainly the tenet of freedom attributed to Voltaire ("I may disagree with what you have to say, but will defend with my life your right to say it.") has been completely disregarded by Elmer Davis and his fellow "liberals." Their silence placed the stamp of approval on the careful and thorough suppression by pro-Zionist forces of the "other" side of the story.

If they cannot say a good word about Israel, "liberals" invariably prefer to look the other way. In his book, *The New Dimensions of Peace*,² and in *The New York Times*³ former Ambassador to India Chester Bowles has written at length about Asia and Africa as related to contemporary American foreign policy. In this otherwise acute analysis, the former Connecticut Governor, who undoubtedly still harbors political ambitions, avoids all criticism of Israel and all reference to

² New York: Harper & Bros., 1954.

³ November 27, 1955.

America's most-favored-nation treatment of that country as a contributory cause to any of the woe he has detailed.

Zionist power springs not from numbers, but from proficient exploitation of chinks in the American mental armor. A maximum of ten per cent of American Jews are Zionist party members, while a bare half of one per cent are anti-Zionist. The rest are non-Zionists, but Israeli supporters, who emotionally follow the Zionist kite as fellow travelers not knowing where they are being led. These neutralists refuse, out of a sense of loyalty, to bare the fiction of Jewish unity.

The "I am not a Zionist but these people must be helped" approach has won far more valuable ground for the Israeli position than Zionists have been able to accomplish. In discussing the Palestine controversy in his memoirs, former President Truman refers to his old partner, Eddie Jacobson, "who had never been a Zionist" but "was deeply moved by the sufferings of the Jewish people." And non-Zionist Jacobson succeeded in moving the President where party members failed.

A fearful, conformist society fortifies the Zionist impression of speaking for all Jews. Few Americans, amongst a growing brood of Casper Milquetoasts, are willing to call their bluff. American Christians no more than American Jews dare ask the Zionist to put his cards face up on the table.

Just as all Jews are not Zionists, so all Zionists are not Jews. In bringing about the partition of Palestine and in securing a most-favored-nation treatment for Israel, indispensable assistance was rendered by American Christians. Desire to make amends for past persecutions, sympathy for the underdog and biblical sentimentalism of fundamentalists molded champions of new Israel on an individual as well as on an organized basis. Old Testament literalists view the re-establishment of Israel as part of biblical prophecy and as a necessary precursor to the second coming of Jesus. This religi-

ous zealousness of Christian Zionists far outstrips the religiosity of Jewish Zionists, whose compulsion is more nationalistic.

Senator Theodore Green of Rhode Island has long been an ardent Christian Zionist and a member of the American Christian Palestine Committee. The Senator, who happened to be in Cairo shortly after the critical U.S. reaction to the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, issued a statement from Egypt taking the United States to task for "favoritism" of Israel in foreign aid. A member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Green stated he could not blame Prime Minister Nasser for his purchase of arms, which the Senator assumed and which "Egypt believes are for defensive purposes." The hometown "liberal" newspaper *The Providence Journal*, in a vindictive editorial, "Better Come Home Now," blasted the 89-year-old senior Senator, whom previously they had unstintingly supported, and labeled his statement "irresponsible and obtuse." This was a case of a sacred cow being rebuked for attacking a more sacred cow.

The average Christian without an axe to grind had no deep feeling one way or another about the controversy raging in the Middle East. What prejudice he possessed was weighted in favor of Israel, whose progress and development had been unfolded in a plethora of sympathetic stories. The little he knew about Arabs and Islam had filtered through a hazy picture of white-robed, bearded, religious fanatics. And many Christians had some real personal contacts with Jews, either commercially or socially—even as neighbors—and presumed that these Jews, whom they had no wish to alienate, were all Zionist minded.

The few who might be better acquainted with that part of the world felt uncomfortable about expressing themselves freely in the face of the known Jewish attitude. The position of Christian Zionists was abetted by this general embarrassment and also by the bias of those who wished all Jews

would go to the new state. Norman Thomas analyzed the reluctance of Christians to speak out as stemming from a "guilt feeling that all Christians should share when we reflect on the treatment of Jews in ages and countries which we call Christian. Hence our special reluctance to criticize *Jewish policy*. Moreover I prize keenly the companionship of Jews, so many of whom have been in the vanguard of the struggle for human rights and justice irrespective of race, creed or color."

"Going along" has become the almost inflexible rule, providing still another strong factor in American life aiding the Zionist cause.

Senator John F. Kennedy, in his book *Profiles in Courage*, has done a neat job of analyzing the pressures confronting the conscientious lawmaker. He lists as the "first pressure a form of pressure rarely recognized by the general public. Americans want to be liked."

Before his political ambitions soared in the direction of the Vice Presidency, the Senator had traveled to Asia and had expressed a deep feeling of sympathy for the Arab position. But later, he addressed a Yankee Stadium rally in support of arms for Israel. Whether through pressure or compulsion, Senator Kennedy was deterred from pursuing an independent course which would either embarrass or irritate a segment of his fellow-citizens.

In his book, *Trial and Error*, Chaim Weizmann uses the favorite Zionist technique of reinforcing the tendency to "go along." Opposition to or defections from his brand of thinking were adroitly dismissed by Israel's first President as coming from people whose objections to the Jews is "that the Jew exists." This handy gadget of "anti-Semite" labeling has been a weapon of inestimable value. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, speaking in June (1955) before a meeting of the Zionist Organization of America, called for an alerted movement to counteract "extensive and growing hostile Arab propaganda

which is now reaching out for collaborators among the reactionary and anti-Jewish forces in America.”

The mere presence of the Anti-Defamation League has bred a sensitivity strong enough to stifle latent Christian opposition to the continued sacrifice of the American national interest. If the smear “anti-Jewish” does not work, the charge “pro-Arab” is certain to pulverize anti-Zionist protestations.

Platforms for views opposed by Israeli-Zionist forces were scarce, and people willing to fill such platforms were scarcer. The tag “controversial” was placed on a lecturer critical of Zionism, whereas unstinting praise of Israel carried no such handicapping connotation. When Father Francis W. Anderson lectured on “Middle East Actualities” at Georgetown University, a vigorous protest was lodged by the Counselor of the Israeli Embassy with the President of the school. Although the Jesuit priest had dealt in his remarks with themes other than Palestine and had answered 27 questions, he was accused of bias. Refutation by an Israeli speaker was demanded. After this incident, Georgetown was reluctant for some time to air Middle East issues.

The Foreign Policy Association and its chapter study groups around the country were still dominated by the views of its one-time president, James G. McDonald, the first American Ambassador to Israel. The head of the Speakers Bureau, Miss Frances J. Pratt, adroitly managed to keep away lecturers with anything but a 100% Zionist approach.

The Council on Foreign Relations was more amenable, at least at the national level, to presenting both sides of the question, but local affiliates still bowed to persistent pressures. In Chicago the Council changed its plans and barred Sir Zafrullah Khan, then Pakistani Foreign Minister, from talking to its membership. A reception for the distinguished Pakistani was canceled because of criticism leveled against his anti-Zionist declarations.

Even American companies with an economic stake in the

area, although fully cognizant that their investment will be affected by the United States' attitude toward Israel, preferred wherever possible to stay completely aloof. The smaller ones felt that it was up to the bigger ones to raise a flag, and the bigger ones were fearful about talking out. There was a reluctance to give financial support to groups opposing Zionism out of the fear that the list of contributors would be made public. A discreet silence was maintained.

While the American-Israel Society was being used to great advantage for Israel, the dormant American Egyptian Society refused to meet for a discussion of the Middle East crisis. Cultural groups working in the Middle East abstained from anything controversial, fearing that long Zionist tentacles might affect their own fund-raising drives. Those interested in the Arab states behaved in a manner quite different from those absorbed with Israel. The former frowned on the proper admixture of the cultural with the political and refused to emulate the realistic pro-Israelis. Long-haired Arabists at Princeton and Harvard, considering themselves scholars only, refrained from entering the Palestine fray.

The Arab governments also failed in efforts to inspire these groups into constructive activity. The Information Office of the Arab League reflected little light through the information blackout. The Arab publicists were as inept as the Israeli propagandists were adept. Their efforts were handicapped by their own divisiveness. When they did not rely upon Arab personnel who were unfamiliar with American public relations techniques, their suspicious natures made them an easy prey to complete fakers who excelled in the fine art of flattering the Eastern mind. What little appeared in print expressing the Arab viewpoint could be said to have resulted almost in spite of the Arabs.

In the face of an articulate Christian minority working together with an articulate Jewish bloc, the American press was only too happy to emphasize news sympathetic to the Zionist

position. Where voluntary compliance was not forthcoming, the threat to withdraw advertising and curtail circulation, combined with the knowledge that the fatal label of "anti-Semite" could be pinned on any editor stepping out of line, assured the capture of the American press and other media of information.

This was reflected in the news coverage and editorial reaction to the major Arab-Israeli incidents occurring from Kibya (November 24, 1953) through Lake Tiberias (December 11, 1955). Christians with very few exceptions remained silent. While many American Jews privately deplored the massacre of Arabs and the destruction of the village of Kibya, they proceeded with far more vehemence to condone the action and denounce the United Nations attempt to censure Israel. (And their course became well known to the Arabs.) There was no suggestion of a formal apology to Jordan or of reparations to survivors of Kibya or other devastated places.

Zionists and non-Zionists alike assailed the few Jewish critics of Kibya who dared speak out publicly. When the oldest Jewish socialist organization in the U.S., the Jewish Labor Bund, submitted a resolution to the Socialist International denouncing the attack on Kibya as a crime against humanity, the *Jewish Forward* immediately charged the Bund with "betraying the Jewish people" and being an "informer to the non-Jewish world."

In the face of the accepted Jewish moratorium on morality, propaganda for the Israeli case inevitably stood up. Israelis were progressive, while the Arabs were ruled by feudal overlords. Arab refugees lost all rights to their property by fleeing, argued the Israelis and their proponents, and their fellow Arabs ought now to take care of them. The Israelis had been provoked into large-scale reprisals by continuous Arab aggression. The Israeli offer to sit down and negotiate peace, this reasoning continued, made United United Nations censure unnecessary.

On his return to Copenhagen, General Vagn Bennike, the former Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, spoke out frankly on the treatment by the world press of the Palestine controversy. The General was quoted as saying that things "undoubtedly would have been more peaceful if another place on the globe than Palestine had been found for the Jews to build up their nation."

In his interview with an independent Copenhagen newspaper the General also revealed the following: "I was very pro-Jewish when I got to Palestine. But Danish newspaper readers are not getting a true picture of what is going on. Jewish viewpoints are predominating. The Arabs have not got the diplomatic web that the Jews have, and they have not, like the Jews, money to finance information activity.

"The Israeli newspaper *Jerusalem Post* wrote that I was a nice fellow when I arrived. Two weeks later I was an enemy of the Jews."

It was natural, the General said, that most episodes took place on the Israeli side of the demarcation line. "After all, he explained, "the Arabs are the ones to suffer from the fact that the line has been drawn across their lands." Thus forthright General Bennike spoke from an expert's experience. But many others, who could have spoken with equal authority, have been silenced. And what has been reported as fact has been distorted by the press, as we shall see, to impart a false picture of what is taking place.

XIII

Slanting the Misinformation

IT IS doubtful whether Zionism would ever have succeeded in the United States had public opinion been adequately and impartially informed. But instead, Zionism has been made to appear as a force of progress and liberation in a backward Arab world. The Arabs were thought of in terms of pyramids, camels, dancing girls, and perhaps oil. John and Mary Doe had no yardstick to measure what was being handed out as Middle East "information." What did anyone have to lose by ignoring the case for the Arabs, never presented even by themselves in the best light? Had all the facts been known, an informed America, with its underdog bias, would never have stood for the injustices inflicted upon the Arab refugees.

As lack of information resulted in ignorance, so propaganda fed misinformation. While the Arab world suffered from stereotyping or neglect, Israel was built up in American imagination with a skill and devotion which has put Hollywood ballyhoo to shame. As Artemus Ward said: "It ain't so much

the people's ignorance that does the harm as their knowin' so much that ain't so."

The International Press Institute at Zurich, Switzerland, in 1954 published a 115-page survey entitled "The News from the Middle East." Although censorship, visa difficulties and kindred restrictions, according to this analysis, have not made reporting from the area easy, the coloring of information has to a much greater degree contributed to the world's ignorance of the Middle East. (The following findings of the Survey are based on discussions with informants whose names were withheld by the Survey to encourage them to speak freely, and to protect them in their jobs.)

Although the large western news agencies, The Associated Press, United Press, International News Service, and Reuters, had their own correspondents in the area, there was a tremendous reliance on *The New York Times*, particularly by United States newspapers. As one editor reported: "We feel that one paper of record is essential in America; and this field is pretty adequately covered by *The New York Times*." This has placed a heavier burden on *The New York Times* to give news and information and avoid opinion and coloration.

While such foreign papers as the *Daily Telegraph* and *Times* of London and *Le Monde* in Paris give good space to Middle East happenings, they have relied on the news agencies which service them, except when they want special coverage.

The British press, generally, is said to report only crises, and the American only spectacular spot news. And both have a definite prejudice, noted the Zurich Survey, against reporting the background of the news, which, as it affects international relations in the area, is particularly vital and necessary.

Another cause for the inadequate handling of news from the Middle East was said to be the home-desk failure to have even the slightest knowledge of the area. Mistakes were not always caught, and the reporters on the spot suffered from

the lack of both stimulation from, and liaison with, their home office.

"There is a profound difference between the Oriental and Western civilizations and mentalities," noted the Survey, "which has consequences affecting everyday affairs and political life." The remoteness of the Middle East from everything understood in the West increases the reader's indifference unless backgrounding is furnished. Interpretation is thus necessary to most stories, but agency writers are generally debarred from such interpretation. The news is then presented as a sensational story arising in a vacuum. If correspondents cannot place major news events within the context of the modern Middle East, stereotyped reporting inevitably results. "The greatest sufferers from this," said the Survey, "have been the Arabs and Iranians. Israel gains by comparisons since it is a new state governed by men with Western ideas."

When King Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem, for example, as one correspondent stated, full coverage was given to the killing, but the steady stream of causes that brought about the assassination were ignored. The reporting of Farouk's exile was presented almost entirely in terms of "love, nude painting and other pornography."

A correspondent who has had great experience in the Middle East was quoted in the Survey as saying:

American newspaper coverage of the Middle East lacks an adult, intelligent comprehension of the fundamental movements that are leading to an economic, social and political renaissance in that vital part of the world. Proof of that statement is the frequency with which some reports in the Middle East are cloaked with an "Arabian Nights" atmosphere.

For the most part, only political events have been reported. Important economic and social matters have been consistently ignored. One of these was the story of the Arab refugees.

Another was the fact that 40,000 (or 5% of Israeli immigrants through 1954) had re-emigrated *from* Israel. Also neglected were accounts of the Arabs who remained in Israel.

The Middle East's emotionalism regarding colonialism, communism, and the Arab-Israeli conflict lent itself readily to prejudiced reporting. One American correspondent reported as follows:

The Americans appear to be sending a well-rounded picture from most parts of the Middle East, except Israel. Here, most correspondents are won over by the Israelis because of a little state's valiant struggle for existence, and they give little emphasis to the bleaker side. For example, one seldom reads about sub-standard living conditions, exorbitant prices, black markets, inefficient and insulting municipal workers, discrimination against Israeli Arabs and the lack of religious devotion, except among the strong orthodox minority. Instead, we get a picture that is "all milk and honey."

This over-balanced picture has made possible American readers' ready acceptance of Israelis as the progressive heroes and Arabs as the backward villains of the Middle East struggle.

Another American correspondent related this experience in Israel: during the winter of 1950-51 moral pressure was exerted against the reporting of a sit-down strike of 140 Jews from India who demanded and won repatriation. The story, embarrassing to the Jewish Agency, was covered fully only by him.

Another British observer pointed out that the British press was tired of the Arab-Israeli question, and this had led to underplaying the issue. "I cannot understand," he wrote, "why no newspaper that I have seen has as yet described the intensity of feeling in the Arab world against Israel. For some reason, none of the correspondents or any of our politicians seem to have appreciated what some of my colleagues and myself have found to be our most striking impression on visiting the Arab world today."

This comment is equally, if not more, true of the United States. Lacking this knowledge of Arab feeling, Americans have failed to appreciate the irreparable damage done to the United States by their attitude toward Israel.

A veteran London correspondent noted that "some newspapers act according to a set policy, either expecting the correspondent to send news which suits the policy, or else partially ignoring or presenting inconspicuously the news which conflicts with these policies." Publishers, editors, and cable and city desk chiefs all are alleged to play a hand in the slanting of news to produce a prejudiced effect. Where the distortion was not deliberate, the coverage often has become naïve and ill-balanced "because of sensitivity and lack of perspective on the part of the man handling foreign news."

One of America's foremost experts has commented: "The present coverage of the Middle East by American newspapers is defective in being slanted toward pro-American, anti-British, anti-imperialist, anti-Communist, pro-Israeli and any other number of points of departure."

Another stated bluntly: "The main restrictive practice does not exist in the Middle East at all but in the United States, itself; American editors are nearly all afraid to tell the truth about the Arab-Israeli controversy because of the Zionist lobby."

Still another American has said:

If Arabs are involved in events contrary to Western policies, or Western interests, such stories are generally amply covered and displayed prominently in the American press, but if events happen that are favorable or in line with policies of the Middle Eastern States, these are often ignored. Then there is the technique of slanting the news against the Middle East. I have seen stories of the Middle East in the American press that were favorable to the Middle East governments' point of view with headlines that are certainly misleading and also contrary to the contents of the news

stories. The reporters told the truth, but the headlines were slanted contrarily.

For example, if a story from Tel Aviv accuses the Arabs of a frontier violation, it will have a headline in from 16- to 48-point type, depending upon whether the headline is one or more columns wide. Just the opposite happens when the Jordanians accuse the Israelis of a frontier violation. The Jordan story will rarely carry a headline of more than one column width and generally the heading is either in 8-, 10-, or 12-point boldfaced type.

With such a situation existing, how can American correspondents or editors expect government authorities in the Middle East to be friendly to an obviously one-sided and often slanted coverage? The story of the Kibya massacre might seem to disprove this contention, but the size and the drama of the incident was such that the American press could not play it down. . . .

The comment of another Middle East specialist was: "Many American newspapers and magazines ran full accounts of progress made in Israel on the first, second, and other anniversaries. But it never seems to have occurred to the editors that progress is not the exclusive possession of one particular group of people or of one country. One might have thought that some correspondent or editor would ask and try to answer the question: "What have the Arabs done in a comparable period of time?" " (And it occurs to this writer to ask: "With how much money were these gains accomplished and from where did the money for Israel come?")

This fault of over-simplifying a two-sided story has been compounded, according to the Survey, by big-name correspondents who are sent for a "quickie" to the area. They cover a brief assignment with the air of an expert, although they have no background whatsoever for the complicated story which they are observing. All too often the result has been a biased, tendentious story.

Countless examples bearing out the International Press Institute findings are printed every day, every week. But few Americans out of their personal knowledge or experience can

refute press over-simplifications and warpings or even recognize them in the headlines and stories of their morning paper. It is therefore pertinent to analyze newspaper treatment of specific events in the Middle East and show the pattern of press irresponsibility. The following examples have been selected by me from material analyzed and filed over the past ten years.

When the story of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal broke in September 1955, every New York newspaper, with the exception of the *World-Telegram*, responded with a sickening irresponsibility toward our national welfare and the truth. The complete refusal of these information media to relate cause and effect of the arms barter compounded American misinformation as the crisis intensified.

Headlines were warped—editorials were slanted. From *The New York Times* to the *Daily Mirror*, the one cry was for peace on Israeli terms, and the Egyptians were assailed as guilty aggressors.

The New York *Herald Tribune* talked of the danger of war, attributing the crisis to a “long series of border incidents, together with the Arabs’ steady refusal to accept the fact of Israel’s statehood.” After thus exculpating Israel from any fault, this editorial continued to rewrite history: “This underlying crisis was sharply accentuated when the Soviets indicated their intention to enter into the situation with their offer of arms to Egypt.” (The Russians had been in the situation since Peter the Great.) And more history writing: “An area that had been under *Western influence entirely* with what seemed the tacit assent of the Soviets was *suddenly* by this move made a new theatre in the rivalry and struggle of the cold war.” To the readers of the *Herald Tribune* the Middle East may have appeared to have been under Western influence and the arms deal therefore have seemed to be a sudden Russian thrust—but only because the *Tribune* for eight years and more had filtered through certain “news”—carefully selected, slanted and simplified—to fit editorial predilections.

Even the usually reliable Alsops indulged in such fanciful aberrations as “the Russians are challenging us in an area which we had always thought an American monopoly.”

