



**Now-Men
And
Tomorrow-
Men: Why
We Are Not
Equal?**

GM MES

Now Men and Tomorrow Men

by Gerritt Mes

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Foreword

People vary greatly both as individuals and communities in the extent of the provision they make for their futures. Hunters, like the Bushmen, keep weapons and tools with which they can hunt, dig, collect and carry their food, but they live from day to day, on what they find or encounter, almost like lower animals. Those who dry and smoke, or salt their fleshy food like the Eskimos and other fishermen, have learnt food storage. Nomads, that take their herds on trek, and agriculturists who harvested crops learned to look still further into the future. Out of this there developed that sense of time which governs everything city dwellers do.

Invisible time dominates the lives of every civilised person and industrial community. The schoolbell punctuated each work day of our youth until holidays came. As adults our daily lives on land, at sea or in the air depend upon accuracy of timing. Nobody escapes. In the country and city alike our lives are based on its ruthless passing. Times of sleeping and waking, of learning and labour, of eating and recreation: they all go by the clock.

So time, though intangible, is something that all of us naturally take, and are forced by circumstances long since outside the control of any individual human being, to take extremely seriously. Alarm clocks awaken the sleepy heads. Watches are on our wrists, diaries in our pockets or handbags, and calendars placed on our desks or suspended in our workshops. Our wages come each week or each month along with our bills We celebrate a regular series of birthdays and holidays each year. We serve apprenticeships over a stated number of years and gain diplomas or degrees. Hence time is also something that every human being rightly thinks he or she knows a great deal about. Its importance has been drilled into us by proverbs from infancy. Take time by the forelock! Time and tide wait for no man! Over two thousand years ago the great Greek tragic poet Aeschylus was telling his audience "time is the great teacher."

Those words 'time' and 'tide' both have their source in the simple Aryan root TI 'cut or divide'. Invisible and intangible as time is, man gradually mastered the art of dividing it. Those words may help us to see when that dividing process started.

Our words for that major time division a 'month' is inseparable from the word 'moon'. So it is likely that the root MAN (MEN) which gave us words such as 'man, woman, memory, menstruation' and the like is merely an expansion of the primary root MA (ME) which earlier still had given us words like 'mamma' to English, mamma 'breast' to Latin and meter 'mother' to Greek The same root gave Aryans their words for 'making and measuring or creating'.

The fact that another closely related Aryan root MER (MAR, MOR) gave us words 'such as marsh, mere, morass mortal' may indicate that when our ancestors were becoming articulate about time and dividing it by the aid of measuring the moon's phases they were also fishermen deeply concerned with the tides and the sea, that brought them food in plenty besides the possibility of sudden death, twice daily. Remembering those things were matters of urgency.

Despite the length of early civilising man's thinking about time and his observations of heavenly bodies and his recordings down the ages of their comings and goings, their movements and eclipses, and despite his naming them and worshipping them, what we do with our understanding of time is still rudimentary.

Whether we appreciate it or not our concepts of time have been undergoing very great changes during the past century. Many of our grandparents believed the world had been created on the fourth of October in the

year 4004 B.C. but radio-isotopes show us that carbon dating can trace human events back over the past 60,000 years and potassium-argon dating over more than 3,000,000 years. Our immediate forefathers thought the world might dissolve in smoke any day or moment. We know that it has been in existence for thousands of millions of years and is likely to continue in existence for thousands of millions of years to come whether men are still inhabiting it then or not. Meantime what are we devising for that human future?

There are very many muddled differences, from individual to individual, between various classes of professional men, artists, philosophers, scientists, politicians, farmers, mechanics, housewives and industrialists, in the ways that they regard time and address themselves towards the future, and also where they cease and glibly take it for granted, or find it too complex to warrant thinking about.

For some years past Mr. Mes has felt that what we know and think we know about time, extensive as it may be, is utterly inadequate. We even lack words to express the attitudes of individuals and of communities towards their futures. Yet it should be obvious that their attitudes, the ways in which individuals and communities regard their futures, have in reality determined from year to year and from generation to generation what their futures, whether as individuals or as communities, have actually become.

That is why he has begun the business of repairing that deficiency in human thinking by coining two new compound words, tempocognition and temporealisation whose object it is to describe the two most outstanding characteristics which he has noted both in the private attitudes of individuals and in the public attitudes of communities relative to their futures.

Tempocognition is the ability most of us have to think out the future before us as being the more or less inevitable outcome of the present situation in which we find ourselves, whether personally or nationally. But at that point it stops and as a motive force is almost inert. Temporealisation on the other hand is the faculty of visualising the future vividly enough to influence the outlook of the individual or the community, and thereby affect their achievements either adversely or favourably.

The tempocognition and the temporealisation, that together build up human time images, being made only of such variable and evanescent stuff as the human thoughts that became fixed in their attitudes, have also naturally undergone vast changes down the course of human history.

The pattern of these changes Mr. Mes has limned in outline. He shows how each person's private time image possesses the tempocognitive (or 'time-knowing'), and the temporealisation (or 'time-awareness') factors in different proportions - making them thereby into 'short-futured' or 'long-futured' individuals or communities.

He then addresses himself to the way in which these two attitudes affect individual and community lives today. How they affect the values we attach to 'truth' and what is regarded as 'sin', in both individual and community ethics; thereby again affecting the current concepts of 'law and justice' and the ideas on 'human rights and liberty'. Through these concepts he looks at governments, at long-futured and at short-futured states, and then at mixtures of them.

Here he knows that, as a South African in the Africa of 1964, he leaves himself wide open to universal criticism as being possibly racially biased in his assessment of which states are rightly regarded as long-, and short-futured. But he has had the courage to make those assessments upon the basis of a time image few, who address themselves to these subjects, appear to possess.

So he wisely leaves his readers with a final cautionary chapter, a couple of appendices and an epilogue to assist those who feel like questioning his and their own bona fides in assessing their personal status as short-, or long-futured individuals.

This is simultaneously a book of man's past and of his present but most of all an initial, creative work relative to his future. Being as deeply interested in man's future as in his past in Africa I recommend its reading and contemplation to all my fellow-men whether short-, or long-futured.

Raymond E. Dart

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The subject of this book is a quality in our thinking and feeling which I have called "Temporealisation".

It is a new word because it describes something new; something that has not yet been, by itself, extracted out of the fantastically complicated Gordian knot of the human personality.

Although several philosophers and scientists have touched upon it, it does not seem to have been realised that here there is actually a 'quality by itself', a definable characteristic in our composition. And for that reason it has, as yet, no official name.

In this book I take "Temporealisation" to mean the quality of the "awareness of location in time" - or - the "inclusion of time in the conception that a living being has of its world."

Once one's attention has been drawn to it, it is obviously true that the sense for time is not equally developed in all living things.

Animals, one can presume, have an image of the 'present'. The higher animals almost surely have a more or less clearly defined image of their 'past', but it is unlikely that they have more than, at best, a very vague image of their 'future'.

As one descends down the ramp of evolution, the 'past' also becomes less and less clearly defined in the different species until it is no longer available and we arrive at those who have only a 'present', a momentary consciousness in which they react 'instinctively' to the problems of staying alive.

On the other hand, as one passes up through the primates, skips to the 'lowest' human savages and gradually works up to the great men of our age, the highly gifted philosophers and scientists, one finds a parallel and gradual perfection of the 'future image'. And, what is most important, there is a complete integration of that image into the factors that determine the actions and the needs of the present. In a certain way 'tomorrow' becomes 'part of today'.

The present circumstances of a man, at any given moment, differ from those of an animal in that they are, to him, no longer haphazard 'events of nature' which just happen. They are, as he knows, for a large part at least, the result of 'prevision' giving rise to 'provision'. By far the most of a man's environment in the present is the result of deeds that have been done in the past by himself (and others) in *anticipation* of today.

At the same time, the present has, for most of us, almost all its significance in regard to our future. The majority of our evaluations in the present are, when one examines them carefully, not values in relation to the day itself. In the present (if one has made sufficient provision in the past), one has enough to eat and drink. One has physical comfort and a reasonable amount of pleasure and amusement which is sufficient to fill the bill.

For most of us all else has its value only in relation to a future that, days and years from the specific moment, will 'materialise', will become a 'present', that will be dependent upon what is being done today for its quality and its contents. It is the awareness of this structure in our lives that, in general, can be called "Temporealisation".

This definition is however not yet fully clear enough for Temporealisation has two aspects i.e.: the ability to make or build up those future images out of the material given in the present and the measure of 'realness',

'conviction' and 'urgency' that is in them.

The first, the 'building up' (or having) of those images one could call "Tempocognition". It is the purely logical and intellectual ability to work out what will happen on the basis of the principles of cause and effect acting on the contents of the present.

This leads to a 'knowledge', a 'cognition', of the future, but it does not necessarily lead to deeds today.

In a way it is merely 'theoretical' and if tomorrow was *in no other way* present in today, tomorrow could not really worry us.

The second quality one can call "Temporealisation per se."

'Reality' is a quality of our present images which it is almost impossible to define - as impossible, say, as to define the sensation of 'pain'. One can see it as being derived mostly from the sense of existing now, and inherent in the immediate quality of the sensations and images that are delivered directly to us by the sense organs. It is also the oldest kind of awareness that we have, the one from and about which the rest has been developed.

Both 'past' and 'future' images are not 'real' in this sense.

They exist solely in the mind or the imagination and, as such, they are also not as immutably consistent, and open to impersonal inspection, as those that come in directly from the 'outside'.

It is when the quality of 'realness', which is peculiar to the image that belongs to the present, is acquired, to some extent, by past and future images, that Temporealisation becomes an active factor in the life of the individual. This will provide him with a 'model', a graphic representation, not only of the present but also of its roots in the past and its possible (or probable) extensions into the future which has, for him, a conviction similar to something that exists in reality. His life will no longer be lived in the present alone, it will be 'orientated in time'.

It is however the 'realisation', (the 'making real') of the image that gives it its conviction - not the 'knowing' of it.

An example or two may make this clearer.

The improvident man is not necessarily a fool or one with a low IQ. He may even be very intelligent and usually he will at least be intelligent enough to have a Tempocognition that will tell him he is riding for a fall.

But, as long as that fall belongs to tomorrow, he does not worry. He gives the prophet of doom a friendly smile and says: "Who cares? Tomorrow is another day."

The 'future image' in him, although correct, is not 'real' to him, not real enough at least to change him from a 'grasshopper' into an 'ant'.

At the other end of the picture we can think of the 'worrier'. He too is often more than intelligent enough to know that his image of future miseries is incorrect - or at least grossly exaggerated.

Nevertheless the 'reality' of it is, in him, so vivid and overpowering that correct Tempocognition is not able to overcome it and to prevent it from poisoning his present.

Tempocognition is an 'ability', allied to intelligence and, as such, largely genetically determined.

If it is deficient in a man he, like the child who is a dud at mathematics or languages in school, may be able to improve it by use, by practice and constant application. He will, however, never get very far and there is a definite limit beyond which he cannot go.

His 'Temporealisation per se', on the other hand is not his to make future (and past) images 'real' for himself. It is the inherent (and also therefore probably genetically determined) degree of 'realness' which those images have for him.

It is the way he has been made.

Some introspection and personal experimenting will demonstrate that it is extremely difficult, consciously to extend the range of the future that is 'real' and 'meaningful' to us (although we can definitely *shorten* it!).

It is therefore more true than the short-futured person thinks when he shrugs his shoulders and says that he 'couldn't worry'. He actually *cannot*.

The worrier, on the other hand, can only stop worrying by an act of will - and he will begin worrying again the moment he relaxes his vigilance.

One surmises that it is because this very essential and basic difference between Tempocognition and Temporealisation per se, has been overlooked that the latter's importance in our thinking and acting has not been noticed earlier on. The apparent sufficiency of pure Tempocognition as a motivator has hidden its partner from view.

Tempocognition is, as said, an intellectual faculty determined, for a large part at least, by the IQ of the individual. It will therefore also be distributed among mankind more or less in the same pattern as the IQ values that are to be found there.

By itself, however, it will influence the actions of those individuals to a very much lesser degree than we tend to think for it is a fallacy that the deeds of men are mainly determined by what they know and by how 'intelligent' they are. 'Intelligent' people are notorious for the foolish things they do, especially when the emotions and nervous tensions take a hand in their lives.

The actions of men are not determined by what they actually 'know', although they like to believe this of themselves, and take it for granted in others.

The intellect, when it makes a decision, does not have the whole of what it 'knows' arrayed before it in a well organised pattern. It has to work with a preselected extract out of that material and the preselecting is not done by the intellect itself. It is the part of man in which he is not conscious that selects the facts to be presented. And that 'subconscious' part is influenced, and greatly prejudiced in its choice of 'data' by the emotions and by overt or suppressed wishes; by the almost calculated intent to make the desired decision to be the one that will be taken.

It shows a lack of insight to say that someone 'should have known better'. The simple fact is that he did not know. If he had *known* that it was a buzz saw into which he put his finger he would not have done so.

And it is the same with the *quality* of the data that are presented.

Only rarely can the intellect evaluate the data correctly and impersonally as to their importance. The quality of 'realness' here overrides almost everything else.

When the data relevant to the present condition stand out, it is on these that the decision is made. Those of the

future count very little although they may mumble of ruin and destruction in the background.

For this reason the future image can only hope to compete with the present one in so far as it has achieved a certain 'realness', 'actuality' and 'urgency' for itself.

Only the 'realness' of the 'harvest image' (with its obverse side: the 'hunger image') will be able to influence the present strongly enough to force the individual to sacrifice the pleasant leisure of today and to replace it by "working in the sweat on his brow".

On the other hand again, full Temporealisation may lead to 'wrong' conclusions if the individual's Tempocognition is not developed far enough to give the 'realised' future a sufficiently understandable structure.

If the individual's I.Q. is not sufficiently high, or if the future sense has developed too far beyond where reasonable predictions can be made, he may live in a world in which time stretches from the infinite past into the infinite future, knowing always that it is one great logical pattern, one unity and very, very real - but he may still lack the ability to think about it clearly and to take appropriate action. He may concede the battle before it has begun because it is all too complicated and involved. He cannot sift the important from the trivial and throws in his hand.

The result of that may be that he will be content with living in the small area of time and environment where his meed of intelligence is able to cope; refusing to think or worry about the rest.

On the other hand again, one may find a super-intelligent man who is content to live only in the present moment, taking and enjoying things in relation to themselves and the immediate, temporal environment without bothering to do any of the tempocognizing which is well within the scope of his abilities.

Thinking about the future is, for him, not worth the trouble, simply because it is not real to him. It belongs to another world.

Once the importance of the concept of Temporealisation in the understanding of the actions and the relationships between men and men, and between men and their environment, has been discovered, it will be found that it permeates our whole pattern of life on earth.

It is not only the cardinal factor in the developments that Anthropology tries to dig up and reconstruct (because the development of man out of the trammels of the animal kingdom must have gone hand in hand with a gradual perfection and extension of his understanding of his place in time), it is hardly less important in the understanding of a great number of aspects of more recent History itself. In it we can find the driving factor for the emergence of 'agriculture' and 'irrigation', and it was also that which helped men start the 'City States' and, from there, the great 'Civilisations' and the 'Empires' that have come and gone.

It is all important in Sociology, Economics and Politics for it provides a new and more understandable way of seeing their nature and their development. Most of the structure of human relationships is vitally influenced, even if not fully determined by the extent to which the future prosperity and safety of the state or the community is felt and accepted as part of the life of its members. It is not, or very little, a matter of those members theoretically 'knowing' what is good for the community. One supposes that the citizens of Ghana 'knew', in the beginning, that a democratic state is possibly the most ideal one that has yet been devised for man. But democracy demands a fairly long future-image in its citizens and they did not have that.

Again, if the individuals comprising the different groups and states into which we have split ourselves up do not feel the importance of the continued existence and the well-being of those states it cannot be expected that they will willingly forego available opportunities and self-indulgences for the sake of a tomorrow that means

nothing to them.

A collection of improvident men can never form, or keep alive, a provident and therefore a successful and enduring state.

Even such concepts as 'Ethics' and 'Justice' are fully involved. Their validity (although we may not have realised it) derives almost all of its meaning from an *enduring* community which is seen as the sine qua non of worthwhile human living. Temporealisation has furthermore a very important role to play in the evaluation of Art - and in the development of Science.

It is the sense of time which gives depth and value to the aesthetic emotions that would otherwise be no more than a refined titillation of the nerves.

Science again, which is the 'will to know', makes no sense if that knowledge were only for today, to be forgotten again tomorrow. Only if Science is seen, and deeply felt to be, the gradual accumulation of a treasure of knowledge and understanding by humanity, can it have a right to the dignity which it claims for itself. Otherwise it would be mere inquisitiveness.

Even Religion becomes nonsense if it is not seen and fully integrated into the eternal which has always been the primary quality of all the gods that man has ever known and adored. Without the deep and awed consciousness of eternity as a framework, religion is no more than a ghost story, a fairy tale, and the church a superior kind of Rotary organisation.

The subject matter is almost limitless. It is present in almost everything that man has ever done and is ever likely to do. The first, general exposition of its most important aspects in a single book like this, therefore became a problem of selection and presentation.

In outline the structure of its presentation follows the following lines.

In chapters two, three and four, the development of civilised man out of some vaguely discerned ancestor is seen to have happened in three distinct stages; the first from pre-man to cave-man, which would have resulted from the acquisition of even the beginnings of Temporealisation; secondly from the ultra short-futured caveman to the farmer who must have had at least a six month's future span. Thirdly there was the development of the City man out of the latter, which needed a full year of future realisation; and finally the feeling of living in eternity as typified in Egypt.

The rest of the "historical" development of mankind is not examined here because too many other influences begin to confuse the picture and because Temporealisation can obviously be extended no further (although it can change in quality).

In chapter five, six, seven and eight, an attempt is made to demonstrate how the degree of Temporealisation present in different individuals is one of the most important (if not the only) factor that produces, for us, the almost bewildering variety of people, types and characters, vocations and values, with which, especially in the 'West', we find ourselves surrounded - from 'Hoboes' to 'Philosophers', from 'Ballet dancers' to 'Shrewd Businessmen'.

Having in this way outlined the developmental and personal manifestation of Temporealisation, the next step had to be a study of how it influences ethical and moral concepts and their application in the life of men.

Here, however, it was discovered that not one of these concepts had been adequately defined as to its nature. Descriptions of qualities laws - and slogans - there were aplenty.

As a matter of fact, there appear to be as many of these as there are writers on the subject, but nobody seems to have asked himself the primary and very essential question of what his subject was - rather than how it manifested itself.

The manifestations of the moral 'virtues' and 'vices' are different in every nation and every race, however much we would like to give our version of these the accolade of absolute validity.

It was therefore necessary to dig down to the source and discover the nature of the 'moral' core that the often contradictory expressions of it have in common.

With this in mind chapter nine examines the surprisingly complex nature of the apparently so simple quality of "Truth" which turns out to mean completely different things to people with different ranges of Temporealisation.

Chapter ten then logically follows up the way in which Truth, or rather its absence, in various practical manifestations, produces 'Lies' and 'Sin', which end in the theoretical generalisation of the "Science of Ethics". Ethics again naturally leads to its own definition in the "Laws" that, together, form the body, if not the spirit, of "Justice" and chapter eleven finds that here too the temporealisising potential is all-important. Only against the background of an enduring state or community do either of these have any sense. In 'momentary life' they can have no meaning at all.

"Laws and Justice" -naturally evoke their counterparts in the form of "Human Rights" and "Liberty" which becomes the subject of examination in chapter twelve where they unhappily turn out to be more or less empty phrases into which everyone puts his own hopes and fears, his ideals and his secret ambitions.

Chapter thirteen takes this examination into the realm of Governments that are judged somewhat haphazardly both by their 'Justice' and their 'Laws', and by the "Human Rights" and "Liberty" they permit or disallow.

The main conclusion arrived at is that Governments 'grow' out of the nature of the people - they are a part of the people (even tyrannies), and not something apart that is placed over them like a roof.

With this the ground is prepared for an examination into the kinds of Governments and ways of living together that will obtain in states or groups of people with different averages of temporealisation.

Chapters fourteen, fifteen and sixteen discuss therefore the Long-futured, the Short-futured and the Mixed States.

It is a well known fact that the reader reads what he wants to read. His eyes will almost automatically skip whole phrases and paragraphs that do not 'fit' into what he thinks he is reading, and his mind refuses to admit qualifying conditions in the argument. It is almost as if it has a blind spot for the little word "if".

The reaction of some of those who were given the manuscript of this book to read almost forced the addition of the cautionary chapter seventeen at this stage. It underlines once more that "Long-futured" is not the synonym for 'Superior' nor is "Short-futured" necessarily a cause for "inferiority". It was even necessary to stress again that a white skin is *not* an outward sign of being "Long-futured".

With this the bulk of the material has passed review but there remain some loose ends that may need tying up for the more meticulous and analytical type of reader.

The first is the vexed question of 'Heredity' versus 'Environment' as the main feature which decides what a man will be - also in regard to the extent of his temporealisising potential.

Appendix I. is an attempt to face up to this and (although it is not possible to arrive at a definite, categorical answer), at least to clear away some of the fog of emotional controversy and prejudice that now beshroud the issue.

If the subject had been introduced earlier on, it would continually have involved us in side issues and destroyed the continuity.

A second Appendix became necessary to cover the growth and development of Temporealisation in the individual from the almost completely 'animal' futurelessness of the newborn baby to maturity and thence into the slow degeneration of old age.

This could also not have been fitted into the text itself without endangering the smooth flow of its argumentation.

The Epilogue at the end speaks for itself.

CHAPTER II

"Man " and "Animal"

It is interesting to discover how the importance of Temporealisation" throws a light on the borderlines between 'Man' and 'Animal', both in the present and the past; how it answers questions that previously seemed to be unanswerable; shows that other questions again do not really exist and finally, how effortlessly it inverts most, if not all, of the current answers, changing effects into causes and causes into effects.

In many respects this is as if one inverted a painting on the wall of a modern art exhibition and discovered, to one's surprise and relief, that, in that way, it does not only make sense but is a clear representation of a familiar object.

When, before attempting to face the problem of evolution, one asks oneself the necessary (even if age-old) questions: "What is Man?" and "In what way is Man different from the other animals?" one finds a heavy quiver full of answers ready for us.

Let us pause a moment and select a few, both for their cogency and for our own diversion.

To open the list we can mention the definition by an 'unknown' scribe who wrote: "Man is the only animal that eats when it is not hungry, drinks when it is not thirsty and makes love at all seasons," to which we can suitably add Mark Twain's observation that: "Man is the only animal that blushes - or needs to."

In a more serious vein we find Plato made one of the first attempts to define 'Man' scientifically. We read in Diogenes Laertius: 'Plato has defined man as an animal, biped and featherless, and was applauded. Diogenes plucked a fowl and brought it into the lecture room with the words: "Here is Plato's man." In consequence of which there was added: "having broad nails."

This quotation is interesting as it demonstrates the strange way in which men's minds work. Here, with their habitual astute blindness, the Greeks - as usual - missed the point.

The adjustment should not have been made by the mere addition of another 'determining factor' but by verbally stating the understood qualification which was already present in the original, namely: "Man is an animal, biped and featherless in its natural, living state". It seems that even Plato himself was not aware that the qualification had been present in his original definition and had only to be expressed in words to make that definition valid again!

As in so much other Greek (and modern) thinking, the words ran away with the thinkers and Diogenes could have scored another success by bringing in his dead chicken again, this time after having removed its claws and glued on or sewn on a set of 'broad nails. If the removal of feathers was justifiable (in logic), adding broad nails would also be permissible in order to refute the new, extended definition.

Fifty years before Darwin's 'The Origin of the Species' saw the light, that strange genius Carlyle, in Sartor Resartus, put his finger on one of the more important points by saying that: "Man is a tool-using animal," and still another sixty years before that again, Benjamin Franklin had already defined him as: "A tool-making animal."

It is because 'tools' are possible archeological and even paleontological finds that the Anthropologists have adopted these definitions as their own and initiated the 'Man-the-tool-maker^v' concept which is still extensively prevalent among them today.

Besides these definitions we have a long list in which authors have defined 'Man' according to their own private pet aversions.

Charles Lamb called him a 'gaming animal'. Shaw saw in him: 'the only animal that esteems itself rich in proportion to the number and voracity of its parasites'. Adam Smith, as was to be expected, saw him as an animal that 'makes bargains' and a more obscure writer in the 'Scientific American' called him, very scientifically: 'the only animal that spits' apparently never having heard of snakes and llamas.

All these are obviously emotional rather than scientific definitions. One could add to this list ad infinitum. One could call him the 'only animal that drives motor cars' or 'the only animal that kills its fellow men to save their souls'; or, to mention but one other, John Ruskin's misanthropic definition: "A fanged but handless spider that sucks indeed and stings, but cannot spin."

Somewhat more to the point were Conway, when he called him a 'talking animal' and Hazlitt who wrote: "Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps. for he is the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things are, and what they ought to be."

One realises that all these are more amusing than intelligent remarks, more emotional than scientific but, if we now turn to the scientists themselves and open Kroeber's, monumental textbook on Anthropology, we, suprisingly, do not find much more clarity there: In summary then, apart from the rather superficial features connected with self-domestication, the specialisations of men are essentially those connected with his brain and his erectness. He lacks all the various specialisations that come to mind when we think of elephants, seal, whale, bat, ant-eater...

In short, where man is significantly specialised, he tends to be uniquely specialised. The rest of him appears to be rather unusually well generalised, in function as well as in structure. And generalisation is normally a precondition for further development in organic evolution."

From there on, being an anthropologist he drops the 'significant specialisation' in which man is 'unique' and concentrates on the details of the development of the generalised 'animal' part of his subject.

He has told us earlier on that, with the exception of one animal, man has the largest brain in relation to the size of his body, but that pleasing quality loses some of its flavour when we read that the 'exception' is the mole who, in the darkness of his burrows, needs a brain that is 1/35th of his body, to find our most prized bulbs, even though Einstein's brain was no more than 1/47th of his, by no means large, body.

Adding all this up, it becomes clear that the anthropologist has also avoided a straight answer, for neither the relative brain mass, nor the erect posture (which we share with most of the birds) is a 'unique' characteristic of the human race. Neither is it the actual size of the brain (which could be an indication of its potential pattern-making capabilities, as it should be proportionate to the number of brain cells) which is important for the elephant, although his brain is only 1/1170th of his body weight, it still is five times that of the average man.

Man is definitely not marked out by any greatly different physical characteristics - he is marked out by what he does with what he has and his special characteristics seem to be subservient to that.

To the basic question "What is man?" the religiously orientated person again has an extremely simple answer. "Man has a soul - and animals have none," is the solution there, and that is all there is to it. When one meets a living creature with a soul one knows that one is in the presence of a 'Man', but for our purpose this definition is altogether too vague and too much dependent upon the observer. One cannot help but suspect that, in practice, a soul is only discoverable in something that has been known to be a man.

On a less dogmatic, but more general and popular plane, we have the 'adjectival noun' definition: "Man is human - an animal is a beast." To the observant and critical reader it is clear that all these 'answers' merely beg the question.

The anthropologist sees only physical characteristics. He measures his bones and fossils, but when he has to decide if some anthropoid remains are those of a 'Man' or of an 'Ape', he depends upon the concomitant finding of 'tools' thereby admitting that the differentiation lies not so much in the physical structure of the 'animal', but in what he did with that physical structure. The 'Man-hood' of Man has very little to do with his body. We can easily imagine a 'Man' existing in an Ape body. even if his tongue would not permit him to talk more intelligibly than a deaf mute. On the other hand the 'wolf-boys' who grew up among animals are found to be hardly more 'human' than their foster parents.

The inherent weakness of the metaphysical solution by means of the criterion of the presence of a soul, can be demonstrated by realising that, if Man has in any way descended from (or risen from) whatever animal form one may fancy. there must have been a point in that 'evolution' when the soul entered an anthropoid body and thereby made out of the 'Ape' a 'Man'. If placed straight before the question in this form, even the modern church-goer (not to call him a 'Christian') must side with the 'Fundamentalists' in the 'Scopes Monkey Trial' of Dayton, in Tennessee. He has to choose between 'evolution' and the 'soul'. Anything less than an instantaneous change (which implies that somewhere and at some specific moment, an 'ape' mother had a 'human' child), implies that there must have been (again at some specific moment and in specific individuals) quarter, half, and three-quarter souls. The historical existence of 'fractional humans' would then throw a doubt upon the generally accepted 'axiom' that all human beings have an equivalent soul. There is then also no reason why (where stone age primitives have survived into our day) people with fractionated souls should not also be alive today.

Our answer should be more clear and unequivocal than either of these and it is to be found in the development of the quality of 'temporealisation' in a certain strain or group of 'anthropoids'.

The essential difference between an 'animal' and a 'man' is, in this idea, that the former has a past and 'present' but that man has a past a 'present' and a 'future' in his consciousness.

Animals have their memory. They can have a kind of 'knowledge' and even an 'understanding', in that their stock of memory-images may be organised for direct reference. They can even have a certain amount of 'intelligence' in that they may be able to use that 'knowledge' effectively.

Reading Yerkes' book: 'Chimpanzees'. leaves little doubt about the latter. They can use their intelligence to solve problems that are not, as such, present in the body of their 'knowledge' and their 'understanding'. It has even been proved that the young chimpanzee exhibits a higher IQ than his human counterpart but, as the latter develops, he leaves his anthropoid brother behind.

It is realised that here we edge on to the question of why he does so, but we must leave that aspect of the problem until later. It would introduce the emotionally loaded controversy between 'heredity' and 'environment' too soon to fit into the argument at this stage.

What happens however seems clear enough.

The young child, like the animal, also has no 'future' and as an animal he is not so good. The 'child of nature' has the advantage. Once the future sense develops or is developed in the human child however, the 'animal' has lost the race.

To the animal the lessons of the past are there only to help in solving the problems of the present. Animals can intelligently modify and mould the present to take on the characteristics that are, from experience, known

to be advantageous or desirable, but that is as far as it goes.

The limits are not necessarily set by their intelligence, they are set by the type of problem it handles. If the problem contains only 'present' factors, the animal can master it correctly. If it contains 'future' elements, the animal is unable to see what is needed and it either errs or does not even seem to know that there is anything he should or could do.

Sharper analysis shows that teaching the Chimpanzees to do 'tricks' (such as 'working' for a token that can be exchanged in the 'Chimpomat' for selected food or amenities) always consists of transposing what, for us, lies in the future, into their 'past' by incorporating it into the body of their 'knowledge; their basic understanding of the world in which they live.

The 'urges' are however always in their 'present'. Hunger and irritation at being locked up, or having to work, drive them to rid themselves of what is unpleasant. The 'spurs' of 'satiety' and 'freedom' are, to them, not (as they would be to us) 'aims' - and there is a world of difference between these two.

The animal may be able to handle a present upon the basis of the past but it can never shape the present to be the basis for a visualised future although, to us, who have all our lives lived with that ability as a self-evident part of our world image, there may seem to be little difference between them because the results are, in most of the experiments, the same actual deeds.

What the lack of understanding of that 'little difference' does to official thinking peeps forth from almost all the writings we have on the subject.

Taking, for instance, more or less at random, a paragraph or two out of Kroeber's Anthropology, we read: (p.6 1)

"The chimpanzee in his youth is as playful, restless, curious and explorative as any human being.

"He does not go very far in tool invention, because his central nervous system seems to become quickly and healthily fatigued by situations that put on the nervous system any strain that cannot be promptly discharged into striped-muscle activity. He is psychologically a clear extrovert.

"The demonstrated ape trait is lack of patience in the solution of a problem, of irritation, sulking, or ignoring as soon as difficulties are encountered which cannot be solved by direct use of hands, feet or mouth."

These two abstracts demonstrate what has been said earlier on extremely well - yet the seemingly implied conclusion is not drawn. Manifestly the writer has interpreted the actions of the apes in terms of his own world and read the meanings into them that would be valid there.

It has not occurred to him that the world of the ape is different and that the ape is not just an 'imperfect man', but a fully perfect entity, an 'animal', in himself.

That the ape 'does not go far in tool invention is, (in terms of the world of the human observer) explained here as due to a 'fatigue', which should imply that there has been some effort at least. The human observer takes this for granted because, to him, it is obvious that there is a 'problem'. It does not occur to him that the animal may see it simply as a fact that something has been 'put out of his reach'. and that the 'giving up, the 'irritation, sulking and ignoring' is no more than a reaction to frustration or to being 'thwarted'.

The animal applies what it knows. If there are some factors that seem to fit, it may try them out. If not, or if they do not work, it gives up. It is not 'solving a problem' at all. It is merely trying to get what it wants in the present. Only human beings 'solve problems', that is, only they visualise a situation and mentally try to shape

the present to lead to a desired future result.

What Kroeber notices seems to confirm this. "Only things that can be 'promptly discharged into striped-muscle activity' (a learned way of saying 'voluntary activity') and 'solved by direct use of hands, feet and mouth'," is as good a definition as any for 'solving' a present 'problem' as compared with a future-tense problem. The 'discharged urge' is a present action. the 'attained object' implies a future image and is something quite different, although in practice they may entail the same visible actions.

The continuation of Kroebers argument is also interesting, both because of the light it throws on the development of 'Man' and the insight it gives into the way of thinking of the anthropologist.

"This is of interest because it finds a parallel in the history of culture. There was required actually less skill to fashion many of the ground and polished stone implements of the New Stone Age than some of the specialized chipped ones of the Old Stone Age - tens of thousands of years earlier.

"The reason seems to be that while the chipping requires definite manual control, it is a rapid process. A dozen failures occupy little time; each may suggest the possibility of an improvement; and the thirteenth attempt may be reasonably satisfactory. Grinding however, although one of the simplest operations, is of necessity slow. Very early man was apparently better able to mobilise a fair degree of manipulative skill than a great amount of patience. This resemblance to the ape - and to children - may only be coincidence, but it looks as if it were more than that."

The onlooker applauds and says: "Obviously! Much more than that!"

The Old Stone Age man had learnt that by certain actions. he could give his implements a sharper cutting edge than they had in nature and he applied them.

During that action he was improving his tool and no more. All, or nearly all of this happened in the present. It was not a matter of having less patience - for the anthropologist forgets that for the seeking and finding of stone after stone for his 'thirteen' attempts he would need as much patience (especially after each frustrating failure) as the 'grinder' would need for this work. Here it is a doggedness and perseverance in which the desire to have a tool of a certain quality drives him on inexorably from moment to moment.

In contrast the much later 'grinder' has an object in view. He has a future shape in his mind to which he makes the material in hand conform. He does not have less skill. The 'object' is different. The chipper has only a sharp edge. a 'quality', to give to his flint. The grinder has the final weapon in his imagination.

The moment the grinder has such an image, he has the patience to materialise it. Lack of the definite goal produces what, to the outside observer, who judges by the standards of his own world, may produce the actions of 'lack of patience'. Anyone who has seen a pair of apes 'grooming' each other can hardly accept that they have a congenital lack of patience.

They become irritated when faced with silly frustrating obstacles just as any civilised human being would be. It is only the lack of realisation that the ape lives in a completely different world and that he is not at all spurred on by the glory of solving the problems humans put to him, which prevents the scientist from seeing this.

In the jungle where Adrian Kortlandt observed them from nearby, in their natural surroundings for months on end, there was no sign of this irritability - rather the reverse.

In his description of what he saw Kortlandt says: (Scientific American, May 1962) "All the chimpanzees I observed were cautious. hesitant creatures. This is one of the major impressions one carries away from

studying chimpanzees at close range in the wild. Behind their lively, searching eyes one senses a doubting, contemplative personality, always trying to make sense out of a puzzling world. It is as if the certainty of instinct has been replaced by the uncertainty of the intellect - but without the determination that characterises man."

Apart from the, once again, obvious lack of realisation of the completely different worlds in which the author and his subjects live, together with the inevitable 'humanisation' of the exterior of the chimpanzees into 'contemplative personalities', there emerges a completely different picture from that found in the quotation from Kroeber which is based on the animals of Yerkes and other similar experimenters.

Here, between the lines, we read a being at the parting of the ways.

He has not yet eaten the 'apple' but he has nibbled at it and the gates of the safe, unfutured and therefore unworried paradise of the animal kingdom are slowly closing behind him while his grasp on the future is not yet strong enough to take the scheme of things and mould it to his heart's desire, as expressed in the 'decisiveness that characterises man'.

Well may he look 'contemplative' - although one suspects that this appearance is no more true than the 'pride' which sentimentalists see in the lion looking out over his hunting field from his favourite lookout, when his tummy is full.

One word in Kroeber's description still needs understanding as it indicates the basic source of much of this kind of reasoning. This is the word 'mobilise' in: "Very early man was apparently better able to mobilise a fair degree of manipulative skill than a great amount of patience". From this we can see that Kroeber starts off, in his mind, with a 'full human being' whose inherent abilities, although present are somehow 'blocked'.

This is essentially the same thinking as that of the 'soul' defining man, and it falls before the same argument. It does not take into account that this "blocked" man must also have come into existence and must be traceable back to the trilobites or the micro-organisms which micropaleontology is discovering in the silt of the ocean. It presupposes a kind of behind-the-scenes development of man. The abilities are considered to be potentially there, arriving from nowhere, before they are 'mobilised". They do not simply develop in practice. Kroeber's 'man', although Kroeber would probably have denied that emphatically, was also 'created' somewhere in the middle of the evolutionary ladder.

It is necessary that one should fight this out with oneself before arguing on a basis which is a mixture of 'Science' and the 'Old Testament'.

Seeing 'Man' as a being who developed out of the animal kingdom (and not out of a preformed but 'blocked' man), we must now accept that he did not begin when he started to make the kind of tools that as far as their flint parts were concerned, could, millions of years later, be found by our anthropologists.

He must have been making tools for millennia before that, from materials that were more easily worked but which were also, alas, more easily digested by the processes of time.

One can even surmise that there must have been a New Wood Age and an Old Wood Age, and that the tools that we find were necessarily developed from the tools with which he made his original tools.

When we see how long it took to take the step from knowing that food seeds grew into food plants to actually planting them, the sudden step from fighting and hunting with picked up sticks and stones, to using chipped flints as 'daggers' and 'arrow heads', is altogether unacceptable as having been the result of a sudden 'inspiration'.

It is much more reasonable to see the primitive using a naturally sharp-edged flint to scrape his wooden spear into a sharp point and then at some great, historical moment in the development of 'man the killer' realising that the cutting edge of that flint, if fixed to the weapon itself would make it ideal for its purposes.

What is more important however is that he did not begin to be a 'Man' even when he started using his wooden tools. The ape had already used them without that making him a 'Man'.

As Kortlandt says: "Chimpanzees use weapons too, I have mentioned the brandishing and throwing of clubs during intimidation displays and when they use weapons in genuinely fierce fighting, both species (chimpanzees and gorillas,) assume a two legged posture." And here one should not forget Ardrey's remark in 'African Genesis' that the word 'tool' is, in the anthropological context, usually merely an euphemism for 'weapons' - that is 'killing tools'.

The hiatus between the use of tools and the making of tools is still too large to be overbridged by what the onlooker feels to be the stopgap of modern evolutionary theorising: 'Mutation'. Somewhere between these two stages 'Man' emerged and we find it where we 'see' how, one fine day, hidden from us in the mist of time, an ape looked at the stick or stone that he had used and, finding it good and suitable to his hand *decided to keep it*.

That is the moment (which, in various ways, must have been preparing for possibly hundreds or thousands of generations) when the new arrival of the 'future sense' showed itself in an act.

Not the using of the accidentally picked up tool, but the keeping it for future use, was the first visible symptom that Man was on his way to the stars.

'Keeping something' demonstrated that the future had struck its roots in him and had acquired the quality of an image in the present.

Keeping the tool indicated a tremendous and fundamental change. 'Perfecting' it and, later, 'making' it were but minor developments in comparison, and there is essentially more difference between a picked up tool and a kept one, than there is between the kept tool and our final tool: the atom bomb.

The kept tool indicated the emergence of something that was entirely new among the attributes of life on earth and possibly in the universe. The atom bomb is no more than the end product and logical development of it.

For thousands of years, possibly millions, the present had slowly extended itself, second by second into the future. The mere instantaneous 'reflex' to a 'stimulus' (possibly modified by experience) had become the 'reaction to a situation' and the 'situation', if really understood, always extends from the past through the present into the future.

With the 'understanding of a situation', an inclusion of the future into the calculations of the present became a part of 'reacting' and the enormous advantages of even the shortest lengthening of the pre-realised future, would have given its possessor such a head start over others that it must have worked wonders for his chances of survival.

"Dodging." for instance, had been known to animals since very near the beginning. The change of direction of the hunted, (not meant to 'confuse' the hunter, but to escape him where he was visualised, in the present, as aiming at the original direction of the flight of his prey) could be done without pre-realisation of the future situation.

The 'feint' in an attack however, the movement made with the intention not to drive it home, but to have it

serve as a cover for the fatal stroke from another direction, must have been the undoing of every non-futured opponent against whom it was used.

Even the, pre-realisation of one single minute would have provided 'strategic' possibilities which, in those primitive movement-bound surroundings, must have seemed to be almost magical.

One can therefore realise that, with the arrival of this pre-realisation, even in a rudimentary form, the pace of evolution in this direction must already have greatly increased.

In a number of ways it must have changed the 'timbre' and 'the tempo' of life almost beyond recognition. Things started to have meaning instead of only carrying 'implications'.

When we think ourselves into this, we can realise that this development could hardly have been a 'mutation'. It must have been something that had been preparing for a long time until a certain group of apes started to keep their weapons, just as the change from a 'gathering life' to 'living in city states' was not due to a 'mutation'. It is probable that in the beginning, those 'kept' weapons were held only for a short time. They were most likely dropped or thrown away when other things caught the attention and caused them to 'forget', but, what we must remember is that keeping the tool, even for a short time, showed that the occasion for its 'future' use must have, at that moment, been in the mind of the 'keeper' as a definite image with a certain amount of reality.

From animals with only a 'present', and instantaneous 'reflex' awareness, (who had therefore only the possibility for memory and the affecting of the present by the past. with the possibility of 'learning') we now have the addition of the future with the possibility of 'thinking'. No more than an extension and perfection of this ability was needed to produce what is now known as 'Man'.

What is most important to us here is that this new insight into the mechanism of the emergence of man eliminates the need for the acceptance of a 'Mutation-en-bloc' to 'explain' our origin.

There is no longer a necessity for the fantastic idea of the suddenly mutated arrival of the 'big brain' and the consequent development of man, as its potentialities unfold themselves. Such a 'big brain' mutated into an ape body by the chance hit of a specific cosmic ray on a specific gene in the seed of a specific ape could, by the wildest imagination, hardly be thought to have produced a pre-formed brain with all its fantastically and wonderfully arranged fibres and synapses already in place. merely waiting to accommodate its new functions. This would have entailed that a 'blind' mutation produced a pre-formed pattern of possibilities most of which would have to remain quiescent for numberless generations before they could be brought into play!

Against this we can see in the orderly and slow development of pre-realisation the simple process of our old friend 'evolution' at work, accelerating itself from the 'survival of the fit enough' to that of the 'survival of the fitter' and finally to the real Spencerian 'survival of the fittest' which, in such a crude form, is rarely found among animals. That is one of the prerogatives of man.

It also becomes understandable that the often asked question why the Chimpanzee and the Gorilla, the Orang Outang and the Gibbon had to remain 'behind' where they lived in the same environment as our ancestors did, has no real validity either. That only can be a question when we see all development as being initiated and determined by the environment and by nothing else.

Among the anthropoids there emerged (or there was) an 'ape' who learned to 'see the future' and from there on there was no stopping him. He could naturally outsmart all competitors. There was no stopping him, just as there would be no stopping of a group of men who acquired Prescience; men who would know that it would rain tomorrow, that 'Bottoms up' would win the Cesarewitch or that their enemy would pass beneath their window at exactly five past ten the next morning.

That the others remained "behind" is only a problem to those who deny the primary if not the total, importance of heredity.

Just as the chimpanzees that were adopted into human families but who, after the first year or so, dropped completely out of the race, once the children had begun to have their congenitally acquired and environmentally developed past-present-future images - so it was with the whole genus.

It is however only when we see the temporealisation which, up to now we have taken entirely for granted in ourselves as an obvious concomitant of intelligence, as the root of all our human 'thinking', and not merely as a part of that intelligence, that we can fully grasp the difference between man and beast and - as we will see soon enough the difference between man and man.

CHAPTER III

Caveman to Farmer

When we realise the implications of the fact that each of us is locked up in his own world, when we stop playing the 'word-game' type of thinking initiated by the Greeks and, when with Laotze, we accept that the only way in which we can really understand life is by finding equivalent manifestations *in ourselves*, seeing there what they mean to us, it is sometimes surprising how our problems, our way of thinking and our conclusions change.

They do not only change. They clear up and one realises that, after all, that is essentially the way in which we used to check up on the results of our thinking on the basis of words.

When we consider the actual reality of the days when 'Man' was lifting himself by his bootstraps out of the animal kingdom, we discover that there never really was and never will be such a thing as 'Man'. At every given moment of time there were a certain and specific number of specific individuals and of these one could not say *this* is still an 'ape' and *that* is already a 'man'. Both the words 'Ape' and 'Man' stand for ideas and not for realities. When the idea fits an individual, one can say it belongs to a certain group of individuals which we 'have given a certain name'. There is however no clear dividing line between the definitions for the two groups or classes and the transitional individual belongs to neither (or both).

The problem is on a par with the one with which we were faced when our microscopes showed us minute living creatures. These did not obviously fit either into the class of 'Plants' or that of the 'Animals', although they were manifestly 'alive' and we had, since the beginning of time, lived under the impression that living things must be either plant or animal. A large amount of energy and emotional heat was spent on deciding if bacteria and cocci were 'plants' or 'animals' where it was merely a question of what we should *call* them.

The answer was finally found, not by locating the microscopic entities in one or the other of the two available classes, but by extending and defining what one would call a 'Plant' and what an 'Animal', in such a way that the new-comers could be classified under the new definitions. The answer was therefore not that bacteria are plants but that they belong to a group of living things that we have decided to call 'Plants', in deference to the majority of its members that were called 'Plants' long before we knew about carbohydrate metabolism and such like qualifies.

Lately the appearance of a crystallisable but still apparently 'living' virus has changed the focal point to one about what 'Life' is. To this question we will again find no answer until we have decided what we will 'Life'.

In ordinary, present day circumstances and at this stage of the development of the animal kingdom, we can say with certainty that a certain animal is either a 'Man' or not a 'Man', but as in the microscope, our researches into our earlier history and the findings of paleontology have discovered a domain where it is merely a matter of where we decide to draw the line. In those days there were living beings that were both 'men' and 'not men' and it is merely a matter of personal taste and prejudice (and not of 'opinion'!) what we will call what.

The anthropologist calls the anthropoid a 'Man' if it makes stone tools, because that is 'positive' evidence. We, who try to look into the creature, insist on calling it a 'Man' when it 'kept a tool'. As this stage cannot be demonstrated from paleontological findings, we cannot prove the man-hood of certain fossils, but we know that some living beings were 'Men' in our definition of the word, long before they *made* tools.

The issue is however not very important. It is only a matter of namegiving. What should be stressed is that this shows that name-giving is, itself, not very important, and that the essential point is that we have

discovered the little root, the characteristic which, *in developing*, leads to the evolution of what we legitimately can call 'Man'.

At what stage of this development, the *individual* creatures had sufficient 'human' characteristics to qualify for the name 'Man' can confidently be left to the tastes of those who wish to express an 'opinion' about it. We have chosen to apply the name 'Man' at the first appearance of the specifically 'human' quality of pre-realising, that is temporealisation, to a sufficient degree to make that quality apparent in their actions.

As has been underlined in the first chapter, this new quality of human 'thinking' and 'acting' does not necessarily imply an increase in 'intelligence'.

The problem of the nature of 'intelligence' is very wide and prolix and beset by the varied interpretations which we give to words. It would send us too far from the present line of discussion to go fully into it here. An attempt in that direction will be made later on.

If we keep to the provisional definition given, namely that 'Intelligence' should be the name retained for no more than the "ability to combine 'data' and to arrive at 'conclusions'", we can see that temporealisation does not influence 'intelligence', as such. It is concerned with the nature and the pre-selection of the data with which the intellect is provided.

Obviously it will influence the 'conclusions' that are drawn by the tellect. An intellect provided with data determined by adequate pre-realisation will produce 'better', more 'useful' and more valid conclusions than one that is not so well served, but this does not necessarily mean that the one intellect, as such, is better than the other. One can only judge intellects by their products when one knows exactly what material they had available *at the moment of thinking*, and we often forget that that is impossible.

One could compare this with the work of an artisan. The artisan who has been given better and more suitable material to work with can produce a better product, even if he is not more skilled than the artisan who has to use defective or unsuitable material or tools that are unsuitable for the purpose.

On the other hand it does obviously not mean that he is not a better artisan if he produces better products from better materials, just as it does not mean that the intellect of an individual with a higher degree of temporealisation is not better than that of one who has only the present and the near future to work with.

On *this* basis then we can (at least provisionally) accept that it could be possible that the average ancestral ape was as intelligent as the ape man who developed from him. We can accept, theoretically, that he was as 'intelligent' as the average primitive man - or even as the average modern man. A misanthrope could, with some justification, point out that there is hardly any doubt about that!

One must not make the mistake of confusing the 'scope' with the 'quality' of the intellect under examination. Even the questionably accurate IQ tests tell us that the development of 'intelligence' in us, stops at about the age of fifteen years, yet there is no doubt that the *conclusions* reached by a mature, thinking man of, say, thirty years are much wider in scope, and more likely to be correct in a wider, practical sense, than those of a boy of fifteen. From here we can concede that, had an ape mind been able to contain and to make available to its intellect the material with which ours is being supplied, there is no real reason to suppose that it would come to other, less valid conclusions than ours does.

The ape however can only see one side (the past-to-present side) of the problems that he meets (we can leave the question of why this should be so till later) and he has only half the material with which to produce his conclusions. This is not because he is 'dull', or 'confused', or 'blocked', or because he is 'only an animal' - but because, to have a future image at all, one must have a special mechanism, quality or structure in the physical brain (congenitally or acquired) which can handle it.