Through the medium of the “public service” advertisements of the International Latex Corporation, additional publicity was given to a St. Louis *Post Dispatch* editorial calling on the Western Powers not to permit the Czech arms deal to force them “to curry favor with the Arabs” and forget “their pledge to maintain peace in Palestine.”

Public opinion media began more and more to regard the Middle East as they did in 1947-48 at the time of the struggle over partition, and again in 1952-53 when an equal wave of pro-Israeli sentiment was whipped to the surface by the trials and persecutions of Jews behind the Iron Curtain.

As one can discover in traveling around the United States, the Sunday “News of the Week in Review” of the *Times* is looked upon as a sort of news bible. It is important to note, therefore, the bias contained in the Review’s treatment of Middle East events. While discussing colonialism and Israel, the Review on October 2 said: “On both questions the West has sought to placate the Arabs and draw them into the Western camp. For one example, Britain quit the Suez Zone and is in process of freeing the Sudan.” (My comment: The end of the 75-year illegal British occupation of Suez came only after the bitterest struggle.) For another example: “On important occasions over the past few years, the West has *sided with the Arabs against Israel*. These concessions have not satisfied the Arabs, however. They want the West to pull out of the Middle East entirely, including French North Africa. They also want the Western powers to back them *fully* in their battle against Israel.”

The October 16 issue noted how deeply troubled were the Western Powers by anti-colonial pressures in the Mediterranean area, ranging from the North African cry for freedom from France to the Cypriot demand for self-determination

which had led to hostility among NATO allies—Britain, Greece and Turkey. The *Times* attributed this unrest to Middle East countries and particularly to Egypt: "Cairo asserts leadership among Arab States," says the *Times*, "that are united in refutation of Western influence and determination to wipe out the Jewish State of Israel. . . . Cairo has blocked Western efforts to build a United Middle Eastern defense bloc." (No less than five times in the course of the recital of the events in the Middle East the article alluded to the "Jewish State," a reference which intensifies sympathy by identifying adherents of a universal religion with the political state of Israel.) United States partiality in the Arab-Israeli controversy and the injustices accorded the Arab refugees were not set forth as factors. The Review talked of the "rough military balance between Israel and the Arabs," and belittled the Nasser declaration that he was buying Communist jets, tanks and other military equipment for defensive purposes.

In this "objective" review, the *Times* set forth three alternative roads open to Israel: to purchase arms from the Communists, to enlist Western help by way of arms and a security guarantee, or to wage preventive war. The first and last courses, maintained the *Times*, had been rejected, which left open the course for which the *Times* was editorializing: arms and a guarantee from the United States. A warning was nevertheless sounded that the third alternative might take place despite the objection "of the majority of the Israelis" if the West refused to help Israel.

The foregoing quotations from the Review are taken not from the editorial and feature pages *but from the news summary*.

The Israeli attack of February 28, 1955, on Gaza was the event which, according to Colonel Nasser, started him looking eastward for help. The incident broke in a statement from the Egyptians, headlined thus in the *Times* of March 1: EGYPTIANS ASSERT ISRAEL SLEW 37 IN GAZA AT-

JACKS. ARMY REPORTS HEADQUARTERS BLOWN UP AND TROOP TRUCK AMBUSHED BY RAIDERS.

As the story unfolded and reached readers in the U.S. during the next few days, warping and partiality marked almost every paragraph.

When terror-stricken Gaza mobs rioted and burned United Nations food warehouses as a protest against their defenseless condition, no background was given on their separation from their own homes and property for seven years. No note was taken of the fact that Egypt was playing down press reports at home in order to avoid arousing the volatile Egyptian public, a concession made in part to protect Egypt's Jewish community.

On Friday, March 4, the Security Council members, with the exception of the Soviet delegate, castigated Israel for the onslaught of the previous Monday. Iran's representative declared that more than condemnation was needed. The United States spokesman declared: "The use of armed force will not produce peace negotiations."

Next morning, the *Times* reported the meeting under the following headline: UN ASKS EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLENCE (thus implying an equality of violence on both sides). Subhead: COUNCIL VOTES TO SUMMON TRUCE CHIEF FOR REPORT ON GAZA CLASH — MAJORITY HOLDS THE ISRAELIS TO BLAME. (Ten speakers had spoken and ten had condemned Israel.)

In his article in the March *Harper's* just then off the press, Moshe Brilliant, the *Times* reporter in Tel Aviv, pointed out that the purpose of the reprisal policy of the Israeli government was to dramatize the plight of Israel and to force the Arab states to sit down around the peace table. Only the week before the Gaza attack, David Ben-Gurion who, together with General Moshe Dayan, was the chief proponent of the

harsh reprisal policy, had returned to the cabinet as Defense Minister.

Editorials across the country responded in exactly the manner on which Israel had calculated. The *Philadelphia Enquirer* declared: "This proves that Arabs and Israelis should immediately be forced by the United Nations to sit down and conclude a permanent peace."

The Mixed Armistice Commission in its final report condemned Israel for the Gaza attack, and this time *The New York Times* acknowledged this simple fact. The Gaza assault on the Egyptians was held to be "planned," and to be a violation of Articles I, II and V of the General Armistice Agreement.

But editorially the *Times*, while it did face up to the findings of the Commission, held unswervingly to its treatment of the Gaza attack as a two-sided affair. In dignified, pseudo-reasonable language, the *Times* presented (March 4) "the whole long background of animosity between the two countries." It cited "warlike statements by Egyptian spokesmen," "Egypt's seizure of an Israeli ship at the entrance of the Suez Canal," and "execution of two men charged with espionage on behalf of Israel."

The editorial went on: "If further investigations bear out preliminary evidence that this is a planned attack, then it is clear that no matter how sincerely they believe themselves justified . . . the Israeli leaders have made a ghastly mistake."

The *Times* chastized Israel not for her international immorality but for her bad judgment (her "mistake"), warning that alienation of world opinion and unification of the Arab states would result.

A week later the Sunday Magazine Section of the *Times* (March 13) ran a two-page photo story on Gaza. A key sentence read: "Egypt has charged Israel with unprovoked military attacks on Gaza; Israel claims that its attacks have been reprisals for Arab raiding." Although both the prelimi-

nary and the final report of the Armistice Commission had already affixed guilt to Israel, the *Times* still conveyed the impression of equal guilt.

In the photo story there were no pictures of exploded barracks, injured Egyptians or Palestinians, or the actual Gaza incident. Three pictures of Israelis portrayed modern Western people with whom it was easy to sympathize. Three pictures of Arabs, however, showed backward foreigners with whom Americans could have little in common. Mr. Sharett and Mr. Ben-Gurion were portrayed smiling together. But Colonel Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan, the latter in native headdress, were shown awkwardly praying. Another picture was captioned: "ISRAELI LIFELINE—Pipelines like these laid by Israel to bring water to the parched Negev have been blown up by attackers from Gaza." This on the heels of the killing of 37 Egyptians and major dynamiting of Gaza buildings!

Life magazine on March 14 carried a photographic report on the Gaza ambush and the subsequent rampage of the Arab refugees in the Strip. Page 42 showed three pictures: *Raided Arabs*, *Ambushed Israelis* and *Skirmish in Jerusalem* under the main caption, A RECORD OF UGLY REPRISALS. This presentation imputed equal guilt to both sides by placing the following caption on the second photo: "Ambushed Israelis were machine-gunned by Jordan Arabs in brutal attack on bus in Scorpion Pass, south of Jerusalem in March, 1954. Only 4 of the 15 trapped bus occupants survived." This, of course, was contrary to UN findings. After investigation and hearings, the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission had found insufficient evidence to hold Jordanians guilty of the crime.

A letter to *Life* pointing out how this misleading caption colored the article and prejudiced a controversy then under judgment by the UN at first received no reply; finally a letter from Caroline Eckel "for the Editors" admitted the inaccu-

racy, but implied that Jordanian aggression — committed always by unofficial and unauthorized persons—was to be equated with attacks in force by the Israeli army. The error in the magazine she attributed to *New York Times* reports from various sources saddling Jordanian Arabs with responsibility. *Life's* Miss Eckel even admitted receiving other letters pointing out this same error, including one from Commander Elmo Hutchison. In his letter, the former Chief of the Jordan-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, who had been on the scene and had refused to adjudge Jordan guilty of ambushing Israelis, had explained his vote. It was his belief that the murder had probably been committed by disgruntled Bedouins whom Israelis had recently uprooted from their habitual area.

Miss Eckel confessed that perhaps it was wise not to run any further reference to this subject “because of its controversial nature.” Such behavior seemed to be a far cry from the 1953 luncheon utterance of Henry Luce when the *Time-Life* publisher had said: “All I want to do is to be the middle man between the American public and the people of the Middle East.” And from his 1948 Easter editorial calling for a bi-national state which would have given the Jews of Palestine “everything but political power.”

Invariably, a propaganda offensive preceded each Israeli military attack, and it invariably found eager outlets. On November 2 David Ben-Gurion, in resuming the premiership in a speech in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament), dramatically proposed face-to-face talks with leaders of Arab states to negotiate peace. Every newspaper, every press association, every newscast and telecast in commentary and editorial alike featured the “Israeli invitation to end hostilities.”

Two hours after the proposal, while the laudatory ink on the American presses was hardly dry, the Israeli army was striking across the desert against the Egyptian forces at El Sabha, killing 50 and wounding 49. Not an editorial recanted to spell the emptiness of Ben-Gurion's peace gesticulations.

While the Security Council was debating the Egyptian demand for censure and sanctions against Israel, a wedding party in the settlement village of Patish in Israel was disrupted by bombs. One woman was killed and 18 hurt in the crime committed by two persons whose tracks led in the direction of the Gaza Strip. The front page of *The New York Times* on March 26 carried the story with the positive headline: *Slaying in Negev Laid to Egyptians*. On the previous March 1 they had headlined: *Egyptians Assert Israel Slew 37 in Gaza Attacks*.

The last four paragraphs of the October 16 “analysis” in “News of the Week in Review,” under the heading “Pressures on U.S.,” began with this sentence: “The pressure on Washington from Israel is balanced by the pressure from the Arabs.”

It is doubtful whether another such misleading and devious assertion has ever appeared anywhere in any respectable journal. The pressure from the representatives of the government of Israel, itself, might be balanced by the pressure from all the many Arab governments. But this did not take into consideration the pressuring in behalf of the State of Israel by Zionists and pro-Zionists alike, by charitable and political organizations, by Christians as well as by Jews, not to mention every “Tom, Dick and Harry” with any political ambition for public office in 1956. Only two days before this *Times* Review appeared in print, a round-robin of 15 New York Congressmen had called upon the State Department and the Eisenhower administration “to immediately secure a pact with Israel and to grant her arms.”

The October 16 *Times* Review closed with this picture of an indecisive Uncle Sam: “Plainly United States aid to Israel would create bitter Arab resentment and might make it easier for Moscow to wean the Arab bloc away from the West. Equally plainly, however, United States refusal to help Israel probably would be tantamount to encouraging war in the Middle East.” No mention was made of a third alternative: stopping the flow of U.S. tax-free funds to Israel, which ac-

tion in forty-eight hours would make preventive war impossible.

While the State Department and other governmental agencies were weighing the merits of the Israeli arms request, the *Times* on November 8 had a front page story under a Washington dateline by Dana Adams Schmidt: "U.S. READY TO SELL SIGNIFICANT ARMS TO ISRAELI FORCES. The U.S. will agree to sell Israel a 'significant' quantity of arms, U.S. officials said this afternoon. The announcement followed a visit by Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban to George A. Allen, Assistant Secretary . . ." These "U.S. officials" were not otherwise identified.

This was modified the next day by a page 16 piece: "ISRAEL ARMS LIST AWAITED BY U.S. — FORMAL ITEMIZED REQUEST IS EXPECTED BY WEEKEND — NO COMMITMENT MADE." This second story, by Harrison Salisbury, quoting State Department press officer Lincoln White as the source, emphasized that no decision as to the exact kind or amounts of arms had been made. The U.S. promised "sympathetic consideration" to the Israeli request, but was not going to supply arms to the extent of "starting an arms race."

Day in and day out, with free news coverage and advertising space, the New York press propagates Jewish nationalism. Historical, anthropological, sociological, psychological, theological and philanthropic factors generate this nationalism, of which Zionism is the political arm. All factors find expression through the paper with the world's largest Jewish readership. (More than 20% of world Jewry lives in the five boroughs of New York City.) Suppositions and hypotheses, emanating from sources interested in using fear to keep Jews conscious of the fact that they are Jews, are given incessant coverage as facts.

Newspaper desks may be bombarded on any given day by releases from the UJA, the Israeli UN delegation, the Bond

Drive, visiting Israeli officials, the Zionist Council, the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League, and others.

When the pro-Zionist American Christian Palestine Committee, purporting to make peace proposals, called for a political and economic aid program entirely in Israel's favor, the *Times* greeted it with favorable space and editorial applause. But the opposing groups did not fare so well. The 2-day Conference of the American Friends of the Middle East in 1955 received only about 3 inches of space in the *Times*. At this conference Chairman Richards of the House Foreign Affairs Committee detailed the continuous pressures sustained by his group from the Zionist organization. Although the *Herald Tribune* gave some space to the Richards speech, the *Times* blacked it out.

When the Middle East Institute met in March 1955 at the Shoreham Hotel in the nation's capital for a two-day conference on area economic and political problems, there was no coverage whatsoever in the *Times*. But when the very same room had been cleared out to give way to another of the many Zionist emergency meetings, the *Times* gave ample coverage to that two-day meeting. The same top-name speaker, George Allen, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and African Affairs, had addressed both gatherings.

Interspersed carefully in the accounts of drives for "philanthropic" needs are always valued droplets of political propaganda. The *Times* on May 25, 1955, under the caption "Jewish Appeal Opens Phone Drive," carried a picture of Attorney-General Jacob Javits and Mayor Robert Wagner lifting the receiver of a giant telephone. The lead sentence of the article was: "State Attorney-General Jacob Javits yesterday described Israel as essential for United States security." The full-page, three-quarter-page and half-page advertisements, which for the United Jewish Appeal alone run into tens of millions of dol-

lars, invariably carry political innuendo to bolster the position of the sovereign State of Israel.

Hand in hand with the vivid coloration of stories in favor of Israel has been extreme warping of Arab actions. Leon Dennen, in a nationally syndicated article which appeared in the New York *World-Telegram* on January 15, 1955, called Israel the West's only reliable friend in the Middle East. In a three-quarter-page story, Russian wooing of the Arab world was correctly noted, but not the reasons for its success. The blame was placed at the door of that perennial whipping boy, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hadj Amin, whose picture and that of rioting Egyptians illustrated the story. While the ex-Mufti's influence in Cairo has always been far less pervasive than Menachem Begin's in Tel Aviv, the American press has failed to write about the Israeli terrorist, who was responsible for notorious acts of violence, had been released from prison just in time to take his place in the Parliament and led the Herut Party which in the 1955 elections polled the second highest number of votes.

Arab intransigency—and perhaps inexperience in their public relations approach—has always encouraged headline-seeking newspapers to convey the idea of Israeli willingness and Arab reluctance to cooperate in efforts toward peace. Thus the New York *Herald Tribune* on November 9, 1955: ISRAEL WILLING TO SUPPORT UN PLAN. Subhead: "But Demands Full Rights in El Auja Area." Inasmuch as the UN plan required both Israel and Egypt to get out of the demilitarized zone, the subhead completely refuted the Israeli willingness.

Three days after the Israeli death-attack on the Syrian outposts on the Sea of Galilee, Colonel Nasser warned the Israelis that further aggression against either Egypt or Syria would mean war. Though UN observers had indicated the clear Israeli guilt and Britain had warned the Israeli government, the New York *World-Telegram* printed on Thursday, December 15, these banner headlines: EGYPT, SYRIA THREATEN

WAR. A much less prominent but more accurate column lead noted: "Warn of Fight if Israelis Strike Again." Headline-guided New Yorkers would have gained the impression that in this most recent outbreak the Arabs had been the aggressors.

The New York Times the same day in a front-page dispatch from Jerusalem indicated that many important Israelis themselves questioned the necessity and justice of the Israeli retaliatory raid on Syria. The Israeli newspaper, *Haaretz*, in an editorial, had noted a distressed feeling toward the attack. But *The New York Times* the same day editorially declined "to pass judgment on what has happened—that will be for the Security Council. Outsiders can only feel a sense of danger and futility."

Headlines provided another example of slanting. On the occasion of the dedication of a new U.S. postage stamp designed to carry the symbol of faith around the world, Dr. Norman Salit, president of the Synagogue Council of America, addressing a government luncheon at the Shoreham Hotel in Washington, interjected the Arab-Israeli controversy into his remarks and referred to "murders by Jordanians." The diplomatic representatives of four Arab nations left the luncheon in protest. The *Times* headlined the story: FOUR ARABS WALK OUT AT RABBI'S REMARKS. This phraseology put the Arabs in the wrong light, making them seem like spoiled children instead of justifiably aggrieved persons.

The Zionists have perfected the technique of feeding human interest stories to the hungry press. But each item always contains its political smidgen arousing simultaneous sympathy for Israel and antagonism for the Arab. "Lack of space" is the perpetual excuse for not giving a hearing to the other side.

While bullets were raining in the Holy City, the *Times* twice found space to note that a matron of an animal hospital in the Israeli section had been honored by ASPCA for remaining with

her charges under gunfire.¹ Articles describe how Israelis train to become cowboys² and policemen. An article on an art colony in an Arab village adroitly imparts Israeli progress and Arab backwardness at the same time. A long, sentimental story³ on an Israeli home for the aged appears on page one of the second section in the limited space of the Saturday edition and carries a picture noting that "many of the residents are survivors of Nazi persecution and home is maintained with funds raised through the U.J.A."

The *Herald Tribune* on September 25, 1955, devoted its political special features section to four articles on Israel. With loving words, Ruth Gruber touted Israel's advances in irrigation, farming, and the development of Haifa. A three-column spread proclaimed: NO AUSTERITY IN ISRAEL FOR TOURISTS.

In less spectacular flourishes, too, the *Tribune* aids the cause. Here is an extract from a thoroughly sympathetic piece, *How Israel Faces War*, by the Israeli journalist, Arthur Saul Super:

Children, from the fifth grade and upward, are sent out regularly under pioneering conditions and get to know and love every part of Israel. They take black bread, some dried fish or cheese and a blanket. They sleep overnight on the floor of a schoolroom or some public building. As they get older, they range farther afield.

They carry small arms to ward off attack by marauders from across the borders. Cases are on record where hikers who strayed across the border were done to death by Arab tribesmen. So the children live with the spice of danger in their nostrils. They get preparedness into their very marrow.⁴

¹ July, 1954.

² The 1953 story was repeated in another version Nov. 7, 1955, on Hi-Yo, Kessel (Hebrew for Silver).

³ December 17, 1955.

⁴ *Herald Tribune*, Nov. 28, 1955.

Upon Eleanor Roosevelt's return from Israel in the spring of 1955, the New York *World-Telegram* (March 30) devoted almost an entire page to her writings. The headline writers, to sell papers at any cost, put this fudge frosting on the sweets served up by the famed columnist: "Israel Diary — Mrs. Roosevelt Hails Child Care in New Holy Land. Camps teach youngsters life will be different from ghettos." The article began: "Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt has just completed her latest visit to Israel—a trip which provided her with the opportunity to appraise the progress the fledgling state has made as its Seventh Birthday anniversary draws near." The seven articles that followed fairly reeked with the gushy humanitarianisms which have characterized this well-meaning but so often misguided former First Lady. She had implied on one of her earlier trips that the Arab refugees were nomads who could easily fold their black tents and move along to make room for Jewish immigrants.

Radio and television networks with their centers in New York City have allowed fear of advertising losses to spike their antennas. Visitors returning from Israel—authors writing on Israel—humanitarians pleading for Israel—invariably were provided with the means of reaching listeners and viewers. But, conversely, visitors, authors and humanitarians returning from the Arab states ran into the usual excuse, "Oh, that is controversial" and were not put on the program.

When for the first time a network (Columbia Broadcasting System) aired both sides of the Middle East conflict, Howard K. Smith was content to make what he considered an objective presentation of the Nasser story. But Edward R. Murrow doctored his presentation on Ben-Gurion to make the strongest possible case for the Israeli side.

A Drew Pearson hour-long television portrayal on the Middle East was so one-sided that even the *New York Times* television columnist could not refrain from commenting: "Partiality for Israel . . . emotionally oversimplified." The

favorite trick of interview programs, when forced by Federal Communications Commission requirements to provide equal hearings on controversial questions, was to put on an Arab with limited command of the language to answer an American pro-Zionist spokesman. Radio and television refused to recognize that, in addition to the Arab and Zionist positions, there was an American point of view which was entitled to a hearing.