To have an effective future-image, one must evolve or acquire the ability to abstract only the essential qualities out of a set of special, localised and specific events or situations, and to make out of them a kind of generalised, overall 'image' of the 'event as such'. Only after the 'event as such' has been abstracted and isolated, can it be legitimately placed in the future-context, together with other abstractions culled from other events and other past experiences. One cannot imagine a specific past event, with all its (non-essential) detail, to be happening in the future. One must imagine the 'event as such' and no more.

The mental processes that do this abstracting for us, are, to us, self evident. The abstracted images have, for us, a kind of personal existence, and specific events are finally reduced to being specific examples of that image. That is the basis of the process by which our memory has become able to store and catalogue its material under 'name' labels, and (being the manner in which images are presented to our consciousness) it does not occur to us to think that this is a special gift which is not available to all awarenesses. It does not occur to us that this gift is one of those on which our ascendancy over the rest of the animal kingdom depends.

When we try to visualise, or to think ourselves into the development of temporealisation in the mind of the highest of the apes we must remember that this is actually a special gift and we must try to imagine how life would be without it or, to put it differently, how the world is that does not contain this ability.

In a way this is as difficult as it is to think oneself into the world of the congenitally blind. One keeps on thinking: "But the animal should see this if it had any intelligence at all", "Given these facts it should be able to draw this conclusion." etc., but in that we will be wrong for, although the facts may be the same, the way they are presented, their qualities and implications are *not* the same.

I am an 'intelligent' animal and hungry. I know that a mile away from me there is food and I set about changing my present (which is, unrealised by me, moving at a steady pace through time), to make it into one where I am where the food is. I walk (because I know from experience that is the method that has the desired effect), and, remaining always in the changing present, I see to it that the change is the one I desire.

I am a Man and hungry, know that, a mile away from me there is food. I visualise the 'goal' or 'eating the food' and set about 'solving the problem of going there. I walk with the goal in mind and see myself approaching it.

This may to the superficial observer, seem to be so almost identical as to make no difference - and, in practice, there is no difference until an obstacle comes in the way.

It is then that the importance of 'being able to solve' comes into its own - and that the increase of survival chances becomes effective.

The animal finds an interference with his progress, tries the tricks he knows, both instinctively and from past experience, to circumvent or overcome the obstacle. and, if they do not work, he still has his hunger and wanders off in another direction, looking for other food.

If the food is visible, or if it is the only food obtainable, so that it remains in his awareness, the result is the 'childish' one of irritation, sulking and manifest ignoring. The environment does not want to play the game. It does not do what it should do, that is: produce the expected results from the standard actions. There is no 'problem' as we know it - things only do not work out.

The 'Man' however has another attitude.

He has what can legitimately be called a 'problem' and in that he sees his 'goal': his eating of the food, as the final future image in a series. Between it and his present position there is an obstacle. which however has continuity both with the present and with the future goal attainment. It is integrated in the past-present-future

image in his mind and has an existence of its own. It is not just a part of the environment. One can realise what a great difference that must make to the way in which the 'intellect' is able to apply itself to the situation.

Its details arrange themselves in a logical sequence. because the mind can see the 'cause and effect' structure extending into the future.

Let us say that the food is an apple hanging, obviously out of reach, from the roof. Man does not move under it and try a few leaps. He can pre-visualise the futility of that, so he does not even make the effort. The animal however has to bring the inability to reach it into his 'present', if he is to deal with it at all.

Man visualises the future act of grasping the apple and knows that he has to visualise some way in which his body can get to the apple, or the apple can be brought to the body. He looks about to see what material he has to 'materialise' or make real either one of these methods on the basis of remembered possibilities.

We do not need to elaborate the way of finding the solution, but one can see that working with future-images, his intellect may find the solution without being, of itself better than that of the animal which gives up without even seeming to try.

The man can visualise the goal. and apply his intellect to the *method* of attaining it.

The ape moves forward as best he can. Looking up, he realises that he is in need of 'being higher'. In his memory he has the image of 'being higher' when standing on something and his intellect may combine the two for him so that he may seem to be able to 'solve a problem' because, he comes to the same 'solution' as the man.

The deduction that it is the same is however not justified, just as it would not be justified to think a purely instinctive action by an insect to be the same as that done when motivated by 'understanding'.

Unlike the man, the ape cannot approach his 'problem' without looking at the apple more than once, selecting his boxes, placing them in the correct position and then to look up and take the apple which will now be within his reach. He must first feel the specific 'problem' almost physically before he can produce a specific 'solution'. The problem must be brought into the 'present'.

In the development of a still rudimentary but slowly extending prerealisation in the pre-human, we can see the cause for the solutions the cave man found for the problems in his life. Once the problems were seen, the solutions were there to help him.

Because his future sense now made him always keep a weapon (and one that suited his strength and his abilities) ready to hand, he attained a mastership over others who, when the occasion arose, had to pick up the first stick or stone they could find.

Secondly, the pre-visualisation of future battles and the precognition of what was important there would lead to improvements in the quality of the weapons themselves and enable the longest futued ones to preselect that time and place of battle which was most advantageous to them.

We should, however, not only think of the 'killing tools' that the caveman had.

There is for instance the time when the most primitive man wished to carry a large number of fruit to his lair. The ape would load his arms and, still picking up more, drop some, pick them up and drop others until, giving up, he would carry away what would stay in his arms.

The primitive man however would have his pre-realised image to help him. He would be able to see himself

carrying the 'too much' away and that image would be part of him *at the moment of picking up*. He would be able to see the 'burden' as a whole and thence the intellect would have a chance to find the solution of 'wrapping up' in a palm leaf or a piece of skin.

Lacking that pre-vision, the ape, even if given the load lying on the skin, would not be able to put two and two together. At the moment of picking up he would still be no more than a 'picker up' He would not also be a potential 'carrier'.

Once the or the concept of the 'container' had been found, the intellect could get busy improving on it, just as we imagine that it did on the weapon image. Association of images, things seen in other relations, all would lead to different solutions once the problem had been perceived. *Solving* the problem was not difficult. *Seeing* it was the difficulty, even as it still is now. (Inventing the paper clip was not difficult, but seeing that it would solve a problem and attain a to be desired goal, was the thing!)

One can imagine that the development was from folded skin bags to baskets (via the plaited palm leaf, to keep the fronds together?), to sewn bags (where the possibility of joining things by threads had emerged from the plaitings) and, by itself, the making of the unfired clay pot which would emerge from playing with clay (which, when made into a ball and pressed with a thumb automatically produces a 'container').

The use of skin containers would lead to intentional skinning of the animals killed and, where the skins were present, sheltering under them and the eventual making of skin clothes would need no more than merely 'intelligent' observation and association of ideas.

The ape might shelter under the skins, but he would not have the future-image to tell him that he had discovered something 'useful'. The moment the need for shelter was gone he would drop them and, meeting them later on, he would merely see something to eat or to play with, because in that later image the 'sheltering' quality was not cogent.

Once 'clothing' was given, the development of 'weaving' from 'basketry' would be only a minor step to the production of cloth.

The same can be seen in the change of habitat from the edge of the forest to the caves.

The ape that, due to circumstances, found shelter in a cave would emerge without more than vaguely having realised that he had been safeguarded on all sides except in one, as he probably would anyhow have been hiding from one danger in the 'present' of that moment.

To the futureless animal, danger is always only there when it is present. He is continually on the watch for it coming, but it is not there until it has arrived. The futured animal, nascent man, however had already tasted the bitter fruit of pre-vision. With the entry of the future into his present, its dangers had entered too. Not only the problems of tomorrow but also its dangers had become a part of today.

In the Game Reserves of Africa it is quite common to see the antelope grazing or contentedly chewing the cud within sight of a pride of lions. They know that there is no danger at that moment, and it is up to the lions to keep them in that impression when hunger sets them off on their hunting routines.

To the 'intelligent' observer who automatically translates everything into intelligent manipulation of 'facts', the buck seem to be inconceivably dense. They *must* know that the lions are a danger to them and that presently the peaceful scene will change into one where sudden death will overtake one of them. It is even possible that they do know, but that knowledge is not 'real' to them. It has happened every day of their lives, but tomorrow and even this afternoon does not exist.

With the coming of pre-realisation, the primitive man also lost the paradisiacal animal 'safety' in the dangerless 'present without a future'. He was no longer only constantly and instinctively on the alert for the first sign of danger. Danger was already there because it was sure to come.

When he therefore first found himself in a cave, the nearly palpable diminution of danger, which now could only come from one direction, must almost consciously have been felt as an ineffable relief and, being able to visualise a future (however brief) it is understandable that *he* saw that this would be an ideal 'home'.

The final step in his development, the institution of his symbiosis with the creature 'fire', that gave warmth and held predators at bay in return for being regularly fed with wood, was probably the most remarkable advance for this period of his development.

One can produce a series of theories showing either the development from his 'flint chipping' and 'wood shaping' 'activities' or from capture of the fire from volcanoes, lightning or spontaneous combustion, but, like all the above, they would be, and would remain, no more than that.

The actual events and their sequence are hidden in the mists of anonymous time and it is quite probable that the same things happened in a different sequence or in different ways in different places all over the world. Once the problems could be seen there is no need to suppose that suitable solutions had to be found in only one place and spread out from there. Even now, in science, we find that time and again, several workers in quite different parts of the world find the same answers quite independently and we shake our heads over this 'remarkable coincidence'. We do not realise that here too it is not the finding of the answers which is the important thing, but the fact that, in the body of science, the realisation that there was a problem, something that needed an explanation, had slowly come to the surface.

The question of how and where the different developments took place are without any real importance. What is important is that it can be understood that all the developments that made up the life of the caveman can be explained upon the basis of the appearance, in him, of a future-sense of a few days. On that basis, experience, association and the realisation of the goal would be sufficient to enable the intellect to produce what it did.

With the fire in the cave, the cooking of food, the use of fire-hardened wood for digging tools and weapons and finally fired-clay pottery were natural developments needing no genius of higher inspiration to eventuate. Observation and average intellect would suffice.

The important point of the evolution of man is really to be found in another direction.

Our honoured ancestor was not only a superior brand of a carnivorous ape. If that was all, he would have remained more or less where he was, as 'his advantage over dumb animals was such that he need never have hungered. He was far and away the 'fittest' animal to survive and not in need, of any more 'evolution' to do so.

He was also a cannibal however and it is in his cannibalism that to a great measure we can see the actual reason for the unprecedented speedup in his evolution far beyond the necessities of his mere survival in relation to other animals. It was probably his cannibalism which made man, who was a relative newcomer on the scene, outstrip everything else in the last few 'minutes' of the calendar of the ages.

Our forefather was a logical being, not overly imbued with ideas about the rights of others to exist and he was not inclined to take the more difficult way where an easier one was available. He realised, probably right from the beginning, that the logical source of his meat ration and that of his troop, was the slightly 'duller' neighbour in the next valley whose way of life he thoroughly understood, whom he could 'out-think' at every turn, and who was not as tiresomely fast as the antelopes, as large as the elephant or as fierce as the bears and the lions.

The natural and most obvious food for the man, when he had started to *think* about such things, was man. In the fossils there is enough evidence for such practices, although paleontologists tend to be rather averse to 'telling' on the old man. As a matter of fact it is most likely that the remains we find in the refuse of the kitchens of prehistoric man were not those of prehistoric man himself but of the generation which, at that time, was already on its way out. They died to make a Sunday meal for the occupants of the cave whose remains we are more likely to find in the kitchen offal of the next evolutionary spurt in the plains.

In this situation, where the less gifted, less aggressive had already lost the race almost before it had started, the selective activity of the 'survival of the fittest' must have (otherwise than in nature in general) been working in high gear all the time. Where, in other packs, the fight was mostly between dominant males while the young that had been sired usually survived, in a cannibalistic evolution we can expect that the young with the 'less fit' genes also disappeared, for children must have been a specially succulent dish, something like veal or sucking pig.

One can note that, although we have outgrown this habit of eating each other, and now think it disgusting, we have not yet outgrown the habit of killing off our weaker brothers, if not for their meat, then at least for what they have - as we showed during the last two wars.

We should therefore not be surprised (where we do such things on a grand scale) that our ancestors, who were less 'civilised' than we are, did it in a smaller and more personal manner. It is also understandable why the evolutionists, judging others by themselves, saw the 'human' survival-of-the-fittest pattern as the principal cornerstone of *all* evolution. 'Live and let live' can only be found in nature in the raw. The animal generally only kills 'for the pot' and otherwise lives in quite a tolerant and friendly relationship with his environment and even with his prey. The animal does *not* eat when it is not hungry and it does not kill when it does not need to eat.

But not so man - and that too, like his cannibalism, is really the result of his temporealisation. We can realise that his needs were no longer only the needs of the moment. The needs of tomorrow already started to clamour for attention today, long before they were due. This was not intellectually and consciously worked out, but with the intrusion of the future it is understandable that there was the tendency to kill more than was necessary. There is an automatic association between the avidity, (the need to have), of an individual and the stretch of time that is 'real' to him. A modern example of this is the 'miser' and the man who is 'saving for a rainy day' all his life! Even if one is inclined to accept this temporealisation development as the real cause for human evolution because it gives such a relatively simple explanation of it all and because it seems to leave no residual problems to solve, one should not overlook that there is one aspect of it that produces what one could nearly call a 'proof of its own validity. This does not lie in something that happened, but in something that did not happen. There was one thing that one would have expected on the basis of 'intelligent action on an ever larger body or organised experience' but which did not eventuate even though the intelligence and the experience were there. The more we learn of them the more it is clear that even the most primitive men were both intelligent and able. Their artefacts, their basketry (as shown by the imprints on the shreds of clay-plastering that have been found) and their pottery itself were not in any way mere dull adaptations in the use of the material available in the environment.

The paintings on the walls of their caves have been given a high artistic evaluation even in comparison with the art of today, and altogether the picture we receive across the ages is that of a lively and imaginative mind, solemn but with a considerable sense for beauty - an active mind too, observant and alive.

And yet, despite all this, it took untold millennia to proceed from 'knowing that a food seed planted in the ground. will provide a food plant', to the logical result of 'agriculture'. Almost up to the end of his time Neolithic man remained a 'gatherer' even though the adoption of 'agriculture' should have been much more simple than the 'invention' of basketry and the bow and arrow.

That the absence of agriculture is a problem, is only mentioned in passing by most anthropologists. Kroeber, for instance, hardly seems to notice its mysterious implications at all. He simply passes on to 'agriculture' as if the sequence of inventions was merely one of 'who thought of what first'. There is little or no realisation that inventions must have grown out of the qualities of men as they developed from animals to full 'human' beings, and not the other way about.

One, reads that agriculture 'changed the way of life of the late Neolithic man' (as if it was something that was introduced from the outside, or just happened to come along) - where in actual fact 'agriculture' was no more than a symptom of something that had happened *in* Neolithic man and which made him able to start farming. If we realise the importance of temporealisation, both the fact of the tardiness of the arrival of agriculture and its explanation fan into place. One can even realise that it could not have been otherwise.

As 'temporealisation' presupposes, to do a thing now, in *this* present moment, so that profit can be drawn from its effect in the future, needs a quality which animals lack entirely and which (necessarily) must have developed only slowly in man. It needs a quality of 'reality' in the image of the future moment aimed at, at the time of doing the deed, which is far above that of an image merely 'constructed' by intelligent deduction -even if the latter is *known* to be valid.

To work today, to leave other more immediate chores or amusements undone, to forego a pleasant hour of lying in the sun and chewing on a stem of grass, needs a strong and clear, a 'real' image of the time of reaping and of plenty to eat which is, at the least, still several months away in the future.

We can find a practical and living example of this in the Far East where, in some places, the hills are inhabited by still completely Neolithic people while the valleys, or the neighbouring areas are inhabited by prosperous farming communities.

These Stone Age people are not dull brutes and neither are they afraid of work. It can also not be argued that they do not know for, as Levy Brühl points out so often, all savages are extraordinarily observant.

Doubtlessly too they have been down in the valleys and peered out on the activity going on in the fields from behind their jungle screen. They do speak with the valley people and barter amenities and one must accept that the idea must have occurred to them that it would be a good idea to do something about planting their own food plants nearer to their huts - but the day of harvesting was too far off.

It somehow is not real enough today to start clearing that patch of weeds near the dung heap. There are other things to do and the job is put off until it is too late to catch the season. When harvest time comes in the valley we can imagine the hill man shaking his head in silent or even in expressed jealousy.

Besides this, generally better known, example we have that of our own Bushmen. They too have lived since time immemorial with the agriculture practised by the Bantu in front of their eyes - and they also have never made any attempt to adopt it. Nevertheless, as recent studies have shown, they certainly lack neither intelligence, nor skill, nor the ability to exert themselves prodigiously.

The positive and living demonstration that knowing the methods and being aware of the advantages of agriculture, does not necessarily lead to the adoption of soil cultivation by a people, more or less vitiates at least one of the 'explanations' offered by those who have felt that there is a problem here.

The idea that Neolithic people, being mainly dependent upon meat for their food, had to follow the migration of the animals on which they preyed, around the countryside and that therefore they never remained long enough in one place to plant and to reap a crop, is possibly valid for the cavemen of Europe with its then inclement climate, but it is even there somewhat doubtful.

The seasons there must have been very contrasting and may have caused summer and winter migrations among the game stock, but it is unlikely that those migrations among the game stock could have taken place between the times of sowing and harvesting. An occasional bad year might have made the animals leave certain areas, but, in general, one can expect that the summer and winter residences of both the men and the game would have followed more or less regular routines.

Besides this, some tribes in the Middle East show that it is possible to solve even that problem quite simply. They planted their fields, trekked away, and moved in again when the harvest time was due.

The 'explanation' on the basis of the availability of the 'wheat' plant fits better into the next chapter, as it is associated with the development of the 'city states'.

Here we are concerned with locally present or developed plants and the list of these includes, Oats, Barley, Millet in all its multitudinous forms, and even such root plants as Manioc.

On the basis of the necessity for a pre-realisation of harvest time, to induce work at planting time, the reason for the tardiness in the adoption of agricultural processes by the otherwise already able and intelligent human race, seems to be logically inherent in the situation. Neolithic man *had* to wait until his future image had extended itself far enough into the future so as to include 'harvest time' in his images to a sufficient degree of 'reality' to drive him into breaking up the ground now and sowing the seed, in order to eat four or five months later. Before that he *could* not become a farmer. A fully pre-realised future of at least half a year was necessary to make him do the work and not just 'sufficient intelligence' to work the method out from known facts.

This six months' time limit however implanted several characteristics on the type of farming which developed.

In a way one could say it was 'farming without a farm', for it was not the farm but only the crop, that existed as such in the mind of the primitive agriculturist. He neither irrigated, nor manured, nor rotated his crops. It was a pure predatory agriculture which still is the only one that has ever been known in Bantu Africa.

Each planting season was a thing by itself. It had to be initiated by magic and incantation. Fertility rites had to be practised to make the seed grow and the rains to come in time - but when it was finished, when the harvest was in, it was finished until the next 'season' came along.

Nowhere in Bantu Africa do we find even the simplest of irrigation even when the drought withers a crop situated below the level of a running stream. Nowhere do we see a special plot of land tended for years on end as is really understood by the word 'farm'. When a certain piece of land stops providing food, another is prepared.

One can concede that there were (and are) other factors at work preventing the aborigines from using irrigation.

The Maya, for instance, although they had a fully developed 'time sense' and a civilisation on a par with that of the people of Mesopotamia, if not of Egypt, were also unable to do it. As van Hagen writes in 'World of the Maya' (p. 67 New American Library): "One of the enigmas of the Maya is that neolithic block which prevented them from devising a way in which to obtain the water which lay immediately below the land surface. Landa noted that there 'are few places where one digs down that water cannot be found, sometimes within one metre.

"When droughts occurred and despite their astonishingly high level of civilisation: "the Maya abandoned their cities. went into the jungles and were reduced to eating the bark of trees."

The reader will again have noted the use of the word 'block', which, implies the presence of an ability which is not allowed to materialise. One would suppose that such an inability to draw a, *to us* obvious, conclusion is not due to a 'block' but to an 'inherent disability', something that is as yet *lacking*. Where there is intelligence and no solution to a simple problem, the most reasonable solution is that the problem was not seen as such. One cannot believe that, with their undoubted intelligence, their building ability and their inexhaustible stock of human labour. they could not have solved their problem *if they had realised that it existed*. One feels behind this the same kind of thing as that which prevented the chimpanzee from distinguishing the 'container' from the 'place in the room' where the banana had been put into it.

It is probable that the mind of the Maya (and that of the African primitive) did not realise that it was the 'wetness', the 'wateriness' of 'rain' that made the crops grow. It was the 'rain' and not the 'water in the rain' that did the trick, therefore the 'solution' of bringing up 'water' from the rivers or from the wells, simply did not occur to them where the *method* of doing so would have been easily solved.

This idea is confirmed when, as we will see later, it is found that 'irrigation' was discovered in those areas, and only in those areas. where nature showed the way by providing 'water' (and not 'rain') by means of seasonal inundations. There 'irrigation' was actually on a par with the 'rain-making' of the witchdoctors in areas dependent upon rain for their moisture.

However that may be, one can find another symptom of the restricted future-sense of the Neolithic people of Bantu Africa, in the total absence of roads.

The mind that lives only in a short-futured stretch of time is also necessarily a 'parochial' mind, because its environment is only in any sense 'real' in so far as it can be reached within the timespan that is real to the imagination.

The Neolithic and earlier social structures had therefore to be small, more or less isolated communities with only occasional contact with others. One can imagine that travel, as we know it, was rare and only indulged in by individuals with personally longer time spans than the average. One does not travel without the goal of that travel, and the image of arrival at that goal, fairly clear in the mind.

The making and especially the keeping in repair of roads which, like planting, needs work today to serve for use tomorrow or rather next year, would not appear to be a reasonable thing to do. just to lighten the burden of the occasional traveller.

The final structure of the 'farmless' farmer community would therefore be that of relatively small villages with possibly a central larger one, in which most of the inhabitants were of one original family stock and their social structure would not be able to outgrow the first stage of that of one big and complicated family.

There would be the absolute authority of the 'father' (who, at a distance would tend to attain divine qualities), the 'democratic' group of 'uncles' with advisory and secondary duties, powers and privileges and below them the intricate structure of family priorities and positions.

The City States and their type of social organisation with specialisation of duties had to wait for further developments before they could materialise.

One of the more important points, in this conception of how things developed among men (as has already been mentioned in passing) is that the 'who' and the 'where' are relatively unimportant.

The actual discovery of a new thing or method was not the main factor in its appearance. Just as a new art-form, or a new scientific theory cannot prevail however valid it may be, until the minds of men are ready to receive it, so any other idea however practical and advantageous it may be, will not take root till the people

are ready for it. When they are ready, however, the thing is often so obvious that the actual initiator is only doing 'what comes naturally'.

As we have seen in the example of the Neolithic hill people of the Far East, it is not the knowledge, and not even the actual demonstration of the advantages of something, that makes men do things. People did not start cultivating plants because they saw other people doing it, but because they were ready for it and it follows that there is no sense in searching for an original focus from which something originated and spread over the world (unless it is a special plant) - or an invention from which a particular practice radiated out among men.

The actual ideas are so simple that even an ape could think them out. They are certainly no more difficult than discovering a method of pushing a banana out of a long tube by means of a stick that first has to be 'assembled'.

That there was need for a special intelligence, or a teaching by example is therefore extremely unlikely. We can with a good conscience accept that everywhere where the future-sense of the people had developed beyond a certain degree and in a sufficient number of individuals, the new 'skills' and 'agriculture' would follow - either spontaneously or by imitation, just as we find in Africa today that, where the time-sense is still the late Neolithic half yearly one, teaching and demonstration of the advantages of new methods is singularly disappointing in its effectiveness.

It is because of not knowing, or of not realising this all important point that the 'forced' civilisation of Africa is going to run into snags that will fill the pages of later history books with a series of 'unexplainable' frustrations of the idealists.

May it be granted that it will not turn into an extension of the drama of which the Congo gave us only a slight foretaste not so long ago.

CHAPTER IV

Farmer to City Man

The step from 'seasonal farmers' to the emergence of recognisable civilisations in the form of the 'City States' is one of the most interesting in the evolution of Man as we know him now.

It is however also one of the most confusing because, in the process of development, the human being acquired several characteristics, each of which, in its own way, influenced his development. This makes it difficult to extract the essentials out of the maze of details.

One of the most important of these details is the development of the ability to see 'many' in the 'one'. It is more or less that covered by the 'Gestalt' theory and we have already met it in the inability of the Chimpanzee to analyse the 'container' out of the 'place where the banana was put into it'. It is also to be found in the apparent inability of the seasonal farmers to analyse the 'wateriness' out of 'rain'. which prevented them from finding the obvious solution of *irrigation* in their fight against drought.

The tendency of official anthropology to see in the invention of irrigation the stimulus for the next step in human development is still based on the idea that man, as he is now, was already present in the earliest specimens of his race and that it only needed 'inventions' and 'discoveries' to bring it out. Man discovered 'agriculture', they say, and he became a farmer. He discovered 'irrigation' and he developed 'City States'.

As an example of this way of thinking we can quote from the 'Concise Encyclopaedia of World History' (p. 40): "In the Protoliteral phase, southern Mesopotamia first surpasses the surrounding areas in cultural achievement. An astounding vigour and vitality manifests itself in every department of life, and we cannot doubt that this élan is chiefly due to the way in which the challenge of difficult natural conditions had been so successfully met and overcome.

"The energy elicited, was by no means exhausted in coping with it and went on to produce achievements which greatly exceeded anything that the nature of the country rendered essential. The wheel was now available to the potter, who had become a specialised craftsman, and the wagon builder. Oxen and asses were used as a means of transport."

As a typical example of what one finds everywhere, this quotation can hardly be bettered and the habit of seeing a 'Man' instead of 'men' is particularly well illustrated.

The men of Mesopotamia are here seen as a 'Man'. This would not have been so bad if this had only been done for the purpose of facilitating description, but when one gives this conglomerate 'Man' such an extremely personal characteristic as an 'élan' which is supposed to be due to a (here also personalised) 'Challenge' which has been 'overcome', the picture becomes somewhat distorted and out of perspective.

It should be obvious that such a 'reaction' could only take place in individual men who had met an individual challenge. It would moreover have had to be the reaction of a man who had personally been able to compare the conditions before and after the 'victory', and one feels the spurious 'veni, vidi, vici' quality of a specific 'invention' behind the image given by our 'authority'.

In actual fact however there must have been thousands of individual men spread over a completely unknown number of generations in the time during which they slowly and painfully adapted themselves while learning how to use the special, but as yet unsuspected, facilities which the environment into which they were born happened to provide.

It is extremely unlikely that any one of them felt any particular élan or even saw himself as a conqueror of the river or the 'difficult natural conditions' to such a degree that he started to look for new fields to conquer.

To the individual men who lived in those days, there could hardly have been more than a gradual increase in affluence but that would certainly not have 'made the wheel available', nor led to the use of draught animals, nor to any other item in the long list which ends the original text of the above quotation.

What one senses here is not the reaction of individuals to a difficult environment, but the appearance of a different kind of men: men with a better and clearer outlook, a better organised mind and with a better, more facile, understanding and grasp of the essentials of reality.

They were not merely flushed with the heady fumes of victory.

Where and how did these new men emerge?

One can accept that their association with the river had something to do with it, as all the civilisations in the Middle East appeared in the great river basins. Up to a certain point one can even see that the new developments could have been a mere product of the 'invention' (or rather the enforced adoption) of 'irrigation'. Soon however we will find that that explanation is no longer sufficient.

We can imagine that the rivers had a certain selective evolutionary effect on the local populations, tending to bring out certain characteristics - but this means that the men with whom the process ended were not the same kind of men as those with whom it started.

When we focus our imagination on the neolithic men among whom the first 'civilisations' appeared and observe them with some sympathetic understanding, the process itself becomes understandable too. Once the 'future-span' had extended sufficiently to encompass the time needed for a food seed that had been planted, to produce its crop, the material for the new development was already there. We can see how groups of the resultant 'seasonal farmers' were edged out into the semi-arid plains of the regularly inundated areas along the great rivers.

Having learnt to think, or rather having been taught to believe that 'rain' was the life-giver, this must have seemed to spell doom to them, but the river took them and taught them, by example, that its 'waters' did the job just as well and better than the rain. Then, gradually, it became clear that it was much easier and more effective to 'make a miniature inundation' than it was to 'make rain' - and they were on their way.

That the result of this was so extremely felicitous was just their good luck and not due to any special gift of intelligence, insight or even 'long-future' sense on their part. They also had not really 'met a challenge'. They had simply managed to adapt themselves and, in doing so besides surviving, they had found a "bonanza".

In adapting themselves however, several things must have happened, all tending to the evolution of a man with special characteristics.

In the first place, the areas suitable for 'irrigation' farming would be closer together and not divided by natural barriers. This would result in a breakdown of the congenital (possibly cannibalistic) enmity and distrust between the different tribes, an example of which those of us who still remember reading Herman Melville's 'Typee' will easily call to mind. There had to be a breakdown of the barriers between neighbours, not only because one could not survive and keep on shooting at each other every time somebody stuck his head out of the rushes along the river bank, but because, to establish a reasonably efficient system of irrigation, quite a large amount of co-operation became necessary.

We can therefore imagine that here, otherwise than in the essentially parochial and fragmented areas of the

seasonal farmers, those who could not co-operate and who were wholly selfish (and therefore the more markedly short-futured ones) would be eliminated and snapped off as undesirable branches from the tree of 'evolution'. Only those who could live together, not only with their own family but also with others, would be the survivors in such a situation and this would tend to lengthen the average future-sense of the dwellers in the river lands.

But there would be more than that for there would also be another factor tending to prepare them for 'city life'. The places fit for human habitation, that is, those above the highest water level which were still within a reasonable distance, from the lands, would of necessity be still more limited and lead to an unavoidable closer living together.

Altogether we can see that, after possibly numerous generations of fighting, bickering and feuds, those who managed to survive must have been those who had the potential *ability* to live together in a still more close and complex social structure. The others had been eliminated or had eliminated themselves - a 'survival of the fittest' therefore in a completely different sense than the one that Spencer gave to Darwin's ideas.

Just to remind ourselves of what we are trying to underline here, we should remember that these special factors were present nowhere else. They did not operate in the Savannahs of Africa or in the source area of our own race, Northern Europe and Asia. There people remained 'short-futured' and produced no 'civilisations', at that time at least.

The river valley men can hardly have been filled with an élan at having conquered their difficult environment, but what surely happened was that the greater productivity of the irrigated fields produced a much higher 'standard of living' and a measure of 'free time' the like of which had never been seen upon this earth.

To produce the 'City States' however, that would not have been enough. A future span of half a year, even in the presence of more than enough food and enforced living together would not have been sufficient foundation for an organised civilisation. A six months' pre-vision will not keep a citizen in check and make him obey laws based on the good of 'next year' or to promote the endurance of a community which, on a six months' basis, has no meaning at all.

What must have happened here is that the original, half-yearly view of time, in lengthening out, closed itself into a 'circle' for a significant part of the people of the area. The future of the 'now' caught up with the tail-end of the past of next year and time started, for them, 'to flow continuously in a circle'. Possibly this event was hastened by living in what was almost a symbiosis with the great annual clock of the river, but the essential point is that time became a 'wheel' and, as such, could be surveyed and understood as a whole. It was something that had neither beginning nor end, a diorama of seasons following each other with predictable regularity because the jointing of the one to the other could be clearly envisaged. It is probably not without significance that it was in this part of the world that the wheel was 'invented' and that the "Wheel of the Universe" became a regularly recurring religious motif - not to forget that the idea of reincarnation, which has its roots in these regions, sees even eternity as a revolving wheel.

With time having attained an, in the present, surveyable structure, specialisation became also for the first time, a possibility. Only when one can see that the environment will, from its side, provide enough, can one leave undone certain tasks that are instinctively recognised as essential, in order to concentrate on others, in the secure knowledge that they will be otherwise provided for.

Then, when specialisation and the division of work became the 'norm' instead of the exception, progress could no longer be stopped. The thing snowballed itself, willy nilly, into a civilisation. It had to - and that without any great intellectual guidance from the men themselves. We can now see how the first great, basic division of 'labour', into 'Soldiers' and 'Civilians' must have taken place at that time.

Life is essentially a serious business and, being animals, we must fight to be able to survive, even if, nowadays, we leave that to our armies and to the policemen who patrol our streets.

There are those who love fighting, those who enjoy the excitement of battle, the trappings of the belligerent and the lust for loot, rapine and violence. These were (and are) also obviously the more short-futured ones who shunned or disdained the new backbreaking work in the fields that had become necessary according to the more long-term view of time; those therefore who did not fit easily into the future-directed structure of the developing state.

On the other hand there were those who disliked fighting and preferred to take upon themselves the task of working to produce the food and the amenities of life, content to leave the bloody and dangerous work of defence and (inevitably) offence to others.

In those days the soldiers were very necessary, especially in Mesopotamia where virile, warlike neighbouring tribes were always ready to descend from their hills into the plains to gather what they could of the treasures in food and wealth that the men of the river had amassed.

Once organised and trained into bands of professional, full-term fighters the countryside could have had very little effective resistance against the 'Soldiers'. The world was there for the taking and they took it. They must have had a grand time and incidentally brought in their loot to gladden the hearts of the citizens who would eventually own it - as soldiers, being short-futured, do not know how to save. Easy come, easy go, is their motto. What is more important is that they must also have brought in slaves to do the hard work of the community, both in the home and on the fields thereby producing still more free time and 'security' for the population itself.

Soon one sees a new specialisation, dividing the community into 'horizontal' layers: Rulers (Priests, Kings and Nobility), Craftsmen and Merchants - all resting on the lowest layer of the farmers and slaves who produced the food on which all of them lived.

All this was not intellectually thought out. It happened because it had to happen. It happened because that was the pattern of the forces inherent in the situation, just as the iron filings around a magnet take the shape of the pattern of the lines of forces that are there.

The minds of men, freed from the immediate duties entailed in survival, now had time and the wherewithal to turn to other aims.

It became possible to make things, or to have them made, not only for use, but also for the pleasure ('Aesthetic', 'Status-giving' or otherwise) that one could derive from them. It became possible to organise social relationships in the way that those in power thought that they should be - not, as one would like to believe, for the 'common good' but in such a way that those in power had what they wanted.

That this meant that a general prosperity evolved, which was also to the advantage of the lesser men, was more or less incidental.

Without becoming 'idealistic', one can even concede that here and there there may have been a ruler who was concerned with the lot of the common man (once his own personal and regal requirements had been adequately provided for). What is important is that one should realise that there need have been no 'thinking out', no 'guiding intelligence' or 'ideal'. Each man strove for the best he could visualise for himself and the final pattern gave to each the maximum available according to his abilities to obtain it, considering *all* the circumstances.

If that striving included making others do the work, it all went into the overall design of the state that was

developing.

Like a plant which does not think: "I must put a root there" and "I think another branch there is too much for that side," the State grew as an expression of the aggregate mind and the evaluations of the people themselves.

Personal Gods were merged into the City God and communally adored through the offices of specialised priests. Things were made for the sake of beauty, personally or at the command of a master, because there developed a market for them, and everywhere new possibilities appeared and were fulfilled. Because of all this, we have the picture of an 'élan' which the simple observation of facts sees as 'due' to having 'conquered' the 'environment' but which was actually due to the extra time, the 'leisure' available, created by 'mass production', 'division of work', 'specialisation' and, possibly to the greater extent, by the organised use of slave labour.

The final possibility had however not yet been attained. The 'wheel of time' gives infinitely more possibilities than a half-yearly, seasonal image of time, but it is never much longer than a few turns of the wheel. It tends to keep the mind within the year in which it actually lives, although the 'recurring pattern' may make it possible to feel a certain permanence behind it all and to organize one's life accordingly.

The effect of this emerges when we compare the series of civilisations of Mesopotamia with the one civilisation of Egypt.

The former were civilisations that were lived by still relatively short-futured men on the basis of the continually returning year; and they suffered the defect of having been conceived with an insufficient regard for the more distant future. They were still civilisations determined by the activity and personality of the rulers - and therefore subject to the law which applies to all who rule by force and fear.

Such a ruler must come to power over others by a combination of ability and aggressive ruthlessness. He subdues by force and, once he becomes an absolute master, he finds himself before the insoluble dilemma which the logic of cause and effect always creates in such a situation. The master has expected peace and plenty and an end to having to fight when his last opponent has fallen. He expects to enjoy the spoils at his leisure - but reality does not agree to this.

He is where he is, only because of his ability and his willingness to kill or punish - and only by keeping up that ability and willingness can he remain where he is. Like a man on a treadmill, standing still means going back. He has set the pace and he must keep it up or he will fall by the same rules by which he himself came to the top.

With no enemies left and no immediate danger in view, it becomes more and more difficult to keep up the qualities necessary for his survival as a master. What is worse, and in a sense, more 'unfair', is that, if he settles down to enjoy the results of his labours, if he eats and drinks to continuous repletion and allows himself to be pampered by his slaves and cozened by his women, he inevitably degenerates as a fighter.

In practice the original master usually manages to survive for his natural lifetime (if court intrigues do not put poison in his coffee). The memory of his frightful deeds is still too fresh in the minds of his underlings, but in a few generations his progeny fall for the lure of the luxury with which he has provided them. They do not train for personal battle as is the 'duty of princes'. They become dependent upon the ministrations of slaves and accept that the mere fact of having descended from the original master (and not the fear which they personally should inspire) gives them authority and power as an inborn right. They may even formulate it as the 'divine right of masters'.

They forget, or do not know, that reality demands that they can only be and remain as masters by being able

and ready to kill and punish. Hence they disappear from the scene, either as the result of excessive debauchery or on the edge of the sword of other ambitious men who are willing and ready to kill and to risk their own lives for the chance of a place at the fleshpots.

We see this simple, logical design repeated all over the history of the world, at different levels and different degrees of magnitude, from the individual to the national - and Mesopotamia seems to have been one continuous example of it in action. Few of its civilisations lasted more than a couple of generations before they faded out or were overrun. "Semitic" and "Aryan" dynasties alternate with monotonous regularity and some of these did not even bother to learn the language or to change the governmental machine which they took over, being content to skim the cream off the top as long as it lasted.

The 'wheel of the year' was not an adequate image of time on which to build a state that would endure.

It is true that this is an over-simplified picture, for Mesopotamia always had its row of vultures, its surround of warlike hill-tribes, perched on its borders, waiting for any sign of degeneracy and a hankering after peace and goodwill to all men. Egypt on the other hand was more or less safely walled off by deserts and the sea.

Nevertheless Egyptian history is not at all peace-loving, as the recorded glories on the obelisks of its most famous rulers tell us - in a language that, over the years, has lost none of its bombastic qualities. If they had been haters of the sword, they would also not have had the slaves to do most of the work; and slaves were, at least in those days, a very important factor in the basic structure of 'civilisations'.

Somehow, amid prosperity, the Egyptians retained an efficient war machine and bred men that were willing to kill, and risk being killed.

Their history also shows indications of several major invasions (although these have been carefully deleted from the official records) and even in the origin of the civilisation itself one finds evidence of an invasion, peaceful or otherwise, from Mesopotamia.

As said, 'the wheel of the year' was not an adequate image on which to build a state that would endure for more than a few generations. It needs a thorough understanding and awareness of the 'wheel of fate', to keep a nation on its toes and fighting fit, despite apparent safety and the debilitating influence of having more than enough.

In Egypt the time-sense extended fully into eternity.

Here we find a people who were fairly hag-ridden by their awareness of infinity. Time, for them, was the road along which the wheel of the year trundled, and that road had, for them, more reality than the wheel which was merely incidental and personal.

They built for eternity, hewing temples and monuments cut of mountains and they constructed mountains (the symbol of endurance) piece by piece out in the plains.

They conserved their dead. They studied the heavens, the clock of eternal time, as the Mesopotamians had done, but with infinitely more care and exactitude, and clocks were about the only invention they added to the "gadgets" of mankind.

In them temporalisation was present to its utmost extent and, in consequence, they created the first example of an enduring civilisation that existed above and beyond the individuals that 'inhabited' it.

The full realisation of eternity caused them to institute a permanent social organisation that could only break down with the degeneration of the people themselves (a possibility they did, not envisage); and a system of

laws that were considered to be above the authority and the interpretation of its administrators.

They built in 'eternal' stone and constructed extensive public works that were designed to outlast the builders and the lives of all men to come. They dug canals and made roads and state-organised irrigation schemes - in short, the 'State' assumed the status of a 'Superman' whose lifespan was visualised in numberless generations of mere, individual men. In this way it became a completely self-sufficient organism, with a 'life' of its own which survived the troubles and the weaknesses of those who happened to be in power at any given moment.

Man builds - and he can only build - his State in accordance with his own inner world. To put it more precisely: "The State grows and it has to grow, naturally out of and in accordance with the worlds of its individual members." It is an expression of what they prize and hold dear enough for them to be willing to work for and, if necessary, to suffer and die for.

Contrary to what one feels behind so much historical and modern sociological thinking, the State does not arrive out of nowhere to 'lead' the citizens to ever higher achievements. There is no such a thing as a State that is an entity that does things. It consists, at any particular moment, of mere men among whom there is essentially little difference between the ruled and the rulers. It arises in the hearts and the minds of the people and the rulers. It symbolises what they are - and when they degenerate - it dies.

Egyptian civilisation of those days expressed the Egyptians, the higher castes and the lower, the rulers and the subjects, the Pharaohs, nobility, priests, citizens and even the slaves, just as the Egypt of today expresses the Fellahin.

The point of all this is however that the essential factor was the extension of the average future-span of the citizens.

We have tried to show how the conditions in the inundated valleys might have caused a set of circumstances that would lead to the selective evolution of a long-futured people. It was not a 'victory over difficult circumstances that generated the civilisations', as Toynbee would have us believe, although, as in all, generally, if temporarily, accepted explanations there is a certain measure of truth in that. It is not the challenge of the difficult environment which makes men 'surmount' it and causes them to aspire to higher things, but the difficult environment simply eliminates those that cannot survive and thereby produces a stock with certain characteristics that naturally can do more and better than the whole group could do earlier on. One could compare this with the effect of Penicillin on a colony of bacteria. It will kill most of them off, but those that survive are not only resistant to penicillin - they too can go to 'higher' things. A difficult environment produces specialised evolutionary effects and it is only our way of seeing 'men' as 'Man' that hides this fact from us.

Neither was it the 'invention' of irrigation or the living in inundating river valleys and the consequent improvement in the living standards. that did it. This was a specific cause, active only in the Middle East. for there is no doubt that in Central America there occurred a rash of very similar civilisations where there were no rivers.

The Aztecs, Toltecs, the Mayas and the Incas had no rivers to teach them irrigation. They had no narrowly localised arable lands that forced the people into living in close proximity and, among them, the Maya never found irrigation, or even a central government, for that matter. And yet, seemingly out of nowhere, in the interior of the jungles where survival was in no way a great problem (they went back to it when the artificial supplies of their civilisation failed them), they developed civilisations that were so like that of Egypt that the theory was held for a long time that they had been started by Egyptian sailors shipwrecked on the coast.

On closer examination this similarity proves to be misleading however.

What they had in common with the old world civilisations, despite the absence of rivers, was their extraordinary preoccupation with time. They too built for eternity and in stone among a plenitude of wood such as Egypt had never known. They took the precaution to calcine the limestone rubble for the filling of their temple pyramids. so that they would hold eternal shape (although this nearly doubled the amount of human labour that went into their making). They built their canals, and causeways, temples, public baths and grandiose ball-game stadiums so well that they have withstood, unaided and untended, half a thousand years of attack by the jungle - and survived it surprisingly well.

But above all, they had a fully worked out calendrical system which was as perfect as it was humanly possible to make it with the observational tools at their disposal.

The attention and labour expended on it, totally out of proportion to the actual practical use it could have had for them in regard to their agricultural problems, shows that it was valuable and meaningful for them for its own mystical sake.

Finally the popular theory that the 'presence' of the 'wheat plant' was an essential pre-requisite for the development of the civilisations in the 'fertile crescent' loses some of its convincing qualities when one realises that the American civilisations did not have it at all.

It may be readily conceded that the availability of the wheat plant helped - and, to a certain extent determined the nature of - the civilisations of the Middle East, but it was *not* the sole, or even the main causative factor.

One does not wish to belabour the point, but it would seem that this is at least a demonstration, if not a proof of the fact that the development of an extended temporalisation in a people is, of itself, enough to spark off the process of civilisation, without the help of outside influences. These can determine, up to a certain extent, the special quality of the civilisation, but not the appearance of civilisation itself.

Black Africa has never, by itself, been able to produce a 'civilisation' worthy of the name, and the reason is not far to seek.

With the development of agriculture the diet changed from meat to cereals and, as the supply of the latter became sufficient and even plentiful, the need to have roast neighbour on one's eating mat dwindled.

As a consequence not only cannibalism died out (except in some more ritual and traditional contexts), but also the full implications of the 'survival of the fittest'. With the coming of agriculture, all over the world, one of the main and more primeval 'engines' of human evolution was switched off. Only there, where other factors remained at work, where competition was keener and the possibilities for survival less, did it move on. But at a much more leisurely pace.

For the Bantu, with all of Africa to be 'eaten up' by their typical 'predatory agriculture', evolution more or less stopped in its tracks.

From now on (in their famous "isolation"), they could only obtain their 'share' of the new characteristics and talents, that occurred in other places, by 'miscegenation' - and even that, as it would seem, does not work really well for them.

Since the civilisations of the Middle East, we have seen numerous others flower and die, but these, if one goes into it carefully, prove to be due to other factors entering into the picture, although always together with a long-futured base underlying the whole. Their special characteristics are due to other human qualities which, developing to the full, gave their owners an advantage over their environment of which they were not slow to take advantage.

The possibilities of pure temporalisation, as such, had however been exhausted by Egypt and we have to leave the subject of the evolution of Man to work out its own further developments, and pass on to look at some of the other facets of life in which it plays a no less important role.

CHAPTER V

The two basic types: Now-Men and Tomorrow-Men

After this generalised review of the effect which the emergence of temporealisation has had on the evolution of 'Man' we can now shift the focus on to the 'men' themselves and observe what it does in determining their personal characteristics.

It is much more important there than one would have imagined.

The story of the eating of the 'apple' in Genesis 2 has had numerous interpretations, some profound, some merely facetious, but, when we see the effect of eating the fruit as having been intended to mean the development of the faculty of temporealisation in 'Adam and Eve', the whole suddenly becomes full of meaning and a deep, sympathetic understanding of the predicament of Man.

"Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it; for the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." (Gen. 2:17).

From the text we know that Adam 'did not know sin', 'did not work for a living', 'was not aware of his own nakedness' and 'did not know death' - which is as good a description of an 'animal' as any.

The only difference between Adam and the other animals was that, although, in this version, both had been made by God out of the dust (Gen. 2: 7 and 19) and not specially 'created' as is claimed in Genesis 1, God had implanted in Adam a 'soul' and the ability to 'give names' - that is: the potential ability to 'speak'.

"And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof." (Genesis 2: 19).

It is quite likely that primitive men did actually begin the sound-image association of speech, by distinguishing, in their warning calls, between the different enemies and preys, so that the appropriate defence measures and hunting techniques could be brought into effect by the pack. 'Adam' started by giving names to the animals before he made other words. One sees the same sequence in the subjects of his paintings in the caves. First there were the different 'food animals', then some carnivores, then men and possibly some abstract ideograms, ending finally in story-telling pictures.

Adam did not stop at naming the animals. He soon was giving names to his fellow men, and the things that concerned his life. Then, once the technique had been discovered, there followed names for actions and, as the images split (for him) into their component parts, names for the qualities of things and finally for the qualities of actions.

As all this was interrelated with, and even helpful in the development of temporealisation, it was inevitable that Adam and Eve eventually had to eat from the forbidden fruit. They could do nothing else, and the writer of Genesis 2 could just as well have called it the 'tree of knowledge of the future' as the 'tree of knowledge of 'good' and 'evil' for both 'good' and 'evil' need realisation of the future to have any relevance at all.

Only in relation to a known future-effect can a deed be either 'good' or 'evil' and it is for this reason that an animal, whatever it does, however harmful its deeds may be to itself, to others, or even to its own kind, cannot do 'evil' - nor can it do 'good'.

It does not know, and cannot know or evaluate what is coming. The future does not exist for it and, as it

therefore cannot judge the results of its actions (which take place in the pure 'now'), it is innocent of 'sin' and also of 'lack of sin'.

It was the same with nakedness. The exposure of the body to the sight of others can only be 'wrong' or 'shameful' if that tends to disrupt social relationships, and the 'wrong' again lies in something that may happen in the future. Nakedness, in effect, only comes into the category of the 'shameful' when there is already quite an extension into the future of the concept of a permanent social group. Without that, 'shame' at being 'naked' is as impossible as it is in animals.

'Working', again, that is: doing something that does not produce immediately useful results, is also dependent upon a future sense. We have already seen this in the previous chapters. Finally, the knowledge that death waits at the end of the trail for everyone obviously also needs the ability to 'foresee'.

All these 'human' qualities therefore are not to be found among animals.

When Adam had 'eaten of the fruit', that is, when he had attained a knowledge of the future, God's curse merely underlines his new situation. The 'punishment' is not arbitrary. It follows logically from the premises and is rather an 'effect' than a 'punishment'.

"Because thou hast eaten of the tree of which I commanded thee, saying Thou shalt not eat of it: cursed is the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all thy life." (Genesis 2: 17). In other words: having looked into the future, you will never be rid of it again. Never will you be able to return to the paradisiacal existence when, existing only in the now, you ate from the fruit of the earth without a thought of the morrow. The future and its possible disasters and the need to provide for them will be with you all the days of your life.

In this connection it is interesting to read the advice that Jesus gave to his followers and which amounts to telling them to return as much as is possible to the forbidden peace of Paradise lost.

In Matthew 6:25 we read: "Therefore I say unto you. Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than the meat and the body than the raiment.?"

"Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your Heavenly Father feeds them. Are ye not much better than they?"

"Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature?"

The 'taking thought' here is actually 'taking thought for the morrow' as appears from the summary given in the last verse of the chapter: "Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

Jesus has correctly seen that most of human suffering is due to 'taking thought for the morrow'. His advice to stop doing that may however work for a single individual, but (as with Buddha's advice to live on the proceeds of the begging bowl), if all men followed it, none would survive. It can only work for as long as there are a sufficient number of (unsaved) others who do 'take thought for the morrow' effectively - and suffer for it!

The curse, which we will never be able to escape, whatever we try, proceeds logically: In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread." which is another way of saying: "From now on you will work for a living. Because you have brought tomorrow into today, its worries and troubles will spill over together with it. Gone are the days of merely liking what came to your hand. From now on you will have to provide for tomorrow today - you will have to 'earn' what you eat." Even the curse on Eve contains the same logical core. She too is

doomed to sorrow, for is not the sorrow of women their worry about what shall become of their offspring in the future?

The most fearful result of all was however that the eating of the fruit brought 'death' into the life of man.

The animal does not 'know' death. It knows fear, but not fear of death. It is afraid of the claws and fangs that rend and tear and crush, but it knows nothing about death. Just as it has no idea that it ever 'began', so it cannot visualise its 'end'.

With the gift of understanding of the future, Man however received the curse of knowing that life could end, although the necessity of death only became known much later on. He learned to understand the meaning of the body that had once and for all stopped moving and reacting, to solidify slowly into the stillness of rigor mortis - and he learnt to apply it to himself. He learnt to fear in a different register from that of the animals when in danger, and ever since then the dark shadow of death has hung upon his horizon. He may refuse to look at it and learn to live as if it was not there, but the words of God have become true for him: "for, in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely (know that thou shalt) die," - and, cowards that most of us are, we die a thousand deaths before we do.

We may have seemed to be belabouring the point unnecessarily by now. Once it has been noticed, or pointed out, one realises that one has 'known' it all along - but even as the basic principle has not been analysed out, so, still less, have its implications.

Although we may have accepted the validity of the idea of the importance of temporealisation, it is forgotten, or not realised, that there still remains the matter of the degree to which the future is realised in each individual person.

The stress has, up to now, been laid on the effect that temporealisation had on 'Man', that is, on the evolution of the human race and on the emergence of 'civilisations'. There the difference lay in the future-depth or the aggregate of the individual human beings who, at any given moment, represented the 'idea' Man. We did not focus very sharply on those individual men and thought in 'averages'. In that we tended to overlook that all men did not have - and *still do not have* - the same depth of future.

Our personal depth of future is, to us, so obviously the 'norm' (or 'as it should be') that we do not realise that the particular and arbitrary future sense that we have is not common to all those who, from external appearances alone, we call 'human beings'. We cannot help confusing their 'anthropological humanity' with the 'humanity' which we know to be in ourselves, and to think these essentially identical.

Nothing, however, is further from the truth and, once we have realised this, a host of simple explanations and unprecedented understanding replaces the surprise and irritation which we feel in regard to the often incomprehensible deeds and reactions of others.

Let us begin with Laotze, sitting in our study and seeing what the world of those people, whose future span is either extremely short or very much longer than our own, must be like. Then, when we have done that, let us look out of our windows and see if we can recognise them there.

What would the world be like to a "Now-man" whose day after tomorrow had, for him, no more than the qualities, the sense of reality and actuality that a specific day, a month from now has for us? How would we see life if something that is a month away would already be no more 'real' to us than something that is three years away is for us now, and how would it be if the end of this present year were as totally 'theoretical' as the end of thirty years is for us now?

We can think ourselves into the world of such a person by taking our own 'future image' and compressing it

into a shorter time span. but we must make an honest attempt to do this correctly. We must guard against the ever present tendency to interpolate the values of our personal world into that of the other, just as, in trying to think ourselves into the world of the blind we must attempt to eliminate everything that has, in us, been built upon the 'visual' image of space.

When we succeed in this effort, we find that such a short-futured person will be congenitally, or naturally, surprisingly much nearer to the ideal defined by Jesus than we are or can ever hope to be.

He will take as little heed for tomorrow as we take for something that may happen a month from now, as little heed for the things of the end of the month as we do for those that are three years away, and what will happen at the end of the year will, for him, only exist in theory - if he takes time to think about it.

The result will be a person who will tend to leave things of the future. He will leave it to God, to the Great Spirit, to Fate or, in general, leave it to take care of itself, whatever his upbringing, or the structure and ideas of his environment may have taught him to do.

He will, in our eyes, be 'improvident' just as we are improvident in the eyes of those with a markedly longer future span than we have. He will tend to eat and use *up and enjoy* all that he has in the present - and why not? After all, we waste a large part of our yearly savings on holidays at the coast and living above our income for a month or more, instead of just enjoying ourselves and doing the things we are meant to do at home. (The inner reaction that 'after all, one has a right to a holiday' etc., which many readers will have felt in regard to that last observation should help to demonstrate the kind of reaction that the short-futured man would have to the suggestion that he should not eat and use what he has - and with as much, or as little justification!)

He will also, but in a more general sense, be like our native servant who, to our displeasure and dismay, dumps the left-overs of today's meal into the dustbin. He will not even see the need to conserve what he does not need today, for use tomorrow.

He will also be generous and tend to give without counting the cost. We must however realise that what he gives, being of today, has relatively little value for him, although, to us he may seem to be bankrupting himself. If he has enough for the moment, the rest is there to be given away or buy appreciation. What will happen tomorrow is not important.

He will often seem to us to be completely irresponsible because 'responsibility' must needs be towards something that has its roots in time, at least a certain distance into the future.

Paradoxically he can also be extraordinarily conscientious. His conscientiousness will however depend upon in how far his environment has been able to translate his 'duties' into a present 'must'. If that 'must' is an integral part of the authority that rules his life and if he is, by nature, not aggressive, he will accept that authority without question (because he knows that he cannot judge it) and obey it meticulously. When the 'must' is taken out of the situation however, when it is left to himself to decide what he should do or leave undone without fear of punishment, the 'irresponsibility' inevitably takes over; first by 'slacking', and then, when nothing happens, completely.

He will also, (as always, dependent upon his environment and its tendency to punish) be happy-go-lucky, given only half a chance. The future beyond a certain span, may, if he sits down and thinks about it intelligently, harbour nothing but dangers and probable misery (just as most of us will find if we sit down and ponder about our 'old age', or about the results of a casual 'love affair'), but, even if he knows this to be inevitable, it will not be 'real' to him. Like Mr. Micawber, he supposes that 'something may turn up', it always has -and the 'theoretical' doom will not spoil his day.

As long as, in the present, he is healthy and without aches and pains and indigestions, actual want or aggressive debt collectors, he will enjoy the present for what it contains, and, in that, he is a source of envy and disdain to all of us who cannot say with the people of Kedar "And behold joy and gladness, slaying of oxen, killing of sheep, eating of flesh and drinking of wine: let us eat and drink; for tomorrow we die." (Isaiah 22 : 13).

We may look down upon such a person for being a 'fool' and a 'worthless fellow' or whatever we like, but that judgement will be false. If we think ourselves into his world we will realise that, if we were in his place, and the world looked to us as it does to him, we would do the same. On the basis of his data we (and he) could do nothing else.

He is not, or need not, be as unintelligent as he seems to us, who judge him from the time-scale that happens to be real to us. On the contrary, he may be extremely, intelligent. It is not a matter of intelligence at all but of what the intelligence is given to handle.

Such a man is also not necessarily as 'shallow' a character as he seems to us. He can even be extremely sensitive - but only in relation to that which exists in his past-present-future world - a world which is not anything like ours.

It is here that very often the extremely sympathetic characteristics which make him friends wherever he goes have their origin. Being in a closer and more direct contact with a shorter range of material he may (in this context) understand it better than those who see things against the background of a long stretch of time which causes momentary events to fade into relative insignificance. It can be felt that in such a case his reactions will be much more direct and, in their way, sincere.

His loves will often be short, but passionate and also dreadfully sincere - for as long as they last. (Here again that last observation which most readers will have made in themselves as they read, shows up the idea very well. What actual difference in value is there between that of a love which lasts a year and one that lasts six years, when the seven year itch enters into the picture? It is only because the latter is a part of our world that we think the six-year love more valid than one that lasts a year - or even less!)

His hatreds (in compensation) will also be sudden and violent arriving from nowhere and fading soon, like the mist before the sun of another day.

He may be essentially as honest as the next man but, again, only in relation to the time span that is real to him. His dose of the fruit from the tree of knowledge of good and evil has been small. What will happen beyond a certain time does not really exist for him and, where the animal cannot 'sin' at all, he can only 'sin' a little.

His promises are only given for his 'always', and as time passes beyond the limit where it was 'real' when the word was given, that promise is only anchored in the relationships of the fast fading past. His promises become as difficult to honour as a promise given five years ago would be to us. His conscience will trouble him as little about breaking it (if he remembers giving it, where the present 'now' is the one that was unreal when the promise was given) as we would trouble about not honouring ours. The result of this is that he may present to the external observer a curious mixture of dependability and undependability - which may confuse his environment as it does not know the dates on which his promissory notes happen to become invalid. He therefore may make as many undeserved enemies as he makes undeserved friends.

But above all this he can really laugh.

He does not need the de-realisation that we longer-futured ones need and which, in the so-called true 'humour', leaves a tear in the tinkling vial of the laugh.

As Bergson pointed out (Le Rire): "It seems as if the comical can only provoke its special shock effect when it touches the surface of a calm and well-balanced soul. Indifference is its natural milieu. The laugh has no greater enemy than the emotions.

"I would not say that we could not laugh about someone who, for instance, inspired sympathy or even affection in us, but in that case one will have to forget that affection for a few moments and silence the sympathy.

"In a community of purely intellectually orientated people, it is likely that one would weep no more; but it is possible that one would still be able to laugh."

As the short-futured "now-man" is personally involved with a much shorter range of reality - and as even that reality has no enduring and eternity-based serious values, he has a much larger area in which his intellect can discover ludicrous fallacies and inherent contradictions. To him the laugh will come more easily and it will be free from the suppressed knowledge of the inner tragedy which lies behind everything that is absurd. He is the born exponent of the 'belly laugh'.

Such a man can be loyal to what is in his present, but one cannot expect him to remain loyal when the environment changes and the object of that loyalty moves too far into the past or becomes anchored too far into the future.

Finally we can mention here one supreme gift that is his birthright. He has the ability to make his mind a blank and to sit around and do, and even think, nothing - that is: he can 'relax'.

One can understand that where the contents of his world are only short-term entities and not intricately interwoven with what has happened and especially with what is going to happen, it will be much more easy for him simply to switch himself off and revert to the condition of a cow contentedly chewing its cud; to let the passage of time flow through him, aware, but retaining nothing; or allowing the mind to wander freely in a daydream because there is really nothing that clamours for attention. For this same reason, (if there is no physical cause for it) sleeplessness should trouble him much less than it does the long-futured tomorrow-men. Sleeplessness is very often based upon a sense of the future, on suppressed visualised problems of the days or the years to come. Once the reactive life has stopped, they nag for attention during the long hours of the night and demand active thinking or the concentrated counting of sheep to keep them out.

The short-future man also is able to do routine and repetitive work and be happy at it while, once again, he sends his mind daydreaming or merely makes it a blank. He can even keep his attention sharply focussed on his work if need be, for he is not troubled by the work he still has to do. He likes work with clear-cut duties and few decisions - which would bore the long-futured man to tears. The short-futured person is therefore the basic type for the factory worker and the clerk, the users of typewriters and knitting needles - as was found when woman replaced men in the munition factories of the last two wars.

It is inevitable that such a man should be an extrovert, as Kroeber said of his nearest relatives on the other side, the apes.

He is not conscious of the long way through life that still lies before him and its valuations and implications do not interfere with the relative simplicity and obvious structure of today. Therefore the present does not have to be weighed against, and manipulated in relation to, the effect it will have on things that are still far ahead in the lap of the gods. He is free to act on, and to react to, his environment and to enjoy both for their own sake. The 'feel' for the moment is much stronger in him, much more concentrated than it is in those to whom the 'sense of living' is dispersed over a longer stretch of time.

Action and reaction are immediate to him and free from the overtones to be found in the long-futured men in

whom they are buffered by time.

He is creature to be envied, not despised. He is much nearer to the paradise which we have lost - and we should wish him luck if his irresponsibilities and improvidence do not place too heavy a burden on our backs, for, whatever may be the moral of it, we will have to carry him along as we have always done.

The other extreme is represented by the overly long-futured man whose week is as real to him as our tomorrow, whose next five years or so are as real as our next month; and for whom eternity has more in the present than our future, thirty years from now, has to us.

It is much more difficult to imagine oneself into the world of such a day-after-the-day-after-tomorrow-man than it is to do so in regard to a short-futured man. After all, it is easier to think something away and imagine how the rest would be, than to add something that one does not have at all.

But it is not only that. The lengthening of the future adds numerous possibilities which are simply not there in the world of the short-futured. It becomes difficult to analyse them out because different causes can have the same results and different results the same cause. Over and above this there is the possibility available to the long-futured man of shutting off his future-span with an effort of will or at the behest of training and influence. He can even make himself into an 'artificial' short-future man showing no other symptoms of this to himself or others than a slight sense of not 'fitting' where he is; possibly being a bit 'difficult' or in his having a tendency to make remarks that disturb his short-futured environment.

The result is that the long-futured man is not simply the opposite of a short-futured one. He has the short-futured man in him and can revert back to him if need be, or even sometimes where it suits him.

We find however that there are certain basic characteristics that will have to be part of his life. He, for instance, being aware of a long stretch of time, must inevitably lose some of the immediate, sharp-focus contact with the reality of the momentary environment.

In his fully developed form he, unlike the extrovert, short-futured man will have his personal existing in the centre of the picture of his world.

To the short-futured person life consists of a give and take, more or less on an equal basis, between the environment and the self, (both of which are in this case valued equally on their equal but short-future extension), and therefore there is little reason why he should become acutely conscious of his own personal existing. He leads a more or less completely 'reactive' life and his attention is continuously focussed on what is happening.

The long-futured man however lives in a long stretch of time and in that he is the only common denominator. He is not so much aware of what is happening, but of what is there. One could say that he leads a 'reflective' life. He will therefore tend to become especially aware of the personal existence which ties the whole future image together. He becomes aware of himself as *the T* and learns to see the rest of his world as *the 'not-I'*.

In this way. the T being the only permanent thing in his world, it is for him, the basic valuator for everything - so that the typical picture of the 'introvert' emerges. He has to refer everything to himself and becomes, in our eyes 'selfish', 'egoistic' or even 'egotistical'.

The concept of 'possessing' becomes much more important to him. One could say that it acquires a new quality which is absent in the 'mine and thine' of the short-futured, so that it is much more difficult for him to 'give'. Such a gift, if made, is however much more valuable because he gives something of himself where the short-futured man actually merely deals out something that he had the 'right to distribute' but for which he actually has no use.

It would lead us too far away from our present subject to go further into this here but it can be seen that this aspect provides material for a very interesting, if not disturbing, reconsideration of the nature of 'generosity' - and a basis for a complete change in our evaluation of its different manifestations.

Physically, socially, economically, everything has, for the long-futured man, its value, and in a way, even its valid existence, only in so far as it concerns him.

He is not a 'miser' or an 'egoist' in the sense that we think of those characters. He is perfectly logical in his evaluation on the basis of the material which his intellect has been given to work with, and here again we have no right to claim that our relatively short-futured way of seeing things is more valid than his. In a way, we look the same to the more short-futured persons, as he looks to us.

We are not 'normal' where the other two are 'abnormal' and our different evaluations are equally valid, each for its own world. There is no common denominator except the 'average'. Different parts of the human race have passed through both extremes in their time as can be felt from an incidental passage in Hermann Leicht's 'History of the World's Art', where he remarks: "The art of the ancient East is not so much a matter of 'progress' in the representation of spatial relations, as the expression of the philosophy of peoples who could never free themselves from the dark background of life. They realised the awfulness of eternity and their art was inspired by dread rather than by joy."

Here the sensitive mind of the critic has divined the price Man had to pay for his acquisition of Eternity and he has come up with what is more or less a paraphrase of what we have been trying to say more "scientifically". The rewards were astounding. but for many individuals, especially those early ones, the cost was perilously high.

Mankind has passed through both in its time and it has been left with such a collection of 'all sorts' that now, even in one family (and with one almost uniform environment background therefore) we may find representatives of both the extremes, from the totally introverted, long-futured individual to the typical 'prodigal son', whose description must have been clearly recognised in the first half of this chapter.

At most we can call ourselves 'average' and then only in that our future span is half way between the extremes. The 'average' future span in the different racial environments itself varies within the full range of possibilities. As we will see, the 'average' Chinese span will be near to the maximum while that of Black Africa is very near to the minimum. In this, we the 'Europeans', are between them, just as we are in the shape of the transverse section of our hair which, for the Chinese is round, for the 'peppercorned' people flat, and for us oval.

To the extra-long-futured man, not only things but also people do not have the same valid personal existence in his world as he has himself. He is not really interested in their personal and momentary troubles. He may be a 'philanthropist' but he rarely worries about the personal 'life' of his protégés. In a way, he is "buying freedom" from the duty he feels to help others, in the context of the social commitments which form a background to his life. He gives them some money and says: "There you are. Now leave me alone." This is a mental attitude which has its culmination in the public 'treasure chests' that have lately mushroomed all over our civilisation.

The long-futured man also does not laugh easily, and when he does, it has a slightly bitter, if not necessarily unpleasant taste, as exemplified by the typical 'humour' of the Jews, who are a long-futured race.

Wonderful as this Jewish humour may be (so that it gives a peculiar 'satisfaction' even to those that are not of their race), it sees the comical not as 'funny', but as 'foolish'. Basically it underlines the meshuggeneh', even if it has a barb that makes the laugh. "Oy. vay is meer!"

Most of their 'jokes' have a world of tragedy behind them. The satisfaction comes from the feeling that this dreadful thing called life has been overcome by seeing it as a joke. One can only see something as a joke when one is not personally involved - so that the tragedy is not really one's own!

Here one remembers the old Jew who stood admiring a magnificent mausoleum built to the memory of a very rich man. Shaking his head in admiration at the opulence before him he murmured: "Oy! That's what I call living!"

And then there is the little story told by Nathan Ausubel in the 'Treasury of Jewish Humor' where a ne'er-do-well goes to buy a hatchet and tests it in three ways: "He tries to cut a straw. If it cuts it, well enough. If it does not cut it - so what? He strikes it against a hard stone. If sparks fly, well enough. If not - so what? He conceals it under his coat. If the shopkeeper doesn't notice it, well enough. If he does - so what? He puts it back!"

In tasting and retasting these stories it should be obvious that neither of them makes any sense without an eternity of human suffering behind them.

To see this more clearly one need but compare it with a typical non-jewish joke, like: "I understand that Mabel is going to marry a struggling young doctor." "Well, in that case he'd better stop struggling." All the elements are still there, but the situation is completely 'depersonalised' by a play of words, where the 'nogoodnik' comes dangerously near to disproving Bergson's thesis.

Where the short-futured man tends to be a spend-thrift, the long-futured man tends to go to the other extreme. He tends to be a miser and where the former is improvident, the latter is by nature hyperprovident.

Where to the short-futured man, riches are there to be spent and enjoyed, to the long-futured man they are a necessary safeguard for the days to come. He is acutely conscious of the need he will have for them later on - always later on. They are his sole source of security in an inimical world and only when there is money enough to last him for as far as he can imagine into the future, does he feel safe - and not always even then.

However, where the short-futured man tends to be irresponsible and not to be trusted in the long run, the long-futured man is not necessarily a trustworthy person. This, in his case, mostly depends upon the importance he attaches to the whole in relation to the self. The over-emphasis he places on his own existence tends to contradict the importance and the 'rights' of others.

To him the 'lie' may therefore be, potentially at least, an easy way of looking after himself and getting the better of others. If he can see his way to lie in such a way that it will not endanger his reputation for honesty (which he knows that he may need later on) he can lie very effectively, where the short-futured man is apt to be a mere prevaricator because the truth, as such, has little meaning for him. The long-futured man will, if he decides to lie, do so 'artistically' and such a way that he will not easily be caught out while, all in good time. It will bring him a worthwhile profit. To the short-futured man it is usually an impromptu, seemingly easy, way out; a means of obtaining short-term advantages or retained friendships of the moment; and, because he cannot fully visualise the circumstances where his lies will come to roost, he is usually easily caught out. He is essentially a 'bad' liar - a mere amateur.

One can also understand that the long-futured man will have difficulty in relaxing and keeping out of his mind the thought of things that, in the future, demand, if not active attention, at least some sort of a supervision today.

It is therefore to be expected that among the 'less excitable', less immediately reactive people we will find the highest internal tensions and that again provides a new and interesting slant on the 'executive type' and his 'ulcers'.

Popular belief and even medical science explains such tensions on the basis that these people 'bottle up' their emotions, keeping them under control by an effort of will. It would seem that the situation might be completely different.

Getting rid of 'repressed' feelings by 'explosions' is essentially a short-futured reaction. They are not really getting 'rid' of them, they are merely reacting to an unpleasant situation. The long-futured 'tense' man is not what he is because he has 'repressed' himself, and an 'explosion' will not do him any good. The cause of that tenseness will still be there. In effect it is the 'troubles' of the future which can never be fully controlled from the present and which therefore remain a potential atom bomb in the attic.

As in so many other aspects we have again confused cause and effect. The executive is an executive because he is a long-futured man. The executive has tensions because he is a long-futured man, and, if he did not have his troubles in the office to give him his ulcers, he would have them because he has no troubles to worry about!

We saw that personalities that 'blow up' easily do not suffer from tensions and that those who don't, do. The reason now seems to be that those who, because they have no future to worry about and therefore can afford to blow off steam, are the ones who 'blow up'. It is a symptom of their 'non-tension' nature, not a 'cure' for tension. In the same way, the tense men who seem to be 'unable to blow off' cannot do that for the same reason that they are tense. 'Blowing off in the momentary 'now' would seem foolish and irrelevant to them in relation to the long-futured trouble which it would be supposed to cure. If such a blow-off does occur, it does not afford relief but will seem to them to be a sign that they are 'losing their grip' (in effect, that they too are becoming 'short-futured' types).

The only way they can cure themselves is by (by an effort of will) consciously shortening their future span. With a bit of practice, this is surprisingly easy and effective. It needs hardly more than an impersonal weighing up of the possibilities and a realisation that what may seem utter ruin, far away in the future, hardly ever materialises into more than a temporary setback. When it comes into the present it will provide ways and means that, from a distance, were not apparent. After all, where the short-futured people 'get away' with a whole life of not worrying about the future, a little trust in the elasticity of fate is not out of place. The soup is never eaten as hot as it is boiled, as the Dutch proverb says.

Alcohol may help here, but it is a two-edged sword that should be used with the utmost circumspection. It does not 'solve' anything and the 'hair of the dog' may be necessary to face up to it tomorrow morning.

On this same basis, the long-futured man is also unfit for routine, repetitive work. The mechanical acts he must do there will seem so relatively unimportant to him that, even if his precious future depends on it, his mind will not be on his work. As he lives in the whole future image, he will make mistakes, where the short-futured man can confidently leave his present personality to do the work and let his mind be a blank or have it daydream the time away. If the long-futured man has to force himself to keep his attention on the work an unbearable boredom at the futility of it will tend to overtake him. He cannot live merely in the now which is an essential prerequisite for repetitive work. The long-futured man needs work in which each act can be referred to, and integrated in, the whole. He can do monotonous work, and he can do that very well if the occasion arises, but he must be able to see the result of the actual work in relation to what has been done and what there is still to do. One can compare this to two mountain climbers. The one will put his head down and steadily plod on until he gets to the top, look round and go down again. The other will be continually aware of the mountain as a whole. He will see what he has overcome, look up at what he still has to do, and have a feeling of satisfaction at the whole process. He will not be merely 'climbing' he will be 'climbing a mountain'.

The long-futured man, as is his nature, must be able to 'see' the end of the task and have the anticipation of arriving there, otherwise his present labours will seem senseless to him.

Where the short-futured man dislikes continually to have to make decisions, the long-futured man finds his satisfaction exactly there. This means to him that he is putting something of himself into the work and thereby making himself a part of what he thinks is worthwhile doing, in relation to his personal valuation complex.

For this reason it is again only the tomorrow-men who become really bored. The now-man can always escape into the blank of the daydream when he has nothing to do. To the tomorrow-man, the feeling that 'time is a-wasting' and that there is still so much to do, produces the urge to 'do something' which, if frustrated or lacking a definite object, becomes suffering.

Although one has tried to delineate the two extreme types, it should be realised that things are not always as simple as all that. Not only is there an infinite gradation from the one to the other, there is also this - that some people will be more long-futured in certain aspects than they are in others, so that one could speak of 'mixed types'.

What is still more important, however, is that the environment also has its effect on the practical expressions of these traits in individuals, if not on the 'quality' of the human material.

Scientists, as we will see later on, tend to confuse the 'results' of environmental influences and the actual hereditary qualities of an individual, and to give them an equal valuation. It is as if the peach tree, that the gardener has flattened into an espalier against the wall, is considered to be in some way essentially different from an untreated tree. The environment, in the form of the social structure of the community, tends to even out the differences in its individuals. Education, the common rules of living together, propaganda, the names, the attitudes and official valuations, all these will tend to mould them into a single type. The long-futured and the short-futured may live alongside each other for all their lives, do the same work, occupy the same houses and read the same newspapers and only close observation may be able to distinguish between them in the end. The difference may lie in no more than the choice of a political party, the preferred type of sport, the kind of art they like or the quality of their friendships. One could compare it to an orchard in which a group of peach and apricot trees had all been espalier'ed into the same pattern. Only examination of the leaves would be able to show the difference.

However, in times of national or personal stress, in war or disaster, or social upheaval or even a simple change of environment by the individual, it will result in the 'learnt' characteristics disappearing and the natural ones taking over, just as when the gardener stops pruning the trees in the orchard we mentioned. The nature of the peaches and apricots will take over and, in a year or two there will never be any doubt as to which is which.

It will be necessary to go into this much more deeply later on, when examining what kind of states and social relations, the different types will make for themselves.

As no man can really look into the worlds in which other people live, one can only draw conclusions from what they do - and leave undone.

From observing people's reactions and seeing how much and in which way they provide for the different future periods of their lives, one would tentatively suggest that the 'average' member of our Western Civilisation seems to have a 'now' of about two days; a 'present' (which is more or less completely integrated into that 'now') of about two weeks; a directly and spontaneously realisable and realised 'future' (which can be integrated into the 'present') of about three to five years, while the 'possibly realisable future' is some thirty years at the most

It is admittedly dangerous to try and give definite figures for such a vague and variable thing as our average future-sense and it is obviously free to anyone to judge and define them differently - but the general relationship between them in the above estimation should not be very far out.

On this provisional basis we can now very briefly explore the often amazing insights which this gives us into the ways of life of those who apparently vary from what we consider to be the 'norm'; a norm which we, up to now, have taken for granted because we unconsciously accepted that we were 'normal' and that therefore our world must be the actual and real one in which we live together with everybody else.

CHAPTER VI

The 'Bad' Short-Futured ones

The 'extroverts' as described in the last chapter, were those who had no real trouble. They were the short-futured people who, by circumstances, by birth or some special twist of luck or ability, could hold their own in their environment.

When trouble bites the short-futured man, or when he finds that the world has no ready-made place for him, he tends to develop into other, and often less pleasant, directions.

Friendly extroversion is, after all, only possible when life is also basically friendly - when it does not answer a slap on the back with a snarl. The extrovert is not necessarily, or even usually, a fool and, after one or two experiences like that, possibly already in babyhood, he may withdraw his feelers - often for the rest of his life. In this way the 'unsuccessful' short-futured man may even turn into a pseudo-introvert, having learnt that if he does not look after himself, the world will certainly not go out of its way to do it for him. This then will put him chronically on the defensive and make him 'shy', because he cannot correctly judge the situations in which he finds himself.

Overt extroversion and the happy-go-lucky attitude are therefore usually the symptoms of success.

Among the 'unsuccessful' ones we find the 'Hobo', the 'Tramp' and the 'Sherry Boy' types. As they are not able to understand the long-term structure of our society, they are unable to integrate themselves into it. Everything around them has its branches far into the past and into the future and carries meanings which, in the present, they do not actually have. Here the Hobo simply cannot feel himself at home and still less can he compete, even with those who have essentially less intelligence than he has.

For such a man therefore the present is uncongenial and there is nothing for him but to try and change it. He therefore 'moves', but he cannot move 'towards' something. Any object sufficiently far ahead to give him his bearings would not have sufficient reality for him. He can for that reason only move what one could call 'sideways'.

He does move away from discomfort, but he does not move *towards* comfort and, as he can never be comfortable wherever he is, he keeps on moving.

In our books and our songs, we tend to overlook this fact. Incurable romantics that we are, we see his 'human soul' for ever trying to find what is beyond the next horizon - but most of that is only a story that we tell ourselves. It may be that the wind beyond that horizon does not blow so cold and that the handouts there are larger - but, unhappily, that is not the reason for his moving. The reason lies in his present and, wherever he goes, he carries that with him.

When the winds are mild and the householders generous he still cannot stay because, after all, he is still not *at home*. Everyone else still lives in a different scale of values from what he does. Uncomfortable he moves on, he knows not where. Life, having no future dimensions, has no aims and, being aimless in a directed world, he wanders like a grazing animal - until moving itself becomes the central obsession of his life.

Settling down would mean integrating himself into a system, the directedness of which he cannot feel as real, and this he cannot do.

There are two ways in which we see some others like them solving the problem.

The one is the 'hermit'.

Here our romantic interpretation runs away with us again. We imagine that (as we would be doing if we became hermits) he is spurning the hurly-burly and the superficial values of human society in order to be alone with himself, with nature and, possibly, his God. He wants to be alone with his thoughts, we think and do not seem to have noticed that of all the thousands of hermits who have occupied the most bizarre hiding places of the earth, not one has produced a worthwhile thought, a small grain of insight to add to the store of human achievement, although they were supposedly devoting all their life to it. Worthwhile thoughts and understanding has, almost without exception, come from those who led the most busy and diverse lives. The 'Ivory tower' is a defensive mechanism, it is not a 'Belvedere'.

The hermit does not seek solitude. He probably does not like it, but he likes company less.

When we visit him, he is either polite or surly or he hides among the rocks., but wisdom we find none.

The disenchanting truth is that, animal-like he has the gift of making his mind a blank He can sit down in a completely empty present, neither asleep nor awake. Time flows through him, unnoticed and only the small simple chores, needed to keep him alive, interrupt what one cannot even call his 'reverie'. His happiness and contentment are to be found in that he is not unhappy or discontented. Instinctively he has found his 'Nirvana'.

In effect he has side-stepped the trouble of being human by not being human (without becoming an 'animal' in the crude implications of the word). He has side-stepped everything and as adroitly as Gautama Buddha where in the Dhammapada, he advises us: " Leaving all pleasures behind, and calling nothing his own, the wise man should purge himself of all the voices of the mind." The problem is solved by the simple expedient of looking the other way.

The other solution of the problem is the one found by the 'Beachcomber'. In the Islands of Paradise', his short-futured mind fits like a hand in a glove and there he can live among an equally short-futured people. Contrary to what our romances make us believe however, he there also merely accelerates his run down the slippery road into degeneration in an environment that, though congenial, is still infinitely 'foreign' to him, leaving him with a sense of loneliness which only the pleasures of the body can temporarily assuage.

The special characteristic which distinguishes the Hobo and his kind (and which in a way, produces him) is his lack of aggressiveness and his being content to live on handouts. His symbol is the outstretched, upturned palm.

One step above him, (if one can count a certain amount of aggressiveness as a virtue?), is the typical small-time thief and burglar.

When we examine not so much his thieving propensities, but the tenor of his whole life, we again find the symptoms of the short-future man - but one who is willing to do something about it.

Instead of waiting to be given, he takes.

He finds himself in a world where there are things he wants, but in which the laws of the community hold them beyond his reach. He probably knows why this must be so and he knows too that if he did his share of the work in that community, he would have enough - and that without any trouble. However, the 'earning life' - that is: working to be paid at the faraway end of the week, or even the month, - is not in his constitution. He simply cannot get into step there.

On the other hand, the trouble which. is sure to come when sooner or later, he is caught in the act, is not real to him either. It is as unreal to him as our death is to us. Therefore the logical thing, in the context of his life,

is to go out and take what he wants.

The only reason for not doing so would be a lifelong influence, emphasising the 'sin' and the anti-social nature of stealing but, as we will work out in more detail later on, both 'sin' and 'anti-social' qualities can have little meaning for the short-futured man because both of them are based on long-future values.

That, in stealing, he often does more work, applies more ingenuity, suffers more inconveniences and hardships and runs more risk for what is in the end (after the fences have had their share) a far smaller recompense than if he had taken an ordinary unskilled job, does not occur to him. He has not reasoned it out in so many words. His own solution is the only one that is logical on the basis of facts as he sees them.

We, with our ingrown tendency to romanticise, often think it is the thrill of danger that he seeks (which is the only reason that we could imagine ourselves to have if we were to run the risks he runs - and which we idealise in 'innocent' thieves like 'Raffles' and 'The Saint'). On the other hand, we find an excuse for him in that he is the 'product of his environment', not even bothering to ask what made that environment be like it is. We see him as an innocent soul born into a 'bad' world (where all the others also were 'innocents' born into a bad world) - who is 'reduced to sin' by his friends and later by association with 'criminals' in the institutions and gaols which he inevitably and enforcedly frequents.

The thief shows the typical characteristics of the short-futured man, not only in that he does not have sleepless nights about being caught. He also has the inability to keep what he has. Easy come, easy go, is the motto of his life too.

In general he is a man who does not make the impression that he knows and accepts that he commits 'crimes'. The thought of adding violence to the roster of his activities would horrify him as much as it would us - for to him *that* would be a 'crime'.

If he is caught, *he* is the one who has been badly done by. He never has any luck!

Strangely enough, *in the context of his life*, he is right. The 'old lags' have not 'corrupted' him. They have merely taught him the tricks of the 'trade' and, if we learn to see that without any 'moral' dismay, we can learn to realise how it would be possible that in the olden times (and for all we know, also today) the thieves had their own patron saint who gave them a blessing on their 'work'.

We can also see why it is almost impossible to rehabilitate most of them. It is not because they are congenitally 'bad' and 'past saving'. *Their solution of the problem is a logical one.* It is not a matter of 'curing' them but of finding and showing them a better and more easy way to make a living which would be acceptable to a short-futured man.

It is entirely insufficient to threaten them with ever increasing sentences, ending in the final 'incurable criminal' doom. The history of poaching shows that even the death sentence is not enough. The severity of sentences only tends to make desperate criminals of them when (at the moment of being caught) the impending punishment suddenly becomes 'real' to them - when it appears for them in the 'now'.

It also usually is a waste of time to preach 'sin' and 'salvation' at them where 'morals' only have a legitimate existence in a long-futured world and where the short-futured can only be made to accept them by life long teaching and example.

As they cannot be 'cured' and cannot be 'stopped', the choice lies between 'charity' and putting them away for good in some institution not intended for punishment but merely for isolation from a community into which they cannot fit. The 'charity' would have to consist of finding them a form of employment in which the recompense would be immediate, such as it is in stealing. If such jobs were going on the open market, the

waiting list for them would be very long and if one had to qualify for them by being caught at stealing one would have the same kind of story as we have now in Central Africa where the 'handouts' are in proportion to one's lack of stability!

When we now turn from the small-time burglar to the members of what one could call 'organised crime'. we actually find only little difference. There is a bit more aggressiveness, possibly a slightly deeper future sense and a 'conscience' which is slightly more blunted - but the general structure remains the same.

If, for instance, we try to enter into the worlds of a set of gangsters busy with putting a competitor. or a 'squealer' on the spot, even one look inside should convince us that these men are living to all intents and purposes, completely in the present.

In a world that had any measurable extension into the future, not so much the horror of their deed, as its essential futility, would make them turn away - as it is with all violence that is out of proportion to the aim to be achieved.

Such deeds are (again at that level) not done with the awareness of committing a 'crime'. The criminal is, at that moment, enclosed in a small mental space with his victim. There is no world outside and. in that space, he has to act according to his 'code'.

If one wishes to make the overall image clear to oneself, one should start off with one's own 'norm' and imagine oneself as living with one's past-present-future equipment in a society of people who all had. as their 'norm', an immediate present of, say, three months, and a fully realised future of some fifty years (within which therefore all important facts had been pre-integrated and only waited for the details to be filled in later).

. It is interesting and instructive to notice that the idea of such a state, where nothing unexpected. short of an act of God. could really happen, elicits in one the reaction that it would be insufferably boring. And this probably exactly the impression that our long-future world makes on our short-futured brethren.

One cannot doubt however that, in such an environment. we would not be able to fit in. Everything would have implications that we could not grasp and certainly not accept as valid enough in the now to do something about them. In consequence we would be outsmarted at every turn.

If we now imagine that we had been born into that society without the memory of the precepts and moral principles with which we have learnt to guide our lives, - and that they would feed us there with the fantastically rigid, long-term morals which would have to hold in such a world, it should be clear that, in that world, we would be the Hoboes, the Thieves or the out and out Criminals, according to the inherent aggressiveness of our nature.

We take our norm, the norm to which evolution happens to have brought us, to be applicable to everyone, because we do not even realise that temporealisation comes into it. We think that it is due to our intellect and our commonsense, and our moral fibre that we are the relatively well-off and reasonably integrated citizens that we are. We take it for granted that this is open to any equivalent intellect and that everybody's 'conscience' should tell them what is bad and what is good, and in this we are merely blind and foolish. Criminality is neither a disease, nor is the criminal 'guilty'. He is no more than a person who is in the wrong environment. If we pass the thousands of different ways of living together that exist and have existed on this earth of ours, before our mental eye, it will be seen that each of those criminals, in another environment, might have been an eminently respectable citizen according to the standards of his society.

The only real solution to the problem of what to do with the criminal, if we want to keep our long-term state intact, is to deport him and to get rid of him.

It may appear that, in the world of crime, the organiser or the "boss" should at least be a long-future man and therefore 'guilty', but that is also not necessarily so. When we look at the typical 'well organised rackets', we find that they too have not been built up by a 'futures' mind. They are things that have grown by themselves, by taking chances, by judicious intimidation of the weak spots in the opposition, by taking advantage of opportunities as they appear and then - one day - there it is; and it is up to him who is in the saddle to ride it. It has as little 'future' quality as an amateur football game.

Obviously a little more 'future' in the make-up of the boss will give him an edge over the others, but a man with a real future sense. (even if he could be conceived as having got into the racket by circumstances) would very soon see the light, cash his chips and find a peaceful life at the other end of the world on his ill-gotten gains. Only the short-futures man would grimly hang on to his position and fight until the inevitable posse of cops, or the burst of machine-gun fire from his rivals made an end of it for him.

Into this picture, their ostentation, their big cigars, their backslapping propensities and their often maudlin sentimentality (which, despite what 'intelligent' people think, is not false), all of which are typical of the short-futures man, find a more rightful place than if they had really been long-futures, long-term schemers of schemes.

They are the men. who have learnt to ride the crest of the wave, but they do not know how to get off without total ruination because they have not made that wave and do not really know how it works.

A final example of this class of men who lose their mystery before a temporalisation analysis, are the embezzlers. the enigmas of all those who see a man's actions as being determined by his intellectual activities.

One does not think here of the simple till-robber, the little clerk who bets on the horses and finds himself caught in his own net. He is no mystery, and no more than a short-futures man to whom the reality of the present 'sure thing' is immensely more real than the possibility that he will not be able to put the stolen amount back.

We think of the 'secretary of companies' who, by extremely intelligent manipulation of bills and double entries. manages to syphon thousands of pounds into his own pseudonym'd banking accounts.

Where, in the small practitioner, we can see the possibility of a rather under-developed personality setting his foot, in a weak moment, on the slippery path, intending honestly to do it just this once, because such a 'cert' as he has now will never come again in a lifetime - here we have a fully intentional action by a man who is fully aware of what he is doing. He must know that the standard of living that he is building up for himself and his family is dependent upon an unfailing streak of luck. He must know, from his understanding of book-keeping and from what he reads almost daily in the newspapers, that it is inevitable that, in the end, he will be caught - and yet he goes on and on.

One can only understand this, if one accepts that the reality, of that known and inevitable doom is absent in him. Only on that basis is it possible that he could do what he does.

When now, from this strange product of our civilisation, we turn to the general problem of the 'fighter', we come on a very interesting group of varieties on our theme.

Basically, the physical fighter must be an animal at the time of his fight and we are reminded of Julius Caesar's remark that: "Cowards die many times before their deaths; The valiant never tastes death but once."

Under the spotlight of our new way of looking at things, the statement acquires a completely different coloration.

Only the long-futured man can 'die many times'. As a matter of fact, he does so every time that his future image, in its calculations, touches the inevitable death that is always hovering in the background of his life. To avoid those deaths he must acquire the 'gift' of being able not to think about it, and that is not always easy, especially when, in the present, there are indications that that death is not so far away as one would like to have believed.

Only the man fully blessed(?) with an absence of future can 'taste death but once' - like the animals.

The fear of death works havoc with the ability to fight - but it is not only the fear of death that hampers here. In some respects the fear of pain is worse, and here the compulsion to imagine that pain in the future is, to some people almost impossible to overcome. We can therefore see that the usual attitude is not necessarily correct.

One could think it to be true that cowardice is not so much a lack of bravery, but that bravery is a lack of that which makes for cowardice.

Admittedly this would be a fallacious generalisation if it were taken to be valid in all cases, but one can admit that. In many if not in most of them, it is the bravery which is the negative quality (in that it consists of a lack of imagination that engenders fear) while cowardice is positive (in that it is due to a too vivid reality of the future image).

One should realise that this special quality in the 'coward' is not the despicable one which we instinctively feel in him. The situation is more complicated than that.

In actual physical fighting, future realisation must be a great handicap. Intelligent future *understanding* however should be a great advantage.

The British ideal of the fighter who 'keeps cool' expresses this very well.

Obviously the emotion of rage may interfere with intelligent judgement, but the emotion of expecting pain must be even more disturbing and fatal to effective offence and defence.

It is clear that the factors here are complicated by secondary influences. But one can realise that, to be a good fighter, one must be able to put all but the minimum of one's future-realisation out of action.

The fighter must be able to 'forget' what may happen to him and focus himself completely on the ways and means of overcoming the enemy.

The less strong his future realisation is, the easier and more natural this will come; which leads us back to the original statement that the best fighter is the one who can the most effectively make an 'intelligent animal' of himself, either at will, or at the behest of emotions, or, best of all, because he likes the sensation.

A less crude variation of this is the 'ideal' of the 'brave' man. This word softens the essential ferocity of the deeds that are necessary to produce the image of what is considered to be desirable and honourable in a 'man'.

Bravery however, like fighting, is still no more than the ability to switch off the 'human' and to leave the intelligence with the residual animal.

This is not to say that all long-futured men are cowards and all short-futured men are brave. Far from that. As remarked, there are numerous complicating factors here. The long-futured man can switch off his future image and the short-futured man may, by nature of the way life has hit him about, be timid and cringing, but, behind this another system of values is emerging.

One can accept that both 'Bravery' and 'Heroism' should be judged by what has been switched off - and how difficult it was to do that; all of which can lead to a rather interesting analysis of the nature of that quality which we have, since childhood, been educated to hold as one of the virtues of a 'Man' - as contrasted to the disgusting quality of cowardice.

All in all, one is afraid that it starts to appear that most, if not all of the *adoration* for the 'Hero' is due to an appreciation of his having done the dirty work for us and providing us with the opportunity to enjoy the results of his having been - or still being an 'animal'.

In a similar way, if we were consistent, we should therefore also honour the man with the gun in the abattoir who provides us with our chops and steaks by doing deeds we could never do for ourselves!

Here we learn to see the small men as the real, but unsung heroes. They did no spectacular deeds of bravery but, they found in themselves the power and the will to offer their future on the altar of their ideals. This honour will however only be due in proportion to the degree in which that future was real to them and the effort it cost to blot it out - and that nobody but God will ever know.

Here it is important to remember the numerous cases of ne'er-do-wells who became heroes in the furnace of the war - and the heroes of the war who found it difficult, if not impossible, to 'settle down' afterwards.

We tend, sentimentally, to think that this was due to the way their souls had been traumatised by the bloody horrors of the battles they fought; but one can see that it is possible, and even likely, that their 'value as soldiers' and their 'lack of value as civilians' may have been derived from the same personal qualities.

It is shameful, but we need the extremely short-futured man when danger threatens and there is fighting to be done - but in peacetime, and in a well organised state based on a long average future sense, they are really a nuisance - however cruel that may sound -and actually is. The 'war heroes' selling shoelaces in the Strand from heavily decorated trays were beggars and hoboes in the State. despite their magnificent record in the war. They told us that story all too devastatingly, if we had had eyes to see.

Here the Chinese have (or possibly 'had'?) a cynical proverb which said that one does not make nails out of good iron and neither does one make soldiers out of worthy men.

The Western world took two unbelievably costly and bloody wars to learn the lesson that it does not pay to have only short-futured men in the army. It is interesting to note how, typically short-futured, the one war started where the other had ended. The lessons were learnt but they were not developed into the future - at least not on the allied side. Clausewitz remained their bible and the First World War started in the trenches and behind the barbed wire of the Boer War. the Second World War started with what was hardly more than a slightly improved version of the tanks and aeroplanes that helped to end the first.

It is only now, that what are essentially 'civilians' have been seconded to the 'war effort', that we see intensive study of all the possibilities in weapon design, and strategy. Let us hope that their long-future imagination of the horrors of war may continue to prevent them from letting 'mailed fists' shake us into the third and final one.

The last of the short-futured ones who fit into this chapter, the last of those who sell the future for the present, their birthright for a mess of pottage today - are the prostitutes.

One does not need to go too deeply into the details and the psychology implied, but, in effect, we see that long-term sexual and social life is sold by them for the advantages of the moment.

It is, in general, doubtful if 'sex' rather than money is the usual primary incentive, but whatever it is, there is

no doubt that here also the attainment of an immediate result overrules the conclusion which the 'known' choice between future alternatives should have given, the choice between the inevitable degradation which they must see all around themselves and at least a chance at having children and security.

Here too we find once more the typical hall marks of the short-futured, often sympathetic, momentary personalities of which our novels, always on the lookout for the maudlin and the sentimental, even in so-called 'stark realism', make so much.

Here too we find the 'improvidence' which lets even the most successful courtesans down in the end. Money for them also burns holes in their garters, it being meant to be spent today and not tomorrow when it will start raining and never stop again.

CHAPTER VII

The 'Good' Short-Futured Ones

Happily, all short-futured people do not become Hoboes, Thieves or Criminals - otherwise one is afraid that there would be an immense amount of trouble in our Western Civilisation.

The ones that were mentioned in the last chapter were those that could not, or would not integrate - but there are many times their number who do and a large percentage of them are very successful at it. Some of them even manage to be among the brightest stars in our firmament.

The simple extrovert with his backslapping, his loud laugh and his 'hail-fellow-well-met' way of trespassing on other people's private lives, may be somewhat of a nuisance, but if he learns to canalise his extroversion, to subdue its irritating propensities and to give intelligent direction to the rest, one obtains some of the nicest people that it may be one's privilege to meet.

In their 'present', the prevailing mood is that of friendliness and a willingness to help and to listen with unfeigned sympathy to the troubles of others, a sympathy which is not a mask but absolutely real because, again in the present, they are in direct contact with their environment.

These are the 'civilised extroverts' but such well controlled extroversion is the personal and social quality of individuals and here we are more concerned with the place which they occupy in our world.

There are thousands of 'ecological niches' in our social and economic system in which they can exist and, as long as one does not insist too much on an adequate sense of responsibility, innate perseverance and dependability, they fit in very well.

When we take the basic characteristics of the extrovert, that is, his way of living in the reactions which he elicits from others (he lives mainly in the mirror image which his environment throws back at him), his tendency to exhibitionism and the much closer contact he has with the contents of his shorter 'now', one can even work out where he will fit the best.

His first and chief place will evidently be on the stage.

With his lack of emphasis on his own 'sacred' personality (which is a thing that troubles introverts), he can 'forget himself more easily. He can live himself into make-believe personalities and, together with his inherent lack of shyness, we find here the prime requisites for the actor and (if he is gifted with a voice) the singer and the operatic star.

At a somewhat lower level we may also place here, the 'Beauty Queens', the 'born' Mannequins and similar self-exhibiting individuals.

It is not without relevance that, among the actors, the 'stars of the stage and the screen', one also finds the other symptoms of the short-futured personality, such as the tendency to throw childish tantrums (which are the equivalent of the 'irritation', 'sulking' and 'ignoring' which Kroeber sees as a 'demonstrable ape trait' - but here in its 'human' form).

Others who must usually be extroverts are the ballet dancers who use their whole physical self to express what ballet has to express to its devotees. These dancers also have a very 'reactive' private life among themselves, if the reports one has of their rather special world are correct.

These then are the obvious ones who find their place in our economic system by forgetting the self and using their bodies and faces, their gestures and voices to amuse, astound, enthrall, impress and subdue the rest of us - and we are willing to pay for the release they afford us from being bound to the wheel of time.

They, however, find their personal recompense not so much in the money that they earn, but in the immediate applause they elicit, the storm of clapping and the cries of admiration which washes in from the other side of the footlights as an immediate response to what they do. As we have seen, the short-futured person needs his recompense as a part of his actions; and the almost childish concern with their personal mead of applause which one finds in most actors, their hatred of the 'extra' who 'steals the show' etc., is a clear expression of this trait.

Time does not matter to them. Life is a series of performances with longer or shorter 'intervals' between, when they can relax and live their curious short-futured lives, soaring to heights of ecstasy and plummeting down to disproportionate depths of despair. All of this however is 'interval'. They only 'live' on the stage, with the eyes of the world upon them. Only there are they fully 'real' to themselves.

Their loves are short and violent, their hatreds and jealousies flare up and fade and - above all - they are, as a group, improvident. At the end of their professional careers (unless they have had the sense to acquire a manager' or a 'supervisor' of their affairs) few are left with more than a small fraction of what they have earned. Their love of display and their ineradicable 'generosity' have made most of it disappear; and time and again we read of an erstwhile 'idol' of the stage or screen who has died in abject poverty in some third rate boarding house.

In this same category we can place the 'boxing stars'. They too do not fight because they love fighting for its own sake, but because they love being seen fighting, showing, not to themselves but to the 'others', that they can knock their man down. Both as being 'fighters' and as those who 'appear in public', they can be classed as being most likely to be short-futured men - and the boxer who, after having earned a series of five-figure 'gates', goes bankrupt, is all too familiar a phenomenon. Most of them also cannot help themselves.