National magazines have invariably avoided articles on the Middle East, except those replete with glowing accounts of the conquest of the desert by Israeli immigrants. The humanitarian aspects of the Arab refugee story contained too many political overtones to be told in magazines containing advertising. An article sent to *Esquire* bounced back with this observation: "Not for us for one second." Willie Snow Ethridge, wife of the Louisville *Courier Journal* publisher, who never before experienced any difficulty in placing articles, could not get publication of a piece on the Arab refugees based on personal experience. On my return to the States from the Middle East in 1953, I wrote a serious piece entitled "Stranded in Gaza," dealing with four days spent in the Gaza Strip. The *New York Times* magazine section summarily rejected this article as well as outlines of others describing economic or social projects in which the Arab states were engaged.

Following two long, exclusive talks with Prime Minister Nasser, I cabled *Collier's* on September 1, 1954, and received this reply: "Colonel Nasser and the political picture, we feel, would have little appeal." And in the wake of the Gaza attack in early 1955, the answer to a suggested outline on "Last Chance For the Holy Land" submitted to the *Saturday Evening Post* was in the same vein.

The *Saturday Evening Post* has never recovered from the storm which descended upon it for publishing "The Case Against the Jews" by Milton Mayer. They have ever since automatically rejected articles that even remotely raised the

Zionist question. *Holiday*, a fellow publication of the Curtis Publishing Company, in the February 1955 issue ran an article on Israel, "Land of the Bible." This piece, featured on the cover of the magazine and widely promoted, was authored by Joan Comay, wife of the Israeli Ambassador to Canada. From the lead caption, "A mother who lived in Jerusalem through the fear and hunger of war and siege tells her own story of the dramatic rebirth of Israel," to the end, this interestingly written article was 100% pure propaganda in the guise of a travel article.

The Ben-Gurion cover story in *Time* magazine⁵ titled "Prophet With a Gun" fairly reeked with romanticized prose such as "Utopian pioneering of the land" and in customary oversimplified fashion presented a rosy hued version of Israel's financial position. Arab opinion was made to appear ridiculous by the citing of only the extremist views of the Mufti of Jerusalem.

Two weeks later in January, *Time* carried two stories on Israel and Egypt, side by side. The Israeli article, under the heading, *The Hard Life*, breathed sympathy for the "tiny country," for her "brilliant Ambassador," for the sentiment of Senator Herbert Lehman who called it "folly" for the U.S. not to stand up for Israel, and for "the long lines of volunteers imbued with a spirit of austerity, self-denial and sacrifice." In vivid contrast, Egypt's new constitution was discussed under the heading "*Freedom, Yes and No.*" In its best sarcasm *Time* belittled the "long-promised" constitutional draft and with the magazine's accustomed derisiveness bared the "dictatorial escape clause confirming as law all the military junta's previous decrees — including those restricting freedom." Noting that all Cairo "newspapers now refer to the Prime Minister as Mister Nasser," *Time* belabored the phrase "Mister Nasser" in both the caption for his picture and in the conclusion that

⁵ Jan. 16, 1956.

“there seems no reason to doubt that both Mister Nasser and his constitution suit Egyptians fine as of now.”

If national magazines are apprehensive that objective treatment of the Middle East will choke off circulation and advertising, the book publishing industry is pervaded by nothing less than stark fear. For readers whose interest in the area has been awakened by headlines, there are many books on Israel but few on the Arab World. When Lowell Thomas, Jr., presented Doubleday with his manuscript on adventures in Asia and Africa, his chapter on refugees and the plight of Jerusalem was handed back, he said, with these words: “This cannot be used. Too controversial.”

Six publishers refused to handle the book you are now reading—not on grounds that it was in any way a bad book, but because their sales departments had advised them that its publication would harm the sale of the rest of the titles on their list.

How press slanting, fears and smears affected the world’s most renowned scientist, Britain’s leading historian, an Arab diplomat, and a powerful foundation is related in the next chapter.

XIV

Four Victims

WHEN Dr. Albert Einstein, the greatest scientist of our age, died on April 18, 1956, at the age of 76, the New York *World-Telegram* referred to him as “an ardent Zionist.” Amongst a full page of pictures in the Scripps-Howard paper was one showing the late professor buying the 200,000th State of Israel Bond.

The next morning, *The New York Times* in eulogizing Dr. Einstein referred to “Israel, whose establishment as a state he had championed.” This kidnaping of Albert Einstein for Israel was one of the most successful coups ever perpetrated by any political group anywhere. Actually, the great mathematician had opposed the creation of the state of Israel.

Testifying before the Anglo-American Committee in January 1946 in answer to the specific question whether refugee settlement in Palestine demanded a Jewish state, Dr. Einstein had said, “The State idea is not according to my heart. I cannot understand why it is needed. It is connected with narrowmindedness and economic obstacles. I believe that it

is bad. I have always been against it." He went further to deride the concept of a Jewish Commonwealth as "an imitation of Europe, the end of which was brought about by nationalism."

In 1948, Einstein publicly and wholeheartedly supported the views of Dr. Judah Magnes, who favored the establishment of an Arab-Jewish bi-national state and attacked Zionist terrorism. In a letter to *The New York Times* in April of that year, he and Rabbi Leo Baeck of Germany endorsed the Magnes position: "Besides the fact that they [Magnes and his followers] speak for a much wider circle of inarticulate people, they speak in the name of principles which have been the most significant contribution of the Jewish people to humanity."

Four years later, Dr. Einstein spoke (in a message to Children To Palestine, Inc.) of the necessity of curbing "a kind of nationalism which has arisen in Israel if only to permit a friendly and fruitful co-existence with the Arabs." Olivia Terrell, Executive Secretary of the organization, admittedly censored this portion of Einstein's message in the press release. Her explanation: "Our only concern is with the welfare of children . . . not with any political aspects. A Children-To-Palestine dinner is no place for a statement like that."

This act of Zionist censorship took me to Princeton to seek Professor Einstein's views on the incident. Dr. Einstein told me that, strangely enough, he had never been a Zionist and had never favored the creation of the state of Israel. Also, he told me of a significant conversation with Weizmann. Einstein had asked him: "What about the Arabs if Palestine were given to the Jews?" And Weizmann said: "What Arabs? They are hardly of any consequence."

In his book, *Out of My Later Years*, published in 1950, to which he had referred me, Professor Einstein had expanded on his philosophy as follows: "I should much rather see a

reasonable agreement with the Arabs on the basis of living together than the creation of a Jewish state. Apart from practical considerations, my awareness of the essential nature of Judaism resists the idea of a Jewish state with borders, an army, and a measure of temporal power, no matter how modest. I am afraid of the inner damage Judaism will sustain.”

According to a biography by Dr. Philipp Frank, Einstein had the goodhearted weakness to lend his name to the whole of the Zionist platform, although he believed in only one of its planks. He hesitated to rebuke Zionists for frequent manipulations of his views, which resulted in the use of his name to enhance the prestige of Zionists and fill their political purse. This is what helped to confound the American press.

In his modest manner, he had publicly declined the Israeli Presidency on the limited ground that he was not qualified in the area of human relationships. It was hardly in keeping with the philosophy of a great humanist and universalist to accept high office in nationalist Israel.

In addition to declaring he had championed the creation of Israel, the *New York Times*' death story quoted tributes from Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban, Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, Dr. Israel Goldstein, President of the American Jewish Congress, the Weizmann Institute of Science at Rehovot in Israel, the American Friends of the Hebrew University, and the Yeshiva University; all these eulogies tied the scientist to Zionism.

No tribute was more crass in confusing the public than that of Dr. Nahum Goldmann, chairman of the World Zionist Executive, who said, “As early as 1921 Professor Einstein took leave from his study to join Dr. Weizmann in a delegation to the United States to further the Zionist program. For this his people has humbly cherished him.” At the time to which Dr. Goldmann alluded, Zionism was emphatically denying any aim to create a political state, claiming only humanitarian objectives. Einstein came to the States for the purpose

of raising money for the Hebrew University, his pet project.

This was not the end. On Sunday morning, May 1, *The New York Times* carried a page one story headlined: "Israel Plea Halted by Einstein's Death." And it carried the by-line of Albert J. Gordon. The story, exclusive to the *Times*, purported to describe a speech by Dr. Einstein, never delivered, but which, according to the newspaper, "with the exception of a single missing page, was expanded into literary form by the Israeli Consulate." Dr. Einstein, said the *Times*, was to have made the speech over a nation-wide television hook-up from his Princeton studio.

The Israeli Consul, Reuven Dafni, was alleged to be in possession of the notes of the proposed address reviewing Israel's achievement, which he had expanded without, of course, any editorial supervision from the man to whom authorship was attributed. How did the Israeli Consul come into possession of these notes? What was on the "single missing page" and how did one page happen to be missing? Why should the great scientist have taken the notes to the hospital and, for the "three days" prior to his death, "study his notes and be greatly concerned with the speech"?

The entire story sounded as phony as a three-dollar bill. The quotations from the Professor's alleged notes were couched in terms entirely foreign to his writings. The phraseology, including the repetition of the words "Arab hostility," was the language of a propagandist, rather than that of a humanist. In the letter claimed to have been written by Dr. Einstein requesting the opportunity to assist the state, Israel is referred to as "our Republic" and "our Israel." This letter (set forth in full in the *New York Times* story) stressed the public relations advantages which could accrue from a seventh anniversary speech by the renowned scientist—arguments which the Israelis would be advancing to sell Dr. Einstein on the idea, not Dr. Einstein to sell himself. The substance and tone

of the letter were hardly in keeping with the humility and modesty of the great man.

All efforts to track down the relevant notes and papers and check their legitimacy were unavailing. The Israeli Consul declined to cooperate.

Dr. Einstein's last statement about the state of Israel had been made in an interview with Dorothy Schiff, violently pro-Israeli publisher of the *New York Post*. This was how Miss Schiff quoted the scientist: "We had great hopes for Israel at first. We thought that it might be better than other nations, but it is no better." Even Zionist writers themselves (including Dr. Margoshes in the *Day-Morning Journal*) in post-mortem reflections referred to this quotation, exposing the dubious enthusiasm of Einstein for the Israeli state.

A tape-recorded radio tribute in which Israeli Ambassador Abba Eban referred to the "ardent zeal with which Dr. Einstein advocated and sustained Israel's national revival" finished the act. The death-bed memorandum via *The New York Times* was adduced to silence doubters and potential letter writers and to contradict statements made by Dr. Einstein in 1946, 1948, 1950, 1952 and 1955. Having successfully kidnapped the scientist while he was alive, Jewish nationalists were never going to yield the body for autopsy.

The ever-handy charge of anti-Semitism has provided pro-Israeli forces with their biggest weapon, from which even one of the world's foremost historians has not been immune. The super-sensitivity of Zionists to criticism was laid bare in their bitterly vituperative campaign against Professor Arnold Toynbee.

In Volume VIII of his *A Study of History* Professor Toynbee stated:

. . . The Jews' immediate reaction to their own experience was to become persecutors in their turn for the first time since 135 A.D.

— and this at the first opportunity that had arisen for them to inflict on other human beings, who had done the Jews no injury, but happened to be weaker than they were, some of the wrongs and sufferings that had been inflicted on the Jews by their many successive Western Gentile persecutors during the intervening seventeen centuries¹ . . . The Jews had even less excuse in A.D. 1948 for evicting Palestinian Arabs from their homes than Nebuchadnezzar and Titus and Hadrian and the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition had had for uprooting, persecuting and exterminating Jews in Palestine and elsewhere at divers times in the past.²

The British historian, equating the violation of moral principle by Israeli nationalists with that of German nationalists, employed the following overpowering rationale:

In A.D. 1948 the Jews knew, from personal experience, what they were doing; and it was their supreme tragedy that the lesson learnt by them from their encounter with Nazi German Gentiles should have been not to eschew but to imitate some of the evil deeds that the Nazis had committed against the Jews. On the day of judgment the gravest crime standing to the German National Socialist account might be not that they had exterminated a majority of the Western Jews but that they had caused the surviving remnant of Jewry to stumble³ . . . The Jews in Europe in A.D. 1933-45 had been the vicarious victims of the Germans' resentment over fellow Gentiles in the War of A.D. 1914-18; the Arabs in Palestine, in A.D. 1948, became in their turn the vicarious victims of the European Jews' indignation over the "genocide" committed upon them by their Gentile fellow Westerners in A.D. 1933-45. This impulse to become a party to the guilt of a stronger neighbor by inflicting on an innocent weaker neighbor the very sufferings that the original victim had experienced at his stronger neighbor's hands was perhaps the most perverse of all the base propensities of human nature; for it was a wanton endeavor to keep in perpetual motion the sorrowful wheel of *Karma* to which Adam-Ixion was bound and from which only Love and Mercy could ever release him.⁴

¹ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), Vol. VIII, p. 289. ²*Ibid.*, p. 290. ³*Ibid.*, pp. 290-291. ⁴*Ibid.*, p. 291.

Zionists attacked Toynbee as an anti-Semite and assailed his work as anti-Jewish. Before 800 delegates in Atlantic City Rabbi Mordecai Kirshblum, President of the Mizrachi Organization of America (a clerical Zionist party), described Professor Toynbee's statement as "a shocking comparison which is equally false and vicious" and accused the historian of "defamation of Israel and of the Jewish people." Other Jewish organizations and publicists besmirched the Toynbee writings as "a new scientific anti-Semitism comparable to [Houston Stewart] Chamberlain's writings which had much to do with the rise of Nazism."

A Newark rabbi admonished a Yiddish literary critic for mentioning Toynbee's name in public without the use of the traditional Biblical curse "Yimach Shmoi Zichroi" (may his name and memory be wiped out).

In an answer to his maligners in the *Jewish Frontier* (March 1955) Professor Toynbee admitted "the disparity in number between Jewish victims of the Nazis and the Arab victims of Zionists," but insisted that "degrees of sin and tragedy are not determined by the numbers of souls concerned."

In a further letter published in the *Jewish Newsletter*, on April 18, Professor Toynbee wrote:

My own feeling about the Jews (based on long personal friendships with friends of mine who happen to be Jews) is that, in essence, the Jews are like other human beings, and other human beings react as Jews do to particular trials and social conditions to which Jews, and others, have been subject. . . . I might add that while I shall continue to say what I think frankly, I do not seek controversy. What is needed, I am sure, is an atmosphere in which these great questions can be discussed on their merits with goodwill on all sides.

Toynbee's reference to Israel as "a relic of a vanquished civilization" roused the further wrath of Jewish nationalists.

As the defamation of the historian spread, there were a handful of defenders. Dean Virginia Gildersleeve stated:

The inability of Zionists to tolerate any unfavorable criticism of themselves or the State of Israel without pouring on the critic personal vituperation and attributing to him low motives and prejudices certainly impedes a rational discussion of Zionists and Israeli problems. As a good American I freely and publicly condemn acts of my own country which I think wrong. I also condemn at times acts of the long ago homes of my ancestors, England and France. Why should I not be free to condemn in the same way acts of Israel? Why should that State and that people alone among nations on the earth be sacrosanct and untouchable?

The climate favorable to free and open discussion for which Professor Toynbee and Dean Gildersleeve pleaded has never come about. The totalitarian tactics of Zionist supporters, on the contrary, have been stepped up, And foreign diplomats, supposedly the guests of the United States, are not exempt from being victimized.

According to a 9-line story tucked away in the New York *Herald Tribune* of May 13, 1955, the Young Women's Republican Club of Westchester County had withdrawn an invitation to Omar Khadra, alternate delegate of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, to speak before their convention. This action, the brief account said, had been dictated by threats to picket the meeting and otherwise embarrass the organization if Mr. Khadra spoke.

Local Westchester papers filled out the details. Mrs. J. Noel Saxton, President of the Club, indicated that Miss Margaret Calman, a fellow director and Vice President of the New York State Association of Young Republican Clubs, had informed officers of telephone calls "from persons she did not identify, saying that they would rather Khadra would not speak at the meeting." Disorderly picketing of the Gramatan Hotel in

Bronxville was threatened if Mr. Khadra appeared there as a speaker. And, according to the Club President, Miss Calman had been "so alarmed and so insistent that an incident would arise if Mr. Khadra appeared that we voted to cancel our invitation."

After the story broke in the press, all concerned were most reluctant to discuss the affair, and the circumstances surrounding the threats were difficult to trace. The Chairman of the Board of the State Association stated he "was not in a position to go into this question at this time."

A little probing revealed that Miss Calman ran a secretarial service in New Rochelle in Westchester County. Over the phone she denied the truth of the published stories: "The newspapers were inaccurate; it was not a question of pressures. No one terrorized me. As a matter of fact, I work both for Jews and for the California-Texas Oil Company. You know how sympathetic they are to the Arabs."

Miss Calman continued: "We simply went over the agenda and then decided that the program was too full. We, therefore, had to dispense with a speaker. There was no pressure."

In the course of the conversation, Miss Calman changed her story: "I received calls from friends — not from any organization," she admitted. "These friends inquired who this Arab diplomat was and why he was speaking. That is all. Unfortunately, one of the directors then got into her head that this was pressuring."

Another club officer, Miss Ann Nicoletti, who by coincidence worked for the Arabian-American Oil Company, was reluctant to talk because of fear that she might be blamed for the slight to Mr. Khadra, a diplomat from the country in which her employers produced oil. She had been put in the difficult position of having to notify Mr. Khadra of the cancellation the day before his scheduled appearance. Not wishing to tell him the real reason, she gave him the excuse that the room in which he was to talk had been rented for a wedding. Mr.

Khadra had intended to address himself to nothing more controversial than the culture and history of Saudi Arabia, not to the Palestine question.

Eventually, an embarrassed Miss Nicoletti told how the Club Board of Directors had been polled by phone. They agreed by a 4 to 3 vote to cancel the invitation only after Miss Calman's recital of pressures brought by influential members of the community, including Republican leaders, a former District Attorney of Westchester County, a top woman Jewish leader and representative of an organization. Miss Calman had not given the name of that organization.

Miss Calman expressed herself in another conversation with a person who had represented himself as a member of the Anti-Defamation League. To this person Miss Calman said "I have a tremendous number of Jewish friends. I would not do anything to hurt them. . . . This story of pressures was given out by Mrs. Saxton, who had no right to do this . . . and, off the record, Mrs. Saxton's sister works for the Arabian-American Oil Company. This is entirely off the record and don't quote me . . ." She then said, reassuringly, when asked whether she had protected the Jewish groups: "I haven't told anyone who called. I was the only one who received the calls, which were not only from persons in New Rochelle. I talked with Mrs. Jackson and cleared up the misunderstanding with her. (Mrs. N. Elliot Jackson, of New Rochelle, is a member of the Westchester Zionist Council.) I have many friends among Jews, as I have said, and it is in the best interests of the Republican Club not to go further into this."

This repressive deed, widely reported in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle East, helped reduce America's vaunted words regarding freedom of speech to little more than verbiage at a time when she was striving to win the neutral peoples of the Asian-African world to the side of the West.

The New York Times had questioned the president of the Club for more than half an hour on the telephone and, al-

though their Westchester reporter had filed a story, nothing appeared in either of their editions. The only explanation was the comment of the City Desk: "Apparently the news value of the story did not compare with other news received that day."

As a result of local press notoriety given to the incident, Khadra received an invitation to address the White Plains Rotary Club. On this occasion, before a large audience and guarded by two detectives, the young Saudi Arabian diplomat could not help digressing from the cultural field to comment on aspects of the Arab-Israeli problem pertinent to his own peculiar Westchester experience.

In an editorial on May 19 entitled "Black Eye for Freedom of Speech" the *Reporter-Dispatch* of White Plains pointed out the moral of *l'affaire* Khadra:

We are aware of the fact that there are not very many Saudi Arabians in this country and that there are probably a great many more members of "an organization" mentioned. That makes no difference whatsoever. When the right of anybody to stand up and speak his mind hinges on what outfit has the most members or casts the most votes, or wins a popularity contest, then friends, you can kiss democracy goodbye. You can start selling America short. You can look around for a good funeral orator because, when that happens, we will have had it.

Upholding Zionism has long been a paramount tenet of "liberals," who require no smears and few fears for this crusade. And this applies equally to organizations and individuals.

The Fund for the Republic, headed by former president of the University of Chicago Robert Hutchins, has been under constant fire. The Fund has been accused of being a subversive organization, first by the Reece Special House Committee, and then by the Commander of the American Legion. However difficult it may be to prove this charge emanating from extremely conservative sources, the organization, whose

funds come from the Ford Foundation, has made itself suspect on other grounds. The Fund has not come into court with clean hands.

In the initial public statement announcing the establishment of the Fund on December 13, 1952, Paul G. Hoffman, President of the Ford Foundation, set forth its purpose: "to support activities directed toward the elimination of restrictions on freedom of thought, inquiry and expression in the United States, and the development of policies and procedures best adapted to protect these rights."

On January 18, I wrote to Dr. Hutchins asking whether the Fund had investigated "restrictions of thought and expression regarding Zionism imposed by Jewish nationalist groups in the United States." If they had not, I suggested that they ought to do so.