This is not to say that not one of these has a 'normal' future span, or even a 'long' future mind - but these exceptional ones can be recognised by the fact that they have the habit of retiring when it is still time. They are the ones who have an entirely different attitude to their 'work'. They are less prone to 'tantrums' and end with a well padded bank balance and/or respectable husbands - or wives.

A strange and intriguing exception to this group are the Clowns.

One does not mean the 'comics' and the 'wise crackers' who cause the public to laugh *with* them, but the real clowns at whom, personally, the derision of the public is intended to be directed.

No one would think of Charlie Chaplin or Grock, to mention a pair of the best known ones, as short-futured extroverts.

One can feel that the real extrovert, who lives in the value of his public image, would not be able to stand the waves of howling laughter that this kind of actor has to bear.

When we try to imagine the difference between the interior of a 'wise-cracker', or even of a serious actor 'putting over' the character he has assumed, and Grock busy with his piano or Charlie doing his dance with the bread-rolls and a pair of forks, one obtains a somewhat disquieting insight into the nature of the work of the clown.

In the former there is a hollow mask trying to attain, and often attaining reality - but the little bright eyes of Grock and Charlie look at us through their acts while they deftly manipulate the strings that make the foolish

animal, man, laugh.

The clown must know mankind down to his deepest structural frailties. We laugh at him - and he? He does not even *laugh* at us!

At home he is said to be a 'misery' and often he is a misanthrope, but he is probably also the only actor who can really say that he despises the public. Certainly he is no extrovert.

With the actors the list is however only at its beginning, for, when we look at the essence of 'Art' itself, we find that we must also expect the artist to fall into this group.

Art has always been a difficult thing to define. Our dictionaries soon leave us in the lurch where, as usual, they beg the question by providing a ring of words like 'Beauty' and 'Aesthetic' etc., and then sending the inquirer from the one to the other for his information.

'Beauty' and 'Aesthetic qualities' have however faded long ago out of our art exhibitions, where 'Art' still remains going as strong as ever - still posing the question of what it really is.

To me it would seem to have its roots in the 'personal sensing of the real', the same strange experience as that which made the landscape, or the particular corner of a room in which we first met 'reality', a lasting part of our life.

This being enclosed with something, to the exclusion of all else, in the private space of a moment, although it may not be the final essence of the aesthetic experience, is always present, both in the creation and in the appreciation of art in whatever form it may materialise.

When a play grips us, as it should, then there is no audience around us, no stage props, no time - not even an action as such. One is alone with the event. When a symphony is being 'experienced', it is heard alone, and when a painting is seen as art, there are, at that moment, no Art Gallery, no walls, no frames and, above all, no other viewers, in the world. One is alone with it and acutely and immediately aware of the fusion of the self with whatever one is in contact at that moment.

This is an experience which is so rare and precious, so impossible to express adequately in words, that one cannot but suspect those who go from art appreciation to art appreciation with numerous Ooh!'s and Aaah!'s, can have no idea of what it is all about.

One often wonders again what, in the name of sanity, people can see in 'meaningless' blotches of paint on a canvas; and one tends to sneer at 'status seekers' who go to the concerts of Hindemith and other, so-called 'atonal' composers, all 'dressed up to be seen'. One tries to read a book in which the words seem to have lost all coherence and throws it away in disgust - but one is not aware that the 'appreciation of art' is not an appreciation of something that is in the object appreciated. It is the ability of getting into 'exclusive rapport' with certain things. The 'art' is not in the object, but in the fact that it can establish such a 'rapport' with certain viewers or audiences.

One can try to bring the understanding of this home to oneself by the simple experiment of placing an ordinary matchbox on the table before one, or by standing before one of those ugliest of modern utilities, a telegraph pole. If one succeeds in 'seeing' that object as actually existing and entering with it into the closed space of being fully aware of it, it will be found that it has the same ineffable quality of beauty and is as pregnant with a breathless wealth of meaning which words simply cannot express - as a work by a great artist.

That is 'art appreciation' - even though there is no 'art' as such. The beauty and the 'meaning' are nothing more than the fact that both the match box, the telegraph pole, the painting by Braque and Michaelangelo's

Madonna have the quality of existing and, as such can enter, with the self, into the experiencing of 'art appreciation'. It is the special quality that the artist gives to his work which makes it easier and sometimes imperative for the viewer to enter into that condition. It is therefore obvious that the 'art' of a certain work, be it painting or music or whatever pretends to that quality, is dependent upon the type of appreciators for its validity; and that one can, by precept and teaching be 'taught' to see some things as art while others are to one a mere daub or a rigmarole.

When this (what is called 'taste') has passed one by, one finds that 'modern art' has become mere nonsense, but the difference does not lie in the 'art' but in the producers *and* the appreciators.

However that may be, once it is realised that 'art' is not a definite something that is 'present' in specific quantities in specific objects, it becomes clear that art production and art appreciation is always a matter of a basically 'heightened realisation' and contact with the 'real' and the 'present'. As we have also seen that the reality of the moment is, from the beginning, easier and more natural to the short-futured person because the future is not - or only slightly - in the picture, we can expect that achieving the 'art appreciation' rapport will always be easier and more natural to the short-futured than it is to those who partially live in times-to-come.

On the other hand, it should also be true that, where the long-futured personality achieves that 'art-appreciation-rapport', that rapport must be in regard to long-futured values - and therefore of a deeper and more lasting nature than that of his short-futured brother who moves in intermittent ecstasy from one 'eternal beauty' to another.

Like our 'fighter' the artist also lives only in the moment - one could nearly say, in the 'instant' of creation and appreciation - but the living here is not, like that of the fighter, of an 'animal' quality. The artist is aware that he is aware - the animal is only aware and does not savour the exultation of his awareness.

Nevertheless, it is to be expected that, among the artists and the art appreciators. one will find a relatively high percentage of short-futured individuals, an expectation which seems to be adequately confirmed by the qualities of their typically 'bohemian' way of life - which appears to be nearly a caricature of the one we have sketched out in an earlier chapter as typical for the short-futured.

This comes most markedly into focus in regard to the Hangers-on and the Beatniks who have no personal achievement to give standing and balance to their life. They may spout their long-future philosophy, about the 'meaninglessness' of life, but the general impression they make is that this is mere parrot talk, a mouthing of thoughts that are felt to be 'deep'. Their way of life shows that they are most concerned about the present. The 'philosophy' is only a facade. It does not seem to occur to them that, as the future is theirs, it is up to them to do something about it now.

In the swarming mass of humanity however there is a continuous gradation from minimum to maximum temporalisation and one can sense its effect on the different types and manifestations as one moves up(?) into the more average layers of the community.

We can rediscover the 'Hobo' trait in the man who moves from employment to employment, or from one job to the other, the Jack-of-all-trades who tries everything, and the man who never holds a job for very long because he seems to think that the grass on the other side of the valley is sweeter. He may be intelligent and good at whatever he sets his hand or mind to do. He may be liked by both his colleagues and his employers; but a small advantage, real or imagined, or even none at all, will make him shake the dust off his sandals and move on.

There is nothing wrong in this. It does not make the man a 'lesser' human being, but one must deduce that he does not realise that, by moving on, he is omitting to build the foundations for a secure future which needs to have its roots fairly deep into familiar surroundings. If you ask him he will admit (and possibly even boast)

that 'security'. as such, does not interest him, thereby tacitly indicating that the future is not very real to him. He is only interested in the present part of his life. Future troubles he leaves to the future, and where he will be when his earning capacity has dwindled to nothing is outside the range of his vision. Enough unto the day is the pleasure thereof.

Such wanderings can be considered normal in the young, who have to find their place in the world and therefore have to know 'what is going' before they make a choice. There it is a logical and even a long-future characteristic. Beyond a certain point however, needless moving about is a sign of lack of directedness and therefore of future vision.

On a par with him, but with less wish at least to earn their living, we find those definitely characterised by irresponsibility and improvidence; the 'fortune hunters', the adventurers, the gamblers and. in general again, the 'horse-racing fraternity', shading over into all those to whom it is of more than momentary importance what horse will get there first, not to mention what dress or hat will 'make' the picture-papers and the notice of the multitude.

There is no reason why one should not have one's bet on the tote, no reason why one should avoid the occasional game of poker and neither is there a reason why one should not attend the races and dress up for it - or go to see football matches. All that makes life interesting and gives spice and variety to the present as it passes on under one's feet - but - all of that is also of strictly momentary value.

When the results become important, when one goes home downcast and remains depressed for a week because one set of men made more 'home runs' around the diamond than the other; or because a favourite horse, out of a selected batch, did not manage to cross the line first; when not being able to attend a meeting becomes a major catastrophe. then life is centred on the short-term values.

It should be possible to make a scale of 'depth of future' for individuals based on the degree to which such entirely 'instantaneous' values are important to them.

In the same way, given an equal intelligence, the trustworthiness of a person is, in general, a good indicator for the same thing today. It shows that the question of what things will be like tomorrow or the day after, has been adequately integrated into the present.

One can ask here if, were this to be true and where there is little doubt that trustworthiness, dependability and a sense of responsibility and good workmanship are on the wane, must one take it that the future sense of our people is shortening in?

The answer to that question, although unpleasant and in certain respects disturbing, is that these qualities in our forefathers seem to have been mainly instilled by fear, fear of punishment and fear of the ever present threat of immediate discharge which the employers of those days were never slow in using. The conscientiousness of the earlier generations was not so much an inherent quality but one that was instilled and maintained by a rigidly enforced system of discipline which, today, it is hardly possible to imagine.

One can realise that the employee who daily saw the following notice hanging above his desk, would hardly dare to be anything else than painstaking and trustworthy to the utmost of his ability.

M AND S ...

MERCHANTS AND SHIPS CHANDLERS. SYDNEY TOWN", 1852. Rules for the Clerical Staff:

1. Godliness, Cleanliness and Punctuality are the necessities of a good business.

2. On the recommendation of the Governor of this Colony, this firm has reduced the hours of work, and the Clerical Staff will now only have to be present between the hours of 7 a.m. and 6 p.m. on week days. The Sabbath is for Worship, but should any Man-of-War or other vessel require victualling, the Clerical Staff will work on the Sabbath.
3. Daily prayers will be held each morning in the Main Office. The Clerical Staff will be present.
4. Clothing must be of a sober nature. The Clerical Staff will not disport themselves in raiments of bright colours, nor will they wear hose, unless in good repair.
5. Overshoes and Top-coats may not be worn in the office but Neck Scarves and Head-wear may be worn in inclement weather.
6. A Stove is provided for the benefit of the Clerical Staff. Coal and Wood must be kept in the locker. It is recommended that each member of the Clerical Staff bring four pounds of coal, each day, during cold weather.
7. No member of the Clerical Staff may leave the room without permission from Mr. Ryder. The calls of nature are permitted, and the Clerical Staff may use the garden below the second gate. This area must be kept in good order.
8. No talking is allowed during business hours.
9. The craving for tobacco, wines or spirits is a human weakness, and, as such, is forbidden to all members of the Clerical Staff.
10. Now that the hours of business have been drastically reduced, the partaking of food is allowed between 11.30 a.m. and noon, but work will not, on any account, cease.
11. Members of the Clerical Staff will provide their own pens. A new sharpener is available, on application to Mr. Ryder.
12. Mr. Ryder will nominate a Senior Clerk to be responsible for the cleanliness of the Main Office and the Private Office, and all Boys and Juniors will report to him 40 minutes before Prayers, and will remain after closing hours for similar work. Brushers, Brooms, Scrubbers and Soap are provided by the Owners.
13. The new Increased Weekly Wages are as hereunder detailed:

	s. d.
Junior Boys (to 11 years)	1 4
Boys (to 14 years)	2 1
Juniors	4 8
Clerks	10 9
Junior Clerks	8 7
Senior Clerks (after 15 years with the Owners)	21 0

THE OWNERS HEREBY RECOGNISE THE GENEROSITY OF THE NEW LABOUR LAWS, BUT WILL EXPECT A GREAT RISE IN OUTPUT OF WORK TO COMPENSATE FOR THESE NEAR UTOPIAN CONDITIONS.

Reprinted from the Civil Service Journal of Western Australia.

His punishment was not in the future but definitely tomorrow, if not already today.

Now that the discipline is gone and where, in at least one American Trade Union there was an agitation to provide one day in the week when the work-man would have the right to tell the manager just what he thought of him; now that the individual self is left to provide the driving force, it is only to be expected that a man's real qualities will be expressed in his actions. The gardener is retiring and the peach trees are returning to their natural habitus.

We therefore come to the conclusion that the general decline in 'human' quality which is all around us nowadays. is not so much due to the fact that the 'future depth' of the people is shortening. but to the slackening of 'long-future' discipline. We are left to discover that the percentage of short-future men is, and has always been, much higher than we were led to believe.

In general we can get a fairly good idea of the depth of future of the average member of our society from what interests him, what he provides for and what values are important to him.

We have called our average, '*the average*', simply because we have known no other. The way of life this average produces seems to us 'normal' and we are not even aware that it is not our intelligence that produces it. That this is so is shown by the fact that we readily accept that 'Intelligence Quotients' can give an indication of whether a man is 'ready for democracy' or if a people ready for a 'one man, one vote' system of government.

We should realise that our average is only our average and no more. It is neither a 'normal' range, nor a self-evident one, or even one that any average intelligent person should have - even if his intelligence is equal to, or possibly higher than our own.

As a matter of fact the largest part of the people of this world have survived very well with completely different ranges in their 'present', their 'realised future' and their 'foreseeable future'. We are only one variation on the theme - and, for the same reason our democracy and our 'welfare states' are but one way in which people can live together - even though it may be the only one in which we can do so.

Before driving the analysis deeper into the effect of temporealisation on the life of human beings in the mass, we must still make a survey of what one could call the 'men in our background' - the real long-futured ones - the 'day-after-the-day-after-tomorrow-men'.

CHAPTER VII

The Long-Futured

The quality of being long-futured does not necessarily mean that one has the future all worked out in detail.

The essential effect of long-future sense is that things in the present are seen, not only as they are, but also as they are going to be in relation to a shorter or longer stretch into the future.

We can take the example of chess players, to make this clearer. Some players work out the effect of a move in all its details. If the bishop is moved to that square, the opponent can do that and that and that. The effect of the several counter moves is then worked out; and for each another counter move is considered with the reactions they may elicit, thereby soon multiplying the possibilities into the unoverseeable.

Another kind of chess player knows, or has learnt, all the different plays that have been worked out. For each move he knows the 'correct' answer. This is the player who can face a group of opponents with a reasonable chance of winning a large number of the games.

The third kind of player uses 'zones of influence' and 'threatened areas'. He knows the advantages of certain 'open' verticals and diagonals and sees the play, not as between individual pieces in separate battles, but as an implementation of an overall strategy with flank attacks, defensive positions and all the panoply of war. It is on the basis of these 'positional' relationships that he embroiders the detail of the individual moves.

In our temporealisation, the first two methods of 'playing' life are possible, but they need either great concentration and therefore a strong, almost monomaniacal determination to achieve a desired result or it demands a superior memory and imagination together with the ability to translate memorised experience into equivalent present action because, unlike in chess, in life the principles may be few, but the forms in which they clothe themselves are numberless.

The average long-futured mind plays life in the third way. It makes present moves in relation to the general pattern. It knows that there is *there* a combination of situations and influences which have not yet been fully worked out, and cannot be worked out on the data available. It waits for more details to be provided but, in the meantime, their overall design is realised. Deeds are done and judgements are made on the basis of the way in which they influence the beneficent tendencies.

Usually decisions are only taken when the moment to implement them has arrived, but this nonetheless means that the player continually sees that pattern developing in its relationships to a whole that stretches from the past, more or less far into the future - and he is aware that each individual act is only a detail of the whole.

The short-future man again one can compare with the chess player who is able to see which pieces are threatened, what defences he has available and what counter-attacks he can make in the next move or two.

To the unschooled onlooker there may seem to be only little difference between the plays (except that the one often seems to make 'useless' moves) but it is in the results that the temporealisation of the players finds its proof. The further into the future that the player can see (possibly in detail, possibly only in a general sense) the more likely is he to win in the end - unless he is so engrossed with his future positions that he overlooks the 'present' trap and trips over an unexpected movement of an overlooking knight.

We, who are not schooled chess players, will call it 'luck' that somehow a piece is always somewhere in the right place, just where it should be, but where it could not possibly have been known what it would do, six or seven moves earlier on..

In most ways temporealisation in life works the same way. The deed done, or left undone, today, somehow 'fits in' later on because it was judged in relation to the pattern of the foreseen future. It was felt that it would help in creating advantageous or desired situations and relationships and was therefore included in the deeds of the day although it may have had nothing to do with what, at that moment, seemed to be important.

The first group of men of which we can therefore surmise that they are long-futured, will be the speculators and the successful business men. We used to think of them as having 'luck', or as sitting around and 'thinking out' the future. We say of them that they have 'foresight' and that their plans are 'long-termed', but we think that this is an intellectual process - whereas they simply cannot help themselves. It is in the way they were born. The future which they manipulate is real to them and they arrange it from today because that is the obvious thing to do. They would be as foolish as we are if they didn't.

We overlook the fact that this approach to life is as natural to them as that whereby we, if we wish to go to a test match, try to get our tickets before they are sold out. We do not think of that as 'foresight', but in the eyes of the short-futured we have had foresight when, the day before the match, they realise that they have put the trouble of obtaining tickets off too long, and now must pay through the nose for their lack of temporealisation. The black market thrives especially on this disability of a large part of the population.

How many of us again have not let obvious chances pass by? How many of us have, for instance, omitted to buy a plot of ground near the centre of a growing city when we knew that, without a doubt, in twenty or thirty years time, it would be worth a 'small fortune', paying pounds for pennies?

"Yes," you say, "but at that time I did not have the money." Possibly that is true, but if you really had realised the value that the plot would have today - as you knew that it would have - you can hardly maintain that you could not have afforded the five or ten pounds a month which, in that day, went to paying off the new car or the radiogram - or to the holiday that was not a necessity then and is hardly a memory now.

These then are the long-future chess players who, by the results of their play have shown themselves to be what they are.

But not all long-futured men have actual results to show. It often depends upon what they value in life.

At the other end of the scale we have the philosophers. All philosophy must, of itself, be long-futured in nature - even a philosophy which denies the importance of tomorrow and which hedonistically claims, with Epicurus, that the good of today is the only good.

When we look at Epicurus with this in mind, we find that there is a deep background of long-term thinking behind his often misinterpreted conclusions.

Taking a short excerpt out of the 'Concise Encyclopaedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers' (p. 127), we read: "Epicurus' moral views have been much misunderstood and misrepresented. The theoretical basis is that pleasure alone is good and always good. It consists in driving out pain, and when pain is ended, pleasures can only be varied but not increased . . . But though all pleasure is good in itself, some pleasure brings pain with it as an inevitable consequence; therefore not all pleasures are chosen. Therefore wisdom is of the greatest importance since it is by wisdom that we are able to make the best choice of pleasures. Epicurus thus introduces the notion of a hedonistic calculus."

It will be felt that here, although 'Pleasure of the moment' is the philosophical aim, it is like the 'riches' of the speculator. In effect the philosophy is a long-futured one of how to achieve a continuous present time pleasure (or absence of pain) for as long as we live. It is only the object which, like money, is momentary; and not the philosophy itself.

Between the philosophers and the business men there is a long list of those in whom temporalisation is put to a more practical use. Here we find the men behind the social reforms, the town planners, the constructive politicians who are honestly concerned with power, only as a means to an end that is not primarily to their own advantage (and there are such, even though often, in the end, the means run away with those ends); the idealists, both 'practical' and otherwise, the religious reformers and the leaders of the established churches, the social workers who are more than mere 'relievers of present, sympathy-evoking suffering' or 'providers of handouts' and a very long list of others.

In short, here we find all those who see their own personal life-work (or who find their satisfaction in) contributing something that they deem to have a higher value than themselves and who are compensated, not by money or appreciation, but by the knowledge that they 'have not lived for nothing'.

Finally there is the nearly separate group of the law givers and the law administrators (which does not include those lawyers who live by being ready to twist a word and discover an omitted comma in the verbal definition of 'Justice!'). We mean those who have found it in themselves to rise above the ruck of 'cases' and to see that the law is kept 'holy': a thing above the machinations of 'now-men'.

One can realise that, whatever their special characteristics, all these long-future men will not be subject to 'tantrums' or liable to 'make a scene' when things go contrary to their wishes. If they did so, such is our instinctive understanding of the nature of men, that we would immediately be convinced that they were certainly not the 'real thing'.

Only a short-futured personality will express himself in fits of temper which are short lived, useless and soon forgotten. When something goes wrong with the life of the long-futured man, he will react by trying to put it right; and if that is obviously impossible he may be subject to a depression or a smouldering anger, or, possibly he may develop an 'ulcer', but he will not, what is colloquially called, 'blow his top'.

Reading between the lines, it will have been felt that it is these men who give our civilisation its special characteristics, both for good and evil.

Democracy, Liberty of the Individual, Social Welfare and Health Services, Conscientiousness (with 'Work' and 'Duty', not as impositions but as a valuable part of life), Laws that are above their administrators; the Ideal of the 'Honest Man', Long-term planning and maintaining of Industrial and Economic patterns - all are characteristics peculiar to the Western Civilisation which we have built up and which (now that our period of 'Colonisation' has petered out) we are trying to give to a world which does not seem to know what to do with it.

All of these qualities and ideas too are the result of these men existing and having existed among us - like a leaven.

In the following chapters we will study some of these aspects of our social, political and economic life in more detail, in regard to their 'future-sense' components.

Just as there was a gradation from the extremely short-futured men towards the central 'average', so obviously, there must be a gradation from the men we have described here and the same 'average'.

Here we will find a basic gradation of 'success' which will tend, in general, to parallel that of the future-span of the individuals; but this is by no means true for any particular individual.

We have already seen that the chess player, who is too interested in future plans, may be tripped up by a short-futured player because he has omitted to take sufficient notice of the 'present' position. In the same way the man, too enamoured with future images may come a cropper. Important as the future is, it is still a coldly

logical development. on the 'cause and effect' basis, from what is fact in the present. It takes no notice of beautiful dreams and, where the future-vision assumes too much importance, with a consequent lessening of a sufficiently direct touch with the immediate reality, that future vision tends really to become only a dream rather than a realisable pattern.

Here we have the builders of Utopia and Erewhon, and the Idealists who are notoriously impractical. In commercial life we have the men who go bankrupt because the vision they had of future opulence made them forget that such grandiose things can only 'grow' by a continuous and balanced give and take between credit and debit.

The good things of tomorrow are not already there because one has 'seen' them, as these people find out the hard way.

Just as the Utopian dream collapses because it does not take sufficient note of the quality of the human material at any 'present' moment. so the 'capitalistic empire' collapses because it is not realised that. at every moment of its existence, that empire must still have the common, earthbound quality of being 'solvent'. The promises of the future are not directly discountable today.

A long-futured view is therefore only good and valid when it does not try to cut the umbilical cord to the reality of the 'now'.

In this way we can understand why, in our society. a too long future span may prove a disadvantage instead of a boon. Our society is built upon a still sharply defined, practical relationship of the individual to his present environment (which is an heirloom of the days, not so very long ago, when we were still short-futured ourselves) but to which the, introduced, long-futured qualities have added a certain amount of 'depth' and effectiveness.

As we will see, it is this *combination* which gives our Western Civilisation its peculiar flavour. It is not so much the longer future span of our 'average' citizens. There are races and nations in which this is much longer, but, by having lost *their* short-futured characteristics almost entirely, their present is no longer sufficiently important to them. A sense of personal inadequacy of the individual in regard to the whole takes over and prevents 'doing something about it'. There the future in having attained an existence almost of its own, has moved so far ahead that it has ceased to be effective as a guide to what should be done today.

CHAPTER IX

The Different Values of Truth

The effects of the quality of temporalisation on human life and relationships are not confined to its evolutionary, historical and psychological aspects.

When the picture is seen as a whole, one realises that it also profoundly affects the evaluation of the moral and ethical systems and principles on which we have built our life as if it were on solid rock. In this it, unhappily, tends to rob these foundations of some of their imperative and 'absolute' validity, but one is compensated by the fact that it now also becomes possible to understand the reason for what seemed to be insoluble conflicts and contradictions in them.

The absolute validity of our ideas on 'Justice', 'Truth', 'Sin', 'Human Rights', and 'Democracy' has, for us, an 'eternal' quality which is above doubt, and when we see others who do not acknowledge them (or who have completely different ideas about how they should be) we tend to take it for granted that they are either blind, mentally deficient in some way, or basically criminal and immoral. At best we may shrug our shoulders and think them 'queer'.

We know, with an absolute conviction, that our variations are the nearest it is humanly possible to get to the Absolute Ideal. We may admit that they are not yet entirely perfect, like Longfellow's 'broken image' of the 'moon in heaven' which he saw on the bridge at midnight. They are only a 'human' attempt to approach it but, nevertheless, we know that this is merely a matter of how they should be interpreted and implemented in terms of our admittedly imperfect human material. We are willing to admit that one may be justified in arguing about details, but despite superficial differences all of us know that these 'eternal' values exist and must be the guiding principles not only of our own, but of all judgements. All the world may not yet have seen the light but eventually they will all have to come, Arab and Indian, stone-age Dyak and Eskimo, Russian and Chinese, to what is not 'our' way of seeing things, but the only way. These values are 'eternal', we think, and it is only some strange quirk in the make-up of the others which prevents them from seeing it so. In their heart of hearts, we know that they know that we are right. In regard to the subject of this book, the word 'eternal' here is the key-word and it will be noted that, if we delete it from the text, the statement loses most of its convincing quality and, on closer examination, most of its sense: in a way it becomes a mere impudence. Only values that are 'eternal' are valid to us in the sense of being 'absolute', and higher than the validity of a season ticket on the City and Suburban which will expire within the year. This is so obvious as to seem almost a platitude but what is not so obvious is that it follows that those values can only be real to an individual up to the end of his future span. An evaluation that depends upon and has its roots in something that does not really exist for him - or that at the most is only theoretically there - is impossible. If we make 'Truth' the first subject of our examination, some of the implications of this will become clearer.

Truth is not an easy and simple subject to study, however much we think that we know instinctively what it means. We even admit this by nodding our heads wisely at the shoulder-shrugging question by Pontius Pilate: "What is Truth?", because it serves as a convenient screen behind which we can hide our little white and grey lies - not to mention the occasional big black one that we 'had' to tell because too much hung in the balance. The implication there is that we do not need to bother too much about it as, after all, nobody really knows what Truth is.

This is as far as practical Truth is concerned. On the other extreme we have the eulogies that, by their exaggerated claims lose all semblance of meaning. Here we have, for instance, Alcott's: "Truth is inclusive of all virtues, is older than sects or schools and, like charity, more ancient than mankind," or Browning's:

"Truth is within ourselves. It takes no rise

*From outward things, whate'er you may believe.
There is an inmost centre in us all Where truth
abides in fulness."*

It will be found on examination that this 'Truth' is a kind of olla podrida of the 'truth of the revelation in the Gospels' mixed with a strong leavening of other, mostly sentimental, evaluations. It has little to do, for instance, with little George Washington, his axe and his cherry tree.

From here it achieves almost an existence of its own and ends up in the inanity of such sayings as: 'Beauty is Truth' and its almost more inane counterpart: 'Truth is Beauty'. Here the adjectival noun (the noun made out of an adjective) completely takes over from its underlying adjective, in order to produce the effect of pronouncing a deep wisdom; where "Beauty is always truthful" and "Truth is beautiful" would have been much less impressive.

When we leave this kind of thinking aside and really try to concentrate on what we mean by 'Truth' we must first emphasize to ourselves that it is not a 'something'. It is no more than a 'quality of something'.

Next we try to find what 'somethings' can have the property of 'Truth'. Stones and flowers and even men cannot be 'true' in the sense of the word that we are examining.

When a man is 'true' it means that he is 'true to an ideal', a 'loyal subject' or 'truly a man'. In any of these guises he may still be a thoroughgoing liar if, for instance, he wants to get something to which he has no right.

It will be found that the kind of 'truth' which we are seeking is only applicable to 'statements' and to 'images' and, when we try to pinpoint that still more, we find that the essential quality in which they have the factor of 'truth' is that they are both 'representations of something'. The statement 'represents' in words, the image 'represents' in some other material.

The quality of 'truth' in a given statement or a given image turns out to be that it is a 'correct' representation of what it purports to represent. Truth is therefore not even a quality of something, but a quality of a quality, the 'correctness' of the 'representing'.

Although this may seem to be a satisfactory answer to our question, we find that we have only made the first step into the maze which our 'human' way of thinking and verbalisation have made of the subject.

Here again, as so often elsewhere, we tend to confuse the container with the contents. When we say: "This stick is a foot long," the statement may be true (that is, it may be a true representation) of the specific object indicated by 'this'; but "This stick is a foot long," is, of *itself* not a Truth.

One may think this to be a mere quibble, but it is an important distinction of which we must be conscious if we do not wish ourselves to be led astray. Overlooking this has given rise to the idea that there are 'absolute truths' where Truth is never more than a quality of a specific relationship between a specific representation and its specific object. A statement or an image, is never true by itself. It can only be a true representation of something. In daily use this is not so important, as the specific object of which the statement or the image is made is always more or less understood by both parties, but, when one enters the domain of the so-called 'higher' truths, the argument soon takes wings into the realms of fancy, having cut its cable to the reality of which, in the end, one still is supposed to be speaking.

The second main complication comes in when one does not realise or specify of what the representation is supposed to be a 'correct' representation - to put it in other words: when one does not define exactly what one is talking about.

When I say: —The Victoria Waterfalls are the highest in the world," I may be speaking the truth, if I have not heard of the Angel Falls in Venezuela. and when that is therefore what I truly believe. I will be telling a lie if I am merely bragging. But even if I believe it to be true and am therefore not telling a lie, the statement, not being a correct representation of the facts, is also not true.

One can develop this kind of thing - and in philosophy it is often so developed - until it becomes completely confusing and everyone has the right to believe what he likes to believe.

It is here however not the intention to confuse ourselves, but to discover what we are really thinking about. To do this, we must face the other way. The confusion would have disappeared out of the above example if I had said: "I believe (I have the image) that the Victoria Waterfalls are the highest in the world."

If we examine this, we find that the original statement was really a two-stage or a two-layered one. In the first variation, the statement was a correct representation of my inner image and therefore 'true'. The inner image however was not a correct representation of the facts and therefore 'untrue'.

It is due to the 'double layered' nature of our statements that nearly all the confusion arises.

As most of our statements must be about our images, (because it is only in our images that we know the outer world) most of our statements are essentially ambivalent. They have two levels.

The layer where that becomes directly apparent is where the statement is or is not a correct representation of the inner image of the speaker, and it is here that we replace the 'not-true' by the term 'lie' because, if the statement is not true at this level, the speaker must have been conscious of it and there was therefore the implied, if not overt, intention to deceive.

Here then is little mystery and the subject falls more naturally under the discussion of the 'lie'.

The 'ground level' of the truth is the important one however and this leads us to the question of in how far our images are, or can be, 'correct' representations of reality.

At this point we find ourselves suddenly face to face with a blank wall because of the realisation that not one of our images is, or can be, a 'correct' representation of what it stands for.

Science has told us long ago that leaves are not green and the rose is not red, that taste and smell are chemical qualities of substances and that the irregularities in the grooves of a gramophone record are a more 'correct' representation of the 'symphony' which it contains, than what we hear when it is played.

Here we have arrived at the borderlines between the knowable and the metaphysical and where the fact that we are, each of us, locked up in our own private worlds, has its final, frustrating result. Our images are interpretations of what our sense organs perceive and no more. It is also absolutely impossible to know if the interpretations that others are aware of from the same source, are the same as ours. The vibration of the air is translated in my brain into a symphony and I hear it as such. The same vibrations, in the brain of my Chinese friend (even if they are interpreted into the same sounds) do not make a 'symphony' but a 'noise', and he will tell me so, if he knows me well enough not to be afraid of hurting my feelings or being himself thought to be 'stupid' and 'bad mannered'.

The difficulty goes deeper than that for I have no way of knowing if even my beloved does not see 'green' as I do 'red'. She may even have the same sensation as I do when I 'taste' sugar, when she 'sees' the gold of the sunset.

This setback is however not as bad as it seems, for as all of us perceive 'interpretations' of reality, there still

remains the fact that these 'interpretations' themselves can be 'correct' or 'incorrect'. Basically they are still 'representations in another medium'. When I translate a passage out of the Bible into the electronic language of the Martians, that translation will be 'correct' if it produces, in the mind of the Martian, an electronic image which, in his image world is an equivalent, in terms of his images, of the image which is produced (in terms of my images) in mine by the original. These two images may, to a third observer have no discernible point in common and still they can be correct translations or interpretations of each other.

In the same way the electromagnetic wavelengths of 7000 angstrom units of reality are 'correctly' translated as 'red' in terms of my images, even if they happen to be translated into 'green' in terms of the images of my neighbour for whom that is the correct translation.

The only difficulty is that a 'translation' is never fully 'correct'. Even in the German language there are numerous words that cannot be 'correctly' translated into English (like 'Schadenfreude' and 'Weltschmerz') just as there are words in English that cannot be 'correctly' translated into German (like, 'Home' and 'Gentlemen'). Translations are always approximations - but they can be 'as correct as possible' and what we have to accept is that our personal images are, on the average, translations of reality that are as 'correct as possible' into the different 'idioms' of the different worlds that perceive them.

Although we cannot see into each other's worlds, we can make legitimate deductions, both from the acts of others, from what they tell us, from their expressions and their evaluations and from an insight into how these images must have developed from the rudimentary ones of our common, most primitive ancestors.

Admittedly a large part of the evaluation, relative importance and interrelations of the images with which our intellects are provided for us, are due to our environment and education, although possibly not as much as modern thinking would like to believe. The inability of my Chinese friend to 'hear' the symphony which impinged on his eardrums in exactly the same way as it did on mine, was probably due to the fact that he grew up in a world where 'music' was 'melody' - that is: a sequence and not a simultaneity of notes. It nowhere contained the concept of 'harmony' so that the, to me, harmonising notes were, to him, merely an unnecessary and confusing welter of sounds among which it was impossible to find the rather childishly simple sequence of notes of our occidental concept of 'melody'.

If he had grown up in a European environment, it is possible (although not necessary) that he would have 'heard' the symphony as well as I did - although one would have expected that, in that case, he would even now have had some inkling of what he should be bearing, after years of contact with western music. Dr. Chi, as I remember, was undoubtedly intelligent enough for that. I learnt much from him.

On the other hand, this lack of appreciation was not a sign that there was something 'lacking' in him. It was as difficult, if not impossible for me to 'hear' his 'melodies' - uncluttered though they were by harmonies. The time-stretch was too long for me to bind them together and they sounded as if someone was haphazardly playing around on the black notes of a piano that was somewhat in need of a tuner.

I myself doubt that, if I had grown up in a Chinese environment, I would have 'loved' our Chinese music for I, having also melody in my music, should at least have been able to hear more in his than I did. I would not be surprised if the length of a melodic structure that can be 'heard' as one, is also inborn, like having an 'absolute Pitch' and the other qualities needed for true music appreciation.

That people and races, as a whole, can be essentially different. (and that not only due to their environment) follows from a most enlightening passage in 'My Country and my People' (p. 80) by Lin Yu Tang who in passing, throws a rather intriguing sidelight on the mystery of 'she' whom Oscar Wilde irreverently called the 'Sphinx without a riddle'.

"Indeed the Chinese mind is akin to the feminine mind in many respects. Femininity, in fact is the only word

that can summarise its various aspects. The qualities of the feminine intelligence and feminine logic are exactly the qualities of the Chinese mind. The Chinese head, like the feminine head, is full of common sense. It is shy of abstract terms, like a woman's speech.

They have never had higher mathematics of their own and seldom have they gone beyond the level of arithmetic, like many women, with the exception of those masculine women prize-winners at college.

And finally Chinese logic is highly personal, like woman's logic. A woman would not introduce a professor of ichthyology as a professor of ichthyology, but as the brother-in-law of Colonel Harrison who died in India while she was undergoing an operation for appendicitis in New York by that lovable old Doctor Cabot; you should look at his handsome forehead. In the same way, a Chinese judge cannot think of law as an abstract entity, but as a flexible quantity as it should be personally applied to Colonel Huang or Major Li. Accordingly, any law which is not personal enough to respond to the personality of Colonel Huang and Major Li is inhuman and therefore no law at all. Chinese justice is an art, not a science."

As 'East is East and West is West' here seems to indicate a basic difference of approach or of seeing things, which is similar to the difference between men and women who have grown up in the same environment, the deciding effect of the genetically determined, hereditary qualities becomes difficult to ignore!

From the other end of the scale we can add a quotation from the June 1962 number of the South African 'Camera News' which has an article on the ability to see pictures in 3 D.

"When the average person, raised in the Western culture looks at a photograph, a drawing, or a painting, he interprets it three dimensionally, seeing depth in it, even though it is flat.

"But what happens when people not orientated in the Western culture, which is a primarily visual one, interpret flat pictures, illustrations and diagrams?"

"Research into this problem is being carried out by the National Institute of Personnel Research - using White and Black subjects

"The Institute found that where the White child began school, he usually saw pictures as flat, but by the time he had reached Standard VI, he was competent in perceiving them three-dimensionally.

"The illiterate Black adult saw the pictures flat and misunderstood them -. It was found that Black matriculation scholars, as well as graduate teachers experienced the same difficulty - They were shown a drawing of a man (back view) with one foot raised as if he were stepping on a block of wood. Illiterate labourers saw this as a drawing of a man who was maimed, whose foot had been cut off or who had been born with a short leg.

"The surprising finding in this study was that the highly educated Black subject had difficulty in perceiving pictorial material, three-dimensionally - it was apparently possible for a black graduate to complete his studies in spite of his misperception of pictorial meaning."

Beside the hint given here for a possible explanation why Black students in the engineering subjects generally do so badly, one can see how the 'misperception' is also present in the mind of the writer. He has the modern failing of blaming everything on the environment and has not even noticed that the facts blatantly contradict the soothing initial 'explanation'. His 'surprise' is entirely due to the misconception with which he started and which surprisingly remains intact in him, leaving the contradiction as a 'mystery'!

That the defect is still present among the highly educated Black graduates who have had a full training in the use of visual material, indicates that there is a congenitally different world-image in them and that it is

extremely likely that this is also true of all pure blooded Bantu and Negroes, be they in Africa or America, despite the particular environment in which they have grown up. This demonstration of the fact that people may actually see things differently makes one wonder if the contorted shapes of modern painting are not possibly, after all, a much more 'correct reproduction' of how the artists actually see the world, than we were formerly inclined to believe!

Having in this way tried to give some evidence for the fact that the worlds we live in are by no means as much alike as we thought and only similar in that they are different translations of the same thing, each only 'correct' in its own idiom, we can approach the subject of the varied degrees of temporealisation and its effect upon our actions and values with somewhat more confidence. All this is evidently not entirely 'theory'.

When we read between the lines of the world's history and look impersonally at the world's art, it becomes obvious that the knowledge that our images are only *representations* of an existing reality, is not much more than two thousand years old, and that it is even now not something that we have in common with the largest part of humanity.

This may seem to be a very bold statement to make where all our lives are built upon the self-evidence of that fact. It is difficult for us to conceive that it is not directly apparent to everybody with a minimum of intelligence, despite the evidence to the contrary that we can find everywhere, even in our own personal surroundings.

As this profoundly affects the basic, ground-level concept of what Truth is, it is not superfluous to indicate some of it here, so that the reader can learn where to look.

In the first place we can start at home and ask our wives or sisters if the idea seems to be so strange to them as it does to us.

Having lived all their lives in a 'Western man's' world, they have learnt to adapt and (as the Black scholars who learnt to see that the foreshortened leg of the man in the drawing did not necessarily mean that he was 'misformed or maimed') they have learnt to recognise the existence of 'things' behind the images they have of them. Nevertheless the lady who introduced the professor of ichthyology shows definite signs of living only in her own image world. She minutely describes the professor as he is there and not as he is in some self-existing outside world. Their disdain of 'laws' and 'abstractions' and 'male logic' based on 'facts' points the same way.

The same thing is again true for the Chinese whose 'personalised' law responds to the personalities of Colonel Huang and Major Li because, in their estimation, if it was inhuman, it would not be a law.

Our laws are like those of 'gravity' and therefore essentially 'inhuman'. For us it is 'humanity' which *tempers* them with 'mercy' but for us a law that is 'human' would not be a law!

As Lin Yu Tang puts it (being himself a Chinese): "Chinese logic is highly personal. like woman's logic." It is highly personal because it is based on personal images. Lin Yu Tang sees *our* 'impersonal' logic as the result of a more or less intellectual abstraction which we seem to *make* of the common denominator or the aggregate of all our personal images where, in actual fact, it is nothing of the kind. We do not think the chair is there because all of us see it there. We *know* that it is there and that it would be there even if nobody had ever seen it. We know that the diamond which we pick out of the heap of gravel after the washing, has been somewhere in the earth since time began although nobody has ever seen it.

No wonder therefore that we often have a kind of 'East is East and West is West' situation in our own homes even though our wives and daughters are by no means orientals.

To be fair, we must admit that this characteristic is, among us also, not only confined to the female sex. Bishop Berkeley, who taught that 'no object exists apart from the mind', has, in his time, had a very large following and, according to the highest authorities, the understanding of Einstein's Relativity Theory needs a basically Berkeleyan mental approach (Encyclopaedia Britannica).

A more important indication is to be found in the nature and the meaning of Magic which was originally the basic way of thinking of all men and is still that of a large part of it today.

Both in its 'Homoeopathic' and its 'Contagious' forms, it is manifestly based on the images in the minds of men and not on a factual existence behind them.

Homoeopathic or Imitative Magic is described by Sir James Frazer in "The Golden Bough": "Perhaps the most familiar application is the attempt which has been made by many peoples in many ages to injure or destroy an enemy by injuring or destroying an image of him.

"For example, when the Ojebway Indian desires to work evil on any one, he makes a little wooden image of his enemy and runs a needle into its heart."

Contagious Magic again: "proceeds upon the notion that things which have once been conjoined must remain ever afterwards, even when quite dissevered from each other, in such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done to the one must similarly affect the other. Thus the logical basis of Contagious Magic, like that of Homoeopathic Magic, is a mistaken association of ideas; its physical basis, if we may speak of such a thing, like the physical basis of Homoeopathic Magic, is a material medium of some sort which, like the ether of modern physics, is assumed to unite distant objects and to convey impressions from the one to the other."

One does not like to cross swords with such an eminent authority as Sir James Frazer, but it would seem that his first explanation is the valid one. This Magic is based on an 'association of ideas', that is, on the images which alone exist in the mind of the primitive. The second explanation shows a lack of realisation that our worlds can be entirely different from, and not directly explainable in terms of, each other. Sir James 'explains' Magic by finding a way in which his mind would be able to explain it to himself if Magic was really valid and effective. The 'physical basis' for Magic is needed only by him who, himself sees things as existing behind their images. The primitive does not need an explanation at all. His 'ideas' and his 'images' both of the enemy and of the little wooden doll, all exist together in one medium, that of his image world and are there naturally associated. It is for this reason that what seems sheer nonsense to us on the basis of the difference between 'images' and 'things', is simple and self-evident 'logic' to them. It happens in their mind and therefore it happens where it is.

Going back into the very beginning of history we again find the same thing. S. N. Kramer, one of the most important Sumerologists, writes in his book: 'History begins at Sumer' (P. 127): "The Sumerians failed to develop a systematic philosophy in the accepted sense of the word. It never occurred to them to raise any questions concerning the fundamental nature of reality and knowledge.

"Sumerian philosophers failed to discover that the all important intellectual tool which we take for granted, the scientific method of definition and generalisation - To take even so relatively simple a principle as cause and effect, the Sumerian thinker, while fully aware of the innumerable concrete examples of its operation, never came upon the idea of formulating it as a general, all-prevailing law." This admission in a book that really intends to have the message that everything began at Sumer, has compelling importance.

When we look at it again, we find that it is, as a whole, partially true of all primitive people, and of all those who believe in Magic. Of these it is also true that it 'never occurred to them to ask themselves questions about the nature of 'reality' and 'knowledge' and that for the simple reason that that 'reality' does, as such, not exist for them, and that therefore 'knowledge' also has no 'real' meaning.

Passing on from here to look at Egyptian art, we find that all men are drawn with the one eye and the shoulders facing the beholder while the face is always in profile and the feet point sideways. Although this is 'explained' by the blanket explanation which fits so many curiosities in peculiar art forms, namely that it was the 'tradition', no explanation is given of how, at some specific time, that tradition could have originated.

If one however imagines the artist as drawing his subject, part by part, not as he would be seeing it on a sitter, but as the images he had of each of the parts, a product like that of the typical Egyptian drawing would be likely to result. One sees an eye as an 'eye' only from the front and shoulders too are 'shoulders' only when seen from there. A face is a flat expanse from the front, but typical of a 'face' if seen in profile, and feet and knees seen from the side especially are only 'feet' and 'knees' when seen from the side.

The same is, in another way, true of Japanese and Persian art in which the background is drawn as it exists for them, like wallpaper, and in the background to the image world.

The most important argument is however to be found in that one can almost exactly pinpoint where and when the discovery of the 'real' behind the 'image' took place and find there the roots of what is our special civilisation.

There can be little doubt that it happened in Greece.

This is to be deduced, not so much from the fact that, in Greece, art suddenly left the walls to stand up and become something that existed by itself in what Spengler characterises by the untranslatable: "Das punktförmige Dasein" - but in that the whole Greek culture suffered from an obsession for discovering and defining 'laws'! These laws were not, like those of Hammurabi, seen as rules and regulations defining the will of a ruler or a God. They were more like the 'principles' or the 'essences' of what they defined.

The Greek, having seen that his images were the images of things, was supremely concerned with discovering what that self-existing world was, and, above all, how it was run, because that was what he needed to know and feel secure in it. The laws he sought and found were therefore immutable and without possible occasional exceptions and he found them for everything; not only for his own way of living together, but for nature, the universe, for the arts and even for his own thinking. They were not invented or determined by human will or ideas; but an attempt to define the structure, in space and time, of the 'reality' with which the Greek had found that he would have to live.

It is admittedly difficult to imagine this difference. Each of us sees things as he or she sees them and, of itself, the thought cannot enter that this is not obviously the way that even a dog has to see them. Judging by the results and the actions of people we must however accept that there is a great difference here, and in the expression: "Seeing the 'reality' behind the 'image'," we have tried to express it as concisely as possible. Obviously that is not the real way. One does not see an image and think that the thing is hiding 'behind' it. The process is more subtle than that. It may give a more exact representation to say that in the first kind of (more primitive) seeing one 'sees something', and that in the other 'something is seen'.

The Greeks were the first to see things not as 'common denominators of what everybody saw', but as the cause of what they saw, and that new view of the situation was not only the reason for the fantastic advances they made in nearly every field of human achievement - it was the beginning and the essence of what is at the root of our own whole Western Civilisation.

On this basis we can now state something that seems to have been overlooked up to now.

Because, for the Greeks, there was for the first time, a difference between the Image and the Subject of the Image, it was therefore also for the first time possible for them to have (or to realise that they could have) a 'correct image' or an 'incorrect image' of the outer world. From this it follows that, also only for the Greeks,

the word Truth assumed the meaning that it has for us to this day.

It is strange to realise that the Greeks were the first people, and for a long time the only ones, who could ask themselves the simple little question: "Is this true?"

Up to then the word 'Truth' only had the antonym 'Lie'. Now it also had the antonym 'Not True'. The Untruth that was not a lie had appeared.

It was the second meaning of Truth. in its 'Truth of the Image' form. which led us to the concepts of 'absolute' and 'eternal' truths.

One does not need to work it all out here, as it would take several chapters to do it justice, but if one sits down and turns the idea over in one's mind, it will soon become apparent that it is as a result of this new development in their personal worlds that the Greek Civilisation arose on the shores of the Aegean. It is also as a result of further specialisations of it that the derivatives of the Greek civilisation, among them our own, developed. It explains why no other Civilisations have ever had an abstract Science. The others may have had 'Observing Sciences' - like the Astronomy of Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and the Maya, but not 'Explanatory Sciences' like ours.

To them the observed facts remained facts - facts that could be arranged, or found to be arranged, in patterns - but that was all. One could say that they could analyse the basic repeating pattern out of a complicated wallpaper design, but that they could not draw from that the conclusion that a printing process, using rollers, must have produced it.

One point that still needs to be underlined is that 'being long-futured' did not, of necessity lead to the discovery of a 'self-existing reality'. Egypt, China and Middle America, all of them produced extremely long-futured people who, even up to today, have not yet discovered reality.

On the other hand one can see that it must be completely impossible for a short-futured people to discover it at all. To see 'reality' behind the perception, that reality must first have a fairly long extension of itself into the future, if it is to be the basis for the fleeting images we have of it.

To those people therefore, to whom the future does not exist or is relatively unreal - the 'Thing as such', (or, as the Germans call it: 'Das Ding an Sich') can also not exist - or have only a relatively unreal existence which will not sufficiently obtrude itself from behind the apparent reality of the present image to make itself known.

This then is the difference between a 'Woman' and a 'Chinese'. Both live in an as yet closed, or only partially open image-world, but the woman tends, in general, to have the characteristics of a short-futured person where the Chinese has a peculiar kind of long-futured outlook that later on, we will meet again. It was that which enabled Lin Yu Tang to understand, if not accept *our*, to him 'inhuman', impersonal kind of Justice.

CHAPTER X

Lies, Sin and Ethics

As the quality of 'truth' is basically different to people with different future-ranges, it must follow that their personal attitude to the quality of truth in their own statements, and that of others, must be different too. In other words, the 'lie' must have an entirely different meaning to the long-futured as compared to the one that it has for the short-futured.

The long-futured man has not only the need to judge in how far he should declare the contents of his image world to others, he also has the need to decide in how far he is responsible for making sure that his images themselves are correct, in how far he can make use of hearsay and impressions gained from unremembered sources; and in how far he can permit himself to complete his image by suppositions, rational deductions or pure imagination when reporting the results as facts. Finally he must decide in how far he should make a bore of himself by meticulously stating what he knows, what he supposes and what is deduced - and why.