The reply indicated that such an inquiry had not been conducted and was believed "to be outside the scope of activities presently planned by the Fund." The door was left open, however, for a meeting with David F. Freeman, the Secretary of the Fund; when I availed myself of this opportunity, our talk was pleasant, but unproductive. From Mr. Freeman's own acknowledged experience with the Arab-Israeli problem he must have realized that Zionist restrictions on freedom of thought and expression were doubly important because they were so germane to American foreign policy in the area. Still, he did not feel that an investigation such as I proposed fell within the scope of the Fund. "Give us a memorandum, but I am doubtful whether it will change our present opinion," were Mr. Freeman's parting words.

A careful memorandum was prepared in which restrictions on thought, inquiry and expression regarding Israel, Zionism and American foreign policy were outlined. Instances of restrictions up to 1948 affecting freedom of expression in the press, radio and television were cited, together with restrictions imposed since the State of Israel came into being.

The general direction for such an investigation was charted. Material similar to that contained in this and the following chapter was generally outlined, including an indication of the sources of the pressures and on whom they were being exerted. The 1946 boycott of the *Times*, the activities of the Anti-Defamation League, the efforts to have anti-Zionist lectures canceled, the Zionist broadcasts for "humanitarian" purposes, amongst other subjects, were touched upon. Inquiry was suggested into the amount of space given by the press and the amount of time given by radio-television to both sides of the controversy.

Paul Hoffman had aptly pointed out that "the many controversial problems in this area (restrictions on freedom of thought, etc.) can best be acted on by an organization that has complete independence." The millions placed at the disposal of the Fund had placed the organization in a unique position beyond the reach of advertisers and politicians alike. This memorandum submitted to the Fund noted in conclusion that only an organization with such "complete independence" could act in the area of Zionist and Israeli pressures.

An acknowledgment of the memorandum signed by Mr. Freeman was promptly received, stating that it would be brought to the attention of other officers of the Fund. Three days later came the following two-sentence letter: "Thank you for your letter of February 10." (This he already had done in the previous communication.) "It was most interesting and informative." And that was all! Could he have forgotten about the letter of three days earlier, or was this letter his means of ending the subject without further reference of the matter to anyone in the Fund beside himself? This letter bore no secretary's initials as had the previous one.

When, after seven weeks, nothing more had been heard, I telephoned the Fund on April 6, asked for Dr. Hutchins and was given Mr. Freeman. In response to my inquiry as to what decision had been reached, the Secretary of the Fund re-

sponded, "I think I told you when you were in here that I felt this was not within the scope of activities planned by the Fund." Obviously, Mr. Freeman had never intended to consider the memorandum himself, or to have it considered by the Board of Directors. He admitted that no consideration by others had been given to the subject, but denied vigorously that they were shying away from controversy. I demanded a letter putting on record a rejection of the proposed study by formal action of the Fund.

Within a week I had a letter from Mr. Freeman stating that the proposed study had been discussed with the other officers of the Fund. It read, "I must advise you that your project falls outside the scope of activities presently planned by the Fund."

As critics have alleged, the Fund seemed to be interested in investigating only certain obstructions to freedom of thought, expression and inquiry. There was some justification in the excuse offered by Board member William Joyce of Pasadena that the Fund could not adopt every suggested course of action, but why was Zionism being made a sacred cow? If attacks on civil liberties from the right endangered the Republic, were attacks, because they came from Zionists, any the less dangerous?

These are only four of many, many victims. Their story sheds light on the only possible reasons why the American people, who always have helped sufferers everywhere, have sat by doing nothing and have permitted a million Arab refugees to eke out a miserable camp existence for nine years.

The Forgotten Ones

WHEN the bullets of Israeli assassins cut short the life of the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, the Arab refugees lost a good friend.

The earnest appeals of Count Bernadotte to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and to individual members of the United Nations had brought some immediate assistance for the refugees by way of supplies. It was also at his request that the refugee problem appeared on the agenda of the Third Session of the UN General Assembly as a separate item from the political question of Palestine. As a result the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees was created. Stanton Griffis, American Ambassador to Egypt, became the first Director of the new organization.

The United Nations also adopted in Paris on December 11, 1948, the resolution, renewed every year, which called for facilitating the repatriation of and compensation to the refugees. Resolution 194 stated: "The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should

be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of International Law or in equity, should be made good by the government or authorities responsible.”¹

Early in its history the new UN refugee organization and its successor organization, the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA — set up in 1950), tried to by-pass the political issues with a resettlement program, in accordance with the recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission which had been headed by Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority. This, like the U.S. effort behind the Johnston Jordan development plan, was to prove only a delusion.

The Clapp Mission fixed December 31, 1950, for ending relief, but by that date only 12,287 of the 878,000 refugees on the rationing rolls were employed. The United Nations then became occupied both in meting out relief and attempting to put the refugees to work via permanent projects. In the task of increasing the too few jobs available for refugees in host countries, the international organization has been almost a complete failure. Although technicians explored every possibility for developing self-support opportunities for the refugees, the objective of Major General Howard Kennedy of Canada, the first UNRWA Director, to substitute jobs for relief met with rebuff. Long-range projects offered the only real hope of employment, but these plans smacked of reintegration. The refugees feared that any real integration would mean yielding their rights to return to their homes.

The Sixth General Assembly (1951) came up with a new

¹ The Resolutions of the General Assembly on Arab Refugees: Resolution No. 194 (III) of December 11, 1948; No. 212 (III) of November 19, 1948; No. 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949; No. 393 (V) of December 2, 1950; No. 513 (VI) of January 2, 1952; No. 614 (VII) of November 6, 1952, and No. 720 (VIII) of November 27, 1953; Resolution No. 818 (IX) of December 4, 1954.

three-year program backed by \$250,000,000, 20% of which was to be for relief and the rest for reintegration. Relief was to be progressively reduced until it would cost only \$5,000,000 by 1954. Fifty million during the first and third years and one hundred million during the second were to be spent on rehabilitation projects. By the end of 1954, scheduled to be the last year of UN financial responsibility, only some 8000 Palestinians had been made self-sufficient and less than 5% of the \$200,000,000 had been used, the bulk of this on elementary, secondary, and vocational education, and small scale agricultural developments. This led to the Ninth General Assembly Resolution which extended UNRWA for five more years, starting July 1, 1955, and to end June 30, 1960, with additional relief appropriations.

Although Syria, Jordan and Egypt signed agreements for major development works with the United Nations, signs of progress have been lacking. The attitude of host governments toward resettlement has not changed. In their eyes the facilities offered to refugees of a house and an opportunity for a normal life were in no way to reduce his right to repatriation or compensation.

The implementation of the two major reclamation projects—the utilization of water from the Jordan watershed in the Jordan Valley and from the Nile in Western Sinai—awaited political decisions.

The former was linked with the Johnston Plan for the international control and development of hydroelectric power and irrigation in the Jordan Valley. The harnessing of the Yarmuk and Jordan River waters could bring 125,000 acres into use for refugee resettlement.

The Sinai Desert Project offered hope for resettling some 60,000 refugees cooped up in the Gaza Strip by moving them to a 52,000-acre strip of the Sinai Peninsula north of Great Bitter Lake. The land would be reclaimed by bringing water from the Nile via the Ismailia Canal, and siphoning it under

the Suez Canal to the sandy strip. Four major engineering developments were involved, the cost of which was to be covered from the 30 million dollars set aside by UNRWA to enable refugees in Gaza to become self-supporting.

Long and complicated negotiations carried on between 1949 and 1954 by the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine finally brought about the release of blocked bank accounts in Israel belonging to some 6000 Arab refugees. Settlement was delayed by Israeli demands for offsetting of frozen accounts in Iraq belonging to Jews who had emigrated to Israel.

Barclay's Bank and the Ottoman Bank, which served as the media for the transfer of the accounts as well as of safe deposit contents, distributed necessary forms on March 1, 1953. These contained a statement to be signed by the applicant, acknowledging payment "by the Government of Israel and in accordance with such stipulations as they may make." This implied a recognition of the State of Israel. In addition, accounts over 50 pounds had the Israeli 10% compulsory loan deducted from the deposits. A storm of protest was raised on the Arab side from some of the refugees. The Conciliation Commission was forced to substitute the words "competent authorities" for "Government of Israel." A clause was added to the effect that refugee rights would not be jeopardized by the signing. A partial, first installment payment of one million pounds was then made available for the clearance of accounts of 50 pounds or less. In September 1954, an agreement was reached for the release of all blocked accounts, to cover an additional three million pounds. Barclay's Bank facilitated payment by making a special long-term loan.

At the end of August 1955, some 1600 applications, mostly with very small deposits, were still to be received and cleared. The return of safe deposit holdings was proceeding save for delays arising from Lebanon's insistence on levying duty on

the newly regained possessions accruing to refugees in her territory.

As the United States had exaggerated the importance of the Johnston Plan to a settlement of the refugee problem, the Conciliation Commission likewise had exaggerated the psychological importance of the release of these accounts, claiming this step would advance "intercourse and relations between Israel and Arab countries." In point of fact, this was a minuscule part of the whole refugee problem.

On May 29, 1949, President Truman had sent a strong note asking for repatriation of 200,000 refugees to which Ben-Gurion reiterated: "Without peace there will be no sizable Arab return. The United States is a powerful country. Israel is a small and weak one. We can be crushed but we will not commit suicide." In a more formal reply Israel also rejected the U.S. note.

Ambassador McDonald points out the complete U.S. retreat in the face of the Ben-Gurion note: "The (next) American note abandoned completely the stern tone of its predecessor . . . More and more, Washington ceased to lay down the law to Tel Aviv."²

A previous Israeli offer to re-admit 100,000 refugees, subject to economic and strategic considerations as to where these were to be located, was withdrawn as the Israeli politicians and public joined hands in an outcry against U.S. pressures. An Israeli offer to reunite separated refugee families was modified to reunite only minor sons, single daughters and wives with parents and husbands. By 1954 some 4000 refugees had been permitted to return under this offer.

Through the media of the Conciliation Commission, negotiations looking toward alleviation of refugee suffering and compensation for property were carried out between 1949 and 1951. The Commission, after two and a half years of

² James G. McDonald, *My Mission to Israel*.

operations under Louisville publisher Mark Ethridge, public official-attorney Paul Porter and diplomat Ely Palmer, could boast of an expenditure of 10 million dollars through May 1951—and abysmal failure.

The 1951 proposal of the Commission that Israel agree to the repatriation of a specified number of refugees was promptly rejected. In May 1953 Foreign Minister Sharett declared Israel could not agree to even a token repatriation, which statement Ambassador Eban repeated to the UN General Assembly the next fall. The Conciliation Commission turned its efforts to the difficult process of identifying and assessing individual Arab property, a task infinitely complicated by missing land records and the Ottoman system of land registration which differed from the Land Settlement Act of the Palestine Mandate.

The question of compensation to Arab refugees, agreed to by the United Nations since December 1948, has run into many bitterly controversial obstructions. When the Conciliation Commission proposed in 1951 that both sides waive claims for war damages, neither party would consent to the payment demanded. Israel has claimed her capacity to pay compensation depends on her economic ability, which was being adversely affected by the Arab blockade. The Egyptians countered with the observation that Israeli capacity had increased with the Bonn reparations agreement. Israel at all times reiterated that refugee compensation must be linked to final refugee and over-all peace settlements.

The opposition parties to Prime Minister Sharett turned the issue of refugee compensation into a domestic political issue in Israel. "With the assumption of responsibility for the 19,000 Arab refugees in Israel," they contended, "Israel has done all she should unless all Israeli conditions are fulfilled."

Another Israeli answer to Arab claims for property compensation was war damages in Israel and Jewish property frozen in Arab countries, principally in Iraq, at a value esti-

mated to be equal to the value of "abandoned" Arab property in Israel set by the Conciliation Commission.

The estimates of Arab property varied considerably from 120 million pounds by Holgen Andersen for the Conciliation Commission to 2 billion pounds sterling set forth by some Arabs. Part of this wide disparity arose from the Israeli contention that the new Israeli government inherited all government-owned property from the Mandate and that consequently no compensation need be paid Arabs for non-privately owned property.

The Israelis admitted liability only for lands previously under cultivation and not for unused, barren or desert lands. This eliminated consideration of large Arab-owned areas for olive orchards and fruit plantations, classified as non-cultivable for that purpose.

The Israeli government refused to give the Conciliation Commission any rights over Arab property. Absolute power to declare any person or property absentee was vested by Israeli law in the Custodian of Absentee Property. Under the 1950 law, every Arab who left his town or village after November 29, 1947, was liable to be classified as an absentee. Thirty thousand who became refugees by fleeing from one part of Israel to another were actually declared absentees and lost their property. Half the Arab inhabitants of Kafr 'Elut remained in their village during the fighting, the other half took refuge in Nazareth. All were declared "absentees." Those who remained in their homes were required to make payment to the Custodian for use of their own lands.

Under the Land Acquisition Law of 1953, cash compensation to Arabs, who owned the land in Israel and who remained behind but had moved or been moved elsewhere, was based on the 1950 value which ranged between 15 and 25 Israeli pounds per dunum, or quarter-acre, rather than the 1953 value which was somewhere between 250 and 350 Israeli pounds per dunum. The pound had depreciated from \$2.80

in 1950 to \$1.00 at the time of the new legislation. The Tel Aviv newspaper *Haaretz* protested: "There is no reason to legalize the fact that certain farms exploited the victory of the state and seized for their own benefit the lands of their neighbors."

Four million dunums, of which two and a half million were cultivable, were being held by the Custodian. Within Israel the left-wing Mapam Party endeavored to win for the Arabs greater rights over their property. They and Arab delegates in the Knesset argued in favor of giving back property to any Arab who possessed an Israeli identity card even though he may have fled from his own village to other places in Israel. The only benefit from Arab absentee-owned property derived by other Arabs who had remained in Israel was the lease of 25,000 acres to 5000 Arab families in 100 villages and the settlement of 370 refugee families.

The Israeli government, while severely attacked, successfully blocked amendments which would have liberalized the oppressive legislation governing Arab owned property. In the Knesset two-thirds of the members present abstained from voting on either side. The national security of Israel was advanced as an excuse in defense of the legislation. The Arab absentee property, the argument ran, must be controlled because Israel was surrounded by Arab enemies who intended to start a second round of warfare.

If their property was not to be in the hands of an international neutral body, the Arabs felt entitled at least to the yearly income which the Custodian received. Such income would have provided a more amicable atmosphere for a final settlement.

Israeli progressive Moshe Smilanski realistically saw in compensation to refugees a mitigation both of the hatred of absentee refugees and the growing problem of infiltration, if such payments were to include Arab farmers who were deprived of their land as a result of the irregular, badly drawn

Israeli-Jordanian armistice line. This Israeli, a former colleague of Dr. Judah Magnes, referred in these words to the causes of infiltration: "Persons without a roof over their heads or bread to eat will endanger themselves to return to their homes and land. Having nothing to lose, they will even risk death by the sword, which is better than death by starvation."³

The best thing that has happened to the Arab refugees was the appointment of Henry Labouisse in 1954 to head the United Nations Relief Works Agency. A brilliant career statesman, Labouisse had served as Special Assistant to Secretary Hull and Thomas K. Finletter, and later headed the ECA mission in Paris. He possesses tact, patience and understanding, traits so necessary in this sensitive United Nations organism.

In his 1955 report to the General Assembly, Director Labouisse noted that "the strong desire of the refugees to return to their homeland has not diminished during the year and its strength should not be underestimated." The demand for repatriation springs mainly from the natural longing of the people for their old homes.

To these refugees, repatriation of course meant a return to a Palestine as they knew their homeland prior to 1948. It was impossible to ascertain how many displaced persons would in fact accept a repatriation which would mean something different from a return to their former way of life. As Labouisse pointed out, the refugees ought to be given an opportunity to choose between "distinguishable alternatives: on the one hand, repatriation, the true nature of which is clearly understood at the time of choice, and on the other, the amount and form of the compensation that would be offered instead."

The difficulties facing Mr. Labouisse were compounded by these hard realities: As of June 1955, more than one-third of the refugees were inhabitants of the 58 UNRWA camps in

³ See *Haaretz*, August 11 and December 8, 1949.

Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Gaza Strip. The shock of personal loss and the strain of flight had caused a large number of psychiatric cases, and an untold number of adults have become professional refugees without hoping or desiring to work again.

What reduction in numbers had resulted through the integration of refugees and the departure for homes with friends or families in nearby Arab towns and cities had been more than offset by other accretions. Births had brought new mouths to be fed and failure to earn a living in the cities had of necessity returned many to the ration rolls.

The United Nations, by limiting the definition of "refugee" to "a person normally a resident of Palestine who has lost his home and his livelihood as a result of the hostilities and is in need," eliminated those who still lived in their own homes but had been cut off from their means of livelihood. There were 200,000 Jordanian villagers destitute because their fields were cut off from their houses by the irrational demarcation line. There were almost 70,000 in Gaza whose plight was equally serious. Also not entitled to UNRWA rations were certain refugees in Egypt, Bedouin tribes, and Jordanian children born since February 1951.

The Ninth General Assembly instructed the UNRWA Director to study and report upon the problem of supplementary relief for children and for inhabitants of villages along the demarcation lines. While not making any specific recommendations for action to the succeeding General Assembly, Director Labouisse appraised the situation and emphasized the great suffering by this category of refugees unprovided for by UNRWA.

After considerable debate over responsibility, the General Assembly in December 1955 adopted a refugee resolution submitted by the U.S., Britain and Turkey. This emphasized resettlement efforts and made no provision for assistance to the economic refugees either in the frontier villages or in Gaza.

Nineteen of the member nations, including all the Arab states, abstained in the final vote on the resolution.

The three powers who had sponsored the draft resolution directed an appeal to the voluntary philanthropic agencies to help these refugees not covered under the operations of UNRWA. Many delegates opposed such an appeal as being charity and wanted the UN to include these additional refugees in their program. Those voluntary agencies already working in this endeavor had indicated that they were hardly in a position to take on any new burdens. It was exceedingly unlikely, from a practical standpoint, that any new organization would be attracted to work in this controversial area. The American Friends Service Committee had filled an important gap in Gaza before the present UN organization had come into being. The Lutheran World Federation, the International Christian Committee, Church World Service, the American Middle East Relief and the Catholic Near East Welfare Association all had participated for a number of years in supplementing the governmental program and saving lives. The money, clothing, food and medicine furnished were invaluable. Shelters, made available or newly constructed, saved infants from death in the wintry cold and spared grown-ups from epidemics.

In the spring of 1949 Pope Pius XII established the Pontifical Mission for Palestine to meet what His Holiness described as "the prey to destitution, contagious disease and perils of every sort." Although the Catholic refugee population numbered less than 50,000, charity had been extended to hundreds of thousands of other Christians, and Moslems, by the Mission and its component national organizations.

All of the private American aid was severely handicapped by the inability to carry a direct appeal for the refugees to the American public. The political implications involved in this humanitarian problem combined with a sincere religious desire

to avoid stirring anti-Semitism kept the charitable campaign at a stage whisper level.

In attempting to foist additional responsibility on these voluntary agencies, the United Nations was hardly realistic and seemed to be running away from a responsibility toward the victims which their own mandate had created. Before the 11th Session of the General Assembly adjourned on March 9, the delegates were forced to agree upon an appeal to member governments for financial help in making up an 18-million-dollar deficit of UNRWA. Because of defaults in contributions by these governments, the Agency was confronted with closing down all operations and foregoing even the seven-cents-per day pittance for the refugees.

UN reliance on the resettlement projects, even had these plans been realizable, was equally unrealistic. The maximum that could be expected from the two grandiose schemes in the Sinai Desert and the Jordan Valley was the resettlement of 200,000 refugees, which would leave far more than half a million in Jordan and Gaza still needing care, not taking into account the natural increase during the period of construction. The basic project in Sinai could be completed within three years, the refugees moved on to the land three years later and self-support achieved within three to six years after the last resident was settled. In that eleven to fourteen-year period the Gaza refugees would have had a natural increment of between 66,000 and 84,000.

The Jordanian refugees would have added to their numbers 150,000 new mouths to be fed by the time the Jordan Valley plan could have been realized, even were this scheme to fulfill the expectations of Eric Johnston. These figures indicate the extent to which present United Nations efforts to solve the refugee problem serve as a palliative rather than as a remedy.

The suggestion by the then Lebanese Ambassador, Dr. Charles Malik, in a New York speech in 1953 that "the only reasonable and practicable solution of the problem is to make

it possible for the greater part of the refugees to be resettled on Palestinian soil" still made infinitely better sense. This goal could be accomplished by ceding to the State of Jordan a portion of the land seized by Israel beyond the territory granted under the United Nations Partition Plan. Some 420,000 people lived in western Galilee. The overwhelming majority of these were now refugees, who could be returned home by the cession of western Galilee to Arab hands. The internationalization of the Holy City of Jerusalem could mean a return for some 100,000 other Arabs who once lived in the Jerusalem enclave, including 70,000 in the city.