All this again will have to depend, for him, upon the relative importance the matter has for him, and especially, how important its truth may be to the recipient.

The short-futured man however can have no such scruples. He need only decide in how far he should give a correct report of his image world and, as that image world is, for him, not based on anything solid (consisting as it does of often easily manipulable entities that have a habit of automatically fitting themselves into his moods, acquiring tints and implications that show the desired qualities; and disappearing when they are not wanted) one can imagine that 'telling a lie' is all too easy for him. It is telling the truth that needs attention.

In telling a lie he also does no 'permanent' harm for nothing has more than momentary implications. He is manipulating the present and, if in doing so, he twists the hardly realised future relationships a bit, or chips some unpalatable pieces off present reality, it is all to the good.

As he has no moral obligation to show exactly how his inner world looks - it is after all his own and nobody else's - he does not need to speak the 'truth' at all. Where experience has shown him that life is not easy and that it is often a little advantage that will turn the scales, he may think that only a fool would show himself as he is and it is interesting to find how, in some of them, this develops into a habit of telling a lie in preference to the truth as, in that way they avoid the difficulty of judging where they can show themselves without running a risk.

If he gets away with his lie, well and good - not so much because there is, for him, no permanent reality that may bring the lie home to him later on, but more because the *validity* of momentary image is also less.

Lying is therefore not a 'sin' to him. He commits no sacrilege, he twists no distant permanent relationships whose distortion may cause a flaw to fan outwards into eternity. Neither can he do the other any permanent harm. He sees of the other also no more than the immediate future and as long as his lie has the desired effect in that, he is content.

An amusing example of this can be found in the native who will tell you, when you ask him the way, or how far it is to the next town. exactly what you want to hear.

He will look at you, sense the answer you would like and give it to you, shortening the distances by how tired you look and not wishing to do you the disservice of telling you that you are going in the wrong direction like a fool. That the momentary relief he gives you will eventually make matters worse does not enter into his mind. He is doing you a favour!

The idea that one can apply the concept 'wrong' to this is obviously preposterous. It is hardly a 'lie' in any sense of the word that one usually applies to it.

When the long-futured man tells a 'lie' however, it is quite a different thing. He knows that both he and the recipient live together in a real world which will remain as it is whatever he says - a world in which we humans can only find our way if we succeed in making our image worlds as perfect replicas of it as possible. Distorting another man's images is therefore doing him actual harm.

The final ideal condition would be when all men on earth had acquired a fully correct translation of reality in terms of the idiom of their own worlds, not only of the things and relationships and qualities of the reality in their environment, but also a valid, (if only general) image of the contents of the worlds of those around them. In such a situation there would be a minimum of mistakes and, above all, a minimum of silly, useless and often directly harmful misunderstandings.

All the time of humanity, since the first primitive men learnt to keep and perfect their tools, has actually been spent in an excruciatingly slow development towards this single goal. Step by step, as slowly as the invisible movement of the hour-hand on our watches, we have gone forward, sometimes slipping two steps back for every one we took forward, but always eventually catching up again and going ahead.

We discovered the future and, through that the concept of an overseeable time, we learnt to see things as existing by themselves and not as images in us, we learnt to see that existing as happening in Space (when perspective came into our drawings during the Roman civilisation). we learnt to see movement happening in space and time (when, during the Renaissance, our painting suddenly came to life) we learnt to make models in space and time in our image worlds of the motions we wanted to be performed for us and learnt to make machines; we analysed out the principles of cause and effect. and dropped Magic; we analysed out the laws of nature, and mathematical relationships and patterns; we learnt to distinguish between true and false conclusions and the laws of valid evidence and proof.

We have come a long way, but most of this is still mere theory. In the image worlds where we live, we are still ridden by our emotions, apt to revert to what is very little above the level of the apes. Wishful thinking still largely rules the selection of the images we are personally allowed to see, anger distorts the images of those we dislike; jealousy discovers falsehood where there is nothing of the kind; fear of death and of what is behind the final dark curtain at the end of our lives, lets us hold on to variations of the traditions left over from the days when Magic ruled us to the exclusion of all else. Fearfully we hold on to these against all logic, grasping a word or two that we refuse to examine for their validity - as a shipwrecked sailor holds on to a floating piece of wreckage in the storm. We are alone with the cosmic horror of having become aware of our own existing in an impersonal infinitude of space and infinite time, tied to the small speck of matter we call Earth - and we are afraid. We do not want to think, we do not dare to think and desperately we glue our eyes down into the windows of the 'now'.

And yet - by fear we will never be able to save ourselves.

If there is a way out, if there is a reason for living, for all that has happened and is still happening, it can only be found by going through that fear - by grasping this little soul of ours, holding it tight -and walking on.

Happiness and personal safety, built upon an untruth - upon a discrepancy between our images and reality, is a sitting down beside the road along which we have to travel if we like it or not and each lie that we tell others, or ourselves, is a personal step back from where we came. In a way it is a sabotage of the evolution of man for only when we have, as 'Man', attained complete correctness of our images, can we hope that the next real step, whatever it may be, can possibly be taken by some, as yet unimaginable, descendant of ours.

When we take refuge in a lie we are unfaithful to what has been entrusted to us.

If this is not so, if there is nothing beyond the next horizon, we may as well give up and take out of life what there is to get and now. 'Sins' and 'Lies' and 'Ideals', 'Truth' and 'Virtues', 'Justice' and whatever we have built up are mere inanities and impudent presumptions.

The ideal of a world at peace, with everyone having all that his heart can possibly desire at his fingertips is a delusion of the short-futured. It is not the ultimate 'Good', but the ultimate absence of Evil and leads to the final chapter of some Science Fiction story in which each individual, having attained eternal life, hangs suspended in a container of warm amniotic fluid, fed mechanically by an umbilical cord with all that his body needs, free to dream for ever and ever and ever - as essentially useless and meaningless as an empty asteroid flying through a still more empty space.

No problem has even been solved by running away from it and. when we examine them impartially, it will be found that *all* our solutions nowadays are a running away. They all promise an absence of the bad. Not one promises a positive good.

These are the aspects of life that, in the worlds of the extra-long-futured have an importance that is as valid there as that which, in others, determines the evaluations centred on the survival of nations or even of civilisations.

It should be possible to see that these long-futured valuations are essentially as valid (however abstract and theoretical they may look) as those of the reader himself (if he happens to have a medium future). His evaluations based on the survival of his civilisation will look as abstract and theoretical to those to whom the future only needs to contain the survival of (or coming into power of) their political party, while these again will be thought to be needlessly troubled by future problems, by those who only want to see their favourite football team become the champions of the year in which they are living.

The extra-long-futured man cannot help but see mankind on earth as the last bud in the evolutionary development of 'life'. He has no way of knowing if, like the great Saurians, the human race is doomed to fail by the over-development of his 'knowledge' to an extent so far ahead of his emotional stability that life itself will become impossible to him. In that case, either by the atom bomb, or by internal degeneration, there will come an end, just as it came to the Dinosaurs whose bodies and armour grew beyond the possibility of central government by their life centres and the balancing of their metabolism.

That problem is so far ahead that it can cause no acute distress in the present.

What is visible to-day however is that the last evolutionary development on earth is Man and that his evolution does not consist of his being able to build civilisations and religions and ethical systems. cathedrals, machines, capsules that can fly to the moon and a limitless assortment of gadgetry.

The almost monotonous collapse of our civilisations, the unprecedented cruelty of our wars, the fact that the first question asked about every new development of science is if it can be used to 'kill men'. demonstrates to all but the most incurable optimists that in our inner life we are but one small step above the killer apes from whom it is said that we descend, in that we at least try, between our attacks of madness, to be 'sensible'.

All these things are no more than the external symptoms of what has been developing in man: namely, the ability to make an image and to retain it. His civilisations and his 'cultural' achievements are no more than by-products of the gradual improvement of that image. Civilisations start by the subjugation imposed on the less gifted ones by those who have found a new way of seeing things, a new way of fighting, a new weapon.

The form which that subjugation takes, the beauties and the horrors that those 'civilisations' produced, are never important and, as history shows us, always evanescent. None of their values remain and in the end they are no more than something to be dug up by archaeologists possibly to find a place in some museum, telling

its lesson there to ears that are permanently deaf. Even our own civilisation will, someday, take its place there, next to chipped stones, and fragments of skulls in some, as yet unimaginable future museum that will possibly be situated on a planet of a far away star which will have sent an archaeological expedition back to the 'Old Terra' that spawned the human race, by then several million years ago.

The only thing that is important - or that could possibly be important - is what happens in us in regard to the perfection of the translation of reality into the inner image because that is the sole quality that distinguishes us from the animal kingdom we have left behind.

It will therefore be felt that, in terms of the longest future span imaginable, each unnecessary 'untruth', each wrong image, is a sign of the *individual* lagging behind his stage of evolution; each lack of perfection of that image is an indication and a challenge for the possibility of further progress on the way that we must all walk, if we like it or not, blindly, towards some unimaginable goal. (If we could know that goal now, we would virtually be there already. Once man has seen his goal he will not stop till he gets there.)

The difficulty here is that it is not in the individual that this development takes place - but in the race. Individual man is born with a certain number of possibilities and what he does with them is his own affair. Once he has been born he is, *individually*, out of the race. The only thing that is important in him is the seed he carries and where he places it. What he does with his personal gifts is his own business, his pleasure or his misery. As an individual he can only help to bring civilizations to fruition or destroy them, or spread happiness, or fear, among his contemporaries.

We can do nothing about this evolution. We can neither hasten nor slow it down. We can only try to understand it (and our personal relations in it) in an attempt to make our personal existence in the phase into which we have been born as bearable for ourselves and others as we can. In this, our understanding can be of inestimable value.

Misinterpretation of facts and the chasing of unrealisable or in themselves, misunderstood 'ideals' cause an enormous amount of useless labour and will always result in disillusion and heartache if not infinitely worse.

The structure of humanity at any instant is given with an irrevocable precision in the nature of the men themselves. The preaching of ideals will not make an iota of difference to the people, they will still be as they are for, in their own world, they are logical and cannot know that they really need improvement. It is always the other people who are in need of that. Preaching can bring the aberrants back to the common fold, (which is the common average) because the basic valuation is still in them. It cannot improve a whole nation or a people. No one changes because he thinks or knows that he ought to change, he only changes if *he feels* that he should change. If he does not feel that, he will, if forced, simply fill the 'better' form with his old self and live on like that.

A good example of this is Christianity itself. Essentially a religion of self-denial, of turning the other cheek and forgiving one's brother seven times seven times it was *forced* on our crude forefathers despite what our gentle history books tell us.

The result was that it became the religion of what, in *its own terms and valuations*, is surely the most 'sinful' civilisation that the world has ever known. Under its banners, under the slogan of converting the world to the religion of the gentlest God that ever was, our hordes broke out of Europe and caused more wholesale slaughter and enslavement than anything that had ever happened before. We went out to 'save souls' with fire and gunpowder but, when we did not find gold hoarded under the beds of our converts we strung them up. And when we found it they were hardly better off. Now that we have all that we could possibly want, now that our surpluses and overproduction are crying for markets, while the possibility of 'getting rich quick' on the frontiers has faded away, we have the next phase.

We preach brotherhood and equality while our mobs chase Jamaicans through the streets of Manchester and Sheffield and 'Black' and 'White' walk, hair on end, past each other in the United States, on their toes, like dogs, spoiling for a fight!

The officially stated, and even believed-in goal is the ideal of all of us living together in peaceful equality. We look at it and find it beautiful and look down upon those who do not want to play with us.

That is however not the real goal. What we want is to stop having to fight for what we have already collected. The 'others' again want to get what we have; and to both, this ideal is the best way of getting our desires.

The goal we really envisage is not the one we are sentimentalising about; it is no more than mere, conscious or unconscious, hypocrisy. We do not live in peace and equality even with our nearest 'equals'. In our offices, in industries and commerce, in politics and social circles, we fight as much as we ever did, for the other's place or the other's goods, on the simple basis of the survival of the fittest

We do not want equality and brotherhood. We want to be rid of being masters and having to guard our possessions. But we do not want to forego the collected spoils, so we preach equality and institute the 'League of Nations', backing it whenever it works to our advantage, blocking it ruthlessly when it does not.

On the other hand the have-nots know very well what is going on, they, being closer to nature, know what is behind this make-believe and they are willing to play our little game with us although they do not understand the way we think the game should be played.

Not being aware of the values that we think that should be attached to its complicated formalities they inevitably make a mockery of it. Our values lie, at least partially, in the future, theirs only in today and the gigantic lie must collapse before the facts of reality.

One is either a master or a slave in a community of those that live in inner worlds ruled by the animal in them and all of us will be thus ruled for as far as we can see into the future of evolution. The fight for who is to be 'King of the Castle' will continue for as long as we are like we are, no matter what strange forms that battle may take. The result is not very important, what is important is that we should stop being hypocrites about it.

One thing is sure to the extra-long-futured man and that is that all things are as they are for the childishly simple reason that they are like that. The millions of causes and effects could have built nothing else without themselves being different and each of them (being itself the final result of a chain of causes and effects) is in the same condition. To say, with childish impudence, that they ought not to be so, is as wise, or as foolish as to say that the rain ought to rain on the crops that are shrivelling in the drought.

Nevertheless, we find that each individual has a private collection of things that one 'must do' and those that one 'should not do'.

For the individual these are mostly the collection of 'morals' and 'precepts' defining 'good' and 'evil', which are the sediment of those held by his environment and have for the most part been accepted without examination into their essential validity. They were instilled into the child before he had the ability to reason and were 'fixed' there by the simple fear of the results of disobedience.

There they are now as deeply implanted as that which makes us call anything we heartily dislike by the universally understood epithet of 'dirty' (like 'Dirty Communist' and 'Dirty Capitalist') derived from the days mother tried to teach us the first principles of hygiene.

In the same way every special social complex imposes on its members a 'code' of 'Good' and 'Evil' which has its roots in the nature of those who form that complex. It is, in effect, the aggregate or average of what they

all, by instinct and training rather than by reason, accept as 'good' and 'evil'.

This 'code' conforms automatically to the changes in the 'average' by the simple process of attrition. Those rules that the elders do not 'feel' as important are less stressed in the training of the young and they die out in a few generations (leading to the obsolete laws most law systems contain). Other principles that new developments in the structure of the community make important, will be taught carefully and, in two or three generations they will acquire the status of accepted 'moral' principles, thereby changing 'Wise' into 'Good' and 'Foolish or Dangerous' to 'Bad'.

It is here that we can find the reason for the fact that Cannibals can eat human flesh, that the Greeks could practice homosexuality, the Turk polygamy and the Black African can tell a blatant lie, without having even a twinge of conscience about it - despite those who claim that our conscience is a kind of basic law-book implanted in every human being at his birth; as George Washington must have done when he wrote: "Labour to keep alive in your breast that little spark of celestial fire, called Conscience."

Here we have also the already familiar impudence of the individual who claims that what *his* own conscience tells *him* to be 'good' and 'evil' should be accepted, as such, by all men of whatever colour, race or creed., thereby proclaiming not that all men *are equal*, but that all men *should be equal to him* because there is no reason why they should not be - if they only tried a bit harder.

A new flavour is introduced into this subject by the word 'sin'.

That it is the 'divinity' of certain laws that makes transgression against them into 'sin' is shown by the fact that transgressions against 'ethical' principles do not qualify for that name.

The subject of 'Ethics' is interesting because it enables one to feel what is active behind the laws. In Ethics, first the Greeks and later some of our own philosophers tried to construct a reasoned set of moral laws without a God as the law-giver. Once however the authority for the law was 'pure reason' and the ability to punish was absent, it became a mere theoretical discussion. It was all too easy to stick the pin of facile argument into the reasons 'Ethics' gives for the need to be good' or 'ethical'. One can argue with an intelligence, one cannot argue with a God. One can play with words or refuse to see the 'good of the community' as a sufficient reason to forego a personal, present advantage - one cannot do that with a command by a God.

There is moreover this: that the laws of one's religion are, a priori, the laws of one's own conscience because both stem from the same source which is the average feeling for 'good' and 'evil' of one's community. Ethics applies to the mind. It produces arguments and conclusions that may be logically valid, but it does not take note of the personal evaluations and 'importances' of the different factors among which we live. It can, for instance, not define what it means by the 'greatest good of the greatest number' - as every person has his own ideas about what is advantageous and pleasant - and the term 'greatest number' leaves it open to doubt if the 'democratic' numerical and actual average of all the members of the community is to decide what 'goods' it wants, or if that decision is to be left to the 'better', the 'more educated' or the 'wisest' people.

One can therefore hardly wonder that 'Ethics' was, from the beginning, a still-born Science as far as practical purposes were concerned.

What is important to the subject of this book is that, when we examine them, all evils and sins and unethical deeds are, in the last instance, nothing else but 'lies'.

All the ethical and religious systems define, or try to define a combination of relationships which is supposed to be the actual nature of the state or community. They are not a definition of how it *should* be, but of how it is. Laws are not supposed to 'improve' people, but only to keep aberrant individuals under control.

As therefore the system is as defined, any evil, or sin, that the world images in the evildoer or sinner is 'false'. If he kills, his world has not the true image of the values of other people's lives in relation to his personal advantages or wishes. If he steals, his world has a wrong image of the system of 'mine' and 'thine' in which he lives.

It will be found that, if we examine this aspect of the question, the whole subject of sin and evil has become a force working towards making the inner images of men to be, or to remain more correct, translations of the outer world.

That they do so by making a static, defined representation of that outer world is of minor importance for, in as far as the subjects defined go, the development in any age or generation, or even civilisation or epoch, is, to all intents and purposes static. Evolution works in thousands of years and not in centuries.

It will however be realised that the way 'sin' and 'evil' appear to an individual is, like the 'lie', for a large part dependent upon his future span.

A man to whom the future is only real for a few months will not have the basic respect for the authority which declares this a 'sin' and that a 'virtue'. *His feeling for these qualities will be more defined by the degree in which he has learnt to fear punishment rather than by an internal harmony with that authority.*

If he does not sin, it will not be because he is fully convinced that it is 'wrong' but because the image of his father's 'rod in pickle' tells him that in that direction lie the unpleasant complications of punishment.

CHAPTER XI

Laws and Justice

The concepts of 'sin' and 'good and bad' naturally lead to their formulation and definition in the form of the laws with which we organise our communal lives and the idea of 'Laws' reminds us of that other virtue: 'Justice'.

It will be noticed how strangely the human mind works for, although breaking laws evokes the qualities of 'sin' and 'bad' or 'evil', and not breaking them is seen as 'good' and 'virtuous', the basic principle which underlies the whole problem is that of Justice. If laws are 'just' they are 'good' and if they are 'unjust' they are 'bad'. In a certain way it would therefore seem as if we have travelled the wrong way around: from the manifestation to the defining quality. It seems that we could leave out the words and the ideas of 'sin' and 'good and bad' and replace them by 'just' and 'unjust'.

Laws are not, and cannot be, more than a verbalisation of what the lawmakers think, or thought, to be just.

A law that is a law merely as an instrument and definition of what the ruler expects from his subjects, is not worthy of that name. It has nothing to do, as such, with the Justice which Sydney Smith in his day rhapsodised, saying that: "Truth is its handmaiden, freedom its child, peace its companion, safety walks in its steps, victory follows in its train; it is the highest emanation from the gospel; it is the attribute of God."

At most it can be considered to be a 'regulation'.

Laws are of human origin.

There is nothing sacred or eternal about them with the result that when Mr. Bumble, in *Oliver Twist*, says that it is an 'ass', we smile and do not feel the blasphemy that we would have felt if that had been said about 'Justice'.

When we try to define what we mean by Justice however, we discover that it is by no means as easy to do as we might have thought, seeing that we all know so well what is 'just' and what is not.

Most of what the wise and the articulate have to say on it merely begs the question in variations of Plato's little gem of meaningless wisdom: "Is it not by justice that the just are just?" It is strange that so few people have seen that this is merely an equivalent of saying: "Is it not by redness that red is red?". . . or that by 'humanity' man is 'human'.

Here, as in so much human 'wisdom', the problem is solved by making a noun out of an adjective. The secret of the apparent sense in Plato's definition is that we all know what this justice is that makes the just just. There is no real need to define it. It is axiomatic.

Where Justice is not defined in terms of itself, we find it replaced by paeans of praise to a Justice which is again taken for granted and which is manifestly, from implications in the text, that special variation of it in which the writer believes. In his own private world that Justice is so obviously the only one that all other 'justices' are automatically distortions of it. None of these eulogists seem to feel that the primary need was for them to start off with defining *their* Justice and proving, or at least indicating, why it is the only one that happens to deserve their admiring epithets.

Many others again confuse 'Justice' and 'Law' in their writings, a confusion which is well shown in Pascal's definition (in his "*Pensées*"): "Justice is what is established; and thus all our established laws will be regarded

as just, without being examined; since they are established," which is another beautiful example of talking round a problem. If Justice was 'what is established', every change in 'laws' would be an 'injustice' to the old laws. Once defined and therefore being 'established', laws would crystallise Justice for evermore. Every new development would be 'unjust' and not only 'unlawful' up to the moment that it was established. Manifest injustices (like the keeping of slaves in Arabia) would be 'just', even to us, because they were 'established'.

All these observations can be seen to be true of the word 'legal', but not of our idea of 'Justice'.

Justice has a deeper meaning and we should seek it among the symbols in which man is often better able to express the essence of his ideas than he can do in words.

The symbol of Justice is the 'scales' and it has been so since the beginning of human history. We find that Artef, the Egyptian king who lived more than four thousand years ago, describes himself on his stele, now in the British Museum, as: "I am a man of justice, like the scales, impartial." Like Truth, Justice is also not a godly quality. Any godliness associated with it lies in the man who implements it.

Neither has it anything mysterious or supermundane in its constitution. It is also not a 'something'. It is a quality or an attribute - and not an ingredient.

Justice in the first place applies only to the transactions between men.

It may be cruel that the lion kills the buck who has done him no harm - but it is not 'unjust'.

It may also be cruel that we kill and eat the ox that has spent its whole life working for us - but it is not 'unjust' (unless one sentimentally endows the ox with 'human' qualities).

A transaction between men always entails a 'give and take'. Each of them may be in the form of a material, 'concrete' something, or an 'abstract' good, pleasure or advantage.

One may give or take away at each end of the scales and Justice is where there is an accurate balance or equality between what is given and what is taken. Only when the other's gain is equalled by mine, or the other's loss is compensated by my loss, is the quality of 'justice' present in the transaction.

This may sound like a rather childish and simple way of solving a question that has troubled the wisest heads of humanity for as long as we can remember, but we should realise that we have not 'solved' anything. We have merely been shown that we have been looking in the wrong direction. Justice itself is equality in the give and take between man and man. The problem has however been surreptitiously (but in the great tradition of philosophy) transferred to the question of *what*, in that give and take, must be balanced to make a transaction 'just'.

It can, for instance, hardly be the weight of the items concerned. A pound of wool is not worth a pound of gold and abstract things, that can be extremely valuable, have no weight at all.

We have on the other hand, the practical compromise of our present day society: the 'cash equivalent', but that also leaves us in the lurch.

The heirloom, stolen from a descendant of a famous man, or even the watch one has received from a late, beloved father when one came of age, cannot be counter-balanced by its price 'in money' - and how would one establish the cash equivalent of the index finger of a great musician, or the loss of an honourable reputation?

Notwithstanding all this, there is something that must be balanced, if a transaction is to be 'just' and it has peeped through the final arguments. We can accept that Justice is present when, in a transaction between

men, the 'value' of what is given and received in return is equal. In this way we have cornered the problem in a definite word at last. What do we mean by 'Value'?

Even although we do not yet know the answer to that question, it will be seen that there has been a great improvement in the clarity of the problem.

Each of us, living in our own world, takes the validity of its values for granted and applies them in the determination of what seems to be 'real' Justice. It is on this basis that, completely disregarding Pascal's definition, we think we can say with absolute conviction that certain laws are 'unjust'. By virtue of that, each of us has his private sense of justice which, nevertheless we are unable to define because few of us know exactly on what we built our values.

There is a demonstration of this in the fantastic difference among the laws with which man expresses and has expressed his concepts of 'justice'.

Laws are, of necessity, laid down and defined by those in power. They are therefore always based on the values and the evaluations of the ruling class.

We therefore need no longer wonder why the poacher had to pay with his life for 'taking' a rabbit from the Earl, without that causing a public outcry - or even one voice of protest. The value of the rabbit (or rather the value of the right to be the only one to hunt it) was, *to the Earl*, much higher than the value to him of the life of a commoner who was anyhow more of a trouble than an asset. And, as the Earl and those who thought like him, made the laws, the laws were obviously just and could stand up in a court of law to be openly implemented to legalise what we would call murder.

The development of 'legal justice' is, in this way, an exact indicator of the shift of power from the nobility to the 'common man' which we have seen happening in the last few hundred years.

The Justice, or Injustice, of these laws has not been 'changed' and neither has it been 'improved'. It is the values and the evaluations on which they are built that have been changed, if not always improved.

Justice still merely holds the balance and, being blind, she cannot see what she weighs. She does not care, it is only man who does.

It is our values that have changed. In the olden days the values of the Earl and his kind were accepted values of the state. The poacher on his way to the gallows did not lift up his hands to heaven and denounce the 'injustice' of his fate. In his mind he had simply been unlucky in having been caught - and he accepted his 'just' punishment with whatever fortitude he could muster.

Here we find the force of Pascal's argument as applied to 'established' laws. The values of those in power, be they 'nobility' or the 'mob', being established, are the values of the community and the justice that is built upon them is the justice that applies to them and which they recognise - at least as long as there is the power to back them up, which again is the power that enabled the laws to become established. Absolute Justice (if there could be such a thing) would be based on absolute values - temporal justice on temporal values. English justice is based on English values. Ghanaian justice on Ghanaian values and the justice of the days of the Inquisition was based on the Roman Catholic values of those days while the Justice of Nazidom was rooted in the values of Hitler and his cohorts.

All of these 'justices' are as such equally 'just'; strange and unacceptable though that may seem to our personal

evaluations.

Like Truth, which turned out to be merely the quality of 'correctness' in our images and translations of reality, so justice again depends solely on the correct and meticulous weighing, one against the other, of the values concerned in a human transaction. In neither case do the contents of the images or the nature of the evaluations have anything to do with it.

In Justice it is the different systems of values that causes the often completely different contents of Justice which we usually confuse with Justice itself.

If the life of a Jew has no value while he still persists in eating the food of the community and, besides that, makes a nuisance of himself, he has a very definite 'negative' value in that Community, merely by living in it. By being killed he still comes out of the 'transaction' with a positive balance in his favour for, having taken all and given nothing, he has also made the state go to the expense of building gas chambers and to divert lorries from more useful employment. In merely killing him, 'Justice' has leaned over to *his* side, *but this is only apparent to those to whom the life of a Jew has no value whatsoever* - just as the life of vermin has no value to a farmer.

We may disagree with this evaluation - and there are few people who do not do so - but we still cannot call it an 'injustice'. It is as 'just' as the hanging of a criminal after the extremely meticulous proceedings of the English Courts have decided that it must be done. There are many nowadays who also consider that a criminal 'injustice'.

This is naturally an extreme example, but, it brings home the essentials of the situation much more clearly than an example of lesser kinds of 'just' injustices would have done.

We can now see that the type of justice in a state depends, for a large part, on the average temporealisation of the members in power, and that this justice can only be more than evanescent if its values are based on a futured concept of reality. Only in that way can they have any depth of meaning.

One can fully realise this when we take the analysis one step further.

"Value' has only an existence as 'Value for'. There must always be a 'valuator' to make the value real. Something cannot be valuable *in itself*.

This means that there can never be any actual Justice in a transaction if there are no other valuers of its values than the participants. The most that can be achieved there will be that there is the absence of the sense of injustice when both receive, *in their own evaluations*, as much, or more that they have given. Without a common denominator, Justice is meaningless. There must be a joint valuator to the transaction and, if we weigh it carefully, we will find that that common denominator must be the average values of the community in which the individuals live. Without that, the idea of Justice does not apply, as it does not do to the transactions in which settlers bartered a few baubles for the extensive tracts of land or herds of cattle. Here it was only the personal evaluations by the participants in regard to what they gave and what they received in return that was valid.

In a community, the values of the community are the arbiters and valuers of justice. That, in such a case, the extreme and the aberrant members will possibly not be satisfied is inevitable and cannot be helped. The alternative is chaos and finally no justice at all.

Practical justice, however much our idealists would like it to be otherwise, must always be a compromise.

Appealing to an 'Absolute Justice' is nonsense. It does not exist and cannot exist because there can be no

'absolute' values. There are only 'values for', - values for individuals or values for the state.

It is also foolish to appeal to the 'sense of Justice' of the community. What should be done is to show that the community has a wrong valuation somewhere. If that 'wrong' valuation is changed, the justice of the case will change automatically because it is derived from the values entailed.

With this in mind we can now see that it is to be expected that the sense of justice of a long-futured people (that is: a people in which the long-futured individuals have the practical if not the theoretical or official leadership) must, in its structure and basic valuations, promote the long-term well-being of the community. The sense of justice of a short-futured people will however be content with a more or less immediate punishment-and-award system, built upon short-term values. As these short-term values can have little effect on the well-being of the state, one can see that the laws of such a state will not work towards any common good.

All this is very much more important than it seems. Its practical implications are extremely far-reaching. We see its effect every time that we open the newspaper nowadays.

With this general idea of what the concept of justice really means, we can now take a look at the laws which are, as we have said, a formulation or definition of the ideas of Justice of the law-givers at the time that the laws were made.

They are an attempt to define in words what Justice means for the people whose laws they are, and they are therefore an expression of the values and evaluations current in the state.

Here however, just as we have 'Bibliolatry' (which makes the words instead of the meaning of the Bible divine) so we have what one could call 'Codelatry' - that is - the making of the once established codification of justice into the supreme arbiter of what is Justice and what not.

It is in this aspect of Justice that the legal profession has as its main source of income - and it is necessary that this should be so, but it must not be forgotten that the Law is not Justice. It should be remembered that the Law derives its authority from Justice which, itself, again derives its authority from the system of valuations inherent in the community. A Law, by being passed in the legislature, does *thereby* not become an arbiter of Justice but only the practical expression to which all can refer. If the values change, the Justice changes - and the Law should follow like a dog on a leash.

What is important here is that the Law is actually only valid in so far as it represents the average valuation of the people which it rules - even under a tyrant.

If it does not do so, it becomes an 'imposition' or a 'tyrannical decree'. Nothing can be made 'just' by 'passing a law'.

A law will be obeyed and its transgressors will be punished with the consent and approval of the people if - and only if - they feel it to be just - that is, if they feel that the values they accept have been correctly balanced. In that case the average citizen will obey automatically and even the transgressors will know and feel that they have been 'bad' or 'evil' so that they deserve the punishment meted out to them.

The 'Just' law is not really 'obeyed'. One 'lives in accordance with it' because it defines for one the way in which one should live.

On the other hand, if the law is, in the eyes of the people not 'just', it will not be obeyed automatically. It will only be obeyed for fear of punishment and therefore only the exhibition of power can keep the people lawful. One does not live 'in accordance' with such a law. One tries not to act against it where there is any possibility

that one may be 'caught' at breaking it.

In this case transgressions are also not punished with the consent and approval of the people but despite it, usually to the accompaniment of rebellious grumbling and sympathy for the 'miscreant'.

It is this that makes us realise how extremely youthful we were when, as young men, we were going to make the world a better place to live in, by 'making laws'. We did not realise that the laws are as they are because they must be so. We did not realise that the laws we thought out, not being built upon the general feeling of justice of the people, would have had no other effect than creating new law-breakers in need of punishment. Neither did we realise that, if we could have made our ideas acceptable, the laws would automatically have followed; that, in effect, we were intending to put the cart before the horse.

The demonstration of this 'world saving' by laws, is before our eyes every day. We see it happen where 'foreign' laws have lost the support of the withdrawn 'power to punish' that the erstwhile administrations had.

Even after a hundred years and more of excellent functioning, they fade away as if they had never been because these laws have failed to convince the people of their 'justice'. This again obviously means that they have failed to implant our 'foreign' valuations in the indigenous populations.

But it is not only in these extreme and 'newsworthy' examples that this principle can be seen at work.

Even within a state with a long-future orientation of its justice, the short-futured part of its population do not see the laws as do the long-futured ones. They too *only obey the law for fear of punishment* because the values that underlie it may be very nice, but do not have practical reality at the moment. Security of possession, without which no long-term projects can survive; the sanctity of the person, without which peace cannot reign among the citizens; the insistence on honouring the given word (in the form of a signature), without which no co-operation and commercial stability is possible - all these are mere words to them. They may give them lip-service and even think that they believe in them, but that is all.

It is for this reason not only that the short-futured citizens of our state have the criminals among them but that a not inconsiderable part has a sneaking admiration for these men - so much so. that sloganridden America had to brand its criminals 'Public Enemy No. 1' before the FBI could really start making headway. The same reason explains why to a not inconsiderable part of our population 'snitching' (that is. small-time thieving which has little chance of ending before the courts) is connived at or at least smilingly tolerated by all except the victims. Here too lies the cause for the fact that something that is easily and safely stolen is usually soon stolen even if no 'thieves' have been near the scene, and that, (even in civilised communities) a breakdown of the law and the absence of possible punishment results in orgies of looting and otherwise unthinkable criminal activities.

In this respect, one can to some extent, judge one's own future-sense by asking oneself if one has ever represented one's children as 'underage' for bus tickets and cinemas, where one very well knew that they were not - or, perhaps if one has indulged in a bit of 'innocent' smuggling. If so, however 'innocent' the actual deeds, it demonstrates that one to a certain extent obeys the law because of fear of punishment and not because it is the rule according to which one lives.

Here again, as with 'sin', the long-futured man, although he may think himself silly for being so 'pernickety', cannot help himself but be 'good'. To do anything else would be going against his own valuations.

It should however be noticed that none or very little needs to emerge or be apparent in the actual deeds of the individuals concerned. It is merely present in the motivation of what are, more often than not, identical actions and reactions. The difference only comes out in times of stress, either of the community or of the person concerned.

In a state in which an active law-administration, good courts and adequate, efficient policing, are present, the short-futured ones will, in general act 'sensibly' and according to the laws without feeling that they are being imposed upon. They may even be fully convinced that, basically, they are good 'law abiding' people and that it is not the fear of punishment which holds them in line. Many of them would even be offended if that possibility were mooted.

In the environment in which they have grown up, that has been the 'norm' and they conform to it. Only when urgent personal and immediate desires are active does the 'traditional' law abiding collapse. When the law itself breaks down, we find a more or less rapid cracking up of the 'norm', with a temporary attempt to keep the old 'ideals' and 'principles', (which are not rooted in their own validity but in what one has been taught) alive - but without fear of punishment in the immediate present, that does not last long.

On the other hand, the long-futured man's values will not of necessity be any different or 'higher' than those on which the law of the state is based. After all, these laws are merely the expression of the values which the longer-futured men in the circumstances have felt to be valid. Actual 'eternal' values are not involved. It is only the values that are felt to be eternal and, in that, the people of the state may be abysmally wrong. The 'wrong' or 'right' of the values however does not matter. We, who look on, are as little able to judge them as anybody else. It is what the long-futured citizen thinks that has eternal values that makes him 'live according' to the laws of his community. It is the real or fancied eternal validity which makes his values eternal for him where, for the short-futured man, they are only temporary or as short-futured as he is himself.

It is also this that makes the long-futured man tend to see the laws themselves as divine and to resist changes in them, even if those changes may, in actual fact, be for the better and that even in an eternal and humane sense. It is understandably much more difficult to change a value which has, all one's life, been known to be rooted in eternity and therefore absolutely valid, than to change one that, from the beginning, and always, was merely valid for a short time and not based on anything more profound. Such a value could be changed by itself, by new insights, new possibilities new environments or conditions from day to day without causing any moral indigestion.

To the long-futured ones the law has a deeper meaning that is not lightly pushed aside by present conditions. To the short-futured ones it is merely a set of 'rules of conduct'.

One can follow this up into all kinds of fascinating vistas and insights but, what is important here is that a short-futured people can only be ruled by force, be it police, an army of occupation or the minions of a tyrant. It can only be ruled by fear of punishment - whatever and however good the law may be.

A fully long-futured people again would not need any police at all, and hardly any courts of law. Each man could, to a certain extent, be trusted to be his own impartial judge and jury.

Such a people could naturally also be ruled according to laws repugnant to them, but in that case also only by the fear of punishment. It is however especially of them that the saying that "one cannot keep a people down forever" is true. There would be no let up of the pressure from inside, as each enforced deed would always be felt to be against some deeper and higher principles. When the oppressive force, (as will always be the case in the end) becomes lax - the rout will start and 'liberty' will be achieved. A short-futured people would, in a similar case remain relatively content as long as the 'present' was kept 'bearable' for them. In their case only unbearable repression would lead to revolt.

One can however realise that such a revolt would be 'reactive' and immediate, badly organised and relatively lacking in purpose other than to be rid of the 'tyrants'. The revolt of the long-futured will be a slow and steady, organised pressure and demolition rather than an actual fight. It would be a revolution rather than a rebellion.

All in all, we can therefore understand why it is that the extent to which the long arm of the law must have a fist is determined by the numerical percentage of short-futured citizens in a state.

CHAPTER XII

Human Rights and 'Liberty'

We have 'Justice' and 'Law' to rule our lives and to define for us in words of three letters what we may do and what we may not do.

To most people the 'Law' is a 'rule of thumb', designed to define a theoretical 'Justice', but what emotionally concerns them most, and by which, being 'human' they tend to judge their environment (giving their judgements a standing higher than mere 'personal opinion) are the ideals of 'Human Rights' and 'Liberty'.

It is no wonder that this is so. Man generally does not like to feel himself bound irrevocably by adamant rules and regulations. They tie him down too much to having to bear the full responsibility for his actions. They force him to think ahead further than he likes, into an unreal future, in order to avoid punishments which he will not really have deserved when they come down upon him.

With 'Human Rights' and 'Liberty' we are in the realms of the purely abstract, a region which, to somebody not directly involved, seems to have lost all contact with life as it is lived - and it is strange to observe how these, in reality totally meaningless words are felt instinctively to be more valid and true than all our other attempts to define the ways in which we should adjust our lives so that we can live together.

Few of us realise that both 'Human Rights' and 'Liberty' are, in their present form, not much more than a century old and that they are still only limited to Western Civilisation and the people under its direct influence. To all the others they are, in the meaning they have for us, completely non-existent, not only as facts, but as ideas. It is for this reason that we see the fantastic reactions to 'Uhuru' in Africa and the game of ducks and drakes the United Nations play with 'Human Rights'.

Even among ourselves it is amazing, if not horrifying, to find how few of the (often extremely intelligent) people who use these words every day and advise the most fundamental political changes on their authority, have felt the need to find at least some approximate definition of what they are supposed to mean. Somehow there is a religious aura about them which precludes deeper investigation. They are a 'Credo' and not a mere couple of principles laid down by intelligent consideration as the 'best'. In a way, they are 'holy' and anyone who doubts their absolute validity is a 'heretic'. One cannot argue with that kind of man, just as few priests will argue with someone who does not first admit the essential validity of the tenets of the given religion.

Yet neither of these two words have any real meaning. as one soon discovers when one hammers away at them to try and find the valid core that every word should have.

Few of the idolators of 'Human Rights' have even gone as far as to ask themselves what they actually mean with 'Human'.

For them a 'man is a man' for all that - and that is all there is to it, no matter if he is white, or brown, or black, or piebald; hairy like an ape, or hairless like an adolescent, bow-legged, beetle-browed, spadatoothed, or whatever else may distinguish one 'race' from the other. We are all of the Genus Homo. The great God Science has worked it all out and all members of the Genus obviously have 'Human Rights'. Nobody even asks why anybody should have any 'rights' at all but that we can just pass that by. Nobody would have expected anything else.

What is strange is that, almost in the same breath, when defining these 'Rights', such as the 'right to a vote', these same people take it for granted that an idiot, a mentally deranged person, a convicted criminal and even a perfectly normal, healthy and intelligent specimen of manhood at the age of seventeen, although in all other

senses of the word 'human'. is not 'Human' in the sense that it gives him all 'Human rights'.

It is therefore obvious that the mere fact of being a genuine member of the Genus Homo is not enough - although the slogan derives most of its charm and even its conviction from the fact that it applies to all.

Illogically the same people who place such severe and arbitrary restrictions on the voting rights of their own citizens, demand that hordes of semi-barbarians who have not the slightest understanding of what the vote means, or should mean; whose intellectual capacities have never had the chance (or the possibility) of passing beyond that of the sub-standards of a civilised community - and who have no idea of our kind of social responsibility on which the whole idea of Democracy is built, should be given a 'one man one vote' government immediately, NOW, and in the name of "Humanity".

In whatever way we look at these 'Human Rights' and ask ourselves what is actually meant by its 'Human' component, we go astray.

We have already noticed how, in the development from ape to man, the dividing line was difficult, if not impossible to determine. Recent finds at the Oldavi Gorge have shown that it is extremely likely that the original 'ape-or-man' was already making high quality tools while his body still had few or the characteristics which we would think to be typically 'human'.

On the other hand, if one wishes to accept the official distinction between 'species' which is that their members cannot cross-breed (or at best do no more than produce an occasional, infertile hybrid), our troubles are by no means over. It must be pointed out that, although the experiment of 'cross-breeding' has not been tried and would undoubtedly raise a horrified, medieval kind of protest if it were; recent evidence on the structure of the DNA 'templates' in our genes and in those of the chimpanzees make it quite probable that the 'chimp' should find his legitimate place in the Genus Homo too. One could even think it possible that there is no real dividing line inside the order of Primates, and that we are all one happy family.

It is not in our bodies that the essential difference between us and our nearest relatives is to be found. There is as much variation between one human race and the other as between some of us and the apes. It is in our mental abilities that we are 'human'. As far as our bodies are concerned we could consider the ape a 'primitive man' and ourselves a 'special kind of ape'.

Our humanity is not directly visible on the outside - it lies in what we do, how we do it, and what we know.

If our 'anthropological humanity' was the deciding factor, there is no reason why we shouldn't be able to teach the apes to 'vote' for symbols in the way that some of the newborn 'democracies' have made their citizens do. After all, as Yerkes has shown, one can teach chimpanzees to 'work' for 'counters' and to exchange them in their 'chimpomat' for a desired type of food or for a few hours of 'uhuru'. In the same way they could select candidates, although one might have to use 'Apples', 'Bananas' or 'Jungle Queens' as symbols.

This may seem to be slightly blasphemous in a world where democracy has become a religion, but it serves to underline the difficulty of finding where one should stop.

Behind all these slogans we have been hiding the fact from ourselves that, in the last count, it is '*intelligent voting*' that makes 'voting' a specifically 'human' act. Voting does *not* consist of 'casting a vote', just as Architecture does not consist of placing a lot of stones, one upon the other. It is a method of expressing an opinion, based to at least a reasonable extent on understanding of what one is doing, a reasonable amount of maturity of judgement and a reasonable amount of social responsibility.

It is in the meaning of this word 'reasonable' that our modern times, as in so many other respects, apply double standards because we use these standards and ideals as a cover for self-seeking intrigues.

Idiots, madmen, criminals and juveniles are dis-franchised among us because they are not supposed to have a reasonably sufficient amount of one or more of the qualifying characteristics needed for the act of voting where other nations, who are barely able to distinguish a 'Camel' vote from a 'Motor-car' vote, are considered to be adequately endowed to do so.

All in all it will have been felt that this word 'Human' is without any real meaning in the context (except for the central core of what is obviously 'human' humanity). This now enables everyone to pack his, often half-cooked and certainly undocumented and undigested, 'ideals', into it and to make grandiose statements about the 'rights' of those human beings who do not live in the community of the one who is making the statement.

Once again we find how the lack of attention to the meaning of our primary concepts - or even our unwillingness to understand them is at the root of most of our mutual misunderstandings.

One cannot come to any valid conclusions until one has defined what one is speaking about and the difficulty we had with the concept 'Human' is present to a still greater degree in the word 'Rights'.

What, after all, is a 'Right'?

Our dictionaries tell us (Webster): "a just, fair claim to anything whatever, power, privilege, etc., that belongs to a person by law, nature or tradition."

Here, once more, we have the multiplication of definitions from which the user can have his choice but which, at the same time, is taken to have a central, universally valid and individual meaning.

Essentially the word 'Right' is here split up into 'Right according to Justice', 'Right according to Fairness', 'Right according to Law' 'Right according to Tradition' and 'Right according to (a totally meaningless) Nature'. This adds up to five different kinds of 'Rights' and the real question becomes: "What is 'Just', 'Fair', 'Legal', 'Traditional', and 'Natural'.

Justice and Law we have already examined and when a person claims this kind of a right, the answer is easy. The claimant can be referred to his lawyer. If, for instance, he claims the 'legal' right to vote where he is a citizen of a country that is not democratically organised, he obviously has no 'Just' or 'Legal' right to vote, and that is that.

The same applies to 'Tradition'. A democratic tradition exists only in a certain, limited part of the Western civilisation and only those people can claim to have the 'Traditional right to vote'.

This leaves us with 'Fairness' and 'Nature'.

In 'nature' the 'vote' is usually taken, if at all, by personal combat and the survival of the fittest, which leads to the conclusion that one has the 'Natural right' to fight for power over others. Where Democracy would 'give' that power, this is obviously not what is meant by 'Human Rights'.

'Fairness' is finally such a completely vague word that it serves no purpose in this case. Two people, arguing on that basis would be reduced to saying: "It is only fair that every man should have a vote." To which the other could answer: "It isn't," whereupon the first could give the crushing reply: "It is!"

In short, we can see that here again we have the same kind of variegated collection as we had with the different kinds of 'Justices'.

Something, whatever it is, can only be a 'right', if it is according to a law, written or unwritten - and the

argument really goes about which law, written or unwritten, can be considered to apply to the case in point.

The absence of an 'Absolute Justice', written or unwritten, makes it once more merely a question of personal opinion, but this very important fact is hidden from view by the imposing facade of the word 'Right', which applies to some superior authority for its validity. In that way it acquires a status to which it has no 'right' at all.

From this we see, for instance, the development of the inane 'Right to Work', without defining exactly who should provide the work and who will be responsible if the work is not conscientiously done.

All that one can say in these cases is, for instance : "Every man should have a vote," or "Every man should have work," or "All people should be allowed to rule themselves as they think fit, no matter how much suffering that will entail," - but that does not sound half as convincing and impressive as saying that they have the *right* to those 'Rights'.

If one however dropped this futile reference to a non-existent authority, it is much more likely that one would arrive at least at some kind of a conclusion. In that case there would obviously arise the need for a debate on why they should have these rights and, in the uncovering of the basic values and reasons which lie at the root of every 'Justice', but which are taken for granted by the different protagonists, each using his own 'Justice'. One might get somewhere in the end.

The 'Human Rights' slogan (or Ideal?) therefore becomes very threadbare, if not entirely meaningless, when one gives it more than a cursory glance. Whatever validity it has refers back to the values of the people concerned. It has no supermundane existence or validity of its own. The other slogan which we have to examine here is the counterpart of 'Human Rights', namely 'Liberty'.

This again is a basket word, a bin into which everyone packs his ideals and his secret wishes, ambitions and, most important, his hatreds.

In its Anglo-Saxon variation, it comes more clearly into focus, showing itself to be really a negative quality. Freedom is always a freedom from something specific.

In anything like an absolute sense, a man can only be free on a desert island. There he can do and leave undone what he likes and take the consequences without hurting or inconveniencing anybody else. However, even there he will not be free from the need to gather food and arrange for shelter when the wind blows cold unless of course he happens to have landed on an island paradise. Where a man lives in a community of others, there is nothing for it but to adjust himself to the needs of those others. He must, for all the days of his life, live according to the law, be it written or unwritten, of the community and play his allotted part in it, however much it irks him. If he does not conform to within reasonable limits, he will be cast out or 'liquidated' in some other way.

The trouble with our understanding of the word 'freedom' is that it has, especially lately, been used in two different meanings and nobody seems to have noticed the infinite difference between 'National Freedom' and 'Personal Freedom'. How this is possible (where 'National Freedom' has been demonstrated to mean 'Personal Free-doom' in several cases during the past year or so) can only be understood when one discovers (as we try to show later on) the nature of the articulate part of the mob in the market places of humanity which uses these words more than anybody else.

By giving a nation or a country its freedom, one does not give its citizens freedom. Usually it is the opposite, for a conquering nation that wishes to profit from what it has expended in the act of conquering, has to see to it that the people of the subject state are reasonably well off and contented.

If they are not reasonably well off, they will not be a good source for raw materials and a less profitable market for finished goods and trade in general. If they are not reasonably content, they will add the financial and human burden of the need to maintain a sizeable army of occupation which will itself cut too deep into the profits.

On the other hand, a state with its own, private 'National Freedom' is easily a prey to dictators, power-hungry juntas and selfish politicians whose rule may be (for their personal safety and chances of survival) many times as harsh as that of a military overlordship by another state.

One need only remember that Nazi Germany had an undoubted 'National Freedom' in its day, to realise that.

The freedom that counts however, the freedom of which we think when we use the word in ordinary conversation, is the freedom of the individual and that has, unhappily, nothing at all to do with the freedom of the state or the nation. It is an inherent quality of the living together *within* the state, the way the people of the state treat each other.

What then is personal freedom?

Webster again does not define it, but he gives us the usual list:

"Freedom from control by some other person or arbitrary power.

Freedom from arbitrary restriction of speech.

Freedom from arbitrary restraint on publishing.

Freedom from want.

Freedom from restraint on movement.

Freedom from arbitrary imprisonment.

Freedom from specified obligations or discomfort"

One sees that, of its very nature, Freedom is a negative quality. It is the absence of a restraint or an obligation. It is never something positive, as one would gather when listening to the panegyrics on Liberty. This is one of the main reasons for the large amount of misunderstanding which exists on this subject.

When one lives in a community, one must live according to the rules, the regulations and the laws of that community, whatever they are *and whoever enforces them*.

If one does not agree with the way things are run, one can try to overthrow the authority, but, while one is doing that, one is an 'outlaw'. One certainly cannot claim to have the *right* to do it. If one succeeds, well and good; the laws and the structure of the community change and one may be 'right' in retrospect. *Only successful revolutions are 'right'*.