This continuing misery of the refugees is the greatest obstacle to Arab-Israeli peace. This decay of humanity is enough to justify every ounce of resentment displayed in those unhappy lands against the Western world, which has made no atonement for a grave moral and physical wrong. It now makes little difference why these unfortunates have been displaced. And their homesickness is not lessened by the fact that "home" may be only a mud hovel or a strip of stony hillside.

"Let the Arab states take the lead in resettling them" is the constant advice of the uninformed. But this suggestion comes sharply up against cold economic facts: none of the Arab states has enough of that magic combination, Land-Water-Capital, even to begin such projects.

Let us suppose that a group of Mexicans sought refuge and were permitted to settle in a portion of Texas in which their forebears had once dwelt. After thirty years in which their numbers increased, these refugees then wished to set up a state of their own in that part of Texas in which they had settled. The newcomers said to the native Texans, "You have 47 other states as well as another part of this state in which to live; all we want is this one small portion to which we are sentimentally attached." It is not difficult to imagine what the attitude of Texans would be—and they have not been rooted to their

lands for fifteen centuries—or what the attitude of the other 47 states would be to the claims of the Mexicans.

Some few Jews have appreciated the reprehensible fact that Israeli progress has been achieved at the expense of Arab suffering and deprivation. Dr. Judah L. Magnes resigned from his post with the Joint Distribution Committee, a subsidiary of the United Jewish Appeal, because that organization refused to do anything about the Arab refugees. The beloved President of the Hebrew University, one of the initiators of the Appeal, asked: "How can I be officially connected with a welfare organization that can so easily dismiss such a great and urgent problem? For peace can come only if Israel and Ishmael can feel that they are brothers."

Arnold Toynbee has characterized the fate of the Palestine Arabs as a backwash "from an upheaval in the relations between the Gentiles and Jews." Mr. Truman's "presidential interventions in the Palestine imbroglio," he feels, "would have been utterly cynical had they not been "partially innocent minded." The historian sums up what he describes as the former President's "personal susceptibility to the popular American confusion of mind and mixture of motives" in this manner:

The Missourian politician-philanthropist's eagerness to combine expediency with charity by assisting the wronged and suffering Jews would appear to have been untempered by any sensitive awareness that he was thereby abetting the infliction of wrongs and sufferings on the Arabs; and his excursions into the stricken field in Palestine reminded a reader of the Fioretti di San Francesco,⁴ of the tragic-comic exploit there attributed to the impetuously tender-hearted brother Juniper who, according to the revealing tale, was so effectively moved by a report of the alimentary needs of an invalid that he rushed, knife in hand, into a wood full of unoffending pigs and straightway cut off a live pig's trotter to provide his ailing fellow human being with a dish that his soul desired, without no-

⁴ *The Little Flowers* of St. Francis of Assisi. See Toynbee, VIII, p. 308.

ting that he was leaving the mutilated animal writhing in agony and without pausing to reflect that his innocent victim was not either the invalid's property or his own.

Last Chance for the Middle East

WESTERN ignorance of the Palestine issues, which has given the Russians their golden opportunity, threatens to wreak even greater damage. Public opinion, already completely sympathetic to the Israeli cause, has solidified in the face of Communist aid to the Arabs. From the beginning of the Eisenhower administration, Israel has been protected by America's anti-communism.

Because the media of information refuse to relate cause to effect, no one knows why American chickens in the Middle East have been coming home to roost and are laying red eggs. And each day it becomes more probable that, unless the grave injustice to the Palestinian Arabs is immediately mitigated, the entire Middle East will be lost to the free world. Such a catastrophe would result in a shift in the world balance and would inevitably bring World War III.

Americans have refused to regard the Arab-Israeli controversy simply as a question of American foreign policy involving a strategic part of the world which the West cannot afford

to lose. Emotionalism has beclouded the real issue and injected the completely irrelevant subject of anti-Semitism into the dispute. In this Middle East struggle, Semite is pitted against Semite. For the Arabs, as well as the Israelis,¹ are Semitic people, which means no more than that they speak a Semitic tongue. It makes no more sense to label Prime Minister Nasser and his proponents anti-Semitic than to apply this word to David Ben-Gurion and his adherents.

In the definition of Arabism in the charter of the Arab League, there is no requirement for a particular religious or racial strain. An Arab is defined thus: "Whoever lives on our land, speaks our language and shares our culture is one of us." Jews have lived for centuries in the Arab countries speaking the Arab language, living on the Arab land and sharing the Arab culture with other Arabs. They were an integral part of the great Moorish civilization during the Middle Ages. As pointed out by Jewish historians, the golden era of Judaism covered the centuries starting in the year 711 A.D. in which Jews lived with influence and respect under Islamic sway in Spain and Portugal. And when the Jews were forced to flee the Christian inquisitions, they found refuge in North Africa and in the Middle East.

What is known in the West as anti-Semitism has never existed in the Arab world. The Arabs have never been anti-Jewish. Moses and Abraham, as well as Jesus, are recognized as prophets by the Islamic faith. One of the holiest places in Islam is the Rock in Jerusalem where Abraham was prepared to sacrifice his son. The Koran refers to Jews as "people of the book," and the followers of Islam have always referred to

¹ In fact, many Jews in Israel are of non-Semitic origin. Judaism was at one time a tremendous proselytizing force in the pagan world. Those who carried the religion of Yahweh to other parts of the globe were hardly more than a drop in the ocean of foreign peoples who had never possessed any racial, lingual or cultural affinity with Israel but, nevertheless, became members of the Judaic monotheistic faith. See *What Price Israel?*, pp. 213-228.

their Jewish neighbors as "the sons and daughters of our uncle," an allusion to the Old Testament story of Ishmael and Isaac.

This insinuation of Egyptian anti-Jewishness was without any foundation. Jews controlled a good share of the financial and industrial life in Egypt. Four out of five of the largest department stores on Cairo's Fifth Avenue were Jewish owned.

Even at the height of the Palestinian War, there was no bitterness against Jews in Egypt. As Egypt brought home her dead from Gaza, Jews marched behind the coffin shoulder to shoulder with Moslems and Christians—all equally Egyptian in the eyes of their country. These were the facts until Israel's 1956 aggression.

The charge of racial discrimination against the Jews of Egypt, published in an attempt to discredit Egypt, had been categorically denied by the Grand Rabbi of Egypt in a public statement:

The Jews of Egypt are not the object of any racial discrimination. In my capacity as spiritual chief of the Jewish communities of Egypt, and in perfect accord with members of the Councils of these communities who are persons known for their activities in intellectual, financial, industrial and commercial affairs of the country, it is my duty to declare that no discrimination exists against our communities. On the contrary, and above all under the new regime, the authorities have on many occasions manifested their sympathy for Judaism in Egypt.

Haym Nahoum, the Grand Rabbi of Egypt, is beloved by his fellow Egyptians and respectfully called "Effendi." He is a member of the Academy of the Arabic Language, the select Arab literary circle corresponding to the Académie Française, an honor of which he is almost prouder than of being the religious head of the Jewish community. On all public occasions Nahoum Effendi enjoys equal rank with the Chiefs of the Islamic and Coptic faiths.

The impact of Zionism since 1948 shattered this peaceful existence of Jews amongst their Arab brethren. Zionist "ingathering," accomplished by means of emotional appeals and instilled fears of imminent persecution, literally squeezed half a million Jews out of Iraq, Yemen, Syria, Egypt and North Africa to satisfy the determined will of Israeli leaders for rapid colonization of their country.

In Egypt, Jews lived for millennia side by side with followers of Islam—some of them descendants of ancient Hebrews whom Moses left behind in his exodus. Others fled to Egypt following the first destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem at the hands of the Babylonians. In 250 B.C. Philo tells us there were more Jews in Alexandria than in Jerusalem. Jews gained sanctuary in Egypt from Christian persecutions in Spain and Portugal of the 15th Century, from Soviet excesses at the time of the Russian Revolution and from Hitler's racial persecution. The invasion of Egypt by Israel on October 29, 1956, no doubt brought to an end this Egyptian sanctuary for the Jews of the world.

But what has taken place in Egypt in the wake of the Israeli-British-French aggression has not been anti-Semitism. There has been no discrimination against Jews as Jews, but an identification of Jews with Israelis whom the Arabs oppose on political, not religious grounds. Israel is regarded by Egyptians as a foreign colonial power whose leadership and funds come from Europe and the United States.

Innocent people are often victims of injustice in time of war. Egyptian suspicions toward Jews had an exact American parallel. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, native and foreign-born Japanese were rounded up and moved by the thousands from homes on the West Coast to camps in the interior.

When the Israeli army was within three hours of Cairo, there was never any roundup of Egyptian Jews, and there was no violence. Egyptian reaction came after the toll of Port Said was made public and the displeasure fell upon British, French

and other foreigners as well as on Jews. Even Egyptian Copts came under suspicion in a trend toward Islamization.

The impact of the invasion virtually eradicated in Egypt all distinction between Jews and Israelis. The Zionists in the U.S. and Israel had continually insisted that the state of Israel and the Jews of the world were one. On November 7, Mr. Ben-Gurion had stated that *all* Jews throughout the world were in sympathy with the Israeli attack, a claim never denied by American Jewry. If important people in other lands lumped Jews and Israelis together, how could the uneducated Egyptian masses, excited by the passions of war, be expected to observe the distinction?

The suspicion aroused against Jews in Egypt was not allayed by reluctance of the world Jewish community to take a stand against Zionism, or by complaints and threats raised against Egypt by world Zionism and its supporters. Israeli protestations that regarded Egyptian Jews as if they were nationals of Israel only increased the resentment.

The American press contributed to the deterioration of the situation by the spate of exaggerated reports and the wide use of the label "anti-Semitic." Judgment as to whether Egypt was being "anti-Semitic" toward the Jews in Egypt or whether the Israelis were in fact being "anti-Semitic" toward the Arabs in Israel ought to have been influenced by the fact that not a single Jewish life had been taken in Egypt, while 386 Arabs were killed in two major Gaza Strip incidents—at Khan Yunis and Rafah—66 more in nearby minor incidents, and another 48 at the village of Kafr Kassem within Israel proper.

From the Arab standpoint, the "Jewish" state of Israel is in no different position from that of the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem set up by the Crusaders. No one can deny that there is a deepening anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist hatred in the Arab states, which some day might erupt into anti-Jewish sentiment. To make matters worse, not one of the United Nations provi-

sions for the protection of the Palestinian Arabs has ever been implemented.

The United States is paying an exorbitant price for pursuing a policy contrary to the advice of every American foreign service officer and private citizen with any knowledge of the area. The Communists have merely sat back and taken advantage of the chain of events which this country set in motion by making possible the establishment of a Zionist state in territory occupied for over 1300 years by Arabs.

Is it too late? What can the West do now? Any constructive solution that the U.S. fosters must be based on the overriding consideration of keeping communism out of the Middle East and at the same time doing justice to the legitimate interests of the embattled adversaries. Before even the most elementary progress can be made toward these objectives, policy for the Middle East rather than domestic politics must prevail.

Shameless bartering by candidates for votes in every election year has contributed to the deteriorating prestige of the United States. The myth that all American Jews will refuse to vote for any candidate who does not speak up boldly for Israel remains unexposed. Massachusetts' senior Senator Leverett Saltonstall created an international *cause célèbre* when he presented a Cairo street urchin with a piaster (a coin of less than three cents in value). He thought a collection was being made for "alms," whereas it was for "arms," and the Senator is still abjectly apologizing to every Jewish organization in the state for his "support of the Arab cause."²

Anti-Arab attacks by politicians, resounding more often through the Arab states than small gestures of friendship, vitiate the American goal of impartiality. And past efforts of the Department of State to harmonize Arab-Israeli differences have been invariably hamstrung by fear of domestic political

² The Senator's misfortune was widely reported in the Arab press, one Beirut paper editorializing, "Much ado about three cents."

kickbacks. Although unable to win her own objectives, Israel finds she can paralyze any constructive course of conduct to which she is opposed.

Prior to the next Congressional election, an agreement must be reached to treat the Arab-Israeli controversy on a bi-partisan basis, the goal for which James Forrestal vainly strove. Politicians who try to exploit the Middle East conflict for votes should be put on notice by their parties that they are doing their country a distinct disservice. A speaker for the Jewish National Fund would then look ridiculous if he stated, as the *London Jewish Chronicle* reported in 1955:

The one chink of light in the gloom into which Israel and the entire Jewish people of the world have been plunged in the last few weeks is that there will be a presidential election in the U.S.A. next year, in which both sides will tussle for the very substantial Jewish vote. There might thus be a change of policy toward Israel on the part of U.S.A.

Any Middle East peace plan must be negotiated on the basis of the original United Nations resolutions which brought the state of Israel into being. The armistice agreements, signed on the island of Rhodes at the end of the Arab-Israeli war in 1949, increased the size of the new state by some 2300 square miles. The truce lines were intended to be temporary demarcations, not final boundaries. The Jordanian-Israeli Armistice Agreement of April 1949 provided that "no military or political advantage" be gained under the truce and that the agreement "shall not in any way prejudice the rights, claims, and positions of either party in the ultimate peace settlement, the provisions of this agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations."

Under an ultimate peace settlement, Israel must necessarily yield some of the territory she has occupied under this truce arrangement. It will not be sufficient to make minor border

rectifications in order to remove present hardships imposed on frontier villages by the manner in which the 1949 truce lines were drawn. Israel will have to make substantial territorial concessions.

The cession by Israel of Western Galilee, which was intended to be part of the Arab state, would return to the Arabs some 296,000 acres of hilly territory which has been sparsely settled by Israelis, who prefer the more easily tilled plains. This portion of Galilee contains most of Israel's 180,000 Arabs and includes the town of Nazareth. The Arabs, among the best dirt farmers in the world, with skill in terracing, are alone capable of using this arid land for farming.

In addition to Western Galilee, the Tulkarm Triangle to the southwest and a portion of the fertile plain further south should be reunited to Jordan. Thousands of Arabs live here in this very sensitive area at the border between Israel and Jordan. A territorial transfer, carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Conciliation Commission, would guarantee a minimum of displacement and hardship. (Jews of Arabic background might well be willing to remain in what would become part of Jordan.) A return of this Arab land would heal the wounds suffered by their national pride in the military defeats at the hands of Israel and provide a chance for the hatred to taper off.

Such a territorial adjustment would relocate many of the Arabs who have been living as second-class citizens within the new state. In the last pages of his autobiography, *Trial and Error*, Dr. Chaim Weizmann stated: "I am certain that the world will judge the Jewish State by what it will do to the Arabs."

The nationality law of Israel, effective July 14, 1952, made all Jews of Israel automatically citizens of the state, but not one of the 180,000 Arabs could become an Israeli citizen without first proving that he was a Palestinian citizen up to May 14, 1948, and that he had either lived there continuously

since the establishment of Israel or entered Israel legally after the establishment. Under this law, a Jew may become a citizen of Israel after one minute in the land, a status which may be denied to an Arab although his forefathers have been there for a thousand years.

Not only was the property of absentee Arabs expropriated and registered in the name of Israeli authorities, but Israeli Arabs found themselves removed from their villages along the borders, in the interests of security, and paid only nominal compensation. When the Israeli Supreme Court denied an application by an Arab resident of an Israeli village to halt the confiscation and registration of his land in the name of the Development Authority, Norman Bentwich, Attorney General of Palestine under the Mandate and a Professor of International Relations of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, had this to say:

Although the expropriation law makes no distinction between Jew and Arab, it is obvious that the action would not have happened to an Israeli Jew, but only to an Israeli Arab. Is it altogether surprising that there are violent incidents by Arabs in the frontier district of Israel if an Arab citizen is treated with such harshness, and the Courts find themselves unable to redress a just grievance?³

Under various legal ruses, Arab farmers have been systematically driven from their lands.

The Arabs in Israel are restricted in their comings and goings, requiring special passes in order to move about the country, and they hold an identity card different from the ones for Jews. Military rule over Arab districts and villages continues.

In addition to the seizure of the holdings of the Moslem institutions of charity, a large number of mosques and churches

³ *Jewish Chronicle*, April 16, 1954.

have been desecrated or destroyed, leading to protests by Monsignor George Hakim, Archbishop of the Greek Catholic Community in Israel, and Monsignor Thomas J. McMahon, head of the Pontifical Mission to the Refugees.

Ibrahim Izzat, the Egyptian newspaper man whose secretly-arranged visit to Israel made international headlines in May 1956, reported in the Egyptian weekly *Rose El Yousef* that "while everything was done to promote progress among the Israelis, nothing was done to help the Arabs themselves out of the abject poverty and backwardness that has been their curse for centuries. . . . Arab villages existed under the strictest military law and the people were not permitted to leave their houses after dark."

These disabilities on Arabs in Israel, known only to the well-informed before Mr. Izzat's visit, had led Norman Thomas to declare: "An Arab, without too much exaggeration, can complain that the Jews were practicing Hitlerism in reverse. Arabs have been made second-class citizens."

Israel's treatment of her Arab citizens seriously raises the question of the intent behind Israeli actions. Has this discrimination been aimed at dissuading Arab refugees from agitating for a return? Or was the purpose perhaps to force some of the 180,000 Arabs of Israel to leave and thus enable Israelis to take over still more property for newcomers?

A workable peace plan must provide for the special status of Jerusalem, the Holy City for all three monotheistic faiths. Internationalization of Jerusalem was part and parcel of the original partition plan and still represents the position of the United Nations. Some arrangements could be made for internationalization of Jerusalem and its environs under the United Nations with special rights for Israel in the new city and for Jordan in the old city. The union of the capitals of Jordan and Israel under an international regime would make for progress

toward the economic integration of the two otherwise non-viable, small countries.

The refrain "We want to go home" which moved the world's conscience to restore Israel, has been on the lips of almost one million Arab refugees since 1948. The successive United Nations resolutions calling for repatriation or compensation have not altered their plight one whit. In contrast to the \$32.00 per year that it was costing every American to stop communism in Europe with the Marshall Plan, the United States was displaying its idea of justice and humanitarianism to the Arab world through the UN at an annual cost of from 13 to 20 cents per American.

The major objection to the repatriation of refugees, namely, that these refugees then would constitute a fifth column, dangerous to the security of Israel, could be obviated. Some refugees could be returned to land ceded to the Arab state or to the international enclave. Those refugees whose return home was not feasible or who would prefer resettlement would be compensated by Israel.

In accordance with the Dulles pronouncements of August 22, 1955, on the Middle East, the United States would give support to an international loan that would enable Israel to pay whatever just compensation is due the displaced Arabs. Many refugees, given a choice of compensation in hand or return to a Palestine entirely different from the one they had left, might choose compensation. Only then could UN resettlement projects go forward with the cooperation of the Arab countries.

In return for the territorial concession and the settlement of the refugee problem, the Arabs should recognize the state of Israel and lift the blockades of the Suez Canal and the Bay of Aqaba. The establishment of a free port in Haifa would give Jordan its much needed Mediterranean outlet.

The state of Israel, however much of a mistake her creation may have been, is now a fact. But the kind of state Israel is to be, rather than the fact of statehood, lies at the core of the

Middle East trouble. The intent of the Balfour Declaration to establish a national home, and not a political state, was altered by the United Nations action of 1947 in recommending the establishment of a small refugee state. And the world Zionist movement in turn has drastically altered the United Nations concept of Israel as a refugee state to an expanding headquarters for all Jews.

An Arab proverb says: "The dead donkey has no fear of the hyena." This explains why Arabs do not worry about the designs of the Soviet Union, but are frightened by aggressive Zionism. What concerns them most is the Israeli desire for expansion. The second most powerful political party in Israel today, the Herut, under the leadership of former terrorist Menachem Begin, is pledged to creating an Israel three times her present size. The avowal of expansionist aims is not confined to so-called extremists. The leaders of the present ruling faction, the Mapai Party, are dedicated to the Zionist principle of the "ingathering" of Jewry into Israel by propaganda means and otherwise.

Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, writing in the official *Israeli Year Books* of 1951 and 1952, asserted that the state "has been established in only a part of the Land of Israel," that independence has been reached "in a part of our small country," and that "the State of Israel has been restored in the western part" of the "Land of Israel" only. The *Year Book* of 1955 again confirms Israeli expansionist policy in these words:

The State was established in part of the former British Mandated territory of Palestine (Eretz Israel), and it occupies most of the historical Western Palestine. The State of Israel is the fulfillment of Herzl's vision in his book *The Jewish State*. It is called the "State of Israel" because it is part of the Land of Israel and not merely a Jewish State. The creation of the new State by no means derogates from the scope of historical Eretz Israel.

Thus there seems to be justification for the Arab fear of Israeli expansion. As Jews from North Africa and elsewhere continue to emigrate, it becomes less likely that these people can be maintained within the confines of the present state.