Where there is lack of freedom (that is an arbitrary and unnecessary amount of restraint) it is the restraining agent who has decided how much is necessary. If one does not agree, if one thinks the amount of restraint 'arbitrary', that is one's own opinion, and not necessarily correct.

What is overlooked in this childish and negative adoration of 'Freedom' is that there always must be restraints and that it is only about the arbitrariness and the necessity for specific restraints that one can argue or fight. It is always a matter of determining which restraints are *necessary*.

When throwing off an 'oppressive' rule, one does not merely throw off the 'oppression'. There is need to define what exactly was 'oppression' and what was 'legitimate' control. There can only be a legitimate freedom when the restraint is formulated and enforced by the 'free' people themselves; if this is not done, the result will be no more than 'licence'.

Only by consciously accepting the responsibility for restraint can one talk of a positive form of 'Freedom' at all.

The men who cry and fight for 'Freedom' should not be asking only for the end of the external restraint, but for the transference of that restraint to themselves. They should not ask for 'freedom' but for 'the right to restrain themselves'!

When men ask for freedom of movement, they should not be simply demanding the right to go anywhere they like, but to be allowed to decide themselves where they can go *so that the community is not harmed by their movement*.

Unrestricted movement of untrained workers from an area where they can make a reasonable living, into an area where the average standard of living is higher, but where there is relatively little work for unskilled labour, cannot be allowed. It would result in their having to live in destitution. It will create slums and cause an unjustified drain on public funds and charity. The people themselves must restrain themselves and such restraint is not an 'oppression'.

If they do not do so, they are not worthy of freedom of movement.

When men ask for freedom of speech and the press, they should be asking for the right to restrain themselves from saying and publishing ideas and concepts that are against the welfare of the community, its peace and its smooth functioning. They should ask for the right to judge for themselves what is legitimate comment and criticism and what is intentional distortion leading to possible suffering. They should have the right as a *community* to silence those who individually offend. Freedom of speech does not mean that anybody can just say and publish anything he likes. Working on the weaker brothers who have not the wisdom and the understanding to judge, they may cause untold harm, either intentionally or just because they know no better. If a revolutionary spirit wishes to proceed further, he should have the 'right' to do so, but the community should have the right to defend itself and to punish him. These are but the 'rights', (which are the 'natural' ones) of men to defend their own. There is no reason why a spoken word, when it does harm, should go scot free, (because of a sentimental slogan), where a deed comes before the courts.

The revolutionary must take his chance. He *may* be right, but that can only be proved by the success of his revolution. Until then he also is outside the law and cannot ask for its protection. When people ask for freedom from want, they should not be asking for some thinly disguised form of charity, or the dole. They should ask to be made responsible for their own needs.

That would be asking positively for Freedom, but one thinks that this hardly seems to be the spirit which shines forth from most 'Freedom' and 'Uhuru' enthusiasts! Usually they ask for the end of some particular restriction (which, personally, irks them) under the guise of demanding the 'Liberty' which is supposed to be man's 'birthright under the sun'. All too often it is the politicians and embryo dictators who demand what is actually the right to start oppressing their own people for their own personal advantage.

By branding the 'restrainers' as 'oppressors', they merely give themselves a 'cause' and an 'ideal' which is in reality a fake. It serves them as a 'moral' justification for an insurrection.

Only a long-futured man can fully realise this however. *For the short-futured the glorious freedom from what irks them today is enough*. The price that will have to be paid, the burdens that will have to be carried, the

actual obligations that are undertaken - do not exist for them. They are fighting against 'oppressors' and their battle is 'just'!

CHAPTER XII

On Governments

It would seem to be almost a truism that the different systems by which men are governed grow out of, and are determined, by the nature of the different peoples.

Nevertheless it seems also to be generally believed, at least by the West, that the 'government' determines the way people live together and that, if a people has, or is 'given' a so-called 'good' government, they will live, or settle down to enjoy its advantages.

This apparent contradiction is easily understood when one realises how deep the slogan of "All men are equal" has bitten into our critical faculties. He who can believe with a nearly religious fervour what everything around him, (even in his own family) belies - and for no other apparent reason than that he wants to believe it - will believe anything that suits his book. He will not be able to help himself because he is not even conscious of doing so.

As, to him, all men are equal (and not only 'before God') the only difference between the different nations is their differences in government. It follows therefore that the measure to which they are 'free' and 'well off', 'happy' or 'unhappy', depends solely on the governments they happen to have. The obvious conclusion from this again is that, if one wishes to improve conditions, one has to 'improve the governments' and not the people.

This rather simple, if not entirely childish, view of the situation naturally leads to the visualisation of an Ideal form of government and the construction of 'Utopias', 'Erewhons' and even practical attempts at implementing them, such as those by Saint Simon and Fourier.

However, just as there is no 'Absolute Justice' and no 'Absolute Truth', so there unhappily is, and can be, no 'Universally Good' or 'Ideal' government.

A government is only good in so far as it achieves the best kind of living together among a specific group of people and it should be obvious that there cannot be one way of living-together which will fit all types of people. Only those who, mostly from fear, and in self-defence, think of man as being an unvarying nonentity, could generate such an idea. Others will, or should, realise that the best way of living together for any specific group of people depends on the particular characteristics of that group.

Two aggressive and irritable individuals, if they have to live together and survive, will have to do so on an entirely different basis from that of a pair of easy-going ones. For the same reason a pair of long-futured individuals will be able to evolve a way of living-together which would break down immediately for a pair of short-futured men who would be liable to go off at a tangent in order to obtain some immediate advantage or forget to honour a not very 'important' obligation.

For the long-futured pair their system would be a source of great advantages, both individually and in combination where, for the others it would simply result in squabbles, bad tempers, mutual recriminations and eventually bloodshed.

Lately all arguments on the 'government of the people' start with the axiom that Democracy is the ideal. The 'quality' of all the other forms of government is judged on how near they are to that theoretical 'Ideal'. The measure of democracy has become the measure of the virtue of all 'lesser' systems of ruling.

One need hardly point out how clearly this is again the result of us seeing our own world as the 'real' one and

how it demonstrates that the world in which we live is by no means *the* world; that our truths are not necessarily *the* truth and that our values are not necessarily valid for anybody else.

Once again: what is sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander whatever the goose, and even the gander may think.

Where, in this problem, we are confronted by such a chaos of factors in regard to 'Justice', 'Rights' 'Liberty', 'Equality' and even the mostly theoretical quality of 'Fraternity'. (which made the Sansculotte 'brothers' of the French Revolution send their *Ci-devant* 'brothers' to the guillotine) - it is well to come to grips with the essentials of government quite apart from the endless confusion of values that it has to rule and arrange. We must first ask ourselves for the reason - or rather the basis for the necessity for 'Governments' in general.

William Gordon put the matter in a nutshell when he said that Society is produced by our wants and Government by our wickedness.

We have to live together because we are naturally gregarious. We need each other to mirror our thoughts, to assert our own valuations and to emphasize our sense of existing, and we have learnt to depend upon each other for the amenities of life, both abstract and concrete, to such an extent that, like the bees, we cannot live, or even imagine a life, completely out of contact with our own kind.

However, in living together, we are not wise and honest enough to ask and to take only that to which, in the place of the others, we would consider ourselves to have a just claim. We are apt to demand and, if possible, to take more than we give, and to pay less than we owe.

As long as man is like that, there has to be a supervisor, a referee, in whatever form he may materialise, and whatever values he may try to balance, one against the other. The alternative is chaos and anarchy and even a tyranny of the most despotic type is better than a state where every man has only that which he can take and defend with his life.

A supervisor, a referee, without the power to implement his rulings, to coerce and to punish, would be impotent and useless for where it concerns our own advantages we are rarely willing to listen to homilies on the rights of others. The only possibility that remains is therefore that we must have a government which has the power to implement (if need be by punishment), restrictions on our personal freedom to act as we like or think fit.

Though seemingly obvious and logical, this conclusion is not always easily accepted. People want 'rights', but they do not want coercion to respect the rights of others. This is well expressed by Burke, where he says: "The moment you abate anything from the full rights of men each to govern himself, and suffer any artificial positive limitation upon those rights, from that moment the whole organisation of government becomes a consideration of convenience." (Reflections on the Government in France.)

It is extremely strange to find such a statement in a writer of undoubted authority like Burke. If people are allowed to 'govern themselves' - there is no possible need for a Government! The only reason for a Government is that it is necessary (men being what they are) to 'abate' quite a lot from the 'full rights of men, each to govern himself and all effective governments are organisms of 'convenience'. They are even more than that, they are a necessity.

Men will not keep their fingers out of other people's business. They are, in general, always on the lookout for unearned income, even if they would not think of 'stealing' - and, if they have to live together in some kind of peace and harmony, this interfering must be reduced to a minimum by the threat of the big stick. There is nothing else for it.

Most people, when pressed, are in agreement with this, unpalatable though it may be. It is in the way they consider that this 'supervisor government' should act and the powers it should have that they differ between the widest extremes. We have the 'Social Contract' of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau, while on the other hand, we find those who see the government as nothing but an enemy of the people, like Southey, who talks about the "foul, corruption-gendered swarm of state," and R. V. Johnson, who is still more specific and describes:

"The incredible cunning of the monstrous plan
Whereby the spider State has set its web for Man

Lenin is a bit more sensible about it and adds his prosaic obbligato:

"While the State exists there is no freedom. When there is freedom there will be no State", thereby, like the others also putting the cart before the horse.

All are essentially expressions of irritation at the restraints which 'living together' put upon the individual and, childlike, blame the State for it. All see this as an arbitrary intervention by the State and not as a result of the frailties of mankind.

As Disraeli said: "The depository of power is always unpopular," and it is easy to blame an impersonal 'State' for the imperfections of the self.

They feel, with Sir Walter Raleigh that the "State is but a golden prison, to live in, and torture freeborn minds." The value of such a statement obtains a strange quality when we study the life of this specific freeborn' mind! He was a pirate and a freebooter and, to take a sentence out of the Encyclopaedia Britannica: "He took an active part in the suppression of the rebellion of the Desmonds; he advocated a ruthless policy against the Irish, and recommended assassination as a means of getting rid of their leaders."

All these expressions have the vague ideal of 'freedom' without realising that 'freedom' as such can only exist where men are worthy of it and do not suppress (and even assassinate) each other on the slightest chance of obtaining personal advantages out of it. We can therefore make sense out of Lenin's statement, by putting the horse before the cart and converting it into: "Until man is able or worthy to be free, there will be a State, to control him. When he has, at long last, acquired that ability and worthiness, the State will disappear of itself."

It is in man himself that the 'necessary evil' which Thomas Paine expressed as "Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one," has its roots.

But let us turn away from these 'authorities' and try to see for ourselves.

It should be obvious that 'States' and 'Governments' and 'Social Systems' have grown and evolved together with the evolution of man.

Such ideas as the artificial 'Social Contract' of Locke, are built upon the ideas of existing and valid 'Rights of Man' and, as such, are interpolations of preconceived 'truths' to serve as 'explanations' for what the philosophers found present in the world into which they were born.

No living form of government was however ever decided upon by a committee or a congress.

"States are made, not patched, they grow;
Grow slow through centuries of pain. And
grow correctly in the main."

as Masfield said some time ago.

Governments grow out of the people themselves and are expressions of their nature, determined principally by the typical personal weaknesses of the average citizen in the state for, as Gordon said: "Governments are produced by our wickedness." Even where tyrants grasp power by bloody oppression and intimidation of the weak, that can only be possible among a people who in general do the same kind of thing in a small way to their neighbours as far as they can or dare.

One must never forget that the Tyrant, to rule as he does, must have the henchmen to do his will. The Tyrant personally is only a symbol, the head, the apex of a pyramid of lesser tyrants. Cut off the head and another will be on top. Scatter the pyramid and, if it is in the nature of the stones, it will rebuild itself again. In a dictatorship there must be an adequate number of minor dictators to do and enforce his will.

In this respect we can recall, with a smile, the reply which Lycurgus gave to a man who demanded the establishment of a democracy in Sparta. "Go thou, and first establish a democracy in thy household," he said in what were certainly the wisest and most perspicacious words that have come to us out of the past. *One imagines that this is a saying that should be written in letters of gold above the entrance to the glorious building which houses the United Nations today.*

For the same reason the view which the Russians have of us is wrong. We are not a host of 'Slaves' under the heels of the 'Capitalists. It may be true that we are in their power, but every man-jack of us, down to the most humble dustman, is a capitalist in his small way.

The 'Capitalists' are only those who have been the most successful and, given the chance and the ability, every one of us would do what they do.

In judging the situation, we, in this age, have the advantage over the older philosophers in that history has made a large amount of information about the development of man available to us of which they could have had no inkling. They were presented with the final product which they had to explain 'from inside', while we can see it growing from the roots up. They had Dryden's 'Noble Savage' to contend with:

*I am as free as nature first made man, Ere the
base laws of servitude began, When wild in
woods the noble savage ran."*

For them, being intelligent, and thinking man to be intelligent, the State had, for them, to be the result of intelligent action.

We still build forward on the blind groping of those pre-evolutionary days, possibly because our new facts lead to a less glorious conclusion about the 'Rights' of the descendants of a group of 'killer apes'.

It is however time that we should face up to the implications of those facts, which are the same as those which dominate and are accepted by the other correlated Sciences.

Man grew slowly, very slowly, out of an animal condition and, of necessity, his social structure *grew* with him. Originally it must have been that of a herd, or a pack(?) ruled in its external relations by the physical fighting and hunting ability of its dominant males and, as long as the proto-human packs remained principally hunters, their social system *had* to be of that nature. The internal structure of the pack must have been 'matrilocal' as long as the association between sex and reproduction had not been discovered. (It is, even today, still unknown or only very imperfectly understood among several primitive tribes, such as those to be found in Central Australia and in certain parts of Melanesia. The same is true for a few African tribes. All of these attribute the initiation of pregnancy to animistic influences rather than to the sexual act - although the latter may for them, have something to do with it, in the same way as a rain-making ceremony may cause the spirits to give rain.)

The group naturally consisted of 'Mothers and children'. There were in those days, as yet, no 'fathers'. There were only the 'mates' of the mothers.

With the advent of agriculture we see the necessity for the development of the 'matriarchal' state, which only those who remained hunters and those who took to domesticating cattle escaped. As the tilling of the fields naturally fell to the stay-at-home and more patient women, the women also soon held the keys to the larder, in which the meat brought in by the male sank from the most important food item to that of a welcome, but no longer vital, addition to the common diet.

This condition is still to be found, practically intact, among the Menangkabou of Central Sumatra and vestiges remain in the folklore and traditions of most other people.

All these relations and allocations of power were however merely local and personal until, with the development of the City States, organised living together and slave labour, the reason for them disappeared. The males revolted and took over in a battle that lasted for generations as the cult of Zeus came into ascendancy over that of Hera.

With the development of the Cities and the concomitant rise of military (male) power and importance, woman was restricted to the bedroom and the nursery which were henceforth to be her place, until the days of the militant suffragettes of our youth.

Originally, after the priests, these City States were ruled by power, naked and unashamed, the power to kill or to have killed, to punish or to have punished; a veritable pyramid of fear overt or potential.

The extent to which this power was used, or delegated, depended upon the reasonableness or otherwise of the rulers - with the result that these governments were always entirely personal. There was, as history tells us, a continuous lopping off of heads, a killing by dagger and poison and intrigue in the upper echelons. Killing of brothers and sisters and children and 'popular generals' was more or less a routine, a recognised 'political' means of staying alive at the top. And those less doughty either mirrored the deeds of their 'betters' at a lower level, or tried to survive as best they could.

There were admittedly councils of 'elders' and 'uncles' that make our starry-eyed idealists talk of 'Democracy' even then, but these were always only 'advisory' and a means of testing the temper of the people by the ruler, - or, where the ruler was weak, a 'forcing bed' from which the next 'ruler' was bound to arise.

It is important to remember that this autocratic system was not enforced from above. It was the natural expression of the nature of the people themselves, mirrored in every detail, at all layers of the community. The 'Master' was no more than the one who by luck, astuteness or ruthlessness had managed to get to the top, and the basic pattern was still the 'animal' one of the survival of the fittest (if not necessarily, or even likely, the 'best'). Motives and values were entirely personal and each man saw himself (and possibly his offspring) as living in his own restricted image of the world.

As yet there was no idea of a 'State', but, with the extension of the temporealisation in the people (by elimination of the altogether too short-futured ones in this concentrated battle for survival), the concept of the 'State' slowly did take shape. The pattern of living together acquired a personality and an existence of its own and a permanence not given to the individual.

It became a 'something' that the more long-futured mind could study, accept and finally see as more than the self.

The first manifestation of this is the appearance of the permanent 'City Gods' served by their Priests. To these the 'Kings' became representatives, until finally they were admitted to be Gods themselves. In this way they

became more than human and symbols of a permanency which, as mere men and tyrants, they did not have. The godhood of the rulers of Egypt is a pure example of this, demonstrating the beneficent effect of this 'permanence' on the State that accepted them.

Finally, in Greece (where the Gods were rather too human) we see the emergence of the State as the permanent entity itself, together with the first inklings of 'democracy'.

We will study this 'democracy' later on. Here we can point out that, with the 'State' as the permanency behind the rulers, we find the first formulation of a set of impersonal laws, that defined the nature and the rights of the State in relation to those of the individual.

Only with those laws did the 'Rights of Man' appear. Before that, when a man was taken from his land and 'out of the bosom of his family' to be sold as a slave, it would never have occurred to him to say: -You have no right to do this to me!", just as he would not have thought to say to his God, whose hail had flattened his crops, that He had no 'right' to do that.

It was then that there appeared the 'Government by Law' instead of the 'Government by Men', but, once it had been accepted, one could start to argue about its validity and the way it should be interpreted, where words can mean many things to many people.

Before that one could try to 'convince' or 'influence' a human ruler, but one 'argues theoretically' with a law. We have been doing the latter, in all kinds of ways, ever since, whenever the 'sense of justice' and the 'values' of the law-givers do not agree with our own.

Here we will leave the analysis of the further development of the different types of government for a time.

What is important is again that both the 'Eternity' of the 'God' and the 'Permanency' of the 'State' are (and were) only valid to those subjects to whom 'Eternity' and 'Permanency' mean more than just a word. Only for those is it possible to feel laws based on those qualities, as immediately and self-evidently valid. The others obeyed, and are still obeying, for fear of punishment or because it is the accepted structure of the present environment to which they have been taught to conform.

Those laws expressed the values of the people, or they would not have been implementable. Our laws are not 'better' than theirs. They would have been felt as 'unjust' by those who, for instance, in the days of Rome were content with such laws as:

"If a man has no witnesses, he must walk about in front of his house, calling out for witnesses on three market-days."

"The debtor must be taken before the Praetor in the Forum on three successive market-days. On the third market-day he can be cut in pieces or sent across the Tiber to be sold abroad."

"If anyone sings abusive songs about somebody else, he shall be put to death.

"Patricians may not marry Plebeians." (So much for the Democracy of the Romans!)

For such a people our laws with their 'extenuating circumstances' and minor punishments would seem to be impossibly weak and therefore 'unjust'. In the same way our 'democratic' State would to them seem to be only fit for women to live in.

On the other hand we, with our wider grasp of history, can see the 'permanence' of the 'State' as much less important than it must have seemed to those of old. We know that States and Civilisations come and go. We

live among the ruins of many of them that have disappeared.

We excavate them and try to put the story together from what little evidence we can gather, but most of us do not realise that the foundation of the house in which we live may also, one day, be material for a learned thesis that will earn someone a doctorate.

When something threatens our civilisation, we see in it a threat to the civilisation of the world and we do not see the identity of our great sports stadiums and the replacement of the 'sportsman' by the 'sport' - and the development of 'Welfare States'! with the 'Bread and Circuses' of the last days of Rome. We do not read the total inversion of all our values during the last two to three hundred years as the equivalent of what happened in Greece and Rome and Egypt when their civilisations ran into the doldrums.

To us it seems as impossible that all this will end as it must have seemed to those who lived in the final luxury and grandeur of the classical civilisations.

But both 'Eternity' and 'Permanence' have no meaning in reality. The State and the Government cannot depend on them for survival. even less than the Kings of old found safety in their 'divine right' to rule.

The problem of the Government is a 'consideration of convenience' as Burke called it. It is the problem of finding how we can best live together in peace and harmony as we are, and not as we ought to be.

For this, as we have seen, there must be a supervisor, a Government, for the simple reason that we are imperfect and because most of us are short-futured men with little thought for the days to come - unhappily apt to fall for the delusions of the present.

If it would rule, and rule well, the system of government, in each case, has to take note, not only of the human 'subject' material, but also of the human material that is available to do the ruling - and that material is usually not essentially different from the rest.

When, in the interval between the last two wars, we forced 'democracy' on Germany, deposing the essentially 'different' Junkers, we conjured up the monster of Nazidom, the rule by the people of the people for the people as *given in the nature of the German middle class*. We should have learnt our lesson then, but we are going merrily on.

Laws that are not essentially valid to those who apply them, will not be applied, or will be subverted. Laws that are not essentially valid to those who have to enforce them will not be enforced, but immediately fall into disuse. Not only Nazi-Germany, but Ghana has shown us the same sequence, and most of the other new Black States are likely to follow the same pattern.

All this however has nothing to do with the ideal of the 'Rights of Man', and the only lesson we can draw from it is that it is futile and often dangerous to try and force a government on people to whose nature it is not suitable. We should drop our know-all attitude and leave others to work out their own salvation. Because we are happy under Democracy does not mean that it is a desirable solution for the problems that others have to face.

The Long-Futured States

As the ideal of Democracy is geared to a long-future understanding of the State, it could have been expected that the Ideal State of the long-futured would be an 'Ideal Democracy'.

This is not so. The Western democratic nations may have a strong leaven of long-futured citizens among their populations, but there is little doubt that the long-futured percentage among the communistic Russians, is much higher, even if not yet altogether 100%. From talking with them and from their literature, one comes away with the impression that even the most humble *mòujik* is obsessed by time and eternity.

It is this that gives Russian literature its special flavour: the ever present sense of belonging to eternity which imparts a kind of 'eternal' meaning, even to a flower wilting in a window-box. Often it makes the reality of the moment so passing strange that the hero has to ask himself in the middle of an ordinary conversation: "What am I doing here? Does God know that I exist? Where is all this leading to?" In this way one is given the impression that the moment, to them, is like a glance at the landscape from the window of a moving train. In relation to the life in the train, the landscape has really little meaning.

And beyond Russia there is another non-democratic race in China where time also is a central and well realised facet of life, although there it has not the compelling presence which it has to the Slav. Spengler compared the Chinese attitude to life to that of one strolling along the winding pathways in a landscape-garden. There is more than a modicum of truth in this and it will be seen that this image also includes the 'fourth' dimension of time. All over the Orient and the Near East, we find this attitude in different variations and yet - nowhere among all those millions does Democracy as we know and recognise it, take root easily, if at all. And we need not wonder for, seen as a 'system of ruling', Democracy itself is probably the most illogical and make-believe form of government ever invented. That in certain cases it works, and works extremely well makes this all the more amazing. In theory it is beautiful and even Utopian, but in practice it is little or nothing of what it pretends to be. It does not survive for the reasons it is supposed to survive and its official motivations are more or less invalid even if, on that basis, it is the summum bonum of all systems of government. It is built, (like nearly everything in our world today) on the 'axiom' that all men are equal which is not an axiom, but the most blatant fallacy ever conceived. All men may be equal before God in that each individual soul is, to Him, as valuable as the next. It may be that each soul that is saved, be it white, black or brown, makes the angels rejoice, but in this world of ours not even twins are exactly alike. God himself does not treat everyone in the same way. He still punishes the 'bad' and rewards the 'good'. Obviously there is some misunderstanding here. One cannot accept that people are so blind as all that, but it will be found that those who believe in that 'equality' have themselves great difficulty in defining in which way all men are equal.

One can for instance think that it means that all men are *born* equal and that any later differences are due to the environmental influences which have worked on them. Science has leant over backwards to try and prove this, but has been lamentably unsuccessful as we will try to show in a later chapter where the subject of 'heredity' versus 'environment' is discussed as a whole.

On the other hand, one could again take it to mean that all men, no matter how bad or how good, have equal 'rights'. But this we have already shown to be another fallacy which nobody would like to implement in practice. Even our Ideal Democracy declares that Idiots, Madmen, Convicted Criminals and those who are under an arbitrary age limit do not merit the same 'rights' as the others. This 'Equality with Exceptions' takes almost all the essential validity out of the basic slogan. Equality with exceptions; equality provided there is the ability to understand, equality *provided* there is a sense of responsibility *and provided* there is maturity of judgement, is not 'equality' anymore. It opens the way to arguing that men are not equal and that they must be

judged on their 'merits' which, to the idolators of human equality, is anathema.

Besides these primary restrictions in our democratic states. we have still the extensive network of permits, prerogatives, perquisites, licences, variable rates and taxes and import duties, all of which do not imply and do not mean to imply that all men in the state have equal rights to do what everyone else is allowed to do.

The minimum for this 'equality' is possibly that everyone should at least have an equal *chance*, but that too is but a pious wish. The chances for a boy from the slums to become a Prime Minister or a Field Marshal may be there, but they are but a fraction of those of a boy from the homes of the well-to-do. It is possible, but not probable and can only happen in cases of extreme giftedness or singleness of purpose. Where the chances are so significantly loaded, giving the 'right' to be equal is hardly more than an empty gesture.

In theory again Democracy is supposed to mean that people are ruled by themselves but in practice such a thing could only materialise if every citizen was able to satisfy the condition implied by Burke's dictum in that he could and would rule *himself* according to the best interests of the whole community. In that case as seen dimly by Lenin, there would be no need for a Government and therefore not for Democracy either.

As only a blind idealist would see such a State as being possible in our times, we have to take refuge in the 'Practical Democracy' in which John Citizen is allowed to choose his own rulers so that he can at least have the satisfaction of thinking that he 'rules himself'.

However. even a superficial examination shows this too to be only a more or less pleasant dream. Not only does the parliamentary candidate, once he has become an M.P., completely forget his promises, and even his voters up to the next election, but the voter (under the party system) merely votes for one Caucus or for the other and this leaves precious little 'personal' effect on the government for the single vote by which the citizen expresses his 'will'.

The idea that, by voting, the overall will of the public is expressed, is also only true within a qualified extent. It is possible that a party may poll nearly half the votes in the country and yet have not one member in parliament. Admittedly this, according to the laws of chance, is, in practice, impossible - but, by the system of delimitation of voting districts, a very close approximation to the maximum possible implementation of that factor is often present in the State.

To prevent this effect, one would have to have a voting system like that of one of the original homes of Democracy: the Netherlands. where the overall votes for each 'party' determines how many members each of them has in parliament. (There the 'actors' have a member who represents them, for instance.)

When we look at it from another angle we again find another anomaly. Under the system of 'voting districts' and 'party government', every man who votes for a candidate who does not get in, has also lost his say in 'governing himself'. Others will govern him, if he likes it or not, until the next election. Every man who votes for a party that does not achieve an overall majority can, by proxy, 'have his say' (during 'question time in the house'), but he will not take any active part in the ruling. An article by an editor of any widely read newspaper has a far greater effect than the little speech by his 'representative'.

Again, if he is a 'government supporter', what influence his personal opinions may have on the 'Caucus' is dispersed in that he must always vote for their policies 'en bloc'. To get the things he wants most, he is forced to subscribe, by implication, to a lot of things he may not want at all - so that conscientious. unemotional and intelligent voting is usually a matter of choosing the lesser of two or three evils.

Democracy, as we know it, is in fact a 'Caucocracy', but, nevertheless the little man hugs his personal vote to his chest and is allowed to think "Just you wait! I'll show you at the next election!" With that he is content and looks down upon those who do not have the vote, or thinks them 'slaves'.

The result has been branded by the best thinkers of our day and of ancient times, with a series of sneers that have more than a little truth in them.

Even Aristotle said: "Democracy arose from men's thinking that, if they are equal in any respect, they are equal absolutely," and Plato, although his 'Ideal State' was called a 'Republic', said of it: "Democracy is a state in which the poor, gaining the upper hand, kill some and banish others, and then divide the offices among the remaining citizens equally, usually by lot," to which B. L. Taylor added: "If Plato were writing today, he would have no occasion to revise his notion of democracy -" a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder and dispensing equality to equals and unequals alike."

Seneca said that "Democracy is more cruel than wars and tyrants," while Homer himself was of the opinion that "It is not good that few should be ruled by many. Let there be one ruler only."

In more modern times, Disraeli called it a 'Fatal drollery', Emerson a "government of bullies tempered by editors," Burke (speaking of it when 'perfect!') as the 'most shameless thing in the world', while Shaw grunted that "Democracy substitutes election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few." Lowell remarked that it gives every man the right to choose his own oppressor, to which de Rivarol added the observation that "The populace is a sovereign which only asks something to eat. His Majesty is tranquil while digesting."

Ludwig Lewisohn was more specific when he said that "Democracy, which began by liberating man politically, has developed a dangerous tendency to enslave him through the tyranny of majorities and the deadly power of their opinion."

One could make this list, culled from the anthologies, as long as one liked, but one would like to stress the last one which, where modern tendency is to lay the emphasis on the 'number' of votes and to neglect their 'quality' as much as is possible, is singularly apt.

The essential point is however that, despite all this often very valid criticism, it works in a large part of the world - and it works remarkably well.

The reason is that, as Penn said: "Let the people think that they govern and they will be governed," while Sinclair Lewis has pointed out that "On the whole, with scandalous exceptions, Democracy has given the ordinary worker more dignity than he ever had," and Walter Winchell can now end this set of quotations for us with "Too many people expect wonders from Democracy. where the most wonderful thing of all is just having it."

The amusing conclusion one comes to is that Democracy is a good thing - but nobody knows why!

Whatever it is, it is not because it is a government of the people, for the people by the people, that makes it so. How hollow *that* claim is can be felt when we realise that our parliaments *voluntarily* do not use all the powers that we give them. Once at the helm they could consolidate their personal position of power and change themselves into a virtual dictatorship as the Nazis did in Germany, even within the letter of the law. They can suspend opposition members (or put them into gaol for 'anti-government activities', as we have seen happening in several places lately) even if that is not in the 'spirit' of the constitution. They can always declare a 'state of emergency' and suspend further elections. They have the power to do so as it is extremely difficult to define a 'state of emergency' in law.

That all this does not happen among us is not due to a special virtue of the 'Democratic System', but to the fact that the people and their representatives are themselves 'democrats' at heart. This is the point that is always overlooked when we are trying to 'sell' Democracy to the world. We say: "Look! It works," where we should say: "Look! *We make it work!*" It may be that the average M.P., once he is 'in' takes little notice of the

wishes of his constituents until the time comes round again to deliver his speeches and think out his slogans, but he will not break his basic faith and conspire with the others to hold the state to ransom. If one should ask him why, he would, after some hesitancy, admit that the 'State' after all has a value for him that is above his own immediate interests, showing thereby that he has a 'future-sense' which makes it so to him.

The voter, unwilling to feel that he is completely dependent upon the decency of 'his' member of parliament, and that he has in no way the power to hold him in control, may say: "They had better toe the line - or there will be a revolution!" not realising that *that is exactly the only remedy left to the subject of an unpopular dictatorship!*

It is not the fear of revolutions that keep the M.P.'s in line. With the army under 'constitutional' control, a revolution would have as little chance to succeed as in a dictatorship - that is - if the army did not consist of democratically thinking men who would not lend themselves to be used to back a parliament turned dictator.

The legal powers of parliament are again as absolute as those of any dictator and, by promulgating and abolishing laws, it could alter the legal structure of the country in such a way that it would be completely in their power because the courts would have to administer the laws 'as made' - if the legal profession did not consist of democratically thinking men who would not allow themselves to be used for such a purpose.

It is however not even necessary for parliament to go that far. They have the power to vote themselves huge salaries, emoluments and perquisites, enough to provide every member with a small fortune for the time he was in office - if the Civil Service did not consist of democratically thinking men who would block those schemes, or resign if that was impossible.

In almost every detail, when one examines it closely, it is not Democracy which makes the system work, but the individual democrats who, in it, use their powers correctly and in the way that they were intended to be used.

If those in power were not essentially democrats, the whole situation would collapse. Its strength is not in itself, but in its members. Any 'say' that the citizen has in 'ruling himself is due to the goodwill and the honesty of those to whom he has entrusted the power to rule him.

Democracy is not a good by itself. It is completely dependent upon the nature of the people, both for its efficacy and for its survival. One can say that a 'democratic' people, if placed under a dictatorship, would be more 'democratically' ruled than a 'dictatorship' people placed under a democracy and one can expect that both would very soon revert to the systems that suited them.

The system works for *us*, and it works extremely well, but to think that therefore a government should be judged by the measure of its 'democracy', is sheer nonsense.

We cannot even define Democracy. Such questions as to how many members of parliament a country should have, have no answer. If England elected fifty M.P.'s, would it therefore be less 'democratic'? If it elected only enough to fill the Caucus - would it then be a dictatorship? Or what if it elected only the Prime Minister?

The same is true for the spacing of the elections,

If elections were held ten years apart would the government be less democratic, and would it be more democratic if they were held every year? If elections were for life tenure - what would we have?

Finally it is certainly not the Constitution that makes and safeguards the Democracy but, again, the democrats.

One of the most pathetic and frightening symptoms of our times is the wishful-thinking, almost childish

belief in the efficacy of 'Constitutions', of the manufacture of which England has for the past few years been making a minor industry.

Despite the lessons of the past - especially of the last fifty years or so - it is still thought that by having a 'good' constitution with firmly 'entrenched clauses' one creates a 'good' and permanent government. It is not seen that, just as with laws, Constitutions and Entrenched Clauses depend solely upon the sense of Justice of the people for their survival. Only if the Constitution is seen and accepted as 'just' will the people consent to let it be the backbone of the State and honour it. If not, it will be an 'imposition', an irritating interference by the 'dead hand of the past' preventing 'progress'. Where that constitution has been installed by a former 'master' it will be the last symbol of past 'oppression' and will have to be destroyed in principle before the people it is supposed to rule can consider themselves to be fully 'free'.

All in all, whatever else is still doubtful, it is clear that the mechanism of Democracy is more or less arbitrary. The point is not what is 'Democracy', but what is the essence of a 'Democrat'.

We already know that the Democrat must be either a long-future man himself - or one who is securely caught in the network of a Democracy (which has been constructed, formulated and maintained by such men), in such a way that he either consciously or subconsciously has to conform to the general rules that have been laid down.

This however is not all. As said, the Communist countries have the long-futured quality to as great and even to a greater degree than the democratic ones. What then is the special difference which makes the one into a Democrat, the next into a Communist and the others still to hold on to traditional, semi-autocratic rulers, some of whom even have the vestiges of divinity to make an aura round their throne - as we find in Persia, for instance?

Trying to put it into one word, one could express the difference by saying that the Democrat is naturally 'participative'. To a certain degree he is "aggressively and personally involved" in his government, where the others are merely 'receptive'.

The others seem to be content to leave government to the government, as long as they themselves have a reasonable amount of comfort and safety in their own personal environment. This is not necessarily a weakness in them and it is unjustified to call them 'spineless!' In a way one must agree that they are, individually, the wise ones - leaving the trouble of ruling to others and enjoying what they have, now.

On the other hand, although we do not realise it, it actually needs quite a bit of presumption to think that one can judge and decide on such complicated problems as those which the running of a modern state involves, especially where one is doing it more or less 'instinctively' or 'by ear'. Few of our Democrats bother to study more than the headlines of the newspaper of their party but claim to know enough about everything to be able to express an opinion that it is worthwhile listening to. The 'others' simply do not have this presumption. They are willing to admit that they do not know enough to judge - and anyhow, as things are going reasonably well, they do not really care.

The somewhat aggressive and bold attitude of the Democrat has its roots in the nature of our ancestors. as exemplified by the Angles and the Saxons, the Norsemen and the Danes.

When we think about them, they have a strange individuality which one does not find so strongly marked anywhere else in the world (except, possibly, among the 'Shogun' of Japanese history).

It is true that they came in swarms to devastate the countryside around them, but, in those swarms, each man was still a definite individual. He was a member of a mob, but he did not lose his individuality there. He did not see himself as an integrated part of it. He stood upon his own legs and reserved for himself the right to

decide on his own actions. He had a master, but he obeyed that master of his own free will. One could compare him to the old 'boer' who said to his general "Generaal, jy kan gaan bars! Ek gaan huistoe." (General, you can go to hell, I'm going home.)

He did not belong to a 'family' and certainly did not derive his personal standing from it. The moment he came of age, he made his way in the world with whatever abilities he had, he earned his knighthood and captured or took his own estate. He fought for his own and kept it as well as he could by means of his ability to defend it. His victories were his own as were his defeats and his group prospered or failed as a 'total' of the deeds of its members and not as its 'aggregate'.

He swore fealty as a free man, pledging his services and his sword to the common weal of which, as an individual member, he also received the advantages.

Behind him stood his attitude of self-respect which gave him a code or honour that he was ready to defend with his life.

And not only was this true of the 'upper' classes.

Our history is full of rebellions where the small men said: "This I will not bear. I prefer death, if necessary, to this indignity." There is an enormous difference between this kind of 'rebellion' and what one could call the 'revolutions' where a ruling power has become weak and is swamped, not by a 'multitude made desperate by oppression' (as they like to describe themselves) but by a mob that has lost its fear of the masters and overflows the State. Neither are these 'rebellions' to be equated with situations in which communities are split up by following different leaders who contend for the power of the throne.

These rebellions spring forth from the kind of spirit that infused the 'Yeomen of England' and the men of the Swiss cantons. They consist of a group of farmers who, without much thought or hope for the future, take up their cudgels and their pitchforks against the swords and the armour of a still active, oppressive power, as for instance in the numerous 'farmer's rebellions' in Germany during the time of Luther, and the 'Battle of the Golden Spurs' where the burghers of the Lowlands pulled the heavily armed knights off their horses and killed thousands of them with their flails and pitchforks. None of these can be compared with the 'French Revolution' and the revolt in Russia where a lot of half-human animals overflowed and hit out at everything in the way.

These latter were not so much rebellions against unbearable oppression as the result of too much authority combined with a lack of power to back it up - a loss of touch with reality in the State.

The so-called 'Eighty Years War' which the Dutch Republic fought against Spain, is probably one of the best examples of the real Rebellion. There a small group of people refused to knuckle under to what they did not acknowledge as acceptable authority.

Such things happened nowhere else in the world because nowhere else in the world were there such people.

Among the other races wars were won and wars were lost and that was the end of it. As in Chess where the King had been taken, the game was over. No bishop, with a remnant of pawns would think of fighting on from a corner of the board just *for the principle of the thing*.

At the other extreme we see how typically, in the East, the soldiers were content to leave the issue of battle to a fight between the champions of each side, (as in the one so beautifully described by Arnold in 'Sohrab and Rustum', and in so many battle scenes out of the Chinese Classic: 'The Three Kingdoms'). Then, when in the 'higher regions' the decision had been made, the murdering itself could begin. In one instance, in the early history of China, a whole captured army, some 40,000 strong was drawn up in their ranks and duly

decapitated.

It can be felt that a people who will be content to stand or fall according to a 'champion-fought' battle, will develop a communistic way of living together. where those of the North Western part of Europe, who fought their own fights within the general melee of their battles, would develop a democracy - and 'Capitalism' for that matter.

The world of Western Europe consisted originally of thousands of little kingdoms, in the form of 'Baronies', loosely knit together and, to the person who has only learnt his history from generalising school books, it is often astounding to discover how tenuous the hold of the great Kings on their subjects really was.

We are taught that the beginning of the Western Civilisation was due to the dispersal of the books and the learning which, for a thousand years had been confined in the monasteries in the Balkans. With the coming of the Turks, these are supposed to have disgorged their treasures, but that is almost certainly a fallacy too.

Those books and that learning were not 'locked up'. They were freely available to everyone who came to seek knowledge - but there was no receptive material to absorb it. Our ancestors were still in the short-future stage of their development, each man living in the day and the complex of powers in which he found himself.

It was not the influx of books and learning that caused the new development, but the influx of long-futured genes in the seeds of those who brought the books. Moors from Spain, displaced persons out of the Balkans, seeds that were planted along the trade routes of the Hanseatic League and the backwash from the long series of Crusades - all had the same effect. Together with the books and the learning came the ability to appreciate them.

When the great Saladin sent a wonderful clock as a gift to Charlemagne, our forefathers did not know what to do with it, and placed it in the imperial treasure house. They were simply not ready for it, (like a tribe of savages presented with a Digital Computer would be today), even though Charles himself was already showing the first signs of developing long-future characteristics. He made laws, established schools and, in general, seems to have been a man who did not only live in the day of his breathing.

It is this curious and unique admixture of the clear self-awareness with a slowly strengthening vision of the future that made Democrats out of us.

We see its first appearance among the Greeks. The mixture of their short-future acute awareness of the 'now', absorbed the long-future characteristics of the 'eastern' people they overcame and whose women they took, and this caused them to spawn the first real Democracy, when they broke through to the shores of the Mediterranean. It was the only way in which they could live together and make a 'whole, and permanent' state like that of the kingdoms around them, with a visualised future and without losing their precious self-esteem.

One must not forget the important and relevant fact that, among the Greeks, Democracy was only for the freeborn Greeks, just as later on, the compilers of the Declaration of Independence, obviously did not see the negroes as 'men'. This latter document is certainly in its context one of the most fantastic in existence, despite the high idealism of its phraseology. To write and to honestly believe: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," while, at home, on their plantations, Eliza with her half-caste baby in her arms, was trying to escape from a pack of baying bloodhounds, was certainly one of the more amazing examples of the many-faceted nature of the human mind. (The final irony of this is that the party which called itself the 'Democrats', was that of the slave owners!)

The Democrat of today is fully aware of the pattern of the State, stretching from the past into an infinite future, but he is firmly determined that he will have something to do with its arrangement and structure, even

if it is only by, at regular intervals, casting his vote.

Of the relative futility of this more or less symbolical deed he is not aware, even if he smiles at Private Willis's soliloquy in Iolanthe:

*" When in that house M.P. 's divide,
If they've a brain and cerebellum too,
They've got to leave that brain outside
And vote just as their leaders tell them to.
But the prospect of a lot
Of dull M.P. 's in close proximity
All thinking for themselves, is what
No man can face with equanimity.
I often think it comical
How nature always does contrive
That every boy and every girl
That's born into this world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative."*

He does not realise that this is exactly why Democracy works for him and not necessarily for others. It does not work by any special virtue of its own, but by virtue of what it is *not* supposed to be.

To the Russian, eternity and its ways is something with which the ordinary man does not tamper. Unlike his fickle, presumptuous, know all counterpart among the Democrats who claims that his ideas are any time as good as those of anybody else, the Slav is deeply aware of the inability of a man with his education and background to understand, and much less to direct, the pattern of the State and its valuations.

He is content if the government makes his lot bearable and that is why the shouldershrugging 'Nitchewo', 'It can't be helped', is a typical expression of his attitude towards life. The system of pyramiding Soviets or Committees, which, in his country, filters the devoted and the fateridden visionaries out of the masses into the echelons of the 'rulers', seems to him to be the natural one. To him authority is part of the eternal network, on a par with the seasons, and, as long as it leaves him a modicum of comfort, pleasure and security, it is good. The responsibility for having anything to do with it is too great.

The Russian will never wish to conspire to 'take the scheme of things entire, and mould it nearer to his heart's desire'. It would, in a way, seem a blasphemy to do that.

Typical of this attitude was one of the habits of the 'White' Russians with whom I worked for a time in China. Although living on a very small margin above the bread line, they demonstrated their 'long-future' characteristics by saving a bit, all during the year - but with an entirely different purpose from that for which we would have done it. The whole lot went, each year, to providing a really grand party on New Year's Day. Then the tables literally groaned with food. Wine and Vodka flowed like water and they were happy - as happy as no ordinary, sensible person had the right to be in the conditions in which they lived and with the almost inevitable doom the future held for them.

They knew that they themselves were not very important against the backdrop of history, but they had managed to snatch one day of undiluted happiness and were appropriately grateful.

Another typical demonstration of the basic difference between the 'Democrat' and the others is the way the Western man, when he is in dire straights (such as in the P.O.W. camps of Europe and Malaya in the last war) almost compulsively organises himself to 'keep up his morale', lest he lose his personal self-respect and

'cracks up'.

No other people do this. There the pattern (or fate?) is against them. They carry their burden as best they can and that is all there is to it. They do not need to buttress their 'morale' against fate by organising games and discussion-parties. Possibly, someday, God willing, the conditions will change and they may know joy again. Up to then one does what one has to do, and amuses oneself as best one can in between times.

Only a fool would assert himself. One does not 'grin and bear it', one simply 'bears'.

To the Western man the reality is too real. He has to be able to see the future as possibly containing release, if he does not want to break down. He *must* have his own finger in the pie somehow.

It now becomes understandable that what we know as 'Communism', (but which is really 'Committee-ism') is the natural way in which such a people would organise themselves once the God-given, or God-inflicted, Tsarist Regime had evaporated. It is their variation of a system in which the people are ruled 'by the people, for the people', and not very different from the way in which we are content, when on a committee, to let the 'willing horses' do the work. To an outside and entirely unprejudiced observer it may well seem to be that the Soviet system is nearer than Democracy to the ideal that the latter has defined for itself.

We sneer at their 'one party system' and the mockery it makes of the sacrosanct ritual of 'voting'. If however we manage to see that 'party' not as a 'party with an opposition to give it something to fight against', but as the quintessence of those who, out of the different minor Soviets, have come up because of extreme diligence and willingness to work for (what they think to be) the common good so that they represent the 'best' of the community as far as human relationships are concerned, the thing looks slightly different. If then we realise that here the 'voting' is something like what we would call a 'plebiscite', by which the government tests if it is still in step with those whom it rules, one should at least feel that a sneer is out of place - although one need not think it 'correct'.

Compared with our 'vote' for two or three 'lump sum' policies that give the voter no chance to detail his likes and his dislikes, so that he usually has to make a compromise by voting for the 'lesser evil', the effect of the rise in the 'anti-votes' would be as good, and even more 'correct' than our Democratic method where an inversion of Government and Opposition, entails a politically, socially and even economically upsetting re-orientation all along the line, especially in America.

We can even feel that our system bases itself on distrust. When a party has one vote less than the minimum they must get out because we cannot trust them to change their policies. The Soviet system takes it for granted that if the people say: "We are not feeling so happy about the situation," the government will try to get in step again.

No matter what we are told, one must accept that most Russian leaders are devoted men. (That not one of their leaders has left a huge estate at his death, and that not one of them lives in ostentatious luxury. should at least appear as a valid argument to our kind of thinking).

No doubt there are misuses of power. There are blatant errors and impositions and unnecessary interference with personal liberty. How could it be otherwise? The regularly recurring 'scandals' in our own Democracy tell us the same tale here. Both systems have a remedy for the 'too much', although the Soviet one may seem inhumanly harsh to us who are content to let the criminals off with a big fine.

It must however, by now, be apparent that it will be impossible to 'convert' Russia to 'Democracy'. The human material for that is simply not there. The efforts of our propagandists must seem mere 'hooting and tooting' to them. The Russian admits that he does not and cannot understand the intricacies of government, and that, anyhow it does not really matter to him what individuals actually hold the tiller. The democratic 'power to

vote' seems to him the brash, know-all attitude of an adolescent.

We can also see why, nevertheless, the Russian individual once transplanted into a flourishing democracy, can make himself thoroughly at home there. It does not matter much to him what and who governs him. He is not interested in influencing decisions the results of which he cannot oversee, but he is able to enjoy the nearly heavenly freedom of action and movement and the horn of plenty of our Democracy once he has thoroughly convinced himself that there is nothing 'wrong' or 'dangerous' in it.

The reverse would be much more difficult for only the extremely long-futured idealists among us could make themselves at home in a Communistic State. There they would have to sacrifice an amount of personal freedom to the welfare of the State which, to the average democrat would seem ridiculous if not positively debasing.

To seduce us to Communism, as a state, would also be obviously impossible as long as the majority of our people see the State as no more than a background to their personal lives.

The one way in which it could happen however (and possibly even now, is happening) is through the gradual attrition of our sense of personal responsibility by the effects of the 'Welfare State' and 'Security from the cradle to the grave' or 'from the womb to the tomb'.

When the state takes over the responsibility, it automatically has to take over the power and, where, as de Rivarol put it, the populace only 'asks something to eat' - the writing is on the wall. With the contentment to leave everything to the State, even the selection of the rulers will eventually be left to it and, if we are satisfied as long as there is enough 'Bread and Circuses', we will wake up one day and find that there is as little difference between 'Democracy' and 'Communism' as there once was between 'Communism' and 'Fascism'.

The only way to save our 'Democracy' is to emphasise the personal responsibility of the citizen and not to leave him under the impression that, by casting a vote once every so many years, he has done his duty to himself and to the State.

We will never convert the Russians to Democracy, but, if we don't look out, we will convert ourselves to Communism. We are already well on the way.

Behind the Russians we find the Chinese, whose popular saying 'Mei Yo Faze' 'There is nothing to be done about it', or 'There is no way'. being nearly a verbal translation of 'Nitchewo', indicates a basically similar attitude towards life.

The Chinese citizen is, on the average, also not very much concerned with the particular government he may have and this has been one of the main factors of his survival during the ages of alternate local and foreign dynasties through which his race has survived suprisingly intact. He also does not think of interfering with the ways and actions of his government for his ideal, as expressed by Chuangtze, is to 'be like the water'. When one hits it with a sword, it parts, and falls together again.

The government to him is also like the coming and the going of the seasons, and wet weather following the dry.

Traditionally he has, to us, a strange attitude towards existing, seeing himself as a link between his father and his son. He is the part of the genetic line that is conscious in the present and it will be interesting to see what the integration of this attitude into the present communistic state will produce. Long before the Russians he had communistic leanings, as one can read out of the classic: Shui Hu Chuan, (which Pearl Buck has translated as 'All Men are Brothers').

In his personal environment however he has a relatively more aggressive and calculating attitude than the Slav. Dynasties may come and dynasties may go, but in each he rapidly adapts himself to his immediate surroundings and positively tries to make as much of it as he can. His aggressiveness however only extends to what he can handle and control.