In a cable to the American Jewish Committee, Premier Si Bekkar of French Morocco promised that Moroccan Jews would enjoy the same rights and meet the same responsibilities as Moslem citizens. Despite similar assurances from Tunisian and Algerian authorities of full and equal treatment for all Jews, the so-called "rescue" of North African Jews goes forward. (If anyone needed rescue, it would seem to have been the French.) False stories of Arab persecution in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria made American Jews unhappy enough to subscribe to a special 1956 fund. The greater the number of these Jewish émigrés into former Palestine, the more impossible becomes the eventual return of any Arab refugees to any part of Israeli territory.

Moderate Arabs will tell you that the essential ingredient for peace is an Israeli change of heart. The present day Israeli leadership must demonstrate a willingness to become a part of the Middle Eastern milieu and to cease regarding Israel as the headquarters of a new world state, seeking aggrandizement and expansion. The United Nations has the right to insist on Israel being the kind of state the international organization intended to establish; or, as an alternative, to reconsider the whole Palestine question all over again.

Were Israel satisfied to integrate into the area and to become a normal, national, de-Zionized state, she perhaps could match the accomplishment of the Lebanese Maronites. When this Christian sect, at first mistrusted by the Moslems, demonstrated that they placed the good of the area and of all the people above their own sectarian interests, much of the apprehension regarding them vanished.

Even pro-Israeli American Jews whose ardor remains undimmed must face up to the fact that they cannot maintain

an unwanted Israeli bridgehead in the Middle East. Gifts to the U.J.A. "Special Survival Fund" in essence only destroy Israel's future.

Dr. Judah Magnes, the first President of Hebrew University, and other moderates who opposed the partitioning of Palestine without Arab consent have argued: "We cannot maintain a Jewish state if the whole surrounding world be our enemies." A friendly and fruitful co-existence with the Arabs has always been and remains the prime necessity of the state of Israel. American money and American arms are no substitute for peace. Dean Acheson, certainly never unfriendly to the Zionist cause, has voiced this same sentiment. What the former Secretary of State did not say was that continued preoccupation of American Jewry with the fate of Israel, over and above the national interest, may well raise the spectre of anti-Semitism.

An armaments race will serve the interests neither of the West nor of Israel. Russia will be the only winner. With her readiness to pour obsolete weapons into the Arab world, the Soviet Union can always continue arming 42 million Arabs faster than the West can supply arms to Israel.

The real friends of Israel must see that the only hope for her survival is for her to come to terms with her Arab neighbors. Had the United Nations not halted Israel's preventive war and had Egypt and the Arab world been completely crushed, how long could 1,700,000 people have kept control over a vanquished 42 million persons (presuming there were no holy war and no intervention by 300 million Moslems)?

It would take all of the Israeli troops to quell the guerilla warfare in the Nile Delta alone. Lord Allenby in 1922 discovered that his more than 100,000 crack troops in Cairo could not control Egypt, and the British were forced to establish a protectorate. The Israelis would face the insurmountable task of overseeing an Arab world of more than 2½ million

square miles. In the long run the Israelis would succumb to the growing Arab tide supported by their Moslem co-religionists and their Asian brothers. Yesterday Israel could have swept into Cairo and Jerusalem, crushing the Arab armies before them — tomorrow a resurgent Arab world might yield a different military story. Time is on the side of the Arabs.

This hypothesis has not taken into account the possibility of Russian intervention, directly or through "volunteers." But even if the Soviet sat by and let the Israelis crush the Arabs, the Nasser government would undoubtedly soon be replaced by a pro-Communist, if not straight Communist, government. Communism, taking advantage of political discontent, anti-colonialism and the low standard of living of the people, could very swiftly sweep over this vital land mass. Whoever emerged as the initial victor of another Holy Land war, the Soviet Union would be the ultimate winner. Should the leap-frogging of the Soviets over the northern tier defense yield a red Egypt and a subservient Arab world, is it reasonable to believe that Israel, with strong internal conditioning toward communism, would be able to hold out as a free island in a red sea?

The Arabs believe that they can survive as a bloc of neutralist nations, aloof from the East-West struggle despite Russian wooing. They are apparently equally convinced they can continue to live in a state of neither war nor peace with Israel. But Israel cannot continue to live that way. The Israelis know they cannot live indefinitely under continuing tensions, beset by an Arab boycott cutting them off from commerce, relying on financial support from abroad and making a permanent armed camp of their small country.

The longer the injustice of the Palestinian refugees remains unalleviated, the more remote becomes any Middle East settlement. And the more blood that is shed, the more moderates become extremists. It is certain that no peace will ever be

achieved by means of lethal raids across borders. Israel can never bludgeon the reluctant Arab to the peace table.

The purpose of the Eisenhower policy has been apparently to regain friendship with the Arabs, but not at the expense of Israel, and to hold favor with Israel, but not at the expense of the Arabs.⁴ Such a goal might have been realizable for an administration starting from scratch on the problem. But the Republicans came into office to find the scales weighted far over on the Israeli side. Whatever moves were made to bring the U.S. position into balance were viewed by pro-Zionist forces as hostile to Israel and by the Arab states as insufficient in the light of past American partiality.

The administration has fallaciously assumed that it could settle bits and pieces and work them into a larger area of agreement. There was little ground for believing that an agreement on economic measures, such as the Johnston plan for the Jordan River, could lead to a political settlement. However praiseworthy the projects, they were not the answer to the demand of the Arabs for justice and for alleviation of the refugee plight.

United States shilly-shallying has made us more and more resemble the "poor little sheep who have lost their way." When marines were sent to the Mediterranean as a show of force, we insisted on stating that this was only a NATO exercise, thus vitiating our very purpose. To assert, as the United States did in the 1956 spring crisis, that we would move troops against whoever became the aggressor in the area was next to meaningless. For, if war comes as a result of one of the border clashes along the Gaza or Jordanian frontier, neither

⁴ See speech of Simon E. Sobeloff, Solicitor-General of the United States, at Waldorf-Astoria dinner of the American Committee for the Weizmann Institute of Science, December 3, 1954. The Solicitor-General here announced that the Secretary of State was in accord with these policy objectives.

United Nations observers nor the world public will ever be able to ascertain which side started the conflict. And when there was a clear case of aggression in October 1956, the United States did not move troops against Britain, France or Israel.

The U.S. encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact. But out of fear of antagonizing first Israel and then Egypt, we remained aloof from what in effect has become a paper tiger, and served as an ideal whipping boy for Communist propaganda. Did the U.S. ever consider the cost of bringing Iraq into such a pact and the possibility that the rest of the Arab world would then move closer to the Kremlin? Was there a reasonable expectation that Egyptian resentment could be placated by economic and military help? If so, who was responsible for our failure to arm Egypt?

It is difficult to believe that foreign-policy experts ever could have conceived a so-called "balance of power" based on equality between one state of 1,700,000 people covering 7800 square miles and possessing neither strategic position nor strategic resources, and eight⁵ countries of 42 million people, covering 2½ million square miles and possessing strategic position and resources. Yet this was the absurd approach on which we based the 1950 tripartite declaration, the prop on which the Western Powers conducted Middle East relations for more than six years. What kind of a defense against communism could be built where Israel was supposed to be at least eight times more powerful than any single Arab country, including Egypt—which alone is fifty times larger than Israel? Whose idea of impartiality was this? A glance at the map will show how useless to the U.S. Israel alone would be in another war if the Arabs were neutral or on the side of the enemy.

⁵ The eight countries of the Arab League include Libya, which joined in 1952. The Sudan became a ninth member in 1956.

By means of empty military threats, a gutless Baghdad Pact and a meaningless Tripartite Declaration, the U.S. was doing a variation on Teddy Roosevelt: we were speaking loudly and carrying a little stick.

The American ability to bring the Middle East, as well as other neutrals, to the side of the West depends less on guns and dollars than on the public image we project with our foreign and military aid. In her book *The West at Bay*, Barbara Ward, former foreign editor of *The Economist*, has described the "vast psychological factors" besetting the Asian-Africa peoples; these explain the harm the United States has done to herself by the postures she strikes. Unless the right spirit accompanies economic aid, the results are nil. The Arabs must be convinced that the United States sincerely intends to respect their basic rights before they will agree to any settlement of the Palestine case, let alone join in any effort toward the economic development of the area.

The charge that "the great crime of the West toward the East is lack of love" is especially applicable to Arab-Western relations. The Arabs have had a long history of bitter experiences, broken promises and devious dealings with Turkey, France, Britain and even the United States. This is sharply in contrast to their relations with the Russians.

Policy for the Middle East cannot be resolved by the rules of algebra, whereby multiplying two minuses yields a plus. All the Arab shortcomings, of which there are many—their inefficiency, their lack of social consciousness, their unbridled individualism, the arrogance of some of their leaders, the fanaticism of their mobs, their weakness for words and their susceptibility to flattery—do not multiply into a plus for Israel if American policy is to be based on national interest. Arab weaknesses make them ideal for Russian exploitation, but do not diminish by one iota the indispensability of their world to the West.

The present Arab social structure, which bears considerable

improving, was not a major factor in permitting the Communists to make their bold September entrance into the Middle East. Soviet flirtations with the Arab world had been previously rebuffed. Until 1951, their influence was greater in Israel than in the Arab world. It was Arab resentment and fear of Israel that permitted the Soviets to do their usual trafficking in discontent.

The realism of a Nasser may help his people avoid the Communist net. Whatever unity Nasser can muster in the Arab world constitutes the greatest asset of strength against Communist aggression, however much this unity may be decried by some as the potential destroyer of Israel.

Arab leaders fully realize that communism will mean death to the social, political and religious system of the Moslem world. Efforts to muster full moral and physical strength to remain outside the Communist orbit will, however, be tempered by Arab obstinacy against Western policy as well as by their underestimation of Communist interest and guile. People who philosophically disdain a day to day reckoning, let alone year to year, are unable to gauge with accuracy an encroaching tide in their millennial vista. Arab history tells them how the Phoenicians, Crusaders and other invaders through the centuries were in turn swallowed up. The Communist danger, the average Arab would argue, is being met by the world at large, while he, the Arab alone, is battling an Israel reinforced by her Western friends. It remains to be seen how far King Saud's visit to the United States and his declaration in Washington that the Eisenhower Doctrine is "entitled to consideration and appreciation" will awaken the Arab people to the peril of Soviet domination.

The Suez war aroused the West to the full significance, both militarily and industrially, of Middle East oil. Seventeen percent of all crude oil reserves are located in the United States and 83% abroad, with four-fifths of the latter concentrated in the countries of the Middle East.

The closing of the Canal demonstrated how the loss of Middle East oil could spell industrial chaos for Western Europe and cripple the military forces of NATO. And without resumption of the revenue from her Persian Gulf holdings, Britain faced absolute bankruptcy.

A study by the Petroleum Department of the Chase Manhattan Bank⁶ has estimated that the U.S. demand for oil in the decade ahead will probably increase 53%. The projected production of crude oil and natural gas liquids will leave an indicated deficiency in domestic supply of about 3.2 million barrels daily. Only the Middle East can provide the balancing factor in equating world supply to demand. Should the area be lost to the West, the stark tragedy will be brought home to John Doe when gasoline becomes rationed and he has to pay three dollars a gallon for the little he can obtain.

From the time of the ousting of Glubb the usually reserved British had evidenced increasing fright, anger and desperation. The art of diplomacy in which her international servants customarily excel seemed to have deserted Britain. Nasser's propaganda broadcasts nettled the British immeasurably. During the winter and spring of 1955-1956, the once proud Empire blustered with talk of fighting, if necessary, to hold the oil. Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company provided both the British and the French with the occasion for launching their military assault on Egypt. Eden, who had prevailed upon Churchill to accept the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Suez Evacuation Agreement, could see no other choice than to fight his way back. But this action did not move the world one inch closer toward ending the Middle East troubles.

The differences over Suez between Egypt and the user nations could be settled by negotiating a new "Constantinople Agreement" guaranteeing freedom of navigation and by an

⁶ "Future Growth and Financial Requirements of the World Petroleum Industry," by Joseph E. Rogue and Kenneth E. Hill (privately published, New York, 1956).

international agreement on tolls. Egypt, under neither the old nor the nationalized company, interfered with freedom of passage of any ships, save those of Israel. The right of Egypt, under her alleged state of belligerency with her neighbor in the absence of any peace treaty, to halt Israeli ships as British-controlled Egypt had blocked passage to enemy ships during both World Wars was an unsettled question of international law for the International Court of Justice.

Whatever solution is found for the Suez Canal controversy, there will be no lasting peace in the Middle East until justice becomes more than a lofty-sounding word. There will only be new Suezes and more bloodshed.

The time is therefore ripe for President Eisenhower to enunciate a constructive solution, spelling out specifics of a "peace with justice" settlement. Were the President to make a television appeal to the nation, he would be surprised at the support he would receive from Jew and Christian alike. If Israeli or Zionist leaders balked at the terms of the settlement, the holding up of funds going to Israel for twenty-four hours would bring a quick change of heart.

The West, unfortunately, holds no similar weapon over the head of the Arabs. History has perhaps already recorded that the Eden Guild Hall proposals, enthusiastically received in Arab quarters, were the last chance for Middle East peace.

Will the Arabs, once they have received territorial concessions, keep asking for more and more? It is true that no one can say with certainty whether any settlement of the Palestine case, short of the destruction of Israel, would be satisfactory to the Arabs, but President Nasser has indicated that he still wishes to direct his efforts in other directions and is concerned about Egypt's growing reliance on the Soviet Union. The major problem facing his country is to increase those limited arable areas bordering the Nile and win the race against the rise in population. Even a new Aswan Dam will not take care of the estimated population increase of 14 million by 1975.

A solution to this enigma is more vital to Nasser than Suez Canal tolls.

Whether the loss of China could have been prevented by a wiser American policy is a highly debatable question—but the same cannot be said if the Middle East is lost. By offering no constructive alternative to a continuation of the present “no peace and no war” status, the West makes possible the destruction of both adversaries and the loss of the area. The United Nations has no right to sanction an armistice for eight years. The longer the U.S. attempts to do nothing, the more Arab non-recognition of Israel becomes permanent.

While the cold war in Europe could continue almost indefinitely, in the Middle East the combination of volatile people and an explosive substance called oil means certain combustion. And the Russians are playing the game with that in mind. Having worked one foot inside the Arab door, the Soviets maneuver to bring the U.S. squarely to the side of Israel. It is obviously their clear intention never to wage World War III until they can take the Middle East.

It is one minute to midnight in the Middle East, and the seconds are ticking off for the West. Teeming millions, strategic air bases, oil, and the balance of power between the Communist and free worlds are all at stake. If a peace settlement is not speedily realized, the Iron Curtain will descend on still another large land mass. Israel will be wiped out, the Arab world enslaved, and the United States forced to defend herself against a rocket onslaught launched from Russian-secured North African bases. American mothers would once more—and this time so unnecessarily—yield their sons to battle.

The blame for such a catastrophe would rest on the “liberals” and the do-gooders, on large sections of the press and television, the columnists and commentators, on Christians and Jews alike, who, out of crass ignorance, have inveighed against the Arabs and provided intransigent support of Israel

instead of calling for a compromise based on justice for all.

But Christian guilt feeling for the millennial treatment of Jews has molded inexorable support for Israel, which knows no compromise. In reporting from Amman, Jordan, on C.B.S. radio early in 1956, Howard K. Smith commented:

Our conscience was awakened by Hitler's treatment of the Jews. We felt clearly the need to see the creation of a home that persecuted Jews might go to. The fact we overlooked is—we chose someone else's home to give. The torturers of the Jews were Westerners, the Germans. Anti-Semitism exists in America and Britain, as in many western countries, but never in the Arab countries. The Arabs are Semites, too. So to pay our debt of conscience, we let the Arabs, who have done no harm, foot the bill.

American feelings toward the Middle East have been determined, not by the respective merits of the Israeli and Arab cases, but by Christian-Jewish relations. And it was losing the Middle East for the United States.

XVII

1958 Misadventure: The Brink Again

[The events of late 1957 and 1958, subsequent to the publication of the first edition of this book, have justified the fears and borne out the predictions of these pages. No changes have been necessary in the material presented, but this new chapter has been added as an epilogue to bring the volume right up to the moment.]

EGYPT has confounded the experts in her administration of the Suez Canal since the nationalization of the Anglo-French Company in 1956. The outside world was betting 1000 to 1 that the Egyptians never could run the Canal themselves. How could Arabs, generally mechanically inept, master the tricky currents and the winds of the Canal channels? Where would they get the replacements to pilot the ships?

The management of the old Company had responded to the nationalization by calling on the pilots to quit, making them fabulously attractive financial offers to paralyze the operations of the Canal. Colonel Mahmoud Younis, who over-

night had been placed in charge of the Canal, was confronted with the drastic reduction in pilots, from 185 to 26.

Colonel Younis, a graduate of the Army Staff College for Administration, had heretofore no experience with canals beyond a vast amount of studying and reading. But he upset the dopesters, as much as Harry Truman had in 1948, by keeping the Canal running.

With the removal of the last obstacle, the frigate "Abukir," the Canal was reopened to traffic in late March and free navigability, the alleged objective of the Anglo-French military intervention in October 1956, has continued without interruption in the face of heightened political tensions throughout the area.

In fact, since nationalization, the Canal has been run with greater efficiency and fewer accidents than ever in its history. In November 1955, an average of 40.3 ships traversed the waterway daily. As of May 1958 the 220 pilots of 16 nationalities comprising the present staff are averaging 46.8 ships. On March 10th a record number of 84 ships were handled in one day—32 ships transiting the Canal from north to south and 52 ships in the other direction.

Today the ravages of the Anglo-French landings in the heart of Port Said are nowhere in evidence. Bright, new housing stands on the many city blocks which were levelled to the ground in the invasion. This Suez story proves once more that given able, trained and ambitious administrators, the Arabs, like other people, can produce satisfactory results.

Colonel Younis is not satisfied with what he has already accomplished. He is working on a ten year, 200 million dollar project, to double the capacity so as to accommodate ships of 55,000 to 60,000 tons. This will require both widening and deepening the Canal, the 18 million dollar contract for the first portion of this work having been awarded to three American companies. In July 1958, the final agreement was signed

by the new Suez Canal Authority and representatives of the old company whereby the sum of 28.3 million pounds would be paid by January 1964 to the former shareholders who would retain all the disputed external assets of the company.

The calm which has settled over Suez has not been duplicated elsewhere in the area. In as much as only symptoms, and not the basic cause, had been dealt with, trouble could not help breaking out.

The watchful Arab world could not fail to note the flamboyant manner in which political leaders of both parties had made it all too clear that they would never have permitted President Eisenhower to invoke economic sanctions, however stubbornly the Israelis might have continued to resist the U.N. mandate to evacuate the Gaza strip and the Straits of Tiran. This failure to maintain an air of impartiality in the Arab-Israel struggle negated the good will built up by Washington's hospitable reception to King Saud.

In the face of the Arab mistrust of the United States, Saud could do little to help the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Bermuda Conference made the Eisenhower Doctrine even less palatable to neutralist minded Arabs. In order to bind the wounds stemming from American action in the Suez War, President Eisenhower informed Prime Minister Macmillan, who had succeeded the ailing Eden in January, that the U.S. would join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact. This bow to the British was viewed as a new western plan to bring about the isolation of Egypt and Syria from the rest of the Arab world.

The Arab States engaged in bitter tug of war between those who wished to accept the offer of Western generosity and those who viewed the Doctrine as the latest example of western imperialism in the area. The Nuri regime in Iraq, of course, welcomed the new Washington proposal. In Lebanon, Prime Minister Sami Solh and Foreign Minister Charles Malik won a decisive vote of support for the Doctrine, thus earning ten million dollars in economic aid. By coincidence, the U.S.S. *For-*

restal showed up in the harbor of Beirut as the Lebanese Parliament was making its decision.

Former Congressman James Richards, Presidential envoy on a sales trip scattering U.S. largesse to willing takers, found King Hussein in a receptive mood, although the young Jordanian King knew he risked the open displeasure of Egypt and Syria. But Hussein's financial crisis had been brought to a head by the failure to these two countries to implement the so-called Arab Solidarity Pact. Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia had pledged young Hussein economic help to the extent of 12,500,000 pounds as a replacement for the British subsidy which the Jordan Legion had been receiving until the abrogation of the treaty with Britain.

Jordan's huge Palestinian refugee population was antagonistic to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The coalition government of Prime Minister Suleiman Nabulsi, in office since October, went so far as to vote to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The King opposed this step and, after considerable political jockeying, a new cabinet was formed by former foreign minister, Hussein Khalidi who retained Nabulsi as his foreign minister. The other ministers, mostly moderates, represented various shades of opinion. But this Jordanian government did not last long.