One will never make a democrat out of a Chinese for he knows too well that governments are evanescent things, and personal power automatically means to him that he must use it to better himself. What is important to him, even against the background of eternity, is today. But of the government he will also say. "What do I know of these things? Let them amuse themselves up there. As long as they leave me a breathing space in the world, I am content."

When we turn to our old motherland, Mesopotamia, we again find that "Kismet", or "Fate", is used on all occasions when things do not go according to wish. Here one is content to leave the long-term aspects of life to a semi-divine Shah, or (more to the West) to an assortment of military dictatorships with active or inactive parliaments in attendance, mostly for the purpose of feathering their own nests. Here too the average citizen would rather have nothing to do with matters of State, and occupy himself with the much more important problem of survival.

Probably the most interesting of the long-futured governments is that of Spain. Although the long-futured influence of the Moors has been active here for a much longer time, the Spaniard's realisation of his personal existence as an entity against the backdrop of -history has fully managed to survive. He also has a strong, fatalistic turn of mind, but he feels that he has to play his part, as a person, in the pattern, according to certain traditional rules and principles of personal honour. These are an extension of those that ruled the short-futured life of the Middle Ages, when every man had his place in the State and was honour-bound to hold it to the best of his ability. The result is a mixture which, as said, is probably one of the most interesting ones humanity has to show.

One could write a book about this subject without even coming to grips with more than a general outline - somewhat like Graf Hermann Keyserling's 'Das Spektrum Europas', but on another basis of analysis. That is however not the intention of this book which is to try and point out the underlying factors that make different people 'grow' different forms of government, each according to its special characteristics but mainly determined by the average length to which the future is real to them

The Short-Futured States

In view of the recent spate of experimenting in the laboratory of Africa, where there has been an unprecedented dealing out of readymade 'Democracies', complete with 'Constitutions' and 'Entrenched Clauses' (and an enclosed booklet of instructions), the basic nature of a state consisting principally of short-futured people, becomes very important indeed.

When one tests the typical Black African against our summary of the short-futured man, he turns out to be almost a perfect fit into the kind of personality the short-future span should produce. He is happy-go-lucky when not in trouble, improvident, irresponsible, good-natured and generous. He loves to show off. He is without rancour, but, when roused he becomes a self-forgetting, even if unscientific fighter. His Science and his Religion, even when he has been 'educated', is still 'Magic'. He has an enviable ability to enjoy the present moment, and a good understanding of the human qualities of those around him in their present relationships. He is very observant and his memory is well above the average to the things of his world. This memory however holds individual incidents only and he is not able to draw generalised conclusions from them. Abstractions, as such, are unknown and unknowable for him.

Despite his centuries of contact with the White Man, he is still, in himself, a late Neolithic man whose future has no reality beyond a few months - and that certainly not because he has been 'isolated' from the development through which we have passed. All over Africa there are the ruins of the inroads of other civilisations, Arabic, Portuguese, and Egyptian. The contact itself was there, but it did not produce a spark. There was no assimilation of what was seen. The new ways were not taken over, even in a modified form. Africa swallowed them all up, took what they had to give and, when they went, the jungle grew over the ruins of their buildings, and with a few exceptions (such as in Benin) not even a memory remains alive of what they brought.

These civilisations could not strike root or survive because they were 'strange' to the indigent population. They were built upon qualities in the 'foreigners' that the local people did not have and, in consequence, what they brought was meaningless to them.

As we have seen earlier on, the short-futured man cannot see his 'State' or his 'Race' as having any kind of personal reality beyond the moment of its present existing. The people of Africa have no words for these concepts and that is one of the reasons why, in South Africa there is a continuous bickering about how the 'Kaffirs', 'Natives', 'Bantu', 'Africans' or 'Aborigines' should be called to distinguish them from the 'Whites'. N'tu means 'man' and Ba-N'tu means 'men', so that, in the real sense of the word, every man *belongs* to the 'Bantu' but he has no racial name as such.

The racial names are no more than names of 'clans' or 'tribes' or 'families' or the followers of certain leaders. They are not what we would recognise as 'states', 'races' or 'nations' but a mere classification of what exists in the present. They are not, as they would be to us, separate entities with an existence beyond the individuals comprising them.

The average Bantu knows only his family and, to a lesser extent, his place in his tribal complex, or his clan. All beyond that are 'strangers' and there is as much, if not more 'Apartheid' between the clans as there is between the Whites and the Blacks. To the Zulu the Swazi may be slightly, what one could call 'human', but the M'shangaan, is certainly not. The fact that he presumes to look like a man is, in itself, an offence that, but for the restraining hand of the White man, could only be wiped out in blood. One need only point to the numerous instances in Uhururised Africa, where this is already coming into effect. And it will get worse as time goes on.

In these fights between the tribes, the official 'cause' is but an excuse, mostly thought out by the white man to whitewash his former charges. At the root of it lies the same kind of unreasoning hatred which still exists between the English and the Welsh, and between the Dutch and the Flemings - only here it is in another and more savage key which possibly harks back to the days when the nearest relations in the tree of human development were the natural source of the rumpsteak on the tables of both sides. Cannibalism is not yet as deep under the surface there as it is to us. In one of the riots in East London the mob ate pieces of the nun they had killed, and among the Baluba in the Congo debacle, the same reversion to type occurred.

Without a concept of a 'State' or a 'Race', there is also nothing wider than the family to be loyal to. There is nothing more than the personal family or the personal section of the tribe with whose fortunes one is personally identified. The devastating effect of this can be seen in the 'detrribalised' inhabitants of the townships who, having lost their roots in their tribal complex, have nothing to 'belong' to - a defect which is made good by the creation of 'gangs' who live in blind enmity with everyone 'outside'.

On the short-futured concept of reality no 'State' that has any kind of a permanency can ever be built. It can never produce a set of permanent, and, of themselves 'valid' laws that will be more than regulations issued by those in power and obeyed for fear of punishment by the population. It can never be more than a state ruled by men. It cannot be a state in which all, even the rulers, are subject to an overall structure as defined by the laws of the land.

In the absence of a 'future' in the mind of citizens, as we have seen, the idea of an abstract 'Justice' cannot exist. *The people of Africa also have no proper name for 'Justice'*. Each case is judged by those in power according to their personal values of the moment. 'Justice, as an abstract quality, is completely meaningless to them. To the Bantu even now the 'White' Magistrate lays down the law and assesses the punishments as he thinks fit. He does not 'administer' the law and the policemen enforce their will or the will of the common master. They do not do so at the behest of the 'Law'.

When the full implications of this are realised it will be seen that such a people can never have other than a social structure consisting of a pyramiding of personal power and authority, backed up by force.

There is nothing essentially wrong in this and there would be nothing wrong in practice, if it could be that the aim of that authority was to achieve the best for everyone. Of all the forms of government that we know, the 'benevolent dictatorship' is probably the best (for as long as it lasts).

This ideal, however, does not even exist here in embryo - because the rulers are also 'now-men'. Power will be used for the single purpose of promoting personal advantages as, among a short-futured people, the rulers must be short-futured too. This is already being demonstrated before our purblind eyes by the fact that the 'Emerging African Self-determination' is characterised everywhere by overt and ruthless forms of intimidation, the like of which is not found anywhere in the world except, possibly, in the 'protection rackets' of America.

Another great difficulty here is that short-futured man has, and can have, only a very limited concept of the idea 'Truth'.

As we have seen, Truth, in our sense of the word, demands the having of a correct image of reality and that needs a concept of the meaning of permanency not given to the short-futured. Telling the truth entails conferring a correct image of reality to others.

Among us (although this is by no means always clearly realised), it is still so that, in practice, the Ideal Man' is the 'Honest Man' and most of our virtues will be found to depend upon a man being honest with others and being honest with himself.

The ideal of the short-futured man is however the 'successful liar and cheat', without this being in any way shadowed by any 'ethical' condemnation. The lie to the short-futured is no 'sin'. It is a 'gift'. The man who can use it well is a genius.

This has also come to us out of our own short-futured past in our folklore, in the tales of 'Tyl Uilenspiegel' and 'Reynard the Fox' - not to mention much skulduggery in our fairytales, especially those retold by the brothers Grimm. When re-reading them at a more mature age, it comes as a surprise to discover how most of them are stories of liars and crooks who 'get away with it' to our secret and primeval joy.

There is an almost complete absence of this kind of tale in Eastern and Russian primitive literature. There the stories tend to underline moral precepts rather than the successful fraud.

In the Persian tales we find the 'trickster' again, but here he is merely 'amusing', like a marionette dangling at the end of the strings of his own desires, trying to find his way through the maze of reality. More often than not he is tripped up just as he is about to see his little schemes work out. In the Persian tales, the honest man is still the valuable and worthy one; unlike in our 'Reynard the Fox', where the good old Bear and the Credulous Wolf are merely fools who deserve to be cheated for believing the stories of the Fox. Despite its lusty pornography and its multitude of sins, the tales of the 'Thousand and one Nights' are transfused with a sense of eternity in which the human ant is a more or less unimportant inhabitant. His machinations and his preposterously serious copulations are merely amusing.

We find Tyl Uilenspiegel and Reynard the Fox, in their original form in the stories of Uncle Remus (which are a westernisation of the thousand and one tales of Africa) in which Brer Rabbit takes the place of the jackals, rabbits, snakes, birds, cockroaches and all the other animals to whom local popular fancy (or totemic tradition) have given the attribute of being 'successful liars'.

In passing, it is interesting to realise that this 'westernisation' of the stories actually consists of giving them a beginning and an end. In the original they start from nowhere and often peter out along the way by a changing of the subject. In Uncle Remus, as told by a White man, they are provided with a definite pattern in time, an individuality of their own.

When an individual is not living in a permanent world of which the understanding is the primary requisite; when to him, success by hook or by crook is the ideal; when there are no permanent values but only the values of the moment; when there is possibly a tomorrow to provide for, but certainly no next year to think of today; and when it is mere foolishness to tell the truth, or if it is in any way disadvantageous or even unpleasant, it is inevitable that the resulting pyramid of power will not be a 'good' and beneficent one - except for those who come out on top.

That this is so is all too obvious from what we see happening in Africa and in the United Nations today. One remembers with a smile how poor Patrice Lumumba, one month before the scheduled dawn of Freedom in the Congo, suddenly decided that he could not wait another day. He demanded it now, on the spot! His premature attempt to 'jump the gun' and sell the whole concession of the Congo to the American combine, before anybody else could do so, although glossed over by those embarrassed worthies, is of the same vintage.

The same thing is again visible in the 'talky-talkies' which recently took place in London. They listen with barely disguised impatience to dull arguments about matters that might possibly give some stability to their future states but it is a stability which they are not intending to foster in the least. They are not really interested because all that is not, and cannot, be real to them. It is mere waffling and a waste of time and all one can extract from their public pronouncements, between being crude and walking out of conferences, is impatience. They do not want to wait. Uhuru must come tomorrow and not in some vague and non-existent

'next-year-or-so'.

Make an end to this nonsense and let us get down to the real things, they say in so many words. Let us get down to seeing who is the strongest and most ruthless, whose cohorts will be best able to cudgel the masses into adoring subjection. Time is awasting! Stop pushing our 'rights' just beyond the lintel of tomorrow, make them real now! After all, it is obvious that all these constitutions are makebelieve and nonsense and most of them say so when, in more or less unguarded moments, they forget that they are supposed to be 'diplomats'.

Just let us get on with it! Everyone is a little Nkrumah in his own eyes and it is not just that Nkrumah was presented with the whole thing on a platter where all this talking gives the others at home a chance to get into the game.

This is not so bad, except for Africa - or rather, for the small man in Africa, and *he* is lost anyhow. Nothing can save him anymore.

What is bad is that it is infecting the United Nations among which there are still many self-respecting individuals. There the African Block has introduced the 'Barefaced Lie' (which was Hitler's strongest weapon) into the 'Courts of the World' that many people still respect as a 'Forum of World Opinion'.

In the bad old days, of which we all are now thoroughly ashamed, our envoys admittedly told lies - and to such an extent that a 'Statesman' was defined as 'A man who lies for his country'. But that lying had a quality which is totally lacking in this new development. It went on behind the scenes and was used as a face-saver for agreements that had previously been decided upon. Those lies were not meant to deceive the other parties, but as a facade against 'public opinion'.

No diplomat could afford to be caught out in a barefaced lie. His country's honour would have been at stake. One did not even dare to expose a prevarication in public, for fear of precipitating a war.

Now that completely fantastic accusations backed by faked statistics and figures are the order of the day, it has come to the stage where 'World Opinion' as expressed by UNO is taken seriously only by those who know no better. The Africans have taken a leaf out of Hitler's 'Mein Kampf', knowing that, among the Western Nations the most brazen lie is the most likely to be believed because, basically, they still believe in truth. This makes it appear impossible to them that anyone could possibly dare to tell such a big lie! Ethically that is to their credit, but it does not show much intelligence.

The important point here is however that, where the African infiltration has done this to the highest courts of the world, it is obvious that, whatever form an African government will take it will not be a Democratic one. As we have seen, that form of government is a precarious balance between personal desires and ambitions and a combination of a feeling for the rights of others, a sense of Justice and the sanctity of State and the Constitution. All this can never survive in an atmosphere where Truth has no meaning.

If the Africans were 'given' such a state, we would see how the more specifically long-termed and not immediately rewarding factors would go first - such as the maintaining of Public Health and Sanitation, except in the main thoroughfares and public places.

Next the maintenance of the lesser roads would start to fail. Only the main arterial roads would be kept in repair, for a time, half for prestige and half for the comfort of the men with the big American Cars - but even that would not last too long. The money for repairs would be held back for a month, or till 'next year'. for more 'important' matters.

At the same time schooling in the provinces and the villages would die of lack of funds, leaving a few high schools and a University or two for show (because the African disdains 'ordinary' schooling as much as he

adores 'higher' learning for the prestige it gives). It would however not be long before even these institutes would be closed where they are apt to breed undesirable, or unassimilable 'intelligentsia'. This closing would probably at first be temporary, but, as the money earmarked for them would be canalised in other directions, opening them would be put off till 'some other time'.

All this would be accompanied by a great proliferation of white collar workers in the civil service, because everyone at the top would have to produce 'status' jobs for all the members of his 'family'.

For a time the Law would remain in function as promulgated but, when the 'White' caretaker judges went at last. it would also die out.

When it is discovered that the dead words cannot hit back on their own, when policemen and minor officials, find that they can enforce their own versions of 'justice', there is an end to 'justice'.

We must not forget that the short-futured person only obeys a law for fear of punishment. This punishment can only be enforced by a well-disciplined police force which does not make use of its power otherwise than to do its duty. Where this police force consists of short-futured men, they will also only do their duty out of fear, and the problem will be whom they should fear. That this must mean an entirely different structure from any that we would be willing to accept, should be clear the moment we have seen this difficulty, which simply does not arise in our system.

All this may sound, to the basically 'democratic' reader like 'degeneration', but it is not really that at all. It will be no more than natural; a simple chain of 'cause and effect'. The State will be 'becoming true', in that it will become a correct image of the people that compose it.

In the meantime, where there is more than one 'leader' in the beginning, more than one 'representative of the people', they will be fighting it out among each other, not by free votes and in a democratic manner, but by the age-old and, to them, familiar methods of intimidation and assassination, possibly graced by the few new tricks they may have learnt from us in the meantime. (How many of the original members of the first Congolese Parliament are still alive today?)

Inevitably, in the end, there will be one head - and it is right that this should be so because only democrats can have a Ship of State. with more than one Captain at the helm - (or should one say: one Captain and one Kibitzer?) - and get away with it.

That head, being the supreme master of everything, will also inevitably at first be a representative of God, to end up as partly God and then, in many cases God himself. It is not easy to bow down before a mere human being and to take his, often arbitrary, word as law but it is natural, and even masochistically satisfying, to do so before a God. It was even like that in the days of Rome when Caesar ousted his two competing consuls and made himself a dictator - and a God in his own right.

Of the two long-futured forms of government, the Communistic one would possibly make a more immediate fit for the emergent African rulers than the Democratic. The short-futured man is, like the Communist ordinary citizen, not really interested in what and who governs him, as long as he is left his little niche where he can subsist in reasonable comfort and security. Like the Communist masses, his demands are, in this respect, not very high.

There is however this; that the Soviet system filters out the devoted and the idealist long-futured members who are willing to serve (although, admittedly, a considerable number of power and influence seekers come along). Its ruling committees are not 'one-man committees' although, from our side of the curtain and judging by what they would be like if we were on them, they seem to be like that. The gross of their ultimate leaders are long-futured visionaries and these will be absent in a state of short-futured men. A short-futured 'Stalin' or

'Khrushchev' will soon be indistinguishable from a 'Chaka' or a 'Lobengula'.

With less power for the 'proletariat' and 'legal' support for his absolute power, his total supremacy will be more easily established and better sustained.

We do not need to hope that Democracy will ever reign in Africa, but neither do we need to fear that Communism will take over. Neither one nor the other could possibly thrive there because each of them, in its own way, depends upon the integrity of certain keymen for their durability.

The only difference is in the way of selecting them and the kind of subservience expected. Both of them are however long-futured systems and therefore out of the question.

The African can only have an Autocracy, and a total one at that.

All governments are an expression of the people themselves and our occupancy of Africa has not made any difference to the people themselves (possibly because there has been relatively very little exchange of genes as, sexually, we have kept more or less to our own).

Should the white man leave, Africa will naturally and inevitably return to the kind of government that is natural to its own people that is, *to the one it had before we came*.

We should have realised how egocentric was the slogan of a few years ago when, suddenly, we were making the African 'fit for self-government'. They did it very well before we came - and there is no reason why they should not be able to go back to the good old days before we 'enslaved' them, if the day of our departure from the continent should, God forbid, arrive.

When we 'took' Africa, we however did not take freedom away from its 'people'. We did not subdue its 'nations' for they did not exist. What we did was to take over from the black autocrats who had Africa in their power and whose yoke had, in almost all cases, been very much harsher than ours was to be, with the single exception of the Congo in the beginning. We gave them a respite from the interminable intertribal wars that had kept their numbers down to where the land could easily support them with their predatory methods of cultivation. We gave them justice - although that justice was ours and strange to them. It certainly worked as well and probably better than their old system, even though we had the inexplicable foolishness of executing those that committed medicine murders! We gave them hygiene and prolonged their lives so that there came ever more mouths to feed. We improved their living standards, we showed them possibilities in life that they would never have thought of themselves. We gave them gadgets - and gadgets and more gadgets, like tractors, radio and television, motorcars and can-openers. We gave them cans to open, Coca Cola and soft drinks and white bread.

We profited by it but, if anything, they profited much more because they started so much 'lower' down.

And now we are perpetrating the supreme and heartless injustice of throwing them back to the wolves under whom they have forgotten how to live and how to survive.

We are doing this, not because, as we profess, we love Justice, or adore Freedom and the Rights of Man for in that case it would be our principal duty to see to it that these things would not get lost in the 'scrum' for power. We do it because we are tired, because the advantages on our side of the bargain have dwindled until they have become a burden instead of a 'good'. Most of all, we are leaving because we now have it so good at home that we cannot muster the essential manpower to keep our authority. Because 'masters' (however beneficent they are) must have strength to back up their mastership, we cannot go on.

The primitive feels this all too clearly and, where the ruler weakens, the would-be rulers rise up everywhere,

like dragon's teeth, out of the ground.

It is not true that the 'People of Africa' are rising up 'inspired by a new sense of nationhood and self-respect'. Very few of them have any valid idea of what it is all about. The 'Winds of Change' are not generated by a positive pressure over Africa, but by a negative pressure over Europe. The news that 'Freedom' is to be given is the cause and not the result of the uprising.

Where the 'Whiteman boss' is going home, each African knows that it is up to him to discover as soon as possible who the 'Blackman boss' is going to be so that, under his wing, a certain amount of security may be found.

It is therefore simply logical and natural that, as the new boss will be the strongest, it is the most ruthless and the most vociferous who will attract the most followers and who, to our 'democratic' way of thinking, will therefore be the rightful 'representatives of the largest number of citizens - which makes them (in our terminology again) into the 'leaders' of their peoples!

What we hear in the talking houses of the world is however not the voice of Africa, but the voices of the future Gods of Africa, and we do not hear (or we pretend not to hear) the moan of the African common citizen whom we have shamefully left in the lurch.

The hated, but dependable, Whiteman boss, is pulling out everywhere and most of the men of Africa have already felt, in the intimidating campaigns that went into 'selecting' their 'representatives' what the beloved Blackman boss is going to be like when he comes into his own.

One of the most remarkable proofs of this was that, despite the worldwide horror at the happenings in Sharpeville, the reaction of the common African in South Africa was a sigh of relief. Here, in South Africa, the White man was very definitely not going to pull out! The harshness of the message he understood. His own history, out of the days before the White man came, consisted of little else and it was a language that his present, presumptive leaders were already speaking. As many, and more, people had already been killed by the intimidators as were killed that morning.

The immediate future of Africa, on the present trend, is easy to divine.

Once the painful and hypocritical period of 'giving' (back) freedom has passed over, once what has to be liquidated has been liquidated, and what has to be destroyed; murdered and raped has had its due, there will remain a collection of African potentates, absolute despots who will be continually talking of joining the whole of Africa into one country and fighting about who among them will be the head of it.

We, the Europeans will not leave them alone however. We will start all over again, but we have learnt our lessons in the meantime, which is more than they have done. We have learnt to see that the advantage to be got out of having a subject state is that one can make it work for one; and we have realised that the methods which our forefathers used to achieve that aim, were childishly crude and unnecessarily wasteful. Military conquest is expensive and only possible where a large part of one's own young men are 'expendable'. It is also 'unethical', to kill other people for one's own advantages! Besides that, it is expensive to keep up, especially where one has become moral and soaked through with the 'Rights of Man'.

What is more important is that our crude forefathers, of whose actions we are now very much ashamed, did not know that there was another way in which they could have got what they wanted. Since their day we have learnt to use it in the school of the oil fields of the Middle East.

For this plan to succeed, one needs an absolute ruler, the more absolute, the better. Least of all does one want a 'Democracy'.

From such a ruler one can 'buy' a concession for a price far above what he can ever spend (however many Rolls Royces and Cadillacs he buys) but which will still be immeasurably far below the cost of military occupation.

For that price he sees to it that one has an unlimited supply of cheap labour which will not dare to make trouble - and the right to develop whatever riches, minerals or trade possibilities the country may contain.

The plan is beautifully simple, both for the ruler and the entrepreneur. There is no bloodshed - at least not so that the world comes to know about it. What the despot does to his own people is his business. The people have been given the supreme boon of Uhuru - God bless them, the poor blighters.

At least, that is the idea - and, at present, most of us see no reason why it should not work.

The only difficulty lies in the process of changing over from 'colonialism' to 'partnership in exploitation' with the new rulers. A former slave does not love his ex-master, however much he may have loved and respected him earlier on. The single fact of having been 'freed' demonstrates that the servitude was an imposition. The natural tendency is therefore to turn away from the 'master' and to give the concessions to the crowds who are standing on the side lines. Especially the promoter of all this 'freedom', old Uncle Sam, with his 'support of all legitimate national aspirations' looks a good candidate and Scandinavia is close on his heels.

One can see that the situation therefore needs an enormous amount of 'tact'. The former master will have to swallow insults that would make a small boy gag. There are unmotivated walk-outs, offensive remarks in the press of one's own country, slights and studied insults of those whom we think to be important men, symbolical of the honour of our nation. One 'lets one's nationals be debagged in public and mercilessly beaten up, and smiles at the 'schoolboy pranks', one allows one's settlers to be ruined and 'sells them down the river', as long as one keeps the 'friendship' of the leaders that were in gaol not so long ago for instigating wholesale murder - anything, as long as one keeps the 'friendship' of those who will be able to dish out the concessions later on.

It is a most interesting game to observe, but rather depressing for one who used to think it an honour to belong to a human race that had finally worked itself out of the murk of barbarism.

The irony of the whole situation is that it will not work, because, once again, it is built upon the tenet that 'all men are equal' - and that the Bantu are therefore basically like ourselves.

It has worked out beautifully in the Middle East, but there the people are long-futured too. The people of Africa are quite another proposition.

The 'friendship' of the short-futured may be genuine, but it is shortlived. Their promises may be fully valid at the time they are given, but they do not last well. The short-futured man does not feel obliged to honour them where honour is, itself. a long-futured quality dependent upon a vision of the ego seen as lasting far into the future.

To the short-futured there is nothing morally wrong in selling a concession and, when the factory or the mine is a going concern ('coining money under one's nose'), to take it 'back'. After all it is one's own. It has been built with the money taken out of one's own country and produced by the labour of one's own people! The Israeli's learnt a lesson like that, not so long ago, and they seem to be asking for more, nonetheless.

One graciously permits the others to build a great dam and an electrification scheme on the condition that one also permits them to establish a gigantic aluminium producing industry for themselves -and, when it is ready, one has the whole lot! The world is pledged to peace - so what can they do if one deports the officials and the 'foreign workmen'? The Russians will stop the Americans, and the Americans will stop the Russians from

becoming troublesome and, in the meantime, one sits pretty.

The goings on at the taking over of the Suez Canal demonstrated how such things work in a world where the White men, in their opinion, had suddenly gone mad.

The original conference at Accra confirmed it all. Everyone begged to be allowed to give - give 'without strings attached', if one so much as frowned and let it be known that that would be beneath one's dignity to accept - just as if 'accepting gifts' could ever be dignified! The indication of the possible willingness to grant a concession was enough to start another rain of largesse. One held out one's hand and it was filled. What wonder therefore that the ranks of the would-be leaders swelled and grew vociferous with the voice of 'Emergent Africa'?

The short-futured mind cannot see that there will have to come an end to this kind of thing. It has not heard of the rule of 'nothing for nothing' in this world. One or two really large 'lessons' will make the source dry up - where a bit of long-term planning and a bit of long-term honouring of obligations might have made it last for ever but will one live so long? The treasures are there for the accepting, now. One takes with the one hand, gives the other in 'friendship' to the other side, finds it filled and turns back to see what the first giver is now going to add to his offering.

The end is rather difficult to discern.

It is as yet impossible to see how far the great nations will go, and to what they will submit without baulking.

Probably the grandiose schemes of the present salad days that are already now wilting slowly away, will make place for smaller schemes. The preposterously great, modern buildings in the 'Capitals' of the new, bankrupt (if one takes away the grants) kingdoms, will be put to more prosaic uses than as facades to impress the gullible. The paint will peel off, and the jungle will start to encroach again. The palaces will still be full of luxury, but the little Black man will sorrowfully go back to tending his flocks and his patch of millet - back to his age-old hand to mouth existence.

There will remain a pool of stone-age humanity in the centre of Africa, a continuous thorn in this side of those who must, for their own peace of mind, believe that men are actually equal (and not only equal before God) and the fallacy that Africans are as they are only because they have been 'isolated' - and not because the law of the survival of the fittest stopped functioning in Africa.

CHAPTER XVI

Mixtures

The solutions to the problems of government as described in the last two chapters, are not the only ones that are possible.

One could, for instance, think of a State consisting mainly of short-futured men, which was ruled by an upper layer of long-futured administrators. This is basically the idea which the pioneer-stock of South Africa had of the ideal solution for the conditions in their country.

On the surface the image seems to possess merit. After all, Democracies are, to a certain extent, nothing else, although there the demarcation into layers is not official.

In theory it should work out and one could, by giving it a little thought, sit down and work out an 'Utopia de Luxe' on that basis.

The tomorrow-men would do the long-futured work, the organising, the thinking ahead, the ruling and the carrying of the responsibilities for the smooth running of the State. The now-men would, from their side, do the work for which they are the most fitted, the routine and the repetitive work together with the mechanical part of the administration that would need only the application of rules and no original thinking or decision-making. They would then have nothing to worry about. They would share in the prosperity resulting from the properly organised employment of each man according to his abilities. They would have safety and be able to enjoy their lives within the limits of their need and according to the values determined by their short range of vision. The future need never trouble them nor the intricacies of international relationships.

The tomorrow-men again, seeing their life against the background of time, would find compensation for their conscientiousness in the satisfaction of doing a worthwhile job well, together with the high standard of living to which their work would entitle them and which the economy of the state would be well able to afford.

One fears however that all this is no more than a rather attractive pipe-dream, like so many other Ideal States' which other 'practical idealists' have cooked up sitting in their studies. It takes no notice of the undoubted fact that we are all 'human'. It conveniently forgets that we are, all of us, full of prides and prejudices, of emotional misjudgements and internal maladjustments which we transpose and read into the outer world.

If, in such a State, one could imagine that the top layers would consist only of completely dedicated long-futured men, fully aware of their place and their high duties in the State, and if the ruled masses consisted of nothing but fully short-futured men typical of their kind in that they would be content with no more than was to be found in their present, there might be possibilities - if we looked no further. When we do however, we find immediately that, in such a State there would also have to be a fully long-futured police force and some system whereby the 'future-sense' of a man could be accurately measured. so that provision could be made for a correct distribution of the human material in the next generation. It needs no great gift of imagination to see how both of these would (besides many others) lead to complications and cause areas of potentially explosive possibilities.

Where, as in South Africa, there is a White upper layer which, in itself, necessarily contains a very large percentage of short-futured people who are, in that respect, in no way 'above' the native populations, but who carry the badge of their 'status' in the colour of their skin - the apparent validity of this solution fades rapidly away. The now-men among the Whites will claim, or try to claim, 'status prerogatives' on the strength of their colouring and not on their 'long-futured qualities' - a claim that is preposterous to anybody but themselves. A man may be better than others, but he is not better because his skin is a light amber-pink. If he is better than

others he must prove it by his deeds, and be willing to prove it in open competition.

On the other hand, it is difficult, if not foolish, to expect a short-futured people to admit, even to themselves, that they are not fit to rule, especially when they see obviously unfit 'rulers' among the Whites. The very fact that they are short-futured will preclude them from understanding why the long-futured ones are better able to hold the tiller to the advantage of all!

A little unprejudiced thinking will therefore make it abundantly clear that such a state cannot possibly be one in which the whole machinery of government can run with the consent and full agreement of all and, if that is not so, there will be continuous unrest. What is worse, there will, in such a State, always be those among the 'White' men who will seek to compensate for their relatively low standing among their own kind by 'taking it out on the Blacks' - or, possibly worse, by seeking the adulation and respect they crave from those who are situated lower than themselves. They will 'buy' this respect by preaching insurrection and pointing out the 'injustice' of the whole situation in which 'All men are Equal', but some have all the goods, which is exactly what worries them personally! More than a hundred years ago Thackeray already noted that: "The true pleasure of life is to live with your inferiors."

There will finally be those Black men who, having arrived at the top of the lower level, find an obviously 'unjust' ceiling above their heads, thus making them into ready material for the teachings of the disgruntled Whites.

The only way in which such a State can survive therefore is by the 'arbitrary' use of force by the 'White rulers', and, however honestly they tried, there would always remain a certain amount of 'injustice' at the border lines where the Whites would have more, the Blacks less prerogatives than could be actually 'justified' in any way.

It, all in all, certainly would be far from anything like an 'ideal state' although, if the rulers were wise, it could contain a much higher average of contentment for the largest number of people than any other solution for this, the most difficult problem of all. It would certainly be infinitely preferable to anything a short-futured state could give, despite its 'Uhuru'.

This has been more or less the nature of the arrangement which is now dying out in South Africa, mostly at the instigation of its impractical idealists and seekers of black-adulation where white-respect is withheld.

From here we have two possible variations.

The first is that of the so-called 'Apartheid' plan of the present government.

Essentially this means the splitting up of the country into 'White' and 'Black' parts, and making the citizens of the one 'foreigners' in the other.

On the surface, again, this seems to have excellent possibilities. One removes the contentious political and 'method of ruling' problems completely out of the general picture, leaving each half to decide how it will be ruled, and retaining the overall economy of the whole intact. In this way the weaker White brother can be economically protected from a too dangerous competition, while the ambitious Blacks could find the opportunity they desire in their 'own' country.

As was to be expected, being 'sensible', it will be popular with nobody. Nobody really wants a sensible and just solution. Everyone wants as much as he can get and, if possible, a little more.

But even if one could overcome this, the future for the idea does not look too bright. As we saw in the last chapter, the Black part of the country, being entirely short-futured, will not fall into a Democratic pattern. They, like everywhere else in Africa, will not be able to avoid becoming Autocracies, ruled overtly by fear

and intimidation.

This rule will be worse than the rule by fear which the individual citizens will have known under the 'heel' of the White man - and under their 'tribal chiefs' as controlled by the strict rule of the Whites. The average Black citizen does not want to go 'back' to the conditions that obtained before the White man took a large part of the 'arbitrariness' out of the autocracy of his chiefs, but the irony is that that can only be prevented by remaining under the rule of the White man and that, as his 'educated' so-called 'leaders' tell him, is degrading.

As so often in life, one cannot eat one's cake and keep it. There has to be a government, even under Uhuru, and one has to make a choice between a 'White' and a 'Black' ruler. One cannot have a Black ruler that will rule in the way a white man would. One cannot have a Black ruler and keep the advantages of the 'rule by law' instead of the 'rule by men'. It is as simple as that, but the choice is extremely difficult.

It is to be expected that, during the 'transition period' when the 'Bantustans' will still be ruled by Black rulers under supervision of the Whites (while they 'learn the ropes' and are 'made ready for self-government'), things will go more or less smoothly, except where, here and there a potentate tries to 'jump the gun'. When they have been declared fully independent however, the last chapter which has already been written several times in Central Africa, will surely be written there too. The best laid schemes of mice and men will 'gang agley' because they take no notice of the material, being as they are, solely directed at an ideal that everybody should be able to recognise as 'good' and 'Just',.

The result must be oppression of the Black citizens and a collapse of the economy while the rulers demand a larger and larger share of the goods of their subjects. As poverty spreads, there will come cattle stealing and border raids into the farmlands of the Whites until the latter take out their rifles to quieten the situation down. In the end the new 'Chiefsdoms' may have to be re-taken and held under military control, if only to ensure the safety and the peace of the countryside.

All this the ordinary Black citizen knows, more by instinct than by reason, and he does not like it.

On the other hand, it is improbable that these new 'Countries' will be allowed to 'sell' any worthwhile concessions to other nations than to that of the neighbouring white state. As the 'Great Giver Nations' will not think it necessary to 'buy them away from Communism' (because that same neighbouring white state will, for its own safety, have to see to that aspect of the situation) it is very unlikely that the new rulers will receive their legitimate share of the 'Rain of Gold' which is falling free, all over the rest of Africa. Bantustan rulers will only be saddling themselves with the trouble of trying to rule a black nation according to what will still virtually be the 'white man's law', that is, merely for the 'good of the people'. There will be no palaces with gold-plated furniture, no Cadillacs no regular trips to the United Nations (which their people will not be able to afford) and it is no wonder therefore that there is also very little enthusiasm among the African 'leaders' of South Africa, to become rulers of these non-productive 'Bantustans'. They want to get their hands on the treasures that the Whites have built up and they want to be paid for the 'concession' to operate the large mines on the Rand. That, judging by what is happening up North, is their 'right' according to the new ideas of the West. That is the perquisite of the successful politician which he demands for himself, under the guise of demanding it for his 'people'. No wonder therefore that he scorns all ideas on Bantustans that offer him exactly what he officially asks for, together with education for all, improved social welfare, townships, hospitals, etc., etc. All that means nothing to him. He is out for the richest prize in all Africa. On the other side the average Whites, especially the short-futured ones, see little attraction in the idea of 'giving away' half the country, *and* subsidising the Black governments whom they know only too well. to be potential enemies, especially where they have not yet had a demonstration of the fact that a solution *must* be found - now - to prevent ruin in the days to come.

This solution therefore pleases no one. It seems unlikely that, in the end, it will succeed.

The only other solution is that of 'Integration' and here we arrive at what is merely a larger edition (with a much greater issue at stake) of what is happening in the 'racist' troubles in America and England.

As we saw, a Democracy is basically made up of a mixture of short-futured and long-futured people. Why then should a Democracy not be able to accommodate both White and Black? The question is deceptively innocent, but any knowledge and understanding of human nature should enable one to arrive at the correct answer.

Seen as a 'one man, one vote' system, a mere pattern of the *method* of ruling, that is: a ruling by numerical majorities, Democracy obviously cannot work here. As we saw, the virtue of Democracy does not lie in the way it is ruled, but in the nature of the Democrats that are ruled by it. A mere numerical majority would place the short-futured, undemocratic, and potentially autocratic masses completely on top and thereby destroy the very basis of Democracy itself. It would mean a sudden end, not only to Democracy but also to the economy of the land which, itself, is also built upon long-term planning and which would not stand up for long under the predatory mentality of the Blacks. "Take what you can take now," cannot produce, or maintain a Western type of economy.

However, where we have, in official Democracy, the precedent of the right to eliminate those that are not 'fit' to vote because of lack of understanding, sense of social responsibility and of maturity of judgement, one could possibly arrive at a formula that might do this for us in such a mixed state.

Here again we come up against two insurmountable obstructions. In the first place, it is possible to examine people for the measure of their understanding but no examination could possibly define for us their sense of social responsibility and still less their maturity of judgement. The simple rules which do the work for us in the more or less homogeneous human material of our Democracies are there only needed to weed out the obvious aberrants. The system as a whole. has enough resiliency to accommodate the rest.

It will however not work when suddenly three times the number of original citizens qualify potentially for the vote, but where only a small percentage of these have any idea of what Democracy really is and what the responsibilities of the Democrat should be, not only in the matter of casting his vote, but in the whole tenor of his life. The Central African experiment has shown this to be so, over and over again.

One could work out a complicated system of qualifications, including such items as the standard of education, the possession of property, the continued employment in one position, work for the good of the community and a special examination not only into the knowledge, but also into the understanding of the political structure of the State - but that would lead to the second and still more unsurmountable obstacle.

Any examination or standard set high enough to eliminate those Black citizens whose attitude to the state would constitute a danger to Democracy and a Western economic system, would have to apply to the White citizens also and that would eliminate such a large part of the electorate that it would be impossible to implement it. In measuring qualities which are more or less inherent in the European, either by inheritance or training, one would have introduced such a mass of extra qualifications that a large part of the white electorate which did have the desired qualities would have to be disfranchised. But if this happened, so that those Whites, who did not deserve to have the vote for one reason or another, lost it, one must not forget that we are dealing with human material and that, however justified our conclusions might be, one would have to be able to implement them if one would be doing more than constructing but another Utopia. The voters who now have the right to vote, simply would not stand for disfranchisement and that would be that. On the other hand, to put a higher standard for the Black voter than the one used for the Whites (as it is, for the Portuguese 'Assimilado') would be unacceptable, even to the most rabid radical.

Where a theoretical solution (with a retention of a Democratic form of government and a Western long-term

economy) is impossible - it becomes still more so when one thinks of the human factors which would become operative in any solution.

Here one needs not to blame South Africans. Experience shows that, even in America and England (where there is only a little coffee added to the milk), any threat to the employment or security of a group of workers, is immediately met with rioting and violence, whatever pious declaration of solidarity and brotherhood with the Black nations may be put out by the countries themselves, to charm the ears of the Black potentates in Africa who have concessions to distribute.

Wherever there is a change in the structure of a society, however small, those against whose advantage it acts, those whose prerogatives and possibly even completely illegal perquisites it endangers, will drop their ideals, their slogans, their sense of 'justice' and all the beautiful thoughts that are supposed to distinguish man from the animal, and revert back to the mentality of their ancestors.

They will fight - for, in the last count, it is still only the 'fittest' who survive and not the 'best', the 'most honest' or the good at heart - and this is true wherever man is man. Those not directly endangered may shake their heads in horror and disgust. They may even increase the stream of beautiful and ethical thoughts and idealisms they produce - and feel the better for it - until they discover that the process is starting to nibble at the foundations of their *own* lives. Then there will be a quick end also to that. *There is therefore no peaceful solution anywhere.* It is childish to think that we can ever escape the laws of nature because we have become 'human'.

If a man lies down, or refuses, in principle, to fight (not for his 'rights', but for what is 'his') - then he will simply not survive. The outcome is also not decided by one or more of the thousands of different 'rights' and 'justices' which one may think should apply to the case - it is decided by which one is the strongest, the most astute, and, if necessary, the most ruthless and crooked.

One is therefore afraid that, as in Father Huddleston's book, there is 'Naught for our Comfort'. The mills of God grind slowly - and those at the contacting surfaces have to bear the brunt.

The solution is that there is no 'solution'.

We can work out how the homogeneous communities will find their level, but in South Africa and the Rhodesias they will have to fight it out step by step. There will be no peace for the wicked there, but neither will there be peace for the good.

All that one can do is to try and understand, without hypocrisy and without a 'holier- than-thou' attitude. We must not ask ourselves what they should do, but what we 'would' do. We should try to understand and, in understanding, try to soften the blows; adjust, there where adjusting does not mean a giving way, but insist without compromise, on all that is necessary to keep Democracy. If something is to be saved, Democracy must not be swamped by an unassimilable mass of shortfuted people who will not, like the Democrats, be able to 'make it work'.

The alternative is not Communism, but total Autocracy; not 'Stalin', but 'Hitler' - with a halo of divinity around his, probably black, head. *The admission of every citizen into the body politic will dilute the already dangerously weak leaven of long-futured ones too much to maintain Democracy, and without Democracy Western man cannot live - and Western civilisation cannot survive.*

CHAPTER XVII

But have a care!

The reactions observed in those who by reading this manuscript, had become familiar with the idea of total temporalisation as a potent factor in the determination of the actions of men, makes it imperative that a short, final, and cautionary chapter should be inserted here.

It is common knowledge that man does not only pre-select the material that is transferred from his store of images into his consciousness. The same selection is also effective on material from the outside so that two differently orientated (or indoctrinated) persons may find entirely different things in the same sequence of words.

If one reads two different newspapers regularly (as I do). the one a government supporter, the other backing the opposition - and the so-called 'liberals' - one is struck by the fact that the same report takes different meanings in them. Admittedly this is accentuated by the subtle art of 'headline writing' and the judicious use of the apostrophe - but the fact remains. One simply cannot help it.

Often, going back to an article or a report after an argument, one finds that one has completely misunderstood it by reading what one expected there and overlooking what one did not want to see.

The general reaction to what has been written here up to now, seems to be a sigh of relief. So the Bantu is an inferior person after all! And the book is taken as if it purports to be a theoretical, almost scientific 'proof and a justification for what has subconsciously been troubling the reader or the listener. Now he need no longer feel bad about his instinctive knowledge that he is the 'better' man -and that he is justified in keeping the other down where he 'belongs'!

Nothing is further from the contents and the spirit of what has been written here.

It may be true that all 'racially pure' Bantu are short-futured 'now-men'. As a matter of fact, it probably is. But only the utter amateur and the 'racist' fanatic will believe in a 'racially pure' people. It is as silly as the myth of the 100% American.

Hundreds - and probably thousands - of shipwrecked sailors have been able to live long enough along the shores of Africa after their ships foundered. on its shores to contaminate the 'purity' of the coastal people with their genes. There have been numerous incursions by the outposts of different civilisations - still present or, by now, covered by the jungle and oblivion.

We read in "The Golden Trade of the Moors" by E. W. Bovine, that, in 1590, a large army of whom some 2,500 were 'Christian renegades' set out from Morocco at the behest of El-Mansur, to ravage the region around what is now Ghana, finally establishing a settlement there. The kind of thing that went on (as on p. 169), "The doors of the mosque were closed behind them, their houses containing all the wealth of Timibuctu were plundered, their women were violated; and many of the prisoners in the mosque were massacred", is only too typical of those times. As finally the settlement was swamped and absorbed and as those men must have had black 'wives'. there is little doubt that there is not a Ghanaian alive today who does not have a trace at least of 'Christian renegade' blood in him. (This is not as important as it may seem because being a 'Christian renegade' is probably synonymous with being a 'short-futured white'. There must have been exceptions however.)

The same is true of us. In Roman times the 'black slaves' who were so popular, must already have left their seed in the womb of our race and the history of the Cape leaves little doubt that the process of contamination

must have been accelerated there until 'pure' European blood can hardly be more than wishful thinking among us.

Contamination of one race by another doubles and trebles itself with the appearance of every new generation.

There is therefore in the first place no scientific reason why long future characteristics should not pop up here and there among the blacks. Equation of 'black' and 'short -futed' is not justified in theory - although, in practice, it seems to hold.

In the second place the man who feels that the short futued characteristics of the Bantu races places them in a 'lower' category so that he can justify his instinctive attitude towards them, seems to have forgotten that, in accepting that principle, he has admitted that we Europeans must be 'lower' than the Chinese, the Russians, and the Incas and Aztecs of Central America.

As said very clearly, the Western Europeans are, as a group, predominantly 'short futued' and in no way (except possibly in a relative degree) 'above' the Bantu.

Probably less than 20% of us are really long futued and the man who would use lack of temporealisation as an excuse for being the boss, should ask himself honestly if *he* is one of those 20% who could possibly look down upon all the blacks and no less upon the other 80% of the whites.

The criteria for such a self-examination are not difficult to find or to apply. Is he a man who lives and savours his personal life in relation to the role it plays in the life and well-being of the community? Does he do his work for its own sake - or does he do no more than he has to do? Does he see himself as a member of a multitude that is working out its obscure destiny under the sun - playing his part in it to the full, as well as he can, and finding the source for his self-respect in it? Or does he take and enjoy what he can get, regardless? Is it intrinsically difficult for him to tell a lie, apart from the trouble he may get into and the possibility of being found out? And is it the thought of punishment that plays the major role in keeping him on the straight and narrow path of the righteous? Does he have to overcome something in himself (besides his so-called 'conscience'), if he wants to do something wrong?

True. he belongs to a long futued community, but is he one? That long-futued community exists because even the short futued have learnt to live in it and obey its laws, as they know that 'long futued' people must be elected to pods of power and leadership (one does not vote for a flighty extrovert but for a steady, conscientious man - i.e. a long futued one). But there is no overt reason why the Bantu should not learn to do so too.

For practical purposes that is however not so. The Bantu, if given the vote, will vote for the Bantu. He will vote for his own kind and thereby destroy the long futued characteristics of our state - just as the short futued white would do if an open schism developed between the long futued whites (who now labour unknown and unsung), and the short: futued whites. "Vote for one of us!" would be the slogan and Democracy would also disappear overnight.

This however does not give the short futued white the right to look down upon the (as short futued) black.

All in all it has here not been the intention to give the whites another stick with which to hit the blacks or a theoretical backing for their fancied 'superiority'.

This point has to be strongly underlined - hence this 'disappointing" chapter.

The essential aspect of the situation is that a 20% leaven of unofficial, long futued people has been demonstrated to be able to carry the rest, the 'poor whites', the unbelievably bad workmen, and all the rest that

clutter up our lower ranks.

But if the huge host of Bantu were added to the mixture, *even if they voted for longfuted men like we do*, it would leave hardly more than 5% to keep the ship of state and our economy on an even keel and that would not be enough.

We too would founder like the rest of Africa.

APPENDIX I

Heredity and Environment

The question of how much in man is due to heredity and how much is due to environmental influences, still remains important, although modern popular thinking has solved it for us with glorious simplicity. If all men are, as the authoritative Declaration of Independence states, 'created equal' - all differences 'are due to the environment. One could call them 'post natal' influences, to give the greatest scope to the explanations of the manifest differences between the final products.

It is a fact (and, if we wish to find truth, we must start with facts) that individual men are not 'created' however. They start off, each as a single, fertilised egg-cell and thence develop by division and multiplication into the ultimate individual.

At what stage this cell-mass becomes a 'man' can be defined differently.

The Catholic Church takes the single cell to be already a '*man*'. (It considers killing it a sin).

The law of most Western countries draws the line where it becomes 'viable, that is, where it possibly could survive by itself.

Most of us think of the man as beginning when he has been successfully born; another limit is where he can reproduce himself and finally the State only accepts him as a 'man' when he is, at 18 or 21, allowed to vote.

During all that time, the environment exercises its influences upon him. It feeds him, provides or withholds trace elements and special substances he may need, or which may be harmful to him. It acts by differences in temperature, by physical contact, both beneficent and harmful; and, when the consciousness arrives, it fills that consciousness with images and ties these images up with implications, with pleasure, pain, danger, safety, and later, 'good' and 'evil'. One must therefore come to the conclusion that the resultant 'man' must be the addition sum of all that has happened to him (and for which somehow he cannot be considered to be responsible) - and yet - in practice it does not seem to work out like that. The differences between a set of brothers and sisters, growing up in an essentially identical environment for instance, vary too much.

Emotionally judged there is also a catch. We do not want to feel that we have been pre-determined, that God is a 'racist' and has given each of us a limited and defined set of possibilities with which we must try to get through life as best we can, surrounded by others who have been given greater gifts and abilities. We do not want to feel that God, like what the White Society in South Africa has done to its native populations, has put a 'ceiling' above the individual beyond which he cannot rise if he so desires. We want to be able to feel that the 'poor' criminal young man in the dock 'never had a chance' and that therefore it is our duty (or rather that of our State) to 'educate' rather than to 'punish' him. We feel that to a great extent, if not even completely, 'Society' is responsible and that it has the duty to 'make good' the harm it has done to the poor lost soul.

To a certain extent this need is genuine compassion and a feeling of guilt from our side (who know how very little we have personally done to try and improve that society) but probably a much larger part is due to the feeling that - "There, but for the Grace of God, go I", a feeling of identification, of 'sympathy' with the criminal. It is this which makes us forget the fate of the victim, his dependants, his friends and his family, and see only the suffering of the murderer in the condemned cell leading to the popularity of such books as 'I Want to Live' and the blind denial of the clearly stated laws of the Bible, by 'Christian' agitators against the death sentence.

We do not see that, on that basis, it is even more logical to say that we do not have the right to ruin an

embezzler by taking away all he has and depriving him of his freedom by locking him up. He has not done that to anybody else, so we are demanding more than an eye for an eye!

All this is very logical and understandable but, on the other hand, we, as usual, want to eat our cake and keep it. We also do not want to feel that we are merely an accidental combination of environmental effects. We want to be a 'somebody'.

We may not want to have to be fully responsible for our evil, our weaknesses and our lies, but we want at least to deserve some praise for our good, our strength and our honesty, (otherwise there is very little satisfaction to be got out of them). Here then we find the root for the compulsion that many people have to believe, against all factual evidence, that men are not only born equal - but also essentially 'good'.