Rioting broke out in the streets of Amman, Jerusalem and elsewhere. Two successive chiefs of staff of the Army, first General Ali Abu Nuwar and then General Ali Hiyari, were accused of plotting against the King, were fired and hurriedly left Jordan. Both military leaders, together with certain ardent nationalist leaders, took refuge in Damascus and joined in the propaganda war against King Hussein. Cairo Radio and Radio Damascus now called for the overthrow of the King. Hussein struck back by charging a Communist plot to overthrow him. With the moral support of King Saud, Hussein moved swiftly following a meeting with King Faisal, his Hashimite cousin.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was invoked, and American as-

sistance called for, as more rioting took place. Washington responded with a strong declaration that the U.S. regarded the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital to American interests. What was of greater importance, the 60,000 ton super carrier, the *Forrestal*, anchored at Cannes, was ordered to proceed to the Eastern Mediterranean with her escorting ships. The Sixth Fleet dropped anchor off Beirut.

Encouraged by the U.S. offer of 10 million dollars in Eisenhower Doctrine aid, Hussein flew to Ryadh to win further support from King Saud. Martial law was imposed in Jordan, and the King ruled by a combination of his own military power and the United States show of force. Left-wing leaders were subjected to a drastic purge, some were killed, many were jailed and others sought refuge in Syria. The month-long crisis ended with the ultra conservative cabinet of Samir Rifai maintaining control over the riotous mobs and the displeased refugees.

The personal courage of the King, demonstrated at the outset of the disturbances in his dramatic appearance during the midnight clash at Zerqa, and the loyalty of the Bedouin tribesmen were important factors in beating off the opposition of Nationalists and Communists and keeping the throne. The Hashimite-Wahabite rapprochement had also helped no little bit at a critical moment when both Israel and Jordan's Arab neighbors were readying themselves to move in for their share of the dismemberment, should the fall of the monarchy become imminent.

In Egypt, American popularity, which had reached its peak at the time of the forthright halting of the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression, had begun to plummet quickly. The denial of American wheat, the discontinuance of CARE packages, the withholding of medical supplies—all took place at a time when Egypt was trying to recover from the ravages of the Suez invasion and was in desperate need of these essentials. Apparently, the United States, in aping the British, had divided the Arabs into those who were good and those who were bad, the

evaluation depending on whether they would embrace the Eisenhower Doctrine and take on the anti-communist crusade of the West. The continued exodus of Jews from Egypt furnished necessary propaganda which helped draw a picture of Nasser as the "Hitler of the Nile," thus strengthening the categorization of Arabs.

It was simple for the United States and Britain to squeeze Nasser, whose economy cried out for oil, wheat, spare parts and foreign exchange. (The Egyptian oil fields had been dismantled by the Israelis.) Doubtlessly, the Bermuda plan envisioned pressure on the Egyptian leader until economic collapse ensued or internal revolt broke Nasser's hold on the country. 75 to 80% of the Egyptians were already living at the barest subsistence level. The ever watchful Soviet Union, however, further ingratiated herself with the Arab masses by supplying oil and wheat and by buying cotton.

The June elections in Lebanon, provided a new test for the Eisenhower Doctrine. Both the Government and the Opposition, closely aligned to the nationalist-Egyptian-Syrian point of view, spent an unprecedented three million dollars plus. The price of votes, ranging between \$5.00 and \$10.00 each, was freely quoted in the newspapers. In an election characterized by widespread violence, more than sixty persons were killed. One of the opposition leaders, former Prime Minister Saeb Salaam, was badly hurt in the pre-election rioting. Martial law had to be imposed.

Amidst charges and countercharges of fraud, threats and other intimidation, the Government was returned to power. While leading opposition candidates such as Salaam and another former Prime Minister Abdullah Yaffi were defeated, it was hardly a clean-cut victory that the pro-West forces had won.

Egypt, too, held elections in the late spring. Thirteen hundred candidates, carefully culled by the Government from a field twice as large, contested for three hundred and fifty seats

in the Assembly. While calm pervaded in Egypt, Syria became the new battleground for the Soviet Union and the United States.

Here is the heartland of Arab Nationalism where the people have long thought of themselves as Arabs first and Syrians second. It was no mere coincidence, but a natural historical development, that a maximum of anti-West and pro-Soviet sentiment should prevail in this country. Western colonialism provided the worst administration in Syria, where the French continuously played one minority group against the other in order to maintain their own unpopular rule.

The 1925 ruthless suppression of the Jebel Druze in Damascus and its suburbs was matched in the Spring of 1945 by the shelling of the beautiful capital by French forces. Syrian hatred towards the French soon became directed against their allies, first the British, and then against the Americans, who at the end of World War I had been prime popular favorites. Allegations of American interference in Jordan had given impetus to the sentiment against the United States which had been growing since the Israeli partition of 1947. As the ties between Syria and Egypt grew, the hatred of both seemed to fatten on the other's grievances against the United States.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's popularity, which had been increasing since the arms deals with satellite countries of 1955 and 1956, vaulted to new heights. The anti-French National Bloc and the Socialist-Baath Party controlled the government. The American blockade of Egypt tended to push Syria further into reliance on the Soviet camp. A more conservative, military-civilian element, alleged to be pro-United States, lost out in a battle against a combine which included nationalists, left-wing opportunists and conservative businessmen who preferred the Soviet type of economic help without strings to the American variety of assistance.

Pushed by the ambitious Defense Minister Khaled Azm, Syria accepted a new Soviet economic aid program amounting

to some 300 million dollars for goods, services and credit, one third of which was to be repaid over the next ten years. The agreement which Azm brought back from Moscow in August (1957) contained most liberal terms which were further liberalized in December by a provision that money would not have to be repaid until the projects financed were completed.

While Azm, himself one of the wealthiest men in the country, belittled the dangers from increased Soviet ties, other nationalist Syrian leaders could not view with equal equanimity the growing ascendancy of left-wing army leaders and the increasing influence of Deputy Khaled Baghdash, the lone Communist member in an Arab Parliament.

The Middle East cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union now entered a new stage. The increasing amount of Soviet arms reaching Syria aroused the fear in Washington that the Syrians might be pushed into an act of aggression. Under-Secretary of State Loy Henderson was rushed to the Middle East on a fact-finding mission on which the diplomat studiously avoided Syria and Egypt. He visited only the "good" Arab States which surrounded "bad" Syria. Henderson's return to Washington in early September set off what in some quarters was viewed as a further invocation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Defensive weapons were airlifted to Jordan by American planes and were received in Amman with great ceremonial display. The State Department announced that they also were stepping up the delivery of previously promised arms to Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey.

As varied groups struggled for topdog position on the political scene within Syria, tension mounted along the Syrian-Turkish frontier. The five hundred mile common border became the scene of alleged violations from both sides. Turkey permitted NATO forces to hold maneuvers within sight of the Syrian frontier. The Soviet Union charged that United States units were bolstering the Turkish border and were posed to move against Syria. The American press played up in bold

headlines the deployment of Egyptian troops in northern Syria near the Turkish border. Token Egyptian naval and air units, under the joint Syrian-Egyptian military command, appeared on Syrian territory.

A war of words had been joined by the Khrushchev allegation that Henderson had been sent to incite Jordan and Iraq against Syria. The U.S. sternly warned that she was prepared to defend Turkey in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union. Syria protested Turkish troop concentrations and claimed that reactionary Syrian elements in Ankara were forming a government in exile to move against Damascus.

And just to add confusion to the moves and countermoves, a Jordanian announcement clearly remonstrated that Jordan had any intention of ever using her American arms against any "fellow Arab State." In the same vein, President Chamoun in Lebanon expressed the fear that Israel would take advantage of the Middle East squabbling to attack Syria. In fact, the Arab-Israeli conflict was relatively dormant, save for intermittent border flare-ups and an incident on Mt. Scopus over the conveying of 100 gallons of gasoline. The presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza had kept the Israeli-Egyptian frontier quiet.

In November Syria carried her complaint against Turkey to the UN General Assembly, then meeting in New York. An offer by King Saud to mediate the differences was accepted by Turkey but coldly rejected by the Syrians who continued to demand that a UN Commission of Inquiry be sent to Syria and Turkey. Following a three day adjournment in the debate, Syria abruptly dropped the case which she had been vehemently pressing.

If Syrian nationalists needed to be rescued from the alliance in which they had entered with left-wingers and Communists, outside help was now at hand. The battle for Syria was won with the February 1st announcement of the complete unification of Syria and Egypt. This step, long in the making, hastened

by the customs and economic union between the two states in September, was followed up by the November call for a federal union from both Houses of Parliament in Syria and the Assembly in Egypt. The only surprise was in the form that the union took: the consolidation of Syria into the Egyptian framework and the appearance of a new entity, the United Arab Republic. History has rarely recorded a parallel voluntary yielding of full sovereignty.

The rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad, long exploited by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to advance their own respective ends in the area, was reaching a climax.

No sooner had the United Arab Republic (UAR) been pronounced (and the action was subsequently confirmed by a plebiscite in both countries) than that Kings Hussein of Jordan and Faisal of Iraq proclaimed on February 14th a federation of their kingdoms to be known as the Arab Union. Both the Cairo-headed union and their Hashimite counterpart invited other of their fellow Arab States to join them. While these steps towards unity were unanimously hailed with enthusiasm throughout the Arab world as advancing the Arab dream of becoming one nation, only the Kingdom of Yemen took substantive action.

In early March, Cairo triumphantly announced the formation of a very loose confederation to be known as the United Arab States, and to include the newly created United Arab Republic, the Kingdom of Yemen and "those Arab States which will agree to join this Union."

Whereas the formation of the UAR involved the complete surrender of Syrian sovereignty (and technically, at least, of Egyptian sovereignty as well), the Jordanian-Iraqi merger retained the integral entity and sovereignty of both member states. Both monarchs remained on their thrones, although Hussein was made subordinate to his cousin Faisal who was designated as the President of the Union. This loss of prestige to Hussein was to be more than compensated by the support

his impoverished country could receive from the oil resources and the added military protection of his cousin.

Full jurisdiction over all matters of foreign policy, as well as control of a united Jordanian and Iraqi army, was delegated to the Union Government. This Hashimite union was expected to look to the U.S. and the West for its chief support, while the rival UAR was expected to find strong championing in Moscow.

Despite the optimistic hopes and wishful thinking of Baghdad, it was soon apparent that Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Kuwait would maintain a neutral aloofness from both of the rival unions. The fabulously oil rich ruler of Kuwait, while maintaining excellent personal relations with King Faisal, was not unaware both of the long extant Iraqi claim to certain portions of his sheikdom and of the strong pro-Nasser sentiment particularly amongst the Palestinians in whose hands rested a good share of governmental administrative responsibility. Then, too, there was the presence of many Egyptian teachers, who played an important part in the intellectual life of this rapidly growing country.

The relations between Cairo and Ryadh had been declining since King Saud had both supplied practical help to Hussein with a seven million dollar subsidy and lent strong moral support to the anti-Communist sovereign in the April crisis. But any hope that the Saudis might join their old erstwhile Hashimite rivals in a pro-Western Arab federation soon proved groundless.

An announcement from Cairo added new fire to the Middle East volcano already seething with contradictory currents of unity and internecine plots, with hatred of imperialism and awareness of Soviet ambitions. King Saud was accused of financing a plot to sabotage the Syrian-Egyptian merger and to kill President Nasser himself. No more fantastic plot was ever authored by A. Conan Doyle or E. Phillips Oppenheim than the alleged Saudi offer of two million pounds sterling to Syrian

Army leader, Col. Abdel Hamid Serraj. Photographs of the three checks, payable to bearer, were made public in Cairo, and the outline of a clumsy, unbelievable plot was unfolded. Nasser proudly told his people that the bribery money was being added to the hard-put United Arab Republic treasury.

King Saud, without dignifying the charge by a denial, appointed a Commission of Notables to investigate the Nasser conspiratorial charge. Nothing was further heard from this Commission. The Syrian father of one of King Saud's wives was subsequently tried in Damascus for implication in the plot and was sentenced to death in absentia. And within Saudi Arabia, these differences with Cairo increased the problems of the palace, which already faced the necessity of drastic economy, due to the marked inflation and the skidding value of the riyal. The need of unloading some of the administrative burden from the shoulders of the King was clear.

A series of meetings attended by many of the Royal Princes, brothers and uncles of the King, culminated in a proclamation, investing all internal, foreign and financial powers in the hands of Crown Prince Feisal. This transfer of power to the King's eldest brother made him in fact, as well as in name, Prime Minister, a post he had occupied since Saud came to power in 1953.

A new cabinet system with ministerial responsibility to the Prime Minister, who in turn was responsible to the King, was established—a marked departure from the personal authoritarian rule under which the monarchy had been governed both by Ibn Saud and his successor son.

The outside world was all too eager to read added significance into this latest Saudi move because of the known Arab nationalist sympathies of Prince Faisal. The American press, with its tendency to oversimplify the most complex situation by means of a handy label, dogmatically viewed the new set up as “anti-West,” “anti-Israel,” and “pro-Nasser.” The State Department still considered the only way an Arab country

could be "pro-West" was to be "anti-Nasser." Iraq duly qualified.

Nuri Said, who at the time of the Suez Canal Company nationalization is said to have advised Eden: "Hit Nasser hard and hit him now," was once again Prime Minister, the fourteenth time over a thirty-odd-year span. Since the Suez War, the country had been under intermittent martial law, political parties had been banned, a considerable number of opposition leaders jailed, the right of petition suspended and only certain newspapers permitted to operate. Army officers who disagreed with the Nuri policy were pensioned off; Iraqis, who had petitioned for a break in diplomatic relations with a Britain which was invading Egypt, still languored in prison. Like the rest of the Middle East, Iraq was seething with tension, and the Arab nationalist virus was being spread by means of an underground movement.

It was on little Lebanon, however, that the eyes of the world were riveted in the late Spring of 1958. The Government of Prime Minister Sami Solh, which had come into power under a cloud of corruption and popular mistrust, had maintained itself in office despite increasing opposition and mounting violence. Even as U.S. aid, the fruit of the speedy endorsement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, was flowing into the country, the Syrian-Lebanese border was aflame with tribal-guerrilla warfare.

The "I am more American than the Americans" policy of the Government had deeply divided the country. The union of Egypt and Syria fired the enthusiasm of Lebanese Arab nationalists; street demonstrations in Tripoli paraded hundreds of Nasser pictures. Pressures from within and without were being exerted, if not to push Lebanon into the merger, at least to bring her foreign policy more in line with that of the positive neutralism of the United Arab Republic. The fire of factional strife was fed by the determination of President Chamoun to leave the door open to amending the Lebanese Con-

stitution so that he might serve an additional six year term.

While the split did not follow precise religious lines—many Maronites including Patriarch Paul Meouchi were out of sympathy with the Government position and certain Muslims were supporting the Government's pro-Western attitude—the aged struggle between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon had been revived. This country of 1½ million people had been long splintered into a bewildering number of religious sects, around which the only existing political parties were built.

Under a system of "confessionalism," an unwritten agreement awarded the Presidency of the Republic to a Christian (invariably a Maronite), the Prime Ministry to a Moslem (usually a Sunni) and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Moslem (customarily a Shiite).

This delicate balance had been maintained since the establishment of the Lebanese Republic in 1946, although the Christians no longer constituted a majority. With Christians emigrating and Moslems multiplying rapidly, the religious composition of the country had been changing. But no new census had been taken in years, and this was an added grievance to the intensely nationalist-minded Moslems. It was the Patriarch's own awareness of the possible danger to the Christian community in tampering with the Constitution that caused him to warn publicly: "The Maronites are a drop in the ocean of Moslems; and they must and should continue to live in peace and harmony with them."

In early May, the assassination of the editor of the left-wing newspaper, *Al Telegraph*, set off the sparks of civil war. Out of sympathy to their deceased compatriot, the entire press went out on a three day strike.

Paradoxically, to preserve their traditional tolerance, the volatile and excitable Lebanese have developed a traditional violence. The USIS building in Tripoli was burned. Bombs, thrown from a speeding car in the heart of the downtown area, led to a declaration of martial law. Opposition leaders on May

10th called for a general strike, which was to continue through September 3rd. For nearly four months terror, civil war and insurrection reigned throughout tiny Lebanon's 4000 square miles.

The violent Muslim opposition to a second term for Chamoun had spread. While Prime Minister Solh hinted that the President would now be willing to give up his office at the end of his term on September 23rd and not seek any constitutional change, the rebels now were not satisfied with anything short of the immediate resignation of the President. Bombings in the heart of Beirut became commonplace, and street clashes which broke out here and in Tripoli spread to other cities. Rebel bands controlled large sections of the 150 mile Syrian border, and their strength was estimated at between five and ten thousand.

The rebellion was headed by an informal coalition made up of former Prime Ministers Salaam, Yaffi and Rashid Karami, and Kamal Jumblatt, the chieftain of the fierce Druze tribes which controlled the Syrian-Lebanese frontier. This was a strange operetta war. Salaam, operating from the Basta, the Muslim quarter, had his headquarters right in the center of Beirut. Unmolested, he held press conferences with newsmen who received passes from the Government to go back and forth into rebel-held territory.

Although a continuous war of words flowed from Government offices, the military commander of the Government forces, General Fuad Chehab, refused to send the army into a head-on assault against fellow Arabs. The General feared that in such a battle he could not command the loyalty of all of his soldiers. Chehab himself was being beseeched by Government and Opposition leaders alike to accept the successorship to President Chamoun.

From the outset of the rebellion, it was the position of the Lebanese Government that the rebellion had been inspired by and motivated by outside forces. Foreign Minister Malik, in

a conference with the foreign press three days after the revolt began, charged Syrian armed forces with blowing up the custom house across the border and Gaza irregulars with attempting to assassinate the President and Prime Minister.

Formal charges against UAR intervention were first heard by the Arab League at a special emergency session held at Benghazi in Libya. When the representatives of the Arab States failed to agree on a resolution satisfactory both to the UAR and to complainant Lebanon, the Chamoun Government embodied the accusations against the Nasser regime in a call for a meeting of the Security Council.

The United States through UN Representative Lodge supported the Lebanese contention of massive intervention on the part of the UAR. Following acrimonious debate, during which Iraq's representative Dr. Jamali delivered the most vitriolic public attack ever made against Nasser, the Security Council agreed to dispatch a 100 man observation team to Lebanon. This United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was chairmaned by Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador.

Dag Hammarskjold rushed to the Middle East on another of his now familiar trouble-shooting journeys and met with President Chamoun, President Nasser and other leaders. Neither the Hammarskjold report, his press statement nor the first formal report to the Security Council of the Observation Group in Lebanon (admittedly inconclusive and tentative) substantiated the Lebanese contention of massive intervention on the part of the United Arab Republic. This report of the Observation Group said in part: "It has not been possible to establish from where rebel arms were acquired. Nor was it possible to establish if any of the armed men observed had infiltrated from outside; there is little doubt however, that the vast majority of rebels was in any case composed of Lebanese."

This preliminary victory for the UAR posed a new dilemma for Anglo-American policy makers. The United States had in-

licated that armed intervention in Lebanon was, if not imminent, certainly a very definite possibility. At a press conference Mr. Dulles had stated, "If Lebanon requested military aid to deal with the insurrection, we feel we would be inclined to go along with that." This was shortly after the arrival of the Observation Group in Lebanon.

The British spokesmen at the United Nations made light of UNOGIL's first limited report, still insisting that Lebanon was fully justified in her charge. On the other hand, the U.S. now seemed to have forsaken the Dulles threat of possible armed intervention and adopted the new tack "that the presence in Lebanon of foreign troops, however justifiable, is not as good a solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution for themselves." This was in accord with the Hammarskjold plea: "Only Lebanon can save Lebanon."

While the United States' Sixth Fleet, reinforced by Marine contingents, were on an alert basis in the Eastern Mediterranean and British reinforcements had been sent to Cyprus, it was at this time very doubtful that the United States would resort to military measures when the Secretary-General of the United Nations was insisting that "the phrase 'massive infiltration' is not warranted at present." President Chamoun's request for military intervention had met a mixed reaction in the State Department. The Pentagon strongly believed that military intervention would only be justified in the event of Communist aggression of which there was none in sight.

Although there was no question that Radio Cairo was engaging in an all-out propaganda barrage against the Chamoun Government and that the Voice of the Arabs was calling daily for the Lebanese people to overthrow the regime, the Secretary-General and the Observation Group had failed to find proof that this or other UAR activity was the primary cause, rather than merely a contributory factor, behind the revolt. It was becoming increasingly obvious that aged religious, social, political and tribal antagonisms—all of which had been nurtured

under the West's "divide and rule" policy since the end of World War I—lie at the core of the Lebanese Civil War.

Likewise militating against Western armed intervention in the Middle East was the almost unanimous opinion of British newspapers regardless of political stripe. Apparently the lessons of Suez had hit home. Reports to British readers from the Middle East carried the firm conviction that this internecine strife might well be settled internally and that the arrival of British parachutists and American marines, as one influential observer wrote in late June, "would deepen and perpetuate the present business and lead to another outbreak of anti-western fanaticism far beyond Lebanon."

The failure of the Lebanese Army to take some wholesome action against the rebels was often cited as the best possible reason for Britain not sending in military forces. The British were seriously considering a plan for UN troops to seal off the Lebanese borders from any Syrian interference.

While Anglo-American hesitancy was manifesting itself, President Nasser, accompanied by his wife and children, was paying a lengthy unofficial visit to Marshall Tito in Yugoslavia and was winding up his stay with talks on the island of Brioni. The Nasser visit to neutralist Yugoslavia took on greater significance in the face of the stepped-up Soviet war against Tito, which came on the heels of Nasser's own hospitable reception in the Soviet Union.

The arrival of Greece's Foreign Minister Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza at the Yugoslav resort added stature to the Nasser-Tito meeting. The talks which ensued solidified the outlook of the three countries on the question of Cyprus as well as on Middle East problems. It also added further strain to the NATO alliance of which Greece was a member. Both Tito and Nasser pledged further support to the Cypriot movement against the Turks and the British. The Nasser visit was abruptly brought to an end with the announcement of the revolt in Iraq and the overthrow of the pro-western monarchy.

The first reports of the Iraqi revolution were carried to a stunned world by Radio Baghdad. The announcement merely stated that the monarchy had been abolished and that the Government had been overthrown. "This is the Republic of Iraq"; the Radio said, "this is your day of victory. This is your day of nationalism. Rejoice and be glad. Get into the streets and see the body of the tyrant, who is the enemy of God and of the people, being spat on and being kicked by the people." The broadcast reference was to Crown Prince Abdul Illah whose lifeless body was being carried through the streets of Baghdad and was being torn to pieces by the hungry mob.

It was only later that the full details of the July 14 revolt were uncovered. Certain divisions of the Iraqi army had been ordered to Amman by Nuri to help put down a reported revolt against King Hussein. On early Monday morning under the leadership of its officers, these Iraqi troops had changed direction and had marched instead on Baghdad. In accordance with the details of a well-worked out and long-readied plan, the military had seized control of the capital.

The revolutionary forces met with the barest resistance. The royal family, including young King Faisal, his uncle Crown Prince Abdul Illah and the latter's mother, sister and nieces, were all ordered out of the palace into the garden compound. There is then some conflict in the story as to what actually happened. But by seven in the morning all was over, and the revolution was an accomplished fact. The King and the Crown Prince were dead, some say due to the attempted resistance of Abdul Illah. The reign in Iraq of the Hashimite family, which had been accomplished by the British, had ended. A new chapter of history on the Tigris and Euphrates was about to begin.

The American Embassy had been protected, but the British Embassy had been sacked and partly burned. Nuri Said, the hated Prime Minister, somehow at first had escaped arrest and for 48 hours was at large. But then in trying to flee the city,

he was discovered in the street disguised as a woman and shot down in a gun-battle. The body of Nuri, like that of Abdul Illah, was given to frenzied fanatics thirsting for a piece of his hated flash.

The outside world at first was loath to believe that a republican regime, under the leadership of Brigadier General Abdul Karim Kassem at the head of a thirteen man cabinet, could have been successfully established in Baghdad. (The powers of the President of the proclaimed Republic were being exercised for the time being by a Sovereignty Council, chairmaned by the former Iraqi Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Lt. General Najab Rabi'i.) Initial press stories, which followed the report to the coup, indicated tremendous unrest, street uprisings in Baghdad and a liberation army en route from Amman led by Hussein, who now had assumed the head of the Arab Union.

The unrest proved to be rumor, and no liberation Army marched on Baghdad. Within 48 hours after the revolt, stores on al-Rashid street in the heart of Baghdad were open, order was restored and more than 100,000 people, according to the *New York Times* correspondent, cheered General Kassem, the new Premier, as he drove to the Ministry of Defense. (This writer was called by an editor of *Time* magazine who doubted the accuracy of this account. He would not believe that such enthusiasm could possibly have greeted the new "ruthless regime.")

The U.S. reaction to the overthrow of the monarchy was not long in coming. The *New York Times* headline of July 15th read: "PRESIDENT BIDS UN ACT TODAY ON MIDEAST AFTER PRO-NASSER COUP OUSTS IRAQ'S KING; U.S. MAY INTERVENE; BRITAIN ALERTS TROOPS." The Pentagon indicated that a number of military transport planes had been dispatched to an "undisclosed European Airbase." It was rumored that Dr. Malik, who had never returned to his country after the last Security Council meeting, had personally appealed to the United States, France and

Britain for troops to seal off Lebanon's frontiers with Syria.

Reporters who had been keeping an all-night vigil in front of the White House were finally given the word by Press Secretary Haggerty: The United States, in response to a call for help from President Chamoun, had landed forces in Lebanon. Khalde beach, south of the city of Beirut, was crowded that day and the following with the landing barges of American marines. The initial force of 5000 was eventually augmented by paratroop units of the Sixth Fleet and army groups, bringing the total of the American force close to 15,000.

American landings were without mishap, drawing no other opposition from the Lebanese than bristling verbiage from rebel leaders. There was however a most sharp negative reaction amongst certain Western nations in Europe, particularly Italy and Germany, and criticism reverberated throughout the entire neutral world. Morocco, Tunisia, Burma, India, Indonesia and Japan, voiced a fundamental disapproval of the U.S. military intervention, which attitude was not softened by the subsequent British intervention in Jordan 48 hours later. Prime Minister Macmillan explained in the House of Commons that the British action had been taken at the urgent request of King Hussein who expected a new revolt to break out that day. Israel, concerned lest Hussein be forced off his throne, gave the British special permission to fly over Israel. Navy jet fighters of the Sixth Fleet protected the British landings, as an American airlift carried vital oil to Jordan from the island of Bahrein.

As the threat of war increased, the United States rushed troops from Germany to reinforce the powerful self contained nuclear air striking force at the airbase at Adana in Turkey, some 500 miles south of Russia. The British, on their part, hurried paratroops to Libya. The Soviet Union reiterated its warning to the United States to get out. "Withdraw at once, we can't stand by," said the Reds. It was the drastic tone of the Soviet's Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko that undoubt-

edly spurred the Nasser flight from somewhere in the Adriatic to Moscow.

Cheered by a cable from the new Iraqi Republic announcing that state's long-withheld recognition of the United Arab Republic, Nasser had been homeward bound on his yacht when he suddenly changed direction and flew to Russia for a secret meeting with Khrushchev. Nasser allegedly cautioned the Soviet leader against sending volunteers to the Middle East, an act in his opinion calculated to turn the area into the battleground of World War III. (It was shortly thereafter, that a delegation from the new Iraqi Republican regime, headed by Vice Premier Colonel Abdul Salam Aref and President Nasser met in the Syrian capital of Damascus and signed a mutual non-aggression pact. But at the same time as this step was being taken, other Iraqi sources indicated the desire of the new regime to avoid joining the United Arab Republic.)

In the United States American public opinion bitterly anti-Nasser, pro-Israel and pro-Chamoun rallied to the support of the President. Speaker Sam Rayburn made it clear to Democrats in Congress that he would permit no partisan attacks on the President at a time when American troops were ashore foreign lands. Critical Republican attitude was expressed in the words of Kentucky's Senator John Sherman Cooper: "However bad this action may have been, it has taken place. We must support the President and our troops to the very limit of our capabilities."

The grounds on which American action was defended, widely varied. The President declared his aim was "to protect American lives and by their presence to encourage the Lebanese Government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity . . . Lebanon is a small peace loving state with which the United States traditionally has had most friendly relations."

The Scripps-Howard chain supported the President's move because it was alleged he had acted "to save United States prestige in the Middle East." If we let down our friends Hus-

sein and Chamoun, this argument ran, nobody again would ever trust us. Elsewhere, the troop landing was condoned because President Chamoun had but presented the blank check for help to which the United States previously had committed itself. No doubt that the military intervention was made more palatable to American public opinion by the exaggerated stories of violence reported from Iraq, and by the unfortunate incident at the new Hotel Baghdad in which three American civilians were murdered by the mob during the early hours of the revolution.

The "Get Nasser" press had painted a gory picture of a Nasser-inspired revolt and had depicted in vivid colors endless acts of violence. The Security Council, which had been called into emergency session at the request of the United States upon receipt of the news of the coup, had barely recovered from news of the American landing, than that Ambassador Lodge dramatically announced that Dr. Jamali, the former Iraqi Foreign Minister, "our esteemed and popular colleague," had been slain. The same papers, which had treated Jamali with scant courtesy whenever he bitterly opposed Israel at the United Nations, now ran long and laudatory articles stressing his strong pro-Western ties. The *Herald Tribune* of Wednesday, July 16th, carried a story: "Stop this aggression—a free Iraqi speaks from the grave." This was a reprint of the June blistering anti-Nasser speech to the Security Council by the reputedly slain Jamali.

The announcement from Baghdad that Jamali was alive and healthy, although awaiting trial for treason in an Iraqi jail, seemed not to embarrass Lodge or the American press. There was no effort to shed any light for the American public on why the people of Iraq had greeted the revolt with wild enthusiasm and why they had turned in such bitter hatred against the regime of Nuri. Yet two and a half weeks after American officials had been castigating the revolt as a "murderous uprising," which would eventually be crushed, the

United States followed the Baghdad Pact nations in granting recognition to the new Republic of Iraq.

The U.S. argumentation in the ensuing Security Council debate did not attempt to mask either the conviction of Washington that the Iraqi revolt had been push-buttoned by Nasser or the fear that "this grave development" would serve as a successful stimulus to the Lebanese insurrectionists. Ambassador Lodge expressed it this way:

The members of the League of Nations tolerated direct and indirect aggression in Europe, in Asia and Africa during the nineteen thirties. The tragic result was to strengthen and stimulate aggressive forces in such a way that World War II became inevitable. The United States for its part is determined that history shall not now be repeated. . . . This revolt (in Lebanon) was encouraged and strongly backed by the official Cairo, Damascus and Soviet radios, which broadcast to Lebanon in the Arabic language. The avowed purpose was to overthrow the legally constituted government of Lebanon and to install by violence a government which would subordinate the independence of Lebanon to the policies of the United Arab Republic.

The Soviet Union with monotonous repetition harshly demanded the immediate evacuation of Western troops. The United States insisted that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, as well as the appeals from legitimately authorized governments, justified the intervention. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden's delegate, flatly rebutted this reasoning; he argued that there had been no armed attack or international conflict, which alone would justify an invocation of the Charter's Article 51. A Swedish resolution, which would have suspended the operation of the UN Observation Group in Lebanon, failed to win any support. The U.S. resolution calling for the dispatch to Lebanon and Jordan of a United Nations armed force, similar to that in Gaza, to replace Western troops was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's own resolution received only the support of the Soviet Union.

As the impasse continued and neither side succeeded in carrying the Council, both East and West indicated a resolve to summon a special session of the General Assembly. But, following the Soviet Union veto of the Japanese resolution which would have strengthened the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon, the summit conference approach was instead brought forward. President Eisenhower invited Khrushchev to come to the Security Council for a summit meeting on the Middle East. The Security Council ended its futile debate to await the outcome of further Big Power negotiations.

The East-West jockeying lasted for almost three weeks. Khrushchev initially indicated that he would accept summit talks if Nehru and the Arab nations were also invited to attend. An agreement on this basis seemed so imminent that the press was relating accounts of the security details planned for the Russian chieftain on his arrival in New York for the meeting.

Even at this date there were still Allied misgivings. General de Gaulle insisted that a meeting held in private could accomplish far more than any open UN conclave under the glare of world publicity and conflicting propaganda campaigns. He refused to go along with the Anglo-American position. The United States, pushed into an acceptance of the summit approach by Britain, viewed with suspicion and maneuvered to avoid an agenda which would center the debate on the landing of Western troops rather than a broader discussion to include indirect aggression and other Soviet-UAR action which the West maintained had increased area tension.

Nevertheless Washington set August 12th as the target day for the summit conference in New York, despite the continued obdurate French attitude, and was awaiting final word from Khrushchev as to the exact time and possible alternate place if the regular site of the United Nations in New York City was not suitable for the Soviet leader.

At this juncture the world first became apprised of a secret

four-day meeting in Peiping between Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung. The Peiping Communiqué called for a meeting of heads of state, but one in which the presence of Mao was mandatory. This new factor had been thrown into the hopper by the Soviets with the knowledge that the West would never sit down at the summit with representatives of Communist China.

Upon his return to Moscow from China, Khrushchev indicated that whatever plans he had for a summit meeting without Mao would now have to be abandoned. It was obvious that Mao had exerted pressure on his Soviet brother by insisting on a place at the summit. In an angry note to Eisenhower, the Russian leader charged that the Security Council was merely an "auxiliary organ" of the State Department and stated that he was instructing his representative at the UN to request a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the United States and British troop withdrawal from the Middle East.

Under the "Uniting for the Peace" procedure, adopted by the UN in 1950 and previously invoked at the time of the Suez crisis, the General Assembly is empowered to act where the Security Council has been paralyzed by the veto, as had just occurred. The 81 states General Assembly was then called into session by the Council.

Indeed, it had seemed scarcely credible that a meeting between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev could ever have been arranged in the light of the extraordinary correspondence the two leaders had been exchanging. It was hardly possible that two men could call each other every name in the book at one moment and then go off somewhere with any profit for a talk at the next, particularly when it involved a subject as volatile as the Arab world and the Middle East. Khrushchev's first letter had not only accused the United States of aggression in Lebanon but had implied that American military leaders were indulging in intimidation and that the com-

mander of the Sixth Fleet was a criminal, if not a maniac. In reply President Eisenhower had denounced the Russian "manner in which you have chosen to express yourself," and accused the Soviet Union of indirect aggression, of blocking any opportunity for a peaceful solution in the United Nations and of torpedoing previous attempts to arrive at an agreement on the summit conference.

The propaganda exchange between the two Big Powers centered not only on philosophies, but where the summit meeting should take place, who should be present and on what terms the conferences were to be held. Neither side evinced a really sincere desire to sit down around the table. State Department and White House experts, ever fearful of a conference in which there would be open propaganda warfare and no agreement as to weapons or terms, welcomed the Khrushchev blast killing the summit idea. After all, it had been the British Government, egged on by a Labor Party still riled by the Middle East troop landings, that had been doing the main pushing for the East-West meeting.

Had a first-time visitor to earth from Mars been plummeted in the midst of the General Assembly debate, he would have naturally presumed that the present crisis had been brought on by some kind of economic mishap. In an optimistic keynote Dag Hammarskjöld stressed the necessity for a program of economic cooperation in the area. President Eisenhower followed with a six point program, the main innovation in which was a proposal for "a regional economic development plan to assist and accelerate improvement in the living standards of the people in these Arab nations."

Eisenhower also reiterated American willingness to withdraw troops when so requested by the duly constituted government of Lebanon. The tenure in office of President Chamoun was approaching its end. Lebanese Army Chief General Chehab had at last yielded to the country's call and consented to becoming President to which office a jubilant

Parliament had promptly elected him. The visit to the area of Under-Secretary Robert Murphy allegedly had helped Chehab make up his mind.

The United States plan gained the sympathetic support of Latin and Western delegates, but the Arab group remained cool to the proposal. As wisely put by one discerning delegate, the President had placed the "economic cart" before the "political horse." The Eisenhower speech contained no reference to the Israeli-Arab conflict and only a passing oblique remark on the Arab refugees, problems which lie at the heart of the tensions.

Opposition to the Eisenhower suggestion that a United Nations peace force might take over from Anglo-American troops came surprisingly from the Jordanian delegate Abdul Monem Rifai, brother of the Prime Minister, who insisted that what his country wanted was arms with which to defend themselves. It had been presumed that Hussein certainly would welcome UN forces, inasmuch as the withdrawal of the British troops was likely to throw the country open to the will of the Palestinians and the pro-Nasser masses.

Private parleys in smoke filled rooms and lobby consultations soon replaced the Assembly floor debate as the main method of business. A Norwegian draft resolution, approved by the United States, France and Britain, gathered wide support. This Norwegian proposal omitted specific reference to the withdrawal of Western troops from Lebanon and Jordan, but this factor was covered outside the resolution by Dulles-Lloyd pledges of withdrawal when the situation warranted.

The new Norwegian resolution was not unlike the Japanese resolution which had been vetoed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council. The *New York Times* referred to this resolution thus: "Its language is now so vague that most delegates believe that it will get the necessary two-thirds majority." For his part, the Secretary-General continued to press for a formula providing the maintenance of a "UN presence" in the countries

—in Lebanon through the Observation Group (UNOGIL) and in Jordan by strengthening the UN Truce Supervision Organization.

In other off-the-floor negotiations, Indian delegate, Arthur Lall, with the principal help of Ceylon and Indonesia, pressed for an amendment to the Norwegian resolution which would have provided for the immediate withdrawal of the United States and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan. As the Asian Group moved to bring forward their amendment, Secretary Dulles and his cohorts labored to hold the line by insisting that the Latin nations reject any verbiage calling for United States-British withdrawal.

The powerful Latin bloc had their own interests to serve. They made it clear that they would oppose any resolution which seemed to justify, directly or indirectly, the U.S. and British action in sending troops on the grounds that the duly elected Lebanese and Jordanian Government had requested this help. Such a precedent was held to be most dangerous to the revolution happy countries of South America where a freezing of the status quo could be thus accomplished by armed intervention on the side of the government in power.

At this stage of the UN activity, unity of the Arab world was being advanced in the Middle East. Crown Prince Faisal, the Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia, ended long Cairo talks with President Nasser on an optimistic note, which indicated the closest of relationships between the UAR and the Arabian monarchy. "Complete agreement, as well as the reaffirmation of brotherhood and friendship between the two countries" were the exact words of the joint communiqué, which also praised the Arab League.

Whether this unity statement had any inspirational effect on delegates convening 3500 miles away, future history alone will record. But an unprecedented united Arab world, including not only the eight member states of the Arab League, but representatives of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria (represented

by an informal observer), presented a new resolution to the General Assembly.

The Arab nations, facing a likely defeat with the Norwegian resolution threatening to muster the necessary two-thirds support in the Assembly, had bestirred themselves. Meeting under the aegis of Secretary-General Hassouna of the Arab League, the heretofore bitterly opposed Lebanese, Jordanian and UAR representatives buried their differences and joined together in an Arab sponsored resolution. Under the terms, Secretary-General Hammarskjold was asked to make "practical arrangements" which would facilitate the "early withdrawal of United States and British forces from Lebanon and Jordan." The resolution contained an assurance on the part of the Arab states as members of the Arab League to "respect the systems of government established in other member states and refrain from action calculated to change established systems of government." The Arab compromise likewise invited consultation by Mr. Hammarskjold regarding the establishment of an Arab development institution. The UN Secretary-General was requested to report back to the General Assembly not later than September 30.

This Arab resolution was approved by an 80-0 vote. The emergency session of the General Assembly ended as abruptly as it had begun.

Again, another move toward the brink had been halted at the edge. Americans heaved a sigh of relief as the Middle East yielded priority on the front pages to China and the Far East.

But no problem had been solved . . . no headway had been made toward removing the basic causes of continuing Middle East tensions. No doubt, with the coming to office of General Chehab, some return to normality might be expected in Lebanon, and American troops forthwith withdrawn. But what would be the outcome in Jordan? When could the British leave the harassed kingdom of Hussein? How could any compromise be reached here?

The United States in her role of world leadership faced the very same unresolved problems which confronted her at the end of the Suez crisis. The Arab-Israeli conflict had not been settled. Nor had American foreign policy been able to develop a formula for reconciling our Western alliance in Europe with our need for the friendship of the uncommitted Asian-African world. If anything, the U.S. failure since the Suez War to recognize the fact of Arab nationalism, of which Nasser was but a symbol, had greatly retarded the prospects of ever freeing herself in the Middle East of the irremovable taint of Western colonialism.

As this Middle East saga ends, there are many unsettled problems: Can the economy of Syria be meshed with that of Egypt? When will U.S. troops be recalled from Lebanon? What course will Iraq now pursue? Can Hussein survive without the support of British troops?

Though not as yet resolved, time will find an answer to these subordinate questions and even to the more serious Algerian controversy. But there is no indication that anyone will have the courage to deal directly with the primary cause of Middle East tensions. The United Nations—and the United States as the controlling power in the international organization—continue to duck their responsibility and play the ostrich to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

What might today seem frank but uncomfortable talk to seemingly inflexible and well organized Jewry may prove tomorrow to have been the only means of keeping the Middle East out of Soviet hands, of saving Israeli lives abroad and sparing the Jewish American community the bitter pains of anti-Semitism. Never did the difference between the politician, who thinks of his next election, and statesman, who is concerned with the next generation, mean so much. For this difference could well decide whether the loss of the Middle East and the advent of World War III is the answer to the much asked question: "What Price Israel?"

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