This opens the possibility for us to feel that we have kept at least a generous portion of that 'divine spark' alive in ourselves despite the continuous temptations of 'evil'.

We may not have been able to resist all of it. After all we are only 'human' and that is therefore forgivable. Nobody can be expected to be 'perfect' - but we have been strong enough to hold out to a considerable degree. From that standpoint then we can have pride in ourselves and afford to have understanding and pity on those who were not so 'strong'. We can afford to 'understand' them and to feel that we should try to 'help' rather than to 'punish'.

It is a remarkable demonstration of the effectiveness of wishful thinking that so few are able to see the complete fallacy of the argument. One cannot have it both ways.

Either that 'strength to resist' was given us at birth (or conception) or not.

If it has been given to us, God must have been a 'racist' because He has given us an ability which He has withheld from the others. Those others therefore have a 'ceiling' for which they are not responsible just as the Negro is not responsible for the colour of his skin.

If the 'strength' was not given at birth, it, like the 'evil' itself, is merely environmentally determined. It is nothing that we can be proud of. Thinking of Man as essentially good therefore makes no difference, it is the strength that one must have to remain good that counts and that has either been given or not.

The real Christian view that all men are born evil (which, for some reason, is overlooked by most Christian apologists for man) is much more logical. This at least gives 'kudos' to the man who overcomes it, even though that does not solve the problem for the environmentalist because here again, the ability to overcome 'evil' would have to be either a product of the environment, or a gift, leaving the basic problem as it is.

It is obvious that, if we want to be honest with ourselves and really try to 'understand' (and not merely 'explain'), there is something here that we must face up to.

It is amusing to find how Science does an egg-dance here in trying to belittle 'heredity' as much as it can.

We have already seen how the inability of the Black African to 'see' a flat picture in three dimensions was 'explained' by Black culture being non-visual, despite the fact that Black graduates still suffered from the same disability after being exposed for all their lives to our visual culture.

A better example, because more 'scientific', can be found in Clifford T. Morgan's 'Introduction to Psychology' (p. 41).

After discussing the meaning of 'Intelligence', he reports that the highest correlation of the Intelligence

Quotients is between "identical twins who have identical heredity and almost identical environment". The correlation drops for "fraternal twins of the same sex who have about the same environment as identical twins but less similarity in heredity. This *indicates that heredity is a factor*. It drops again, however, from fraternal twins to siblings (brother and sister), who have about the same degree of hereditary similarity but less similarity in their environments. *This indicates that environment is a factor.*"

The italics are mine, to indicate the type of argument we have here. The fact that identical twins are not 100% correlated is already enough to show that 'Environment is a factor! Where siblings are of different sex they are sure to have a greater degree of hereditary dissimilarity than fraternal twins - so that the drop in correlation can be as well 'explained' by that.

Proceeding in this way, the correlation is shown to drop as the hereditary factor becomes more dissimilar between brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces - but, as the environmental factors also become different both are found to be factors.

In passing it is mentioned that "correlation for height is about the same as that for intelligence", but the importance of that finding is lost in the ensuing argument which brings the author to "Unfortunately, we cannot tell from such data which is the more important factor, if indeed either is; we can tell only that both are involved."

One can feel that the writer is here carefully avoiding the issue with his "if indeed either is."

This tendency becomes still more clear when the next 'study' is taken under review. Here twins who were separated at an early age are compared and the conclusion arrived at is: (p. 43) "We may therefore conclude that a relatively poor environment handicaps a person's intelligence quotient. It is interesting however that the correlation between the I.Q. of identical twins reared apart was .77. This is somewhat poorer than the .88 for identical twins reared together, but it is still better than that for fraternal twins and siblings reared together. Thus both heredity and environment are important in intelligence." (The non sequitur for the last sentence should be glaringly obvious.)

Critical analysis of this argument shows a 'neo-occidental block' against accepting the greater importance of heredity. In all the figures quoted, the hereditary factors give positive results. The environmental factors give 'some influence' results, but, as everywhere both have effect, both are considered to be 'important' and the 'if indeed either is more important' shows where the compulsive 'opinion' has been inserted into the 'scientific' argument.

When we finally realise that, in the definition of the concept 'Intelligence', as measured by the I.Q., the author says: (p. 41) "Intelligence is a general term conveying a person's abilities in a wide range of tasks involving vocabulary, numbers, problem solving, concepts and so on." We find that it is a foregone conclusion that the environment must have its effects on the intelligence quotients because a considerable part of it consists of abilities that can only be obtained from that environment.

If one twin grows up in an environment where people use language to express themselves and read books, while the other grows up in an environment where they merely grunt observations and instructions, the one will have a better 'vocabulary' without this indicating a superiority in his intelligence. If the one merely goes to school while the other also has a private tutor in mathematics (even though in all other respects they live in the same environment) the latter will be better able to handle numbers without being necessarily more intelligent. As a matter of fact, if he were not better, that would indicate something wrong with his hereditary abilities!

One must accept that the significant thing is not that different environments will produce different abilities but that despite this there is still such a fantastically high correlation between the twins reared in different

environments.

Actually the 'Intelligence' measured by these tests is largely an artificial concept which can only have validity among a group of individuals from an essentially homogeneous cultural background. On its sole basis, no 'savage' could ever be considered to be intelligent as he would miss our vocabulary, our arithmetic and our 'concepts'.

To say however that a savage who manages to live in the desert where all other human beings would die of hunger and thirst is unintelligent because he has not heard of Shakespeare, or because he splits his infinitives, is nonsense.

If we really want to distinguish between the influence of heredity and environment by such tests, we must, as has already to some extent been attempted, filter out those that depend for their material on environmental factors and subtract them from the total score.

Manifestly, for our problem we have to dig deeper and, as so often before, we have to find out what we are actually talking about.

Here it is good to start off with the simple example of the pruned and espalier'd peach trees.

If we take a few dozen peach trees all derived from the same parent tree or clone, they are actually the same individual, as much so, and more, as a pair of identical twins. If we plant one of them in a rocky place, another in good ground, irrigate one well, and leave the other dry, give some fertilizers and the others not, we will have the equivalent of the effect of physical environments. If next to these we have another set of trees treated in the same way, but prune them into arbitrary shapes, while a third set is regimented into an espalier according to the rules of the art, we would end up with a bewildering variety of trees - all different and yet -all of them would actually be the same tree: a beautiful example of the effects of environment on the 'individual'.

The question now is, what is the tree. Is it its shape, its size, the way its branches join or any of the characteristics which make those trees into 'different' individuals - or is it still the tree itself?

No matter what we do, those trees will never produce anything but peaches - large or small, juicy or dry. and all will not only be peaches, but even the same kind of peach. Whatever we do we can also never make them produce anything else but peach leaves. We may trim them into all kinds of shapes, stain them with dyes - do anything - but they still would be essentially the same leaves.

Finally, if we adjusted all the soils to be the same and stopped our 'environmental' interfering, they would all revert as near to the common norm as the after-effects of our earlier treatments would allow. If we used each of them as the source for a cutting for a new tree, the resultant orchard would be indistinguishable from one derived from the original mother tree.

This, image, although possibly somewhat drastic, contains all the elements of our problem.

If one has identical twins and teaches one arithmetic, the other not, one has two individuals with different abilities but they are essentially still 'identical'. If one teaches the one good manners and leaves the other in an uncultured environment. the one can go to dine with the Queen, where the other will be stopped at the gate, but they are still 'identical'.

If one now teaches the one 'morals', 'honesty' and 'thrift', the other the futility of being good, honest or thrifty - the result is strangely enough not so easily accepted. It is doubtful if it could be done. The possibility for that is based on the unrealised preconception that one can teach everybody everything. To teach 'honesty' and

'thrift' is however not at all as easy as teaching the A.B.C.. - and here we come to the root of the matter.

The essential point is not whether somebody can do arithmetic or is honest and thrifty - but if he can be taught to have or acquire these abilities and qualities. If a person does not have them, it does not mean anything. It may show no more than that his environment has not developed them in him. If he has them, it demonstrates that the potential to acquire them was born into him.

The difference between people is therefore not in what they have actually learnt, but in what they can learn. What people are may take a million different forms - like a huge exaggeration of what was to be found in our experimental orchard but all that is on the surface. Testing people for what they *are* does not tell very much about what they could be and is more or less a resumé of what the different environments did to them: the result of the prunings, the tyings back, the feeding, force-feeding, starvation and lack of trace elements, the irrigation, the temperatures and the droughts. We have to go deeper than that to find the 'tree' itself beyond its 'appearance'. the 'man' behind the one we see and talk to.

We can compare man with a gramophone record. It is true and without question that what we hear coming out of that must have been put into it by the 'environment' - but the quality of the music depends upon the quality of the record, upon what it can take in, and reproduce. The old cylinders of Edison's experimental efforts could barely hold a voice. The records of our youth could only take the middle frequencies while our present-day Hi-Fi records hold and reproduce them all with almost uncanny exactitude. The grooves of the records can be all over the record. or only in a narrow band, they can be absent in certain parts as in the records one buys at bargain prices. They can be perfectly cut. or produce a 'noise' of their own, they can sometimes take 3D music, where others can only take one vibration at a time.

To make the image complete we should define the 'man' so as to include not only the record but the whole process from the music coming from the orchestra into the microphone, the man who modulates and blends the sounds in the recording booth, the matrix, the stamps, the processing, the records themselves, the storing and finally the reproducing mechanism of our gramophone.

In this image the environment could have an effect on the self. It could teach us, or fail to teach us how to perfect and use our recording system, our adjustments of tonal values etc., etc.

What it cannot do is to supply us with other instruments, other materials and new machinery. That we have received at birth and with that we must do the best we can. Slovenly workmanship, unconscientious handling of material and machines will produce a bad reproduction from our loudspeakers even if we have the ideal equipment.

The essential point is however that it is extremely unlikely that all men have been given the same instrumentarium, to start off with. This we can deduce not only from what we see about us, but from the fact that it all must have started somewhere.

If we do not accept that there was, somewhere along the line, a sudden and individual creation of an 'individual man' with all his potentialities complete, that is, if, in common with modern Science, we believe that man has developed, either by slow evolution on the basis of the survival of the fittest (or the fit enough) or by small 'mutational' leaps that each had to be tested out for survival characteristics, there must also have been a gradual addition, piece by piece, of new machinery, recording apparatus, storing facilities, cross-referencing indexes, reproduction and editing machines together with a slow perfecting of the processes used.

If this is so then it would be foolish to suppose that this gradual perfection of machinery took place over all mankind and to the same degree, in every land and in all circumstances without showing in them.

We know that a large part of humanity has remained, as far as practical living is concerned, in the early and late Stone Age. To think that, without being used, these qualities and these mechanisms developed in them too, because of some metaphysical compulsion in nature to see to it that all men remained equal, potentially if not in practice, is certainly straining one's credulity too far, even though in Kroeber, for instance, that idea must have been present when he talked of the 'neolithic block'.

What must have happened and what, in fact, reading between the lines, we actually see happening, is that slowly and piece by piece, each mechanism and each new possibility was added to the whole. In this book we have restricted ourselves as much as possible to the faculty of making future images - of integrating the past, through the present, into a preview of the future. If we observe it closely, this has needed a whole series of new abilities and therefore the addition of differently functioning material to the brain of the original mere 'observer and rememberer'. To obtain a 'working model' of the future, there would for instance not only be the need to be a transposition of the images of the past into the future - but also the addition of a 'motor' to make those images move, a method of abstracting the essential qualities out of the derived images, and many more, not so obvious, but still necessary refinements.

But this is not all. There are, in general, still many more faculties and facets which all have to combine to make the world, as we see it, out of the material available.

It has been difficult to refrain from going into them more deeply, but that would have been losing sight of the object. Here we can afford to indicate just a few.

They are all around us and we can notice them from the fact that they are absent in some people, and sometimes developed to an extraordinary degree in others. These differences are even present in our own families.

It is, for instance, not to be doubted that some people just naturally juggle with numbers. We have the examples of the 'human computers' who, often with little schooling are able to out-calculate the average computer with ease, and we should realise that this means that they have a special quality in their brain which allows them to do that. It is logical to accept that this is not a kind of 'wart' growing in their Cerebrum, but a perfection in the instrument with which all of us do our calculations, although the methods may be different.

This perfection must be the final one in the gradient up from that present in those who somehow (although otherwise as 'intelligent' as the rest) cannot do 'sums' or certainly cannot do them without effort like others can.

We must therefore take it that each of us is born with his own calculating machine with its own maximum capacity. If we use it a lot and train it, we may bring it up to its own maximum possible perfection, but we will not be able to go beyond that. The saying of Jesus: "Which of you, by taking thought, can add one cubit to his stature?" is, in a way, true here also.

By the full functioning of an organ, one can bring it to its full functional capacity, but it cannot add new material to itself.

It is no use realising that one, for instance, 'should be able to draw that kind of conclusion directly'. It may be theoretically possible, one may even be able to see how it should work - but it will not materialise. For that one needs the functioning of an entirely different set of factors in the way of hormones and genes because such an addition would entail the growing of new cells and the establishment of new contacts which, as such, would not have anything to do with the electrochemical reactions going on elsewhere.

It is here that the word 'education' has its validity. 'E-duce', that is, to 'pull out' what is there. It is not a matter of 'putting in' that the educator does, but a 'bringing out'.

There is still the possibility of 'teaching', but that is giving the mind a set of 'tricks' by means of which it can arrive at results that others arrive at naturally. This 'taught material' never becomes a part of the personality. It is something like Samuel Johnson's 'dog walking on its hinder legs', which, like a 'woman's preaching' was "not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all."

We have another such series of abilities behind the phenomenon that there are people who have a 'photographic' memory, an almost perfect storing and reproduction of visual images.

We have also people with a 'perfect pitch' in their hearing for music and those who naturally can memorise the whole score of complicated symphonies so that they can pick out a wrong note played by an absent-minded third violinist. We have those who can translate the score of a concerto into its internally 'heard' musical equivalent, and from all these there is a descending scale down to the man who is completely tone deaf and cannot even be taught to 'hear' a simple melody or harmony.

All of us also know the people who have no sense of rhythm and cannot help stepping on our toes at a dance.

But we do not even need to look so far. Any school teacher knows that some children take easily to Geometry where they are complete 'duds' at languages and that others absorb words and grammar as if they had known them all along but cannot even find the first clue among the mysteries of Algebra, and so we can go on. Some instinctively draw good pictures, others can hardly draw a cube with a ruler

- and among the artistic again, we have those who excel in composition, others in caricatures. Some have a natural feel for colours, others draw outlines to perfection while still others have the gift of putting 'movement' into their sketches. All these qualities must mean that there are different worlds which they express.

It is only when we see these things as emanating from a non-material mind or soul, that we can think of them as not really meaning a basic difference in the personalities, but merely as different 'tastes' or even different 'abilities'.

With the knowledge that what we see and hear and produce is all a 'translation' of what happens in electrochemical events in the brain, it becomes necessary to accept that all of this means that each of us has a different instrumentarium, different equivalents of microphones, recording material and reproducing machinery.

With the addition of each new faculty or possibility in the history of the development of man, we can see the flowering forth of new civilisations, new ways of expressing the self, new tastes, new beauties - in short, the whole variegated kaleidoscope of human possibilities, both individual and national and racial, which history, anthropology, the arts, culture and science has to show us. The balancing of the one against the other, the interactions, the inhibitions, and discords produce endless variations on the theme of man and, as new refinements are added, we can always expect the appearance of more new types.

However - we must not overlook the important point here. If we accept the qualities and abilities are present in the physical structure of the brain, we have also to accept that these are formed at the behest of 'gene'-ruled physical development, and that therefore each new quality will only be present in the direct descendants of a gifted one, unless, somewhere else there is a similar 'sport'. The development and the spread of certain qualities must therefore be based upon a genetic spread, upon intermarriage and similar factors. This could be the subject for a thesis, but would be outside the scope of this book.

Here we can revert to our original statement that it is not so much what a man has learnt as what he can learn that will determine if he can fit himself fully into a specific environment.

When we now look at that environment, we find that it must be the sum, the expression of all the basic qualities of the individuals that build it up. The individuals make the environment and the environment makes the individuals to be as they are. thereby adding another carrier of that particular 'culture' or 'civilisation' to the whole.

In this we can realise that the basic qualities will be the constant factor that decides the overall pattern. If, as we have seen, the genetic factor determines the qualities, they will tend, more or less, to conform to a basic norm or average.

Just as different racial bodies have different physical characteristics that distinguish them, by and large, from other races, so we must accept that their inner qualities differ also. One knows that it has become an unsavoury thing to say that there are 'races', but that is flying in the face of evidence and of C. S. Coon who wrote "The Origin of Races." Even the most rabid anti-racist will be able to distinguish a Russian from a Red Indian, a Maya from a Dane and a Bushman from a Somali. It is true that the types merge into each other at the edges, but not half as smoothly as our neo-occidentals would like it to be. True, there are many Chinese that one could never distinguish from a Malay and many Malays that could live, unnoticed among a European population. There are Tamils that are indistinguishable from Negroes and Negroes that would pass muster as Arabs - but that does not mean that there is not a basic type for each which anyone with a bit of experience could not pick out unerringly.

It is again mere wishful thinking to believe that the difference is only on the surface, that all are the same inside. The very fact that they produce different ways of living together, show different ways of seeing things and that they react differently to similar situations indicates the presence of that inner difference. Each group therefore makes its own environment by the action and the reaction of the individual on the environment and the environment on the individual achieving a constantly 'balanced out' and correct mean for the whole group.

When we now ask ourselves the favourite question of the anti-racist, namely, what would happen if we took a negro child and let it grow up among the children of a white family, we should have the means to give the correct answer.

Naturally the child would grow up as a white child would, if *that white child had had the internal structure and equipment the negro child has.* (But only if in the surroundings where there was no prejudice whatever against the external appearance of the negro!)

The white environment would then fill the inborn abilities and qualities with its material and not with the material of a negro community. Nevertheless the ability to absorb the White material would be limited to that of the Negro mind and, as much of our material is based upon special qualities (such as long-futureddness, for instance). it would miss a great amount of what a White child, in its place, would absorb naturally, and almost instinctively.

It is therefore wishful thinking again to expect that there would be no difference at all except for the colour of the skin, even though it might need very acute analysis to pinpoint the differences.

Where it would emerge immediately would be when the community was placed under stress so that the particular characteristics of its citizens were forced to the surface.

It would be nice if we were only determined by our environment, but it is illogical to think that, where a bull terrier, brought up as a lapdog, will not only retain its exterior appearance, but its inner aggressive nature, this should not apply to human beings. If we take the above experiment out of its sentimental context of the little negro child growing up among its white 'brothers' and transfer it to two psychologically different black tribes (where even the external factor of 'being black' would not be operative) the result will not be so obvious, even to those who could not see it otherwise before.

Let us suppose that half the children of a specially aggressive Wakikuyu tribe were interchanged with half the children of a neighbouring, less aggressive Wakamba tribe - so that possibly only the wise men of the tribe knew that it was done. One imagines that it will have to be admitted that, in that case, although the Wakikuyu children would grow up fully integrated into the tribal structure of the Wakamba and the Wakamba children would grow up into fully-blooded Wakikuyu, there would be a very noticeable change in the nature of both tribes, the one becoming more aggressive and the other losing at least some of its trouble-making propensities.

As Konrad Lorenz points out in 'King Solomon's Ring', even after thousands of years of domestication and interbreeding, the 'Wolf and the 'Jackal' strain of dogs still plays a dominant role in the determination of their natures. Where the jackal is a solitary hunter, he can make friends with anyone, he has no sense of basic loyalty to anything in him. The wolf, being a member of a 'pack', has the basic need to have something to be loyal to, and he transfers this to his master.

To quote one sentence (p. 120): "Instead of the proud, manly, loyalty of the Lupus dog, which is far removed from obedience, the Aureus dog will grant you servitude which, day and night, by the hour and by the minute, awaits your command and even your slightest wish." (It is, in passing, gratifying to notice that Lorenz notices the difference between 'obedience' and 'loyalty', a thing that many people nowadays have lost sight of completely).

Lorenz's chapter on this subject makes fascinating reading, but for our purpose, we must ask ourselves why, if, as the theory of evolution tells (and as Science amply confirms every day), we are animals - why should we have lost this continuancy of hereditary, racially determined, personality characteristics. Why should it suddenly only be valid for our bodily characteristics? Why would our souls and our egos and our minds, suddenly have become equal, Eskimos, Balubas, Negritos, Norsemen, Singalese, Maori, and Majorcans?

Why, where we are physically so different and nearly as different in our attitudes, our ways of reacting, our tastes and our preferences, should all of us be one 'human' being inside - except for the fact that we do not like to think that God is a racist too, in that He definitely has not read the Declaration of Independence.

If however we accept that the basic structure of the races is different, inside as well as outside, (and that does not mean 'superior' or 'inferior', which is no more than another idea based upon the subconscious acceptance of the fact that our values are the ones by which the world and its peoples should be judged) - we also have to accept that the things we have described in the last four chapters are inevitable. A people, a race must revert to its own nature, just as the peach trees reverted to their own basic structure, once they were left alone.

There is nothing we can do about it except, by using force, keeping on gardening and pruning them back into the shape we think that they should be.

Each group of people, each race, each nation, yes even each group within that nation, cannot help but create an environment that is in accordance with, and an expression of, their inner characteristics.

We can only look on and see it happen in Africa.

We cannot help. We can only shake our heads in pity and understanding and there is little consolation in that we can understand what is happening.

It is however possible that, if this understanding could penetrate up (or down) to those who are manipulating the events from behind the scenes, they could be prevented from making things more difficult and painful than they already have to be.

APPENDIX II

Temporealisation and the Self

Embryology tells us that each individual goes through an abbreviated version of the development of its kind - from the single-celled inhabitant of the primeval deep up to the stage to which evolution is going to take him in his special case.

This can give rise to a collection of interesting ideas, but we will have to confine ourselves to realising that this means that growth, in the individual, is probably essentially a long series of genetically determined events, each 'step' changing into the next 'step' - and not a 'cell growing and multiplying itself according to a master plan'.

We go through the 'gilled fish' stage (without having a use for, or using, or even bringing the gills to a usable condition) - and the 'three-heart-chambered' amphibian stage. Our asymmetrical blood system can be traced back to the details of the symmetrical one of the earlier stages and such strange problems as that presented by the course of the Recurrent Laryngeal Nerve are entirely inexplicable in any other way than by accepting that such a derivation is, in actual fact true. On that basis, the nerve must loop down under the Aorta or the Subclavian Artery in the chest, before it comes up again to supply the vocal cords.

The somatic grouping of our organs into segments (already discovered by Goethe) the nerve supply of the Diaphragm from the upper Cervical nerves, and finally the so-called 'vestigial' organs like the Appendix and (otherwise non-functioning) skeletal muscles found in the 'right' places in some individuals - all of them indicate that the body is repeating a sequence of developments which it has learned by rote through the ages.

It is true that many intermediary steps seem to have disappeared - that short cuts are taken - and that the individual development is more like a 'précis' than a fully detailed exposition of the history of the race, but the sketchiness of the whole does not justify casting out the basic design (which in all cogent details is adequately visible) as being a spurious or merely incidental 'similarity'.

We may not like the implications, but scientific thinking should not find an 'inexplicable' aspect, to be a reason for neglecting a whole cornucopia of 'explained' facts that in that case would become inexplicable themselves.

It would therefore seem as if each of the 'steps' in the growth or development of the individual must be the equivalent of what was once the virtual end-point of the line at that time. From that point the individual of those days 'matured' into a viable entity. At that stage our ancestor, instead of 'maturing', went on to the next step before he again matured out with a new refinement, or a new better functioning characteristic in his make up.

If one tries to think out the full implications of this, one arrives at the rather amusing concept of seeing the origin of man as happening when an ape embryo lost the genetic influences that would have made it into the 'spitting image of its dad'. For this reason nature decided to get rid of it, but the mother somehow managed to keep the misbegotten little thing alive. One could make quite an interesting story about how the child learnt to use its brain in lieu of other faculties and eventually started off on producing the race of man which, as Professor de Vries pointed out is the nearest of all to the 'embryonal' form common to nearly all mammals.

The human baby is far behind even that of the ape, whose I.Q. at that stage is much higher, and whose primitive 'animal understanding' of its environment is already practically complete when the human child still lies on its back, sucking its thumb and looking up at the ceiling.

Taking a report from C. T. Morgan in 'Introduction to Psychology' we read of an experiment done by 'Kellogg and Kellogg' (p. 39): "A nine month old boy, named Donald, and a seven month old female chimpanzee, named Gua, were brought up together like brother and sister. The experimenters made every effort to treat the ape and the child exactly alike and gave them the same chance to practice different kinds of behaviors, like standing, walking, opening doors, eating with a spoon, and learning to use the toilet. Of course, the difference in heredity between the boy and the chimpanzee is tremendous, so the experiment gives us a chance to see how much this difference can be overcome by training.

"As we might expect, Gua, the chimpanzee, developed certain kinds of behaviors earlier than Donald, the boy. The Chimpanzee has about one third the life span of man and matures much earlier. In the beginning of the experiment, Gua was better than Donald in such things as standing and walking. Gua also learned to use the spoon sooner than Donald and developed the capacity to respond to verbal instructions earlier. But after 9 months, when the study was ended, Donald had caught up on almost everything except strength and he was beginning to develop capacities such as language that Gua showed no signs of developing." That was in 1933. In 1951 another couple named Hayes tried again (p. 40):

"A childless couple took a newborn chimpanzee into their home and reared it as they would a child. Their idea was that the ape might learn to talk if it were treated exactly like a human baby and given all the love and attention possible. After almost 3 years, however, although Vicki, the chimpanzee, could occasionally use the words 'mamma', 'pappa', and 'cup' meaningfully, it had not developed its linguistic skills any more than that."

One cannot help but lift an eyebrow over the word 'meaningfully' here. One suspects a large measure of wishful thinking in the 'Childless' couple who must have learnt to love the animal that had become their 'child'. One has seen the same kind of thing only too often in the pathetic parents who have learnt to love their little imbecile.

It will be noticed however that this was 'Genesis' all over again. Before learning to talk, the human child is an animal - and not even a very good animal as animals go. It also has no future sense, reacts only to its surrounding present and can, at best, manipulate that present on the basis of its limited past experience and instincts.

The child, like Adam, however has been given the potential ability to speak - and, like Adam, in learning to name things and actions and finally the qualities of things and actions, the time must come that it eats from the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. By being able to name ideas, it learns to handle them more easily. They obtain a kind of existence of their own for him and that existence is, almost necessarily, projected into the future.

It must not be forgotten however that it is not the making of certain sounds but the 'ability to name' which is important here, as is shown by the chimpanzee experiments.

The Chimpanzees could simply not learn to talk - they did not have the required cerebral organ for it.

To say that 'learning to talk gave their ideas a kind of an existence of their own' is even then really also putting the cart before the horse. We can see that 'learning to talk' is the result of the child developing a better organ for the storage of images in its brain. 'Speech' one can then see as the outward symptom of the functioning of the storage which has developed a filing system. 'Words' are, after all, nothing but the file headings' of the newly opened library - but it is the 'library' and not the 'headings' which is important.

It is this 'organised filing system', this 'library' which the chimpanzee does not develop because it is not in his genetic pattern and, for that reason he not only does not learn to talk - he never learns to 'think', because, not having localised file-headings, he never learns to make even the most simple 'abstractions' out of his

perceived material.

At the time the human child begins to talk, it has made the next step and has left the 'animal' behind. Never again will it know the full blessings of peace. Things have not only acquired names, but meanings and implications, and meanings and implications always stretch into the future. It has eaten of the fruit and the gates of paradise have closed behind it. In a mere two years it has done, what took our ancestors thousands of generations to accomplish because, in it, the library now grows into immediate completion ready for being filled where, in the primeval days, it took generations to add a few cells, one or two at a time.

From here on the children of all the human races grow up more or less in parallel. In the beginning all of them are extremely short-futured and, in regard to this, it is interesting to note a passage (also from C. T. Morgan) quoting in quite another context, a description by Bettelheim. of the personality regressions observed in the Dachau and Buchenwald camps during the Nazi reign (p. 137). "The prisoners lived, like children, only in the immediate present - they became unable to plan for the future or to give up immediate pleasure satisfactions to gain greater ones in the near future ... They were boastful, telling tales about what they had accomplished in their former lives, or how they succeeded in cheating foremen or guards, and how they sabotaged their work.

"Like children, they felt not at all set back or ashamed when it became known that they had lied about their prowess."

Besides the rather unexpected insight and confirmation of what we have written about short-futured people, their equation with children is fairly true, although quite uninhibited boasting and lying is not a really child-like characteristic.

At this stage of development, there is an interesting point to mention for, although all children show short-futured characteristics, those of our race show an aggressiveness and naughtiness such as is rarely found among the children of other races. It is as if they, during this period of their lives, show us a foreshortened version of the troubled times in Europe when we were still short-futured barbarians ourselves! This may be a bit of whimsical fancy, but nevertheless it is true that both the typical Negro child and the Oriental child is very much more gentle and well-behaved and instinctively obedient children in a world of grown-ups in which they are not yet well enough at home to have any opinions or authority. Like the average Communist citizen, they respect the world of the 'rulers' and ask only to be left in a corner in which to play after they have done their 'work' and their 'duty'.

Where (in the 'detrribalised' locations and the slums of our big cities) the grown-ups manifestly lack standing and authority, the children of other races show that they also are basically no more 'naturally good' than our own. In consequence we have the 'tsotsi's', the 'black hooligans' and the 'gangs' of children there too.

It will be noticed however that state-forms seem to be already contained in the families of the people themselves and how here also, the child is father of the man. The complete submission to authority of the Blacks, the uncomplaining submission to authority by the Orientals and the Russians, and the restless, trouble-making, know all, attitude of the 'Democratic' nations who have to make some provision for legal interference by the individual citizen in the ruling of the State, all seem to be there - a most interesting theme to ponder on.

The next 'step' takes place at puberty where the long-futured ones finally leave their short-futured brothers behind.

This is not so very apparent in the young of the very long-futured ones in whom that long-futured quality is more abstract and impersonal - theoretically absorbed and slowly accepted as the need to make a living arises, and the individual becomes one of the community.

It is among the basically short-futured Western people (where the long-futured character is a later addition, and where it somehow has a more direct and personal application and reality) - that it shows itself most markedly.

It is natural that this sense for the future should become particularly insistent at puberty, as it is then that the individual becomes a 'creature of the future'. With the ability to procreate and to start off new lives, the world in which they will grow up becomes more important - but it is not only that.

In both the African and the European youth, this is the time when the young male starts throwing his weight about - like the young buck who begins to test out his horns and his butting abilities in readiness for whatever 'battle of the sexes' his culture may contain - while the female begins perfecting her allurements.

Among the young Western males however, soon after the initial stages, we find, among a certain number of them, the arrival of a tendency to ponder more and more deeply - to ask for why's and wherefore's - to see infinite meaning in the most ordinary everyday occurrences - to talk of 'Love', not as a mere prelude to the sexual act, but as something that is completely out of this world, the upper forms of the high-schools and the lower layers of the Universities, in which these adolescents are concentrated, are full of young men filled to the brim with ideas and ideals about 'Justice', 'Human Rights', 'Eternity' and 'Meanings'; young men obsessed by the intention to make the world better, to devote themselves to the service of mankind, or some other idealistic project - and if they do think of personal glory and power it is always a glory and a power in the service and to the betterment of something that is higher and more glorious than they are themselves. Art and Politics and Love and Idealism form the subject of endless discussion in bedrooms, commonrooms, cafés and street corners. This is the time of life of 'Sturm und Drang' and 'Das Leiden des Jungen Werthers' - the time when the implications of living in an infinite Universe and in an Eternity of Time occur to the erstwhile short-futured minds of the Young Western man.

Such things trouble his female counterpart much less. They do not trouble his African equivalent at all. And in the way he eventually solves his problem and finds his balance, the future man is laid down.

If we look closely this is determined for the Western man by where he finds his ultimate 'evaluator'.

This 'evaluator' is typical and almost exclusive for the average 'Western' man. At first sight it might seem that this could indicate that there is a deeper difference between him and all the others than a mere question of the length of his 'realised' future.

It will however be found that the truth is more subtle.

The real 'long-futured' man, like the Russian and the Chinese has his 'evaluator' too, but there it is common to all - impersonal and rooted in eternity. It is the typical Western man who, with the degree of temporalisation differing from individual to individual, has to have an 'evaluator' tailored to his own size, as it were; hence the multiplicity of 'evaluators' and 'human types' among us compared to the much greater homogeneity of the others.

As said earlier on, the long-term life view tends to deny the 'present' importance, where the short-term life does not even know the meaning of the concept of 'importance' itself.

The Western man, in accepting his available stretch of future as 'important', but still holding on to his present as the actual centre of his life, finds himself facing the necessity of defining what, in the future, is for him going to determine the 'importance' and the values of the things of today.

The strange effect of this is that, where the basic human being evaluates things naturally, and in relation to himself and to the pleasures and the uses he can get out of them, Western man has the need to have a value

himself and, in a way, a 'sponsor': - that is, a value or valuator according to which or whom he himself is valuable or has value, or at least is 'worthwhile'. The Western man is in the position that he must have a value to something else, and one can realise that, to the others, that must seem silly - and why.

The Western man must have an 'evaluator' - some personality, some ideal, some belief, or even a concept that he has made up for himself for the purpose of serving as the basis, not only of the value of the person himself, but also by implication of most of the values of everything in his life.

There is no end to the variations which the shape and the nature of this evaluator can take, from that of a beloved person, a ruler, a religion, a state, and even such a vague thing as Science where a man may think the world well lost for a chance to serve it.

It is true that many of these also serve as a kind of evaluator in other communities, but there they are the communal evaluators and their values are absolute so that dissenters become 'heretics' and 'outlaws' who usually do not survive over-long.

Among Western men, each individual tends to have one (or more) of these evaluators to serve as a guiding line for living and a backbone to his self-respect. Far from wishing to exterminate dissenters, he often needs them to make his own values real.

Here we need only think of the 'High-brow' lovers of music who look down upon those who swoon about the 'popular' kind. The 'High-brows' find their personal evaluation in being part of the specially civilised élite that appreciate 'great music' (although they may have trouble in distinguishing a minor from a major third). One can imagine that these people would be very disturbed if suddenly everyone became interested and knowledgeable about Music with a capital W. It is likely that, in that case, they soon would be looking down upon anybody who admitted a harmonic chord to be 'musical' at all, just as modern 'Art Lovers' have come to the point where their evaluator does not permit them to have even apart of a 'great work of art' look anything like the original.

In most of these things there is this 'evaluator' at work, directly or indirectly. Living in a world where things are valued - we too must have a value and, as we cannot really conceive of a fully valid evaluator, we make one up.

We find value in 'public opinion', thinking that where 'everybody thinks so' there must be some value in it. Public acclaim, fame and glory, therefore will have values for us. Political power too, where having power over others convinces us of our own importance (rather than from what we actually get out of it), may serve the same purpose. We may also find it in the possession of riches, for it is easy to transpose the 'possession of values' into the 'having a value' by transferring the value of the possessed to the possessor. (Which may lead to such curious conditions as that of the old lady of my acquaintance who could not sing a note, but who was amazingly proud of the fact that she had a champion song-bird in a cage!).

In some cases the 'evaluator' is completely and totally artificial, such as that of 'belonging to the upper 400, 500 or whatever number there happens to be at any particular moment'. The membership of this group is not necessarily based upon either ability, hereditary rank, culture or good manners, nor even on the possession of riches. It is amusing to realise why this is so. The given conditions would make the group either into a 'racist' group who believed that some people are born better and more worthy than others (hereditary rank), or it would have to be a 'snob' group of some kind or other (riches and/or culture). To be really select, such a group has itself to be above all that and it has come up with the fantastically simple solution that, in order to belong to it, one has to do and be no more than to 'belong'!

There is really no end to the variations on the theme of the 'evaluator'. One can even build one's life upon being able, in principle, to look down on everybody else - or conversely, to consider oneself the meanest

human being who finds it an honour to look up to everybody else. Again one can find one's self-respect in being the man who can open and swallow the most oysters in ten minutes flat. It simply does not matter. Some people push a peanut from one town to another to prove it, if not to others, then at least to themselves.

Also behind this we find the reason why the Western People are almost the only ones who indulge in really competitive sports to the exclusion of all else. It may seem strange to us that this is so. Sports are to us so obviously competitive that we do not even realise that they need not be, certainly not in that they must lead to the selection of a 'champion'. The short-futured compete until they lose interest, the too long-futured again see no special value in being a 'champion'. It can be realised, although possibly not appreciated, that for the very long-futured there is no real difference between a 'Winner' and a 'Champion'.

An interesting book could be written about all this, as there is a very definite structure here, a hierarchy of 'evaluators' which one can arrange into four 'levels' with positive and negative extremes at the end of each series, but we must leave that for the reader to explore. Here we are concerned with why the Western people have the need for an 'evaluator'.

The answer is not difficult to find, although not very pleasant in its implications.

Having once fixed one's 'evaluator', one need only look at that and have no further doubts about the rest. One has only to be worthy in relation to it in order to feel safe and worthwhile - or at least not entirely meaningless - a speck of dust whirled out into the winds of time - no more.

During the days of his 'Sturm und Drang' the adolescent finds his strength in the nature of his 'evaluator', the young woman does not have this trouble to any similar degree. Finding hers now would merely cause trouble later on. Usually she 'suspends judgement' and finally selects as her 'evaluator' an exaggeration of that of the man of her choice. One wonders how many readers remember Aldous Huxley's 'Two or Three Graces' in which the heroine went through several of these variations.

Another facet of this is the rather special value our forefathers attached to 'work', which often amounts to idolatry. As Carlyle wrote: "Older than all preached Gospels was this unpreached, inarticulate but ineradicable, forever-enduring Gospel: 'Work, and therein have wellbeing'."

The reason one finds again in Voltaire's *Candide*, "Work keeps the three great evils Boredom, Vice and Need, at bay." That work keeps need and vice away is common to all people of the world, but 'boredom' results from 'having nothing to do' and is a blessing for every human being except a Western one. The Oriental, the African Black and the South and Middle American does not get bored when he has nothing to do. He appreciates and properly enjoys the windfall. The Westerner is promptly gripped with a twinge of conscience. He should be doing something and therefore the moments do not pass happily - they are being 'wasted', gone, for ever, never to return - while at the same time the mind has nothing to serve as a barrier between it and the emptiness beyond.

Besides creating the need for an evaluator and its variations, the 'Future sense' still has numerous other influences on the details of our life.

We have already mentioned that a long-future sense may lead to the possibility of hearing melodies better while a short-futured person, with a good ear for music, will tend to the construction of complicated harmonies as in the Negro spirituals.

Temporealisation will also not only help or harm us in life and its appreciation; it will play a deciding role in our choice of work and in our assessment of others and their ways of acting and reacting.

Very important too is what it will do to our love affairs; in how far it will allow us to follow up a momentary

attraction before being reminded of the lasting implications of the things we are doing or intending to do. But not only in that obvious aspect of 'love' does temporealisation find its effect.

Sex itself, the physical part of it is a 'now' thing. Whatever grand words we spill on its etherealisation, it remains basically apart of our futureless 'animal' life and the word 'animal' is here not meant in any derogatory sense.

When, in the act, the future images interfere with the present, when what is going to happen mixes with what is happening now, it can eventuate that the subject will find himself in the position of the man who, with his girl-friend, occupied a 'honeymoon' compartment in a train with another couple. He was most unpleasantly disturbed by what happened to him when he heard what was going on in the upper bunk before he could catch up.

Sex is not only a thing of the moment. It is a thing of the instant, disturbed by any after-thought, but especially by any forethought, both of the pleasures and the pains to be expected, and much sexual incompatibility and unhappiness will, on analysis, be found to root in this simple cause of pre-realisation. The full understanding of this may help the sufferer more than a year of psychoanalysis.

Speaking of psychoanalysis, one can suspect that also in the domain of mental illness, temporealisation must be playing a much more important role than has been imagined.

Worry occurs when the sensed future, (that is the future stretch that is felt to be integrated into the present) extends beyond where there is the present ability to handle or rule it adequately.

When this happens, doom lowers out of its crevices and its 'empty spaces', and over all an ever darkening thunder-cloud spreads its threatening pall.

The subject may think that he is worrying about specific things which he can pinpoint and discuss, but it will be found that, in the majority of cases, he will react to an outside attack on their validity by emotionally defending them; and, more often than not, when one has finally convinced such a person that his worry is foolish, he will drop it - and come up with another to take its place.

These people worry - but what they worry about is of secondary importance. The mind rationalises the worry by giving it a name and a shape - and unhappily - in the average life such names and such shapes are only too easy to find. Finally, if the stock runs low, there is always the atom bomb.

This worry can, in pathological cases, get out of hand to such an extent that 'present' life is immobilised so that the 'mental depressive' needs institutionalisation.

On the other hand, if a mind accustomed to need a certain amount of concern about the future, suddenly finds itself without any future at all. one can well imagine that it will start throwing its images, that were erstwhile so pompously and impressively meaningful, around like balloons at a Mardi Gras.

There will be a sense of infinite relief and happiness at the lifting of the weight, because - without a future, we are so much nearer back to the paradise we lost in the beginning.

As these conditions (especially the depressive) are most likely to be found among the basically long-futured; it is not to be wondered at that they are practically absent among the Black African inmates of our institutions.

Lately an occasional Bantu depressive case is found - but all of them are 'educated' ones and here one can

again feel that it is the beginning of the understanding of the long-futured requirements necessary for one who wishes to succeed in a western civilisation (in any other way than as a politician) - which is the cause here. As said, worry comes when the sensed future extends beyond the present ability to handle it. It is therefore the relative and not the actual depth of future which causes the trouble.

Among the black Africans, the different forms of Schizophrenia are more common and this 'disease', as any one who has observed them, must have felt, is a 'present' condition of the mind. Here it is neither concerned with the future, nor with the past - it is completely enmeshed in the disintegration which has occurred, (or which it has allowed to occur) in the orderly arrangement of the present. With all humility, it is suggested that it might not be without profit for the psychiatrist to examine the possibilities and implications of the effect of the different degrees of temporealisation on the validity, acuity, sense of reality and the obliteration of mental images, with which such a mind has to work, rather than to start with the image of his own 'normal' world as being something that must have been disturbed by the influences of 'complexes' and 'engrams' due to earlier frustrations and shocks. It may be that these strange compulsions are brought about by having been scared by a dog, or by a 'nigger in the woodpile', or because one's parents did not love one in the special way in which one expected it from them, but most of us have had these kinds of experiences, and have come out reasonably 'sane'. One would suggest that, before the haystack can burn there must be a haystack. The match of the arsonist is only instrumental.

There must be an underlying factor: and the form in which the mind clothes the 'complex' and the material it uses for its images may be of the same nature as the choice of the 'subject' about which the worried worries.

The, cures by psychoanalysis etc., might be a case parallel to that of the factory which called in some efficiency experts to find out why the productivity of its women workers was going down. The experts found to their surprise that whatever changes they made in the routine, up or down, sideways or back to from where they started, at every change there was an improvement in the work -from which it took them quite a time to come to the discovery that the active factor was that someone was taking notice of them! The girls suddenly found that they had become important!

There is no doubt that worry can be fought by voluntary shortening of the future span. although this is, surprisingly, not anywhere near as easy as one would expect. A definite effort of the will, sustained over a definite period, is necessary to have any appreciable affect.

From worry one can move on to 'ulcers' the occupational disease of the 'long-futured' planning executive who may not always be as long-futured as the work demands of him. Here there is an interesting point for there is a tribe in the South of India, which is very prone to gastric ulcers. The scientists who examined this problem came to the conclusion that this was due to the special diet on which they lived but it might be worthwhile, if someone could re-examine the material to see if that tribe possibly has not developed an extra-long future sense which its members are not equipped to handle properly.

Many tribes must be living on similar diets without developing such 'civilised' things as 'ulcers'!

The number. of ways in which one can see that the degree of temporealisation that people have affects their lives is well-nigh endless, but we must stop for fear of destroying our argument by trying to prove too much. It is a bad habit of those who have a new idea, to tend to find instances of it everywhere and we will content ourselves with leaving it to others who, more experienced in their several fields, may wish to try out the basic idea. They will be better able to judge in how far it fits the circumstances, in how far it provides a more direct and acceptable explanation (or not.) than the ones that are current at present.

We will end this book, by taking a look at the 'old man'.

As time passes and the span of days that is left to him shortens, the 'past-present-future' sense becomes more and more valid for him, together with a corresponding diminution in the active reality of the 'now'. With that

the gift of 'memorising easily' diminishes in proportion. If the old man observes himself carefully, he will notice that the present foreground of his vision and attention, slowly, but surely fades into the background of the overall image of existing. The present does not stand out so much anymore and hence does not leave such deeply engraved memory images as it used to do.

His localisation in time also becomes less clear because he actually lives in an undetermined stretch of it, where it is not so important as to where exactly it is in touch with the 'present'.

Time itself seems to pass faster and faster for, although he may 'do' as much and more than he used to do when he was younger, a larger and larger part of that has become 'automatic' and more or less subconscious. Then, when he comes back and looks at the clock or the calendar, a rather disturbing amount of time seems to have slipped by unnoticed.

He also finds it more and more difficult to remain interested in the little things of the day. The chatter and 'nonsense' of children and young people irritate him with their inanity. Parties and short-future amusements, lose their meaning and interest, not because he has become a 'curmudgeon' who hates to see other people being happy, but because they have, to him, become a waste of time where, paradoxically, he now wastes it by doing nothing whenever he can find the time to spare to do that.

Finally he comes to the stage where the things of today slip by without leaving more than a trace in his memory. The memories of long ago, that have been etched into the basic pattern of his mind in his early days, become clearer and clearer because that is where he now really lives.

The old man leaves the present and withdraws into the time from which he originally sprung.

Epilogue

A wise man -I can no longer remember who it was - once said: "Nothing is entirely true - and that is possibly even true of this statement in itself."

One is well aware that the almost limitless material that had to be covered in this book could not be adequately discussed in full detail and from every aspect. Had that been attempted most chapters would have had to be expanded, each into a small library of monographs. To bring the concept home however, it was necessary to indicate its widespread ramifications and implications - and that only seemed possible by producing what is essentially a 'line drawing', a 'cartoon', possibly a 'caricature' if one wishes to call it so.

From here on it will be up to the critics and the specialists to take the material to pieces and to test those pieces for individual validity in the light of the whole. What were necessarily sweeping statements and generalisations here will have to be vetted, filled in and completed. But in doing this it should be remembered that an incorrectly stated or incorrectly seen detail does not affect the validity of the whole which is a new vista, a new arrangement of facts giving unexpected insights and an (admittedly not always pleasant) understanding of something that, up to now, seemed to be a mere chaos of apparently unrelated and incomprehensible, so-called 'human' reactions and illogicalities in regard to reality.

There is one point however that must still be faced

One can hardly expect anything else than that the currently so very 'dirty' word of 'racism' will attach itself to this work and stain it, in the eyes of many of its readers, down to its deepest fibres, with disgusting and 'unnatural' implications. Listening to the world today one could legitimately deduce that 'racism' is a worse crime than homosexuality.

In actual fact however 'racism' has been the natural reaction of all human beings to each other until Hitler with his 'Aryan Supermen' and his 'Belsen camps' drew attention to it and made us all lift our hands in horror at the thought of being 'Nazis' or 'Supermen'. In doing so we go to the other extreme and refuse to look facts in the face. We refuse among other things to read what is being written all over Africa in letters of blood and horribly inarticulate suffering.

Our motto is that of Jiminy Cricket: "Wishing will make it so."

'Racism' however does not really deny the difference among races. It centres on the emotionally loaded and hair-triggered concept of 'Superiority'. This question of implied 'superiority' is completely beside the point. It presupposes a valid standard of values according to which this 'superiority' should and can be judged equally for all men.

In this we Europeans (or Westerners) present the ludicrous spectacle of arrogating to ourselves the right to declare our personal scale of values to be the one according to which the nations of the world shall be weighed, thereby denying our own premise of all men being basically equal!

What we actually mean is that all men can be equal to us, the supermen - if they will only allow us to teach them!

If one takes that standard to be valid, our white 'racism' is probably correct for the people make the civilisations in which they live and not the civilisations the people. A people that produces a 'superior' civilisation must be a 'superior' people.

If one takes it that it is 'superior' to be a 'Slave of Industry', labouring at a repetitive, in itself senseless, task

in a factory or an office pulling levers or filling in endless forms - instead of wresting a living from mother nature - then we are superior.

If it is taken that it is 'superior' to live the kind of lives sketched out in 'Peyton Place', in A Cat on a Hot Tin Roof', and in the works of Tennessee Williams, or if one finds pleasure and essentially 'human' values in them, rather than in a fully organised and in itself completely regulated and therefore 'moral' (although taboo-ridden) tribal life then we are superior.

If it is in any conceivable way 'superior' to fly in an aeroplane rather than to ride on a water buffalo, or to take three baths a day instead of to anoint one's body with grease, then we are superior.

If Tammany Hall, political mudslinging and parliamentary chicanery represents a 'superior' way of life to having a demi-god in whom one believes, as the absolute head of state - then racism is justified in its tenets.

If it is 'superior' to worry, day and night, about tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow instead of following the advice of Jesus and leaving it to Fate or to God - then we are doubtlessly superior.

The black man however has the full right to deny us the privilege of fixing the norms and the ideals - and in Africa itself he is telling the world in no uncertain fashion that 'Black Racism' is the obvious and only solution to all his problems. The black man has the right to invert all the above statements. And who, but we ourselves, can contradict him?

It is not a question of 'superiority' at all but of who shall decide what is to be 'superior' in a given community. And there, 'Might is Right', decides the issue.

It has always been so and in the foreseeable future it will remain like that, whatever our wishful thinking may tell us.

There is no doubt that men are different even if we cannot agree on the exact definitions of 'race' and 'genus'. That difference exists not only between individuals but also, in the aggregate, between the races as a whole, just as it exists between their physical characteristics.

Nevertheless, all men are equal before God, but only He will, in the final accounting, decide - or know - who has been 'superior' and who not. It is not for us to say.

As to this book, to quote another wise man whose name I have forgotten: "The value of a book does not primarily rest in its contents - not even in how true it is - but in the degree to which it makes the reader think for himself